Project Supervisors Rahimah Abdulrahim
Executive Director, The Habibie Center Hadi Kuntjara
Deputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center Managing Editor
Ray Hervandi
Thinking ASEAN Team A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi Askabea Fadhilla Fina Astriana Muhamad Arif Rahma Simamora Wirya Adiwena
A Note From the Editor Articles
Military Representation in the ASEAN Community: The Missing Equation in Regional Security Issues
After the Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea: A New Momentum for the Code of Conduct
EU’s Post-Brexit Expectations From Its Relations with ASEAN
Infographic: How the World
Reacts to the International Arbitral Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea
ASEAN Round-Up
Women Are a Potential Boost to the Region’s Economy
Brexit and the False Analogies with ASEAN
Timor-Leste Seeks Entry Into ASEAN Market
Contents
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A note from the editor
Dear readers:
Welcome to the August 2016 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!
This issue presents three articles written by young Indonesians who take a look at different issues important to Southeast Asia: the locus of the military in ASEAN, a new opportunity to push for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and ASEAN-European Union relations post-Brexit.
Maj. Yudi Ardian of the Indonesian Navy opens this month’s issue with a discussion on military
representation in the ASEAN Community. He argues that not bringing in military officers in discussions on security questions relevant to ASEAN member states makes little sense.
Muhammad Arif, Researcher at the ASEAN Studies program at the Habibie Center, makes an argument for another push to engage China on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in light of the recent Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. He points out how China’s response to the ruling provides an opening for renewed negotiations.
In the final article of this issue, Dr. Beginda Pakpahan of the University of Indonesia investigates how much the European Union expectations vis-à-vis ASEAN have changed post-Brexit. He sketches out the subtle changes and shows the way ASEAN can respond to those changes.
Our infographic section documents how the arbitral ruling has reverberated around the world.
Meanwhile, our news round-up section presents articles from regional media on the pink economy, a perspective from Southeast Asia on Brexit, and how Timor-Leste seeks access to the ASEAN market.
Please do not hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, suggestions or prospective submissions.
Happy reading!
Best regards from Jakarta
Ray Hervandi Managing Editor
Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.
The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.
Military Representation in the ASEAN Community:
The Missing Equation in Regional Security Issues
Indonesian frigate KRI Karel Satsuit Tubun.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Common.
Maj. Yudi Ardian is a commissioned officer in the Indonesian Navy. He is currently on assignment to study at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, as part of the first batch of the LPDP Presidential Scholarship. Opinions in this piece are his own.
The South China Sea dispute may well ignite the next conflict among states in the Indo-Pacific theater. The Arbitral Tribunal, part of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, has decided that the case of overlapping Philippine and Chinese claims over islands and features in the South China Sea do not comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially in regard to China’s claimed historic maritime boundaries. China claims the court has no jurisdiction over the issue.
Subsequently, an official press release emphasized China’s disagreement with the ruling: China will protect its national sovereignty that extends to the waters of the South China Sea. The official response also raises the possibility that China will impose an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea—similar to its bid for hegemony in the East Sea. At the 95th celebration of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping said China would safeguard its maritime sovereignty albeit in a peaceful manner. However, recent clashes in the South China Sea between China and other littoral countries have raised uncertainty as to how peaceful the disputes will turn out to be in the South China Sea. In a recent incident, the Indonesian Navy seized Chinese fishing boats within Indonesian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) but a Chinese Coastguard vessel forced the fishing boats free and claimed the area to be within China’s historic fishing grounds.
In international relations theory, realists believe that states will seek a balance of power and choose between balancing and bandwagoning with stronger states, as their search for security demands. It will be a challenge for ASEAN when member countries choose to align with the United States or yield to China vis-à-vis the South China Sea. In addition to the Philippines, which is a long-standing ally of the United States, Vietnam has announced it would welcome US presence on its territory. Meanwhile, other governments in the region, like Cambodia’s, support China’s position against the PCA ruling.
In such a polarizing context, ASEAN must be ready to resolve breakout of conflicts in the South China Sea. The grouping owes its international reputation to its role in promoting peaceful resolutions. National security issues in the region have been conducted in diplomacy and dialogues between high-level officers within the framework of mediation or consensus- based practices, rather than use of force. This is in accordance to Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter: ASEAN and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principle...non- interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States….”
As a result, however, the region has less to show when it comes to resolving conventional and non-conventional threats. Military cooperation in the form of joint patrols, coordinated patrols and joint exercises has proven less effective in countering external threats, be they China’s aggressive military action or US provocative maneuvers. Likewise, the Philippines’ slow response in liberating hostages—more recently Indonesians and Malaysians—taken by Abu Sayyaf shows military cooperation in the region has much ground to cover. The ASEAN Way of soft institutionalism and dialogues seemed ineffective in laying the foundations of an Indo-Pacific regional order thanks to the principles of non-interference as well as the non-use of military forces.
