국가균형발전정책은 중앙정부의 고유한 업무로 인식되어 있다. 과거에는 건설 교통부가 중심적 역할을 수행하였으나, 참여정부에 들어와서는 국가균형발전위 원회를 중심으로 건설교통부, 산업자원부, 재정경제부 등이 가세하여 범정부적 으로 추진되고 있다.
그러나 선진국을 보면 반드시 그런 것도 아니다. 스웨덴과 독일 등의 북유럽 국가들은 중앙정부의 간섭 없이도 지자체 스스로가 상부상조하는 시스템을 구축 하여 두고 있다. 우리와 유사하게 중앙집권적인 프랑스에는 낙후지역 지원을 위 한 레지옹(州)간불균형시정기금(FCDR)이라는 기금이 설치되어 있는데, 기금의 재원은 전액 일드프랑스를 비롯한 부유한 지자체의 출연금에 의존한다.
본 연구에서 제안된 국가균형발전특별회계의 신규 재원들은 모두 수도권 지자 체 및 주민들의 동의 없이는 실현되기 곤란한 것들이다. 지금과 같이 강력한 중 앙정부 주도형 국가균형발전정책 추진은 과도기적 현상이다. 행정중심복합도시 와 혁신도시 건설 등을 통하여 국토균형발전의 기반이 형성되면 국가균형발전을 위한 정책들도 점차적으로 분권화되어야 한다. 그 때를 대비하여 지금부터 지자 체 중심의 국가균형발전 시스템 구축작업에 착수하여야 할 것이다.
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http://lofin.mogaha.go.kr/
http://www.englandsrdas.com
3. 기타 목적세 S ․ U ․ M ․ M ․ A ․ R ․ Y
SUMMARY
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers for Balanced Regional Development
Dong-Woo Lee, Sang-Wook Kim, Youn-Hee Jeong
This study intends to present possible best way that can effectively support balanced regional development by intergovernmental fiscal transfer system.
Description of the current fiscal system for balanced regional development
Most local governments in Korea have troubles in executing regional development projects due to lack of tax revenue. For these local governments which have financial difficulties, Korean central government have three kinds of fiscal arrangement system: general grants, specific grants, and Special Accounts for Balanced Regional Development(SABRD). SABRD is a unique system of korea which has characteristics of general grants and specific grants at the same time.
The source of general grants is internal tax revenue of the central government, the amount of which is determined as a fixed proportion of 19.13 percent of internal taxes. General grants is to be distributed to
the local governments where the amount of own source revenue is insufficient to the required revenue. General grants function as a general revenue because the central government never limit its purpose or make terms on its expenditure. On the other hand, the amount of specific grants is not fixed and the expenditure is subject to designated purpose. SABRD has common feature with the general grants in that source of revenue is fixed and that it is to be allocated to local regions according to a fixed formula. However, it also belongs to the scope of specific grants because the expenditure is subject to its original dedicated purpose of the revenue.
The effects and the problems of fiscal transfer system to localities in terms of balanced regional development
This study examines possible best option in terms of various respects by intergovernmental fiscal transfer system. First option is an augmentation of general grants to localities. However, General grants to localities are mainly expended for the ordinary expenditure of local governments so it is difficult to function as a main source of regional development. Second option is an expansion of amount of specific grants.
Specific grants, however, has been perceived as a tool of the central government to control and monitor local governments. The last option is to enlarge SABRD. The purpose of the special accounts is to do financial support for balanced regional development effectively according to characteristics of each region and proper priority. It was introduced in 2005 but it already shows the problems in the rationale of the system.
The main problems are as follows: Firstly, There exists instability of tax income because main source revenue of the accounts which is alcohol beverage tax is fluctuated depending on economy situation. Secondly, the rationale between earmarked sources and expenditure for SABRD seem relatively irrelevant. About 53.5 percent of the revenue is from alcohol beverage tax and there is clearly no logical linkage why alcohol
3. 기타 목적세
Thirdly, There is too much reliance on the general accounts so it could easily result in inefficiency on executing of accounts.
International comparison of the fiscal transfer systems between governments
SABRD in korea is not found in the fiscal system of other countries.
In theory, main fiscal transfer systems are general grants and specific grants. Among these two systems, general grants are more designated for balanced development. Therefore we examined the general grants system of Japan, U.K., France, Sweden, Germany and Canada to see how the fiscal transfer system works in these countries. The vertical fiscal imbalance arrangement system between governments are employed in Japan, UK, and Canada as in Korea. As for the Swedish government has horizontal intergovernmental fiscal arrangement by transferring source revenue from rich regions to poor regions. France has employed horizontal arrangement fund(FCDR) in the basis of vertical arrangement system of fiscal imbalance. FCDR is collected from rich regions and distributed to poor regions. In Germany, vertical and horizontal fiscal arrangements have been managed together so that fiscal imbalance between regions is adjusted almost perfectly by these processes.
How to fund Special Account for Balanced Regional Development First option is collecting money from local governments such as Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi province to fund special account which is similar to FCDR in France. However, There should be an initiative from local governments themselves and it is essential to have communication between contributing regions and beneficial regions.
Second option is to introduce an earmarked tax for balanced regional development. In this study, however we propose surtax on current tax rather than employing new tax sources. We examined the rationale of principles: Polluter Pays Principle(PPP) and Beneficiary Pays Principle(BPP), assuming that adding balanced development tax means