FROM THE EDITORS
Dear readers
The 2019 is coming to an end and the new year will be here soon! With emphasis on its romance and indulgence, new year might seem like a mere festive celebration. But underneath all of the sparkles and glitters, the new year carries special symbolisms that are intrinsic to all human beings: self-reflection and motivation. Therefore, on this special occasion, the ASEAN Insights Editorial Team would like to dedicate this edition to thepeople of ASEAN, who are consistently improving from time to time in building ASEAN identity and community.
We proudly present you four articles which highlight different aspects of ASEAN and its people. The first article by Muhadi Sugiono, explores the topic of the reiteration ASEAN Centrality. The second article is written by Annisa D. Amalia, in which she discusses human rights issues in Rohingya. The third article by Darang S.
Chandra talks about e-sport as a form of modern diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Lastly, Nurul Isnaeni in her article talks about ASEAN Smart Cities Network.
May 2020 bring new friendship, new cooperation, and new achievement for all of ASEAN people. Happy new year!
Sincerely yours,
Aisha R. Kusumasomantri Managing Editor
ASEAN Study Center
Department of International Relations
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Indonesia Nusantara 2 Building, 2nd Floor Depok, West Java - Indonesia Tel/Fax: +62 21 7873744 • email: aseanstudiescenter@ui.ac.id http://asc.fisip.ui.ac.id/?page_id=57
asean insights
asean insights is a monthly newsletter which aims to provide important insights
on ASEAN issues. The newsletter is published by ASEAN Study Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, with the support from the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN. The content of asean insights does not reflect the official opinion of the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN.
Mission of the
Republic of Korea
to ASEAN
Korean Mission Updates
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vol.2 no.10 december 2019 • asean insights
T he "Consultation Workshop on the Post-2020 AKCF Framework" was held at the ASEAN Secretariat on 12 December.
Ambassador Lim Sungnam thanked the ASEAN Secretariat and CPR for their generous support and cooperation for the successful 2019 ASEAN-Korea Commemorative Summit. He also reiterated that the AKCF had doubled its annual contribution to ASEAN from USD 7 million to 14 million from this year.
At the workshop today, diplomatic corps, academic teams, and the ASEAN Secretariat officers attended to exchange views for better utilization of the fund.
Consultation Workshop on the Post-
2020 AKCF
Framework
DECEMBER
2019
BOARD OF EDITORS
Edy Prasetyono
Evi Fitriani Hariyadi Wirawan
Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad
MANAGING EDITORAisha R. Kusumasomantri
FINANCIAL MANAGER
Yuni R. Intarti
LAYOUT & DESIGNIvan Sanjaya
SUPPORTING TEAMAkbar Renaldy CONTENTS
03 ASEAN Updates
06 Opinion
Rohingya: The Future of the ‘Excluded’ Community |
By Annisa D. Amalia
08 Youth Opinion
The ASEAN Way: Diplomacy a la ASEAN |
By Farhan Julianto, Yudi Iswara Sinatriya Adhyaksa &
Graciotto Van Handriyanto
12 Opinion
ASEAN Smart Cities Network: How Low Can It Go? | By Nurul Isnaeni
01 Korean Mission Updates
10 Opinion
Esports and Diplomacy in Southeast Asia | By Darang S. Chandra
14 Profile
Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN ASEAN Study Center
04 Opinion
ASEAN Centrality needs ASEAN identity | By Muhadi Sugiono
asean updates
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vol.2 no.10 december 2019 • asean insights Dec
2
Lao PDR’s National Day10
Dec Constitution Day (Thailand) Dec3
2019 AICHR Regional Dialogue onGender Perspective on Disability Rights Bangkok, Thailand
3-4
Dec
7th ASEAN-UN Workshop
Ha Noi, Viet Nam3-4
Dec 5th Regional Dialogue on Political- Security Cooperation (AURED V) Ha Noi, Viet Nam3-5
Dec 31st Meeting of the Coordinating Committee on Customs (CCC) Ha Noi, Viet Nam10-12
Dec 5th Task Force Meeting of the ASEAN Food Safety Regulatory Framework (AFSRF)
10-12
Dec 19th ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting on Minerals and Related Meeting
12th ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting on Minerals+3 (China, Japan, ROK) Consultations
7th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Minerals
Bangkok, Thailand
●
●
●
11-17
Dec ASEAN Students Exchange Program:
ASEP
Bangkok, Thailand
16-20
Dec 28th Pharmaceutical Product Working Group (PPWG) and its Related Meetings
Jakarta, Indonesia
27-31
Dec Participation of ASEAN Member States at the 27th National Children Science Congress (NCSC) 2019 India
Jakarta, Indonesia
Opinion
ASEAN Centrality needs ASEAN identity
T he reiteration of ASEAN centrality, as reflected in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo- Pacific adopted at the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok early this year, reflects ASEAN leaders’
concern over the role of ASEAN in the region.