At the political level, there are number of defense and security concepts that ASEAN has started: the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN); the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC); the ASEAN Security Community (ASC);
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). More recently, ASEAN and China managed to sign the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea in 2002. Countries that sign the DOC agree to resolve the disputes peacefully, without use of violence and through negotiation. Nevertheless, ASEAN’s unwillingness to enforce these arrangements means these agreements and initiatives are often no more than ink on paper.
ASEAN’s ambivalence toward security and military cooperation leaves it open to the criticism that it really is a weak regional organization that lacks the means to influence strategic issues. What is worse this ambivalence also leaves countries facing security threats in the region to seek external powers to help them address the security issues.
ASEAN’s security stance evolved in this regard because the grouping refused to interfere in one another’s internal affairs and continues to reject multilateral military cooperation within its institutional framework. As one ASEAN foreign minister put it in 1997, “Non-interference in the affairs of another country was…the key factor as to why no military conflict had broken out between two member states since 1967.”1
However, the non-interference doctrine has not meant ASEAN members do keep an eye on their neighbors’ domestic power struggles. Military cooperation and agreements between ASEAN countries are based on bilateral understanding, and
ASEAN members have been open to provide assistance in helping fellow member countries counter threats to domestic stability. For example, Thailand and Malaysia agreed on the right to engage in cross-border military incursions in hot pursuit of communist guerrillas. Likewise, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have several bilateral border security arrangements against cross-border insurgencies, formal and informal extradition agreements, and a strict policy of not providing sanctuaries to rebels from neighboring states.
A more effective ASEAN at the tactical and operational levels would be helpful in garnering the regional cooperation necessary to counter security issues. Therefore, Colonel Bharat Tientongdee of the Royal Thai Army argues that ASEAN should consider forming, “an ASEAN Standby Force formed by the military and national security services of the member states would be an effective measure to accomplish this.” Regional collaborations on peace and security issues are the primary missing factor of the ASEAN equation.2
Military Representatives in ASEAN Organizations to
Bridge Security Initiatives and Military Cooperation Military cooperations among Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN initiatives on security questions have nothing to do with each other. Although the non-interference concept hampers developing such ties, regional military leaders still support each other and expect larger roles in the region, especially when dealing with Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).
The proposal to formalize an ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting (ACDFIM) to the ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Meeting (ACDFM) has moved forward only very slowly.
The aim is for the meeting to take place under the aegis of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) eventually. The latest ACDFIM meeting in 2016 focusing on “Promoting Defense Cooperation for a Dynamic ASEAN Community” welcomed combined exercises with Japan, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, India and Republic of Korea in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, counterterrorism and maritime security, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian mine action.
Running parallel to individual military efforts in informal cooperations and agreements, ASEAN member states have agreed to establish the ASEAN community in 2018 and consisting of three pillars. One of those is the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) that aims to seek peaceful resolution of issues based on the ASEAN Way. However, the APSC structural organization with regard to interoperability has clear weaknesses. Jones criticizes the APSC formation, arguing that ASEAN should only focus security cooperation in the existing bilateral—or at most trilateral—formats. This is because the absence of interoperability among the region’s armed forces, combined with suspicions about neighbors’
motivations and an unwillingness or inability to set up effective arrangements to cope with transnational challenges will be hindrances to creating a solid ASEAN security community.3
Therefore, ASEAN should try to solve the incomplete security equation by considering military representatives in its administrative organizations, especially the APSC, to assist peaceful ASEAN resolutions to regional conflicts, including the South China Sea disputes and other MOOTWs. Now, it is the right time for compiling those initiatives, cooperation and agreements under APSC.
The ASEAN community should consider military representatives in its organization structure as staffers who comprise mid- ranking military officers. These officers will work as military analysts, liaisons, advisors to the Secretary-General as well as for their respective services. They should have the task to compile all the security agreements, initiatives and evaluate those and ensure they conform to the ASEAN way.
The representation of military personnels of other states in a host country has been common in military cooperations and agreements in ASEAN now. For example, Singapore has been inviting a number of military officers to collaborate in its Information Fusion Center (IFC), with linkages to 65 agencies in 35 countries, and with 16 International Liaison Officers (ILOs) from 15 countries currently working in the IFC. The IFC has played a role in resolving various Maritime Security incidents.4 So, why does ASEAN not see this as an opportunity to improve interoperability among states especially on security? Military staff positions in ASEAN organizations will be able to give strategic advice, support, liaison and evaluate security policies, not to mention provide a sense of ownership of those security initiatives. A military contribution fulfills a vital missing part in the regional security equation. Representation of military personnel in APSC formations would probably be the out-of- the-box solution for military assistance, support, and advice regarding regional conflict not only in the South China Sea conflict but also for regional security issues.
In short, ASEAN as a regional forum should consider military presence in its administrative organizations. Military staff representatives in ASEAN are crucial to providing an overview of today’s security issues. They will able to analyze, liaise, coordinate with their own respective armed forces, and provide a bridge between ASEAN, external powers and domestic interests. Therefore, such a change in policy will be right not only at the political level but also at the operational as well as the tactical levels.
Endnotes
1. Acharya, Amitav. “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: “Security Community” or “Defence Community”?”
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 159-160.
See also Aisarieva. ASEAN and Security Institutions. 2012.
51-53.
2. Bharat Tientongdee. “ASEAN Standby Force: Taking Southeast Asia Security to the Next Level.” USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College,
Pennsylvania, 2013. Accessed August 1, 2016, 1. http://
www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a590240.pdf
3. Sheldon W. Simon. ASEAN and Its Security Offspring: Facing New Challenges. Monograph. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle Barracks Pa, August 2007. http://
www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA472107. Accessed August 1, 2016 via DTIC.
4. “IFC is regional Maritime Security (MARSEC) information- sharing centre. Inaugurated on 27 April 2009, it aims to facilitate information-sharing and collaboration between partners to enhance maritime security”. Information Fusion Center (IFC), “Fact Sheet: Information Fusion Centre” available at ; www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_
room/official_releases/nr/2014/apr/04apr14_nr/04apr14_
fs.html#.V1GKbzEyrU see also Prashanth Parameswaran,
“Singapore Calls for Global Action to Tackle Maritime Challenges”, TheDiplomat available at thediplomat.
com/2015/05/singapore-calls-for-global-plan-to-tackle- maritime-challenges/
After the Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea: A New Momentum for the Code of Conduct
Peace Palace, seat to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and International Court of Justice, at night.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
Muhammad Arif is Researcher at the Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies program.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) ruling on the Philippines v. China case is a blessing in disguise. While it might cause more uncertainty or, worse, escalate conflict in the region, the ruling can at the same time provide a new momentum for the negotiation of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. This betters the prospects of conflict management in the disputed waters.
In their analysis of the strategic choices available to China and the history of great powers’ relationship with international laws, commentators expect China to largely ignore the ruling and, likely, escalate tensions in the South China Sea. China, they say, may take “a very tough reaction,” “a more forceful response to solidify its claims,”
“reimposing a blockade of Filipino troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal,” or “undertaking reclamation work at Scarborough Shoal.”1
China’s immediate response to the ruling gave credence to these pessimistic scenarios. Beijing has called the ruling “null and void,” and President Xi Jinping said China’s “national sovereignty and marine rights and interests in the South China Sea will not be affected in any way by the ruling and case brought about by the Philippines.”2 The hardest blow was later launched by China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, who said that China could demarcate an air defense identification zone (ADIZ), similar to the one it introduced in the East China Sea in 2013, over the South China Sea if its security is threatened.3
However, the apparently gloomy strategic picture in the South China Sea after the tribunal decision overshadows the fact that the ruling actually provides an opportunity for regional powers to manage the disputes better. To see the bigger picture, we need to take a closer look at China’s arguments in refusing to participate in the arbitration proceedings and consequently reject the ruling.
In the note verbale China submitted in February 2013, the country made two basic points. First, China argues that territorial disputes over some islands and reefs in the Nansha (Spratly) Islands are at the core of the dispute between Beijing and Manila in the South China Sea. Thus, China claimed the PCA, which concerns itself with the interpretation and application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Second, and more importantly in this context, China accused that the Philippines of breaching the principles and spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Both governments are signatories to the DOC. In particular, Beijing protested Manila’s failure “to resolve … territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means … through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned.”
China further clarified its stance in the Position Paper that it submitted in December 2014 in which it claimed that, “with regard to all the disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea … the only means of settlement as agreed by the two sides is negotiations, to the exclusion of any other means.” The Chinese government further argued that, “as a member of the ASEAN and having been involved throughout the consultations on the DOC, the Philippines should have fully appreciated the significance of the DOC for the peaceful settlement of the disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations.” Furthermore, Beijing argued, “by initiating compulsory arbitration at this juncture, the Philippines is running counter to the common wish and joint efforts of China and the ASEAN member States.”