An increased great power rivalry can turn the region into a playing-field and make ASEAN irrelevant. A more serious challenge to ASEAN’s relevance, however, comes from internal and not external. It is the lack of cohesion among its member countries, which has prevented ASEAN from playing an important role in the geopolitical development affecting the region.
Fragmented and contradictory responses of the ASEAN member countries to various issues such as the rise of China, the South China Sea disputes as well as the competition between China and the US clearly show this lack of cohesion. This lack of cohesion persists even as ASEAN has transformed itself from a simple international organization into a community of nations, that is, the ASEAN Community.
Why does ASEAN Community fail to bring about the cohesion of its members? The answer lies in the fact that the ASEAN Community is far from being a genuine community. A genuine
community is characterized more by social than instrumental relations among its members.
It is built upon mutual trust, responsiveness as well as confidence. All these characters of a genuine community seem to be absent in ASEAN Community. With the predominance of national interests in ASEAN, the relations among its members tend to be instrumental and not social. For its member countries, ASEAN is a means to pursue their political and economic interests. Consequently, competition, distrust, and suspicions also remain high despite the display of harmonious relations shown by its leaders in the ASEAN Summits.
A genuine community requires its members to develop solidarity and a sense of ‘we feeling.’ The presence of a collective identity is of significance for the development of a genuine community.
Self-identification with their community will
affect the way the community members pursue
their interests. As such, it does not only prevent
the interests of its members from conflicting
with one another, but it can also lead to the
development of common interests.
Opinion
T his month, the world celebrated the well- known Human Rights Day, which marked the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. Two months before, ASEAN also celebrated the 10
thyear of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. These two institutions have raised hope for human rights protection across Southeast Asia and the world. Still, they seem to have no significant impact onthe so-called
‘world’s most persecuted group’: Rohingya.
The oppression and persecution which have continuously taken place in the Rakhine state are nowhere heading towards an end. Nor the Myanmar government and its military group are held accountable for the prolonged structural violence—or if I may say genocide—which they have committed to the Rohingyas for decades.
ASEAN, as many observe, shows very little effort to take this matter into account. It has been widely criticized that ASEAN and all of its related human rights mechanisms have failed to protect one of its minority groups. In a series of ASEAN intergovernmental meetings, the Rohingya issue is hardly mentioned as a strategic issue that needs immediate solutions. In the last ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN leaders even avoided using the term ‘Rohingya’; ‘respecting’ Myanmar’s citizenship law which bans Rohingya as an ethnic
group. But why should human rights criminals be respected? And why is the de facto community in this region overlooked in the name of national sovereignty and non-interference principle?
The continuous reluctance of ASEAN to address the Rohingya issue as a humanitarian crisis is not only seen from the absence of conflict resolution strategies but also the lack of willingness to manage irregular migration from Rakhine to other countries in the region.
Even after the influx of Rohingya refugees to Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia in 2012, ASEAN and its member countries demonstrated a ‘benign neglect’ manner in dealing with this issue. They preferred to delegate the issue to the Bali Process mechanism, which called the phenomena as ‘Andaman sea crisis’ and the refugees as ‘boat people’, and highlighted the human trafficking and people smuggling aspects of the crisis—criminalizing instead of protecting the victims. Thus, many human rights groups, both international- and local-based, found and condemned ASEAN countries’ inhumane treatment to Rohingya refugees. Only three scenarios of the situation are possible for them:
being rejected at sea, being the ‘aliens’ in limbo, or being forced to ‘voluntary’ repatriate to the country which persecutes them.