China, like the Philippines and other ASEAN member states, have long been involved in delaying strategy as far as the implementation of the DOC and the early conclusion of a more-binding Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea are concerned. Although the commitment is usually made in their meetings, the early conclusion of the COC, it seems, is just not in the immediate interest of ASEAN member states and China for various reasons. China generally dislikes the idea of a multilateral arrangement in the South China Sea. It tends to believe that such disputes are not an issue between China and ASEAN collectively as a regional institution, and thus they should be resolved bilaterally between China and the claimant states. Meanwhile, ASEAN has always found it challenging, if not impossible, to find a common and firm position on the issue of the South China Sea as a starting point to restart the multilateral negotiation with China.
The fact that China was ‘forced’ to cite the DOC as part its excuses to not participate in the arbitration proceedings is therefore a heart-warming development—surprising even.
ASEAN leaders should not waste this opportunity to reengage their Chinese counterparts. If China truly believes, as stated in its Position Paper, that “the DOC is an important instrument” that
“has played a positive role in maintaining stability in the South China Sea, and in enhancing maritime cooperation, building
trust and reducing misgivings between China and the ASEAN member states,” why should they not go back to the negotiation table and conclude the COC at the earliest opportunity?
The DOC/COC remains the best opportunity to at least maintain the status quo in the South China Sea and manage the disputes peacefully. The DOC is so far as close as ASEAN and China can get to a multilateral arrangement of dispute settlement mechanisms in the South China Sea. Given the difficulties to convince China that a multilateral approach is preferable to a bilateral one in managing the disputes, the speeding up of consultations on the COC should therefore be the highest priority now.
ASEAN member states should also take up this opportunity for another reason. As noted at the beginning of this piece, there is no sign whatsoever that China would slow down in the South China Sea, not to say completely abandon the area it deems as its “core strategic interest.” Although an ADIZ in the South China Sea remains a remote possibility at this point of time—it is simply unnecessary for China to drastically escalate the tension—China will likely continue carrying out its salami-slicing strategy by upgrading military facilities in areas it has already occupied. It is therefore in the interest of ASEAN member states to have the COC signed at the earliest opportunity, before China creates more facts on the ground and further reduces ASEAN member states’ strategic leverage.
As more and more warships, aircrafts and coast guard cutters are deployed in the South China Sea, the risk of miscalculation and conflict escalation will continue to grow. It is important to note that the COC, as a strategic document, needs to be complemented with more operational arrangements. ASEAN’s and China’s commitment to adhere to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is a good start. In the future, ASEAN and China should also consider regulating and standardising the use and rules of engagement of their respective coast guards.
As it is now, the strategic environment in the South China Sea after the PCA ruling might not be a calm and stable one. A careful look at the case, however, would reveal that there is still an opportunity, if unexpected, to reinforce stability in the region. ASEAN member states must be willing and ready to immediately reengage China and convince it to go back to the negotiation table and conclude the COC as soon as possible.
Endnotes
1. Jane Perlez, “Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea,” New York Times, 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling- philippines.html?_r=0; Gregory B. Poling, “Scarborough Shoal: The Next U.S.-China Showdown in the South China Sea,” The National Interest, 2016, http://nationalinterest.
org/blog/the-buzz/scarborough-shoal-the-next-us-china- showdown-the-south-china-15738; Lyle J. Morris, “The
Day After: The Fallout From the Philippines Arbitration Case Against China,” The National Interest, 2016, http://
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-day-after-the- fallout-the-philippines-arbitration-case-16795?page=2.
2. Kor Kian Beng, “China Rejects Ruling, Deems It Null and Void,” The Strait Times, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/
asia/china-rejects-ruling-deems-it-null-and-void.
3. Katie Hunt and Steven Jiang, “South China Sea: China May Establish Air Defense Zone after Losing Court Ruling,”
CNN, 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/13/asia/south- china-sea-ruling-reaction-adiz/.
EU’s Post-Brexit Expectations From Its Relations with ASEAN
Dr. Beginda Pakpahan is a political and economic analyst of global affairs at the University of Indonesia, Indonesia. He holds a doctorate in Politics and International Relations from the University of Edinburgh, the United Kingdom.
Canary Wharf, London’s financial district.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
Globalization has integrated various aspects of international relations, especially international cooperation. The level of interdependence has increased between regions in terms of political and economic relationships. The interdependence between the European Union (EU) and ASEAN has also increased since the beginning of the 2000s such that the EU is now the largest foreign investor in ASEAN and a significant donor for ASEAN developmental programs.
However, the EU has recently faced a new internal challenge since the United Kingdom (UK) decided it would exit the EU. On June 23, 2016, the British people voted to leave the EU with 52 percent of the voters expressing support for the idea. As I finished writing this article, the UK still has not notified the European Council of its intent to withdraw from the EU by citing Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. The UK’s exit from the EU may significantly affect UK-EU relations and the EU’s regional integration as a whole. Based on the interregional framework and the EU’s expectations of ASEAN, I argue that the EU-ASEAN relationship will not dramatically change because of the UK’s exit from the EU. However, this article will examine the EU’s subtly altered political and economic expectations from its contemporary ties with ASEAN.
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in November 2009, mentions the importance of interregional cooperation as an external EU policy and calls for the Union to cooperate with other regions based on universal principles: democracy, rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, appreciation of human dignity, equality and solidarity.1 The Lisbon Treaty has been the legal foundation of the EU’s external policy since 2010. All external relations departments in the European Commission and the Council of the EU have been integrated into the
European External Action Services (EEAS).2 The EU member states have appointed the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the leader of the EEAS who is responsible for dealing with the EU external policies.
The EU would like to enhance its capabilities and capacity to fulfill its global roles. The main goal of the Lisbon Treaty is to create a solid, coherent and effective voice for EU external policy to speak to and negotiate with other countries or regions.
The High Representative of CFSP/ESDP has several strategic priorities necessary to achieve a greater role for the EU in Southeast Asia. First, the EU wants to strengthen and improve its relationship with ASEAN in many aspects of cooperation from political to economic. Second, the EU wants to engage with other strategic partners in East Asia through the East Asia Summit (EAS). ASEAN is a creator of and a driving force for EAS.
Interregionalism is a potential way for countries or regional organizations to cooperate in the political, economic and social spheres. It develops institutionalized economic governance between countries or regions around the globe.3 According to Gilson, the definition of interregionalism is the interconnection of a region with other regions that exploits resources from two regional blocks recognized by global dynamics.4 Roloff has viewed interregionalism as a process of interaction between international regions in the three main aspects of cooperation:
the political, the economic, and the sociocultural.5 Rüland explains that interregionalism is a dialogue between two regions to exchange information and build cooperation through various contacts. This relationship is based on a minimal level of institutionalization because these two areas would become empowered through their own mutual support.6 I argue that interregionalism is the cooperation between different regional groups in the context of political, economic and socio-cultural elements.
Interregionalism is divided into two categories of relationships:
interregional and transregional. From the two categories above, the EU-ASEAN relationship represents the interregional relationship. Their relationship has officially started in March 1980. The relationship is based on a low level of institutionalization, which includes ministerial, senior officials, and working groups meetings in order to improve their political dialogue, economic co-operation and sociocultural ties. In interregionalism, most of main actors are government officials.7 However, the second relationship—transregionalism—has broadly involved various actors that also go beyond regional organizations, such as government officials, business community, activists and individuals. The examples of transregionalism are the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Transregionalism is supported by a business network and a common secretariat.8
Main expectations of the EU can be divided into economic and political hopes. The economic hopes of the EU are: First, the EU can create free trade agreements (FTAs) with every ASEAN country that shows interest in having further economic cooperation with the EU. The EU has bilateral FTAs with Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. It needs to revise slightly its bilateral FTAs with four individual ASEAN countries to exclude the UK from those agreements. In the future, the EU hopes that it and ASEAN can reach a region-to-region FTA when ASEAN will complete its own economic community. The economic relationship between the two regions has significantly risen in areas of trade and investment. The trade ties between the EU and ASEAN rose gradually from €178.5 million in 2013 (€179.7 million in 2014) to €201.5 million in 2015.9 The EU has also invested increasing capital in ASEAN countries, from €25 billion in 2008 to €192.7 billion in 2010.10
Second, the EU promotes its regional integration experience to ASEAN. Before the UK’s exit decision, the world saw the EU as a successful regional integration. The EU is an example of a deeper regional integration—a hard-core regionalism model—that has high institutionalized and integrated model of regionalism. ASEAN is an example of a solid intergovernmental cooperation—a soft-core regionalism—which has medium institutionalized and flexible model of regionalism.11 After the UK’s exit, the EU should rethink the way it projects its integration model toward ASEAN since they have different models of integration.