Rohingya:
The Future of the
‘Excluded’ Community
Author
Annisa D. Amalia
Lecturer at the International Relations Department, Universitas Indonesia
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vol.2 no.10 december 2019 • asean insights
The condition of Rohingya refugees in many Southeast Asian countries is far from safe—if I cannot say worse than in Rakhine. They reside in countries thatare not parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, thus cannot grant them any legal status nor human rights provision. Many are trapped in detention centers, while few of them manage to obtain refugee status from UNHCR, and even fewer obtain resettlement places. However, the timely process of refugee application and limited protection offered in these countries often put refugees in an uncertain and vulnerable condition. They cannot pursue education nor seek employment opportunities.
As a result, they could not integrate with the local community. Not few of them eventually decided to pay people smugglers and sail the ocean to seek certainty, which most of the time creates more problems.
This systematic political exclusion of Rohingya admittedly indicates the slow progress of the ASEAN Community, which one of its visions is ‘improving the lives of its people…regional peace and security’. But we still have hope.
A recent study by Sandya Institute finds that although most refugees in Indonesia experience economic hardship—due to the high gap between income and expenses, they actually possess a varying degree of economic potentials, which will benefit both refugees and the local community if optimally realized. In Malaysia,
refugee communities are empowered through a series of informal education, workshops, and apprenticeships opportunities, which have paved theway for them to enter the job market.
This strategy can be well-performed by strong collaboration between civil society actors and the government.
It is surely not easy to replicate the strategy in
other Southeast Asian countries. It requires huge
structural change, especially in terms of asylum
policy and protection mechanisms. It also should
go hand in hand with ASEAN and its member
countries’ efforts to end the persecution in
Myanmar. But, as many suggest, Southeast Asia
has a lot of potential and capitals to make the
region a haven for the Rohingyas. It can emanate
as a leading example of human rights and
refugee protector, only if the government and
the people start seeing the Rohingyas as part of
the broader Southeast Asian community.
The ASEAN Way:
Diplomacy a la ASEAN
D efining The ASEAN Way
ASEAN, as a regional institution in Southeast Asia, has a specific diplomatic mechanism in addressing international issues among its members. It is called The ASEAN Way. Amitav Acharya defines the ASEAN Way as a priority claim by ASEAN countries regarding the mechanism of dispute resolution and regional cooperation to maintain regional peace and stability. The ASEAN Way has several main characteristics; (1) Consists of various Code of Conduct and decision-making processes based on consensus and consultation;
(2) Emphasizing on informal processes; (3) Every action needs to be based on the commitment of its member countries without binding agreements.
The ASEAN Way is related to the efforts of building regional identity. Acharya emphasizes that the ASEAN Way is a source for regional collective identity because it is non-hegemonic and promotes pluralistic leadership so that the formed regional identity can complement the national identity.
However, this also has some shortcomings. The ASEAN Way has only formed the identity of ASEAN as an organization, not regional collective identity.
The ASEAN Way also encourages multilateral cooperation based on consensus. Controversial issues will not be discussed in this model. This creates a non-threatening model so countries tend to work together. However, this also has its limitations. ASEAN member countries might still be suspicious of each other, and there are different agendas between member countries and ASEAN external partners.
The ASEAN Way in Multilateralism and Regional Identity Formation
The non-assertive and flexible ASEAN Way is, both principally and practically, different from the traditional multilateralism. Acharya observed that multilateralism in ASEAN cannot contribute to the welfare of the people or the regional order. In order for multilateralism to fully function, each party needs to resist the temptation to narrowly define their interest simply as a national interest.
Acharya sees that national interest and preference are the main determinants in economic cooperation in the region. The interest to protect the weak but politically important domestic sector hampers the support toward ambitious proposals such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Community.
Youth Opinion
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vol.2 no.10 december 2019 • asean insights
Acharya also argues that ASEAN’S gradualist, informal, and cautious approach raised doubts in its ability to provide practical solutions toward regional security issues. At the end of the day, bilateral approach both in terms of cooperation and problem solving are preferred due to it being more useful in advancing common interests in the region. All in all, the ASEAN Way’s nature and trait become the challenge toward achieving multilateralism.