The political hopes of the EU are: First, the EU would like to strengthen the ASEAN Political and Security Community in order to support ASEAN countries for collectively preserving a peace, secure and stable Southeast Asia. Between 2005 and 2006, the EU and ASEAN had a political cooperation on the Aceh Monitoring Mission that monitored a peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement. Second, the EU would like to assist ASEAN to secure the international line in the Malacca Strait and the maritime arrangement in the South China Sea. Third, the EU would like to see democratic process and a political reform in Myanmar in a right direction. For example, the EU observed by-elections in April 2012. As a result from the by-elections, the EU lifted several sanctions except arms embargo against Myanmar. The recent election in Myanmar was carried out in a democratic manner. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory on Myanmar’s election last November 2015.
Htin Kyaw was elected by the Myanmar parliament as a new civilian president of Myanmar after decades of military rule.12 The EU hopes that Myanmar continues its political reform and economic freedom.
The latest developments in Southeast Asia and East Asia have pushed the EU to be more linked to ASEAN. The recent developments in these regions are: First, the crucial role of ASEAN is a focal point for supporting the regional cooperation
in the Southeast Asia region and for equalizing amongst various participated countries in the EAS. ASEAN is a driving factor in the process of evolution from EAS to the East Asian Community.
The EAS is now emerging as a strategic forum to develop a regional architecture of East Asia. It also has had complement with existing regional initiatives, such as: the ASEAN +3, ASEAN dialogue process, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC.
EAS can be an umbrella for all existing regional mechanisms with ASEAN as a center point of various regional arrangements in East Asia.
Second, there are changes in the power dynamics of the external actors in Southeast Asia. The existing and growing external actors have competed to maintain and expand their influence and engagement to the region, for example: the United States (US) and China. Recently, the South China Sea has emerged into a top issue for ASEAN, China, the US, and other regional players.
China, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam have territorial dispute over Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
China and the Philippines have claimed the Scarborough Shoal as their sovereign territory. In May 2012, both countries’ military vessels were face to face in the shoal because the Philippines’
navy arrested illegal fishing activities of Chinese fishermen.13 Then, China has started to explore the dispute area within the South China Sea between China and Vietnam. This has raised a tension between China and Vietnam. The Philippines and Vietnam have developed closer relationship with the US in order to balance China’s assertiveness on the South China Sea.
This situation may lead to the military competition between the US and China in Southeast Asia. In 2013, the Philippines filed its cases to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague after China claimed its sovereignty over the shoal. On July 12, 2016, PCA ruled in favor of the Philippines’ positions over the South China Sea and rejected China’s territorial ‘the nine-dash line’ claims over the sea. China has rejected PCA’s decisions and has maintained its claims over the disputed waters.14
Consequently, the close partnership between the EU and ASEAN would make easy for the EU to have an access in order to contribute in building confidence and strengthen good relationship with East Asian countries. The reason behind this is due to the importance role of ASEAN in the evolving regional architecture of EAS. In order to fulfill the entry requirement of EAS, the EU has acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia in 2012. This elevated the EU’s political and security engagement with ASEAN in order to foster their cooperation. The TAC has been amended by ASEAN in order to open the opportunity for regional organizations to access it.15
The EU has also gradually put more attention on the ARF where it may involve in the exchange ideas and confidence building on the issue of South China Sea. It can persuade ASEAN countries
and China through the ARF in order to support their solving territorial disputes based on peaceful way, such as they can refer the solution to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The EU wants to support ASEAN in order to preserve maritime safety, security and cooperation, freedom navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.16
The EU has given more weight of its development assistance in realizing the ASEAN Community. The EU has supported to the ASEAN Economic Community through specific programs for assisting regional economic integration, such as ASEAN Regional Integration Support by The EU (ARISE). The EU has assisted the ASEAN Political and Security Community through the Migration and Border Management Project and the improvement of maritime cooperation. The EU wants to support the development of regional network and cooperation amongst Border Management of ASEAN countries.
It also wants to assist ASEAN through capacity building of maritime security of ASEAN countries. The EU has supported to the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community through the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Initiative Facility (READI), such as the ASEAN Center for Biodiversity and EU-ASEAN READI activities. After the UK’s future exit, the EU may slightly adjust its development assistance for ASEAN because the UK’s contribution £12.9 billion (in 2015)17 to the next EU’s budgets will be missing. The other EU member states need to fill the gap of EU budget.
The EU views that there are significant developments have emerged in terms of geopolitical and geoeconomics situation in Southeast and East Asia. According to EU global strategy, these developments have pushed the EU policymakers to be more active than before in promoting the EU common political and economic interests toward ASEAN.18 Given changes in the power dynamics of the external actors in these regions, the EU understands that ASEAN has an important role in driving evolutionary process of regional architecture. The EU demonstrates its interest to closely link with the EAS by approaching ASEAN to improve its involvement in economic and political activities in South-East and East Asia. The EU has persuaded ASEAN to be linked to the EAS in order to enable the EU to gain access to other regional players in East Asia and to expand its influence over other regional players (e.g. the US, China, Japan, India, Russia, Australian and New Zealand).19 Given this reality, the EU hopes that its economic and political expectations will complement one another. The EU understands that a stable Southeast and East Asia will foster its commercial activities in these regions and inflow of its capitals to ASEAN and East Asian countries. The improvement of EU and ASEAN economic cooperation may mutually assist the economic growth in Europe, which is currently declining because of a slow-moving economic crisis. Their economic cooperation can expand market access and economic opportunities that may benefit both parties. The EU and ASEAN may foster their
political engagement to encourage constructive discussions on political reform in Myanmar, the capacity building in conflict management and resolution for ASEAN (e.g. the ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation) and maritime arrangements in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. Therefore, the UK’s exit from the EU does not give a significant effect to the EU-ASEAN relationships because the long existence of EU’s interregional framework with ASEAN and its expectations from its relationship with ASEAN.
Endnotes
1 European Union (2007) Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty, Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union C 306/10, 12 December, p.23.
2 Charter, D (2009) ‘Race to Form EU Foreign Office ‘Before Cameron Takes Power’, Times Newspaper, 11 December, p.48.
3 Aggarwal, V and Fogarty, E. A., (2004) Explaining Trends in The EU Interregionalism, in V. Aggarwal and E. Fogarty (eds) European Union Trade Strategies: Between Globalism and Regionalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 207.
4 Gilson, J., (2005) ‘New Inter-regionalism? The EU and East Asia’, European Integration, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 307-26.
5 Roloff, R., (2005) ‘Inter-Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective: State of the Art’ in H. Hänggi, R. Roloff, and J. Rüland (eds) Inter-regionalism and International Relations, London: Routledge.
6 Rüland, J., (2002a) ‘Inter- and Trans-regionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda’. National Europe Centre Paper No. 35, Workshop on ‘Asia-Pacific Studies in Australia and Europe: a research agenda for the future’, Australian National University (July), pp.3-4.
7 Rüland, J. (2002b). ‘The European Union as an Inter and Trans-regional Actor: Lessons for Global Governance From Europe’s Relations with Asia’, National Europe Centre Paper, No.13, paper presented at the conference on ‘The EU in International Affairs’, 3-4 July 2002, National Europe Centre, Australian National University, pp.2-3.
8 Ibid.
9 European Commission (2016) ‘European Union, Trade in Goods with ASEAN’, Brussels: DG for Trade, p.7. source:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/
tradoc_113471.pdf [Accessed 11 August 2016].
10 Khandekar, G (2015) Mapping EU-ASEAN relations, Agora and Fride, p. 10, source: http://fride.org/download/Mapping_
EU_ASEAN_Relations.pdf [Accessed 19 July 2016].
11 Pakpahan, B (2012) The EU’s Policy Development towards ASEAN from 2001 to 2009: Engaging with Their Dynamic
Relationship, PhD Thesis, p. 68, Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh.
12 Al Jazeera (2016) ‘Close Suu Kyi confidant elected Myanmar’s president’, 15 March, http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2016/03/close-suu-kyi-confidant-elected-myanmar- president-160315055816603.html [Accessed 11 August 2016].
13 BBC (2012) ‘China denies preparing war over South China Sea shoal’, 12 May, source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-18045383 [Accessed 11 August 2016].
14 BBC (2016) ‘South China Sea: Tribunal backs case against China brought by Philippines’, 12 July, source: http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-36771749 [Accessed 11 August 2016].
15 European Union (2012) ‘The EU accedes to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia’, Phnom Penh, 12 July, p. 1, source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131708.pdf [Accessed 11 August 2016].
16 Council of the EU (2016) ‘Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on Recent Developments in the South China Sea’, 11 March, source: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/11- hr-declaration-on-bealf-of-eu-recent-developments-south- china-sea/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utmmedium=email&u tm_+Representative+on+behalf+of+the+EU+on+Recent +Developments+in+the+South+China+Sea [Accessed 11 August 2016].
17 Kirkup, J (2016) ‘EU facts; how much does Britain pay to the EU budget?’, Telegraph 29 February, source:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/
eureferendum/12176663/EU-Facts-how-much-does- Britain-pay-to-the-EU-budget.html [Accessed 11 August 2016].
18 Council of the EU (2016) ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’, 28 June, p.38, source: http://eeas.europa.
eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf [Accessed 11 August 2016].