Multilateralism is crucial in the formation of regional identity. Ironically, the ASEAN Way that is seen as a barrier in achieving multilateralism was intended to be the solution. Acharya argues that the development of a multilateral institution is a sociological and inter subjective dynamic instead of a formal legal one. Thus, it could be understood that the ASEAN Way is a cautious and highly deliberate way of creating cooperation and regional cooperation out of differentiating and sometimes contradicting interests. The ASEAN Way wasnever meant to fulfill the traditional definition of multilateralism;
instead, it is intended to directly create a common identity out of differences.
Effectiveness of the ASEAN Way on Enacting Response to Ongoing Regional Issues
With said challenges faced by ASEAN from its diplomatic mechanism, the effectiveness of the ASEAN Way could then be observed.
The integral norms of non-interfering and consensus-building, which supposedly become the distinctive elements of the ASEAN Way, would only paralyze and limit ASEAN's capability on enacting concrete response towards issues faced by its member states. The contradicting national interests among the member states, due to the diversity of socio-political dynamics in Southeast Asia, is a determining factor in
ASEAN's failure to specifically address ongoing issues in the region. Due to its consensus-building norm, ASEAN could only adopt laws that are agreed by all member states. This notion alone is a problematic requirement since it means that ASEAN could only adopt laws that intersect every member states' respective interests.
ASEAN is now limited to adapting less-binding treaties with a less contextual response for the sake of accommodating interests and respecting sovereignties of every member state.
Even if some issues, say, security or economy, were to be discussed, they still revolve on an extensive discussion without enacting actual, specific conduct. It could then be concluded that the ASEAN Way is more or less a satisfying mechanism to accommodate every member states' interests. However, the ASEAN Way is still relatively limited and ineffective for its capability as a diplomatic mechanism to react on ongoing issues within ASEAN itself.
References
Acharya, Amitav. “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building:
From ASEAN Way to Asia-Pacific Way?” The Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997).
Acharya, Amitav. “Multilateralism: Is There as Asia-Pacific Way?.” Analysis 8, no. 2 (1997).
Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order.
New York City: Routledge (2014).
Acharya, Amitav. “The Evolutions and Limitations of ASEAN Identity.” ASEAN@50 4(2017).
Emmers, Ralf. “Enduring Mistrust and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia: An Assessment of ASEAN as a Security Community.” Trans Regional National Studies of Southeast Asia. (2016).
Sharpe, Samuel. “An ASEAN Way to security cooperation in Southeast Asia?.” The Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (2003) Sheldon, Simon. "ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community." Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 264-92.
Author
Farhan Julianto,
Yudi Iswara Sinatriya Adhyaksa &
Graciotto Van Handriyanto
Student of Undergraduate Program Departement of
International Relations FISIP, Universitas Indonesia
Opinion
B
etween September 2-3, a boot camp featuring Evil Geniuses, a top Dota 2 team, was held in Singapore. It should be noted that the boot camp involved the national esports teams from Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, the first-ever multinational activity of its kind in Southeast Asia. A closer inspection of the event found that the participants stated that the boot camp’s goal is for closer regional collaboration and to grow the esports community within the Southeast Asian region. Why are those five esports teams, which will be competing for a medal event at the SEA Games 2019 in Manila, decided to sit and train together? Furthermore, what is esports, and how is it affecting the relations between countries in Southeast Asia?To understand the role of esports and diplomacy in Southeast Asia, we should first look at sports diplomacy. The presence of sports as a tool of diplomacy is not something new, as sports are generally accepted as a form of soft power. The US State Department mentions that “sports diplomacy uses the universal passion for sports as a way to transcend linguistic and socio cultural differences and bring people together”. Sports diplomacy itself is a subsection of public diplomacy which builds on trust and credibility and often works best with a loftyaim, such as building intercultural understanding in mind. Non-state actors, such as athletes, are often the best practitioners of this kind of diplomacy as they have more natural ways of engaging with their foreign counterparts, arouse less suspicion regarding their motives, and are not necessarily seen as acting at the behest of their government.