19 Pakpahan, B. 2012, op.cit pp. 205-206.
How the World Reacts to the International
Arbitral Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea
China
“China has always been resolute in upholding its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea... The development of the international law of the sea gave rise to the dispute between China and the Philippines over maritime delimitation... China maintains that peace and stability in the South China Sea should be jointly upheld by China and ASEAN Member States.”
Chinese MOFA’s Position Paper on the South China Sea
The Philippines
“In the meantime, we call on all those
concerned to exercise restraint and sobriety.
The Philippines strongly affirms its respect for this milestone decision as an important contribution to ongoing efforts in addressing disputes in the South China Sea. The decision upholds international law, particularly the 1982 UNCLOS.”
Statement of the Philippines’ Secretary of Foreign Affairs
...and the rest of the world
World cloud of statements from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand , Vietnam, Australia, India, European Union, Japan, and the United States of America, with omission of commonly used words, South China Sea, and International Tribunal Arbitration.
maritime
UNCLOS
declaration
work together
peacefully
exercise
1982
activities
threat
law
ASEAN
support
believes
Member
so ver eignty str ongl y selfr estraint accor dance respect decision dispute disputes
security or der cooperation con vention na vig atio n ov erflight legal stability
resolv e claimants final peaceful conduct rule for ce peace rights oceans
ASEAN ROUND-UP
Women Are a Potential Boost to the Region’s Economy
Bangkokpost.com, 3 August 2016
By most measures, the ASEAN region is an economic powerhouse.
It is the seventh largest economy in the world. Labour force expansion and productivity improvements drive GDP growth and the 10 member states are making impressive strides in both areas. Almost 60% of total growth since 1990 has come from sectors such as manufacturing, retail, telecommunications and transportation. But the evidence shows that the gains are not distributed fairly and to redress this, governments need to plan and implement policies that better promote inclusive, sustainable and fair growth.
Why it matters: The issue of low participation of women in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) should be resolved by the ASEAN Leaders. They need to ensure that women are able to get the same opportunity in the labor market, equal wage, and to have the same access to education. However, addressing this issue does not become a resposibility of the ASEAN Leaders but also their family, private sectors, and environment around them. Women’s participation is undoubtedly important for a more inclusive development in the region. By addresing this issue and promoting greater participation of women, the notion of inclusiveness in ASEAN can be realized.
Read more: http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/
opinion/1051597/women-are-a-potential-boost-to-the- regions-economy
Brexit and the False Analogies with ASEAN
Straitstimes.com, 3 August 2016
Governments, political-economic analysts and newspaper editorials all over the world reacted with alarm at the June 23 British referendum result for the United Kingdom to withdraw from the European Union. In Asia, the vote to exit from the most integrated regional organisation in the world sparked comparisons with Asean, often touted as the most successful regional organisation in Asia and the developing world. Many warned that regional integration had gone too far in Europe.
They noted that Asean should be careful with projects like the Asean Economic Community (which might aggravate economic inequalities) and the free movement of eight professions (which might raise fears of job losses).
Why it matters: ASEAN has its own way in creating its regional integration which is different with the way European Union (EU) does it. As such, comparing the two regional integrations will not be accurate. However, there are indeed some lesson learned that ASEAN can take from the EU, especially after the Brexit issue. One important lesson is ASEAN should be more active in providing information on the benefits of the regional integration to the people so that they become more aware of it.
Read more: http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/brexit- and-the-false-analogies-with-asean
Timor-Leste Seeks Entry Into ASEAN Market
The Jakarta Post, 3 August 2016
Timor Leste is keen to reap the potential benefits of tariff- free trade once it joins the ASEAN bloc, said the country’s commerce, industry and environment minister on Tuesday.
Constâncio Pinto told reporters that joining the ASEAN free trade area is a key reason the country is eager for the regional group to approve its membership application as soon as possible.
Why it matters: Half a decade on since Timor- Leste formally submitted its application for ASEAN membership, its fate remains uncertain. It is somewhat curious that a Timorese goverment minister should have to quote something he read in a newspaper about his country’s prospects for joining the regional grouping rather than citing more official sources. This would suggest that concerns over the lack of transparency and information over the application process remain true. One thing that is for certain however is that Dili’s enthusiasm for joining the regional grouping and making the most of the ASEAN free trade area is still strong.
Whilst the current ten ASEAN member-states appear slow to fully maximize the recently launched ASEAN Economic Community, perhaps they could learn a thing or two from Timor-Leste’s enthusiasm.
Read more: http://www.thejakartapost.com/
seasia/2016/08/03/timor-leste-seeks-entry-into-asean- market.html
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The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.
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The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.
The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.
Kanawa Island at the border of Komodo Islan, eastern part of Indonesia.
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