Esports come into play when talking about public diplomacy, especially in how different it is from
traditional sports. The most visible difference is the viewers, with esports enthusiasts who generally belong in much younger age groups compared to other sports. Studies conducted in the United States found that the median age of US esports viewers is 28 with 39% of the total audience in the 25-34 age range while other the median age of viewers of other sports are way older, e.g., 39 for international soccer, 42 for NBA (basketball), 57 for MLB (baseball), and 64 for PGA (golf). While there are no detailed studies on median age for esports viewers in Southeast Asia, by simply observing major esports tournaments in the region, one could say that most of the audience are also youths below 28 years old.
Apart from the much younger audience, esports also tend to build a loyal fanbase through online activities and non-stop contents. Actors in the esports industry create the environment for dedicated followings of their digital game competitions where fans keep up with tournament results and regularly watch competitions, as well as their favorite pro gamers and teams who stream their gameplay online. Esports is also enticing for both the audience and the athletes as esports prize pools keep on growing and even surpass some of the biggest prizes of traditional sporting events. As an example, the winner of Wimbledon 2019 receives $2.9 million while the winner of The International Dota 2 tournament in 2019 receives
$3.1 million. In fact, according to research firm Niko Partners, $161.3 million was distributed in pro esports prize money in 2018, up from $115.5 million in 2017, and during the first half of 2019, $74.0 million was distributed. Just mobile esports games generated
$15.3 billion in revenue, with $5.6 billion from China and another $450 million from Southeast Asia.
photo/unsplash: fabian-albert
Esports and Diplomacy
in Southeast Asia
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vol.2 no.10 december 2019 • asean insights Therefore, esports has the potential to fill the
gap of people-to-people diplomacy, with esports athletes, as well as fans and enthusiasts from within ASEAN members, becoming the “diplomats”. The popularity of esports athletes, sport-casters, and game reviewers who have millions of followings in social media could also be used as an indirect tool for intercultural communication and understanding between the people in ASEAN. Esports diplomacy could have a strong standing as at least 60% of all gamers in Southeast Asia are strongly drawn to esports (see Graph 1). The audience, the esports gamers, are numbered at around 180 million by 2019, as seen in Graph 2. By having these “diplomats” to compete, discuss, and create content that will be seen by hundreds of millions of youths in the region that play esports games, a more grassroots-focused connection between esports fans in the region can be generated.
The rise of multinational esports tournaments in Southeast Asia is also another way for the esports athletes to connect with their counterparts in the region. The Dota 2 boot camp in Singapore mentioned at the beginning of this article is a clear example of how esports can be utilized for strengthening the relations
between communities from different countries within ASEAN. Moreover, in some cases, regional esports tournaments are the only way for some esports athletes to travel outside of their countries and interact with their “neighbors”. The author saw the experience firsthand during the Garena World event in April 2019, with esports athletes from Indonesia and Myanmar acknowledging that the event was their first time traveling outside of their respective countries and interacting with athletes and fans who are not their compatriots.
With all the potentials as a tool for diplomacy, esports is an interesting case that governments need to focus on in the near future. Its ability to reach massive young viewers and act as a platform for intercultural exchange cannot be ignored. Reducing the negative images that most older people have about gaming in general and esports, in particular, would certainly be the hardest obstacle to tackle. However, the future seems to be bright as SEA Games’ inclusion of esports in the upcoming Manila 2019 games as well as its inclusion Asian Games 2022 in Hangzhou, China could be the staging grounds for more serious approach in using esports as a tool for diplomacy.
With the potential to target the younger audience who have loyal followings to the activities within the ecosystem, how do we see esports’ role in diplomacy in Southeast Asia, especially in relation to ASEAN? A study by ERIA found that although 87%
of the youths (represented by students) in ASEAN member countries are aware of the organization and its economic pillar, ‘many’ of them could not identify the other two pillars of ASEAN (political- security and socio cultural). The problem could lie in the reality that intra-ASEAN diplomacy is widely regarded as state-centrist and elitist.
Author
Darang S. Candra
Lecturer at the International Relations Department,
Universitas Indonesia
A
t the 32nd ASEAN Summit on 28 April 2018, the ASEAN Leaders established the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN). The ASCN is a collaborative platform where cities in ASEAN can broaden their regional outreach through exchanges of information and best practices in their development experiences, particularly in adopting smart technology to resolve various urban challenges and in pursuing global partnerships with various external partners to support the urban development agenda.So far, ASCN has embraced 26 cities representing 10 ASEAN member countries, as pilot projects. They are (1) Jakarta, (2) Makassar, and (3) Banyuwangi (representing Indonesia); (4) Bandar Seri Begawan and (5) Kota Kinabalu (representing Brunei Darussalam), (6) Bangkok, (7) Phuket, and (8) Chonburi (representing Thailand); (9) Manila, (10) Cebu City, and (11) Davao City (representing the Philippines); (12) Kuala Lumpur, (13) Johor Bahru, and (14) Kuching (representing Malaysia), (15) Yangon, (16) Nay Pyi Taw, and (17) Mandalay (representing Myanmar); (18) Vientiane and (19) Luang Prabang (representing Laos); (20) Battambang, (21) Siem Reap, and (22) Phnom Penh (representing Cambodia);
(23) Ho Chi Minh City, (24) Da Nang, and (25) Hanoi (representing Vietnam), and (26) Singapore.
The question is how we can appreciate ASCN’s significance and strategic implications for the future of ASEAN. There are three points of examination we can briefly discuss to answer this question, namely context, actor, and content. Firstly, the world today has been challenged by rapid urbanization. Around 50% of the total Asian population is currently estimated to live in urban areas (Arnold in INASIA, September 2016).
Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, cities are inhabited by a third of the total population of the region (McKinsey Global Institute, 2018: 2). Urbanization or urban sprawl has been considered as one of the mega sustainability forces that have challenged the world leaders from various sectors, including private business communities.
(see: WEF 2017, WBCSD 2013, www.conserve-energy- future.com)
Secondly, cities are the key players in the framework of ASCN because they are sub-national governments that are considered to have direct access to society as well as being the locus of most social change. Cities or city governments are believed to have very strategic values to manage the challenges of rapid urbanization.
The challenge is indeed a complex and sustainable social-political burden, but it is also intertwined with the city's constructive potential for regional growth.
According to McKinsey Global Institute (2008:2), Southeast Asia is becoming very dependent on the fate of its cities since they are able to drive more than two-thirds of the growth rate of regional GDP.
Opinion
ASEAN Smart Cities Network:
How Low Can It Go?
Author Nurul Isnaeni, Ph.D
Head of International Relations Department,
Universitas Indonesia
o/unsplash: shawn-ang
photo/unsplash: chuttersnap
Conversely, cities can also potentially become a burden of development if the flow of urbanization and urban growth cannot be controlled by good and effective governance. In fact, as a result, the potential for urban development crises can emerge along with the complexity of acute urban problems, such as poverty, crime, communal conflict, traffic congestion, and deteriorating environmental quality.
Today, even though it has become a "backbone"
for relatively high regional economic growth, the tendency of most cities in Southeast Asia, especially secondary cities with populations of 200,000 to 2,000,000, faces the complexity of growing urban problems. Some of these cities are even areas that are very sensitive to the effects of the phenomenon of climate change, especially floods and storms, which can result in the displacement of city residents and destroying the bases of business life. Therefore, the presence of smart cities that can incorporate digital technology and data management in the construction of infrastructure and public services is an urgent need for urban areas in ASEAN to become livable, sustainable, and productive.
Thirdly, ASCN aims to facilitate cooperation on smart cities development catalyze bankable projects with the private sector and secure funding and support from ASEAN’s external partners. Smart cities are believed to be able to bring an urban transformation, which is significant because not only they are able to overcome urban problems effectively, but theycan also improve the quality of life of the cities as a whole and increase the cities’ productivity to be more economically competitive. According to McKinsey Global Institute (2018:2-3), to produce a transformation, Smart Cities need to work in seven vital urban life domains, including economy, mobility, community, social infrastructure, utilities, built environment, and security with the support of strength information and technology (ICT) as a basis for infrastructure and public service management.
As an illustration of the smart cities’ strategic
meaning, based on the results of the McKinsey study (2018:11), at least six ASEAN member countries need productivity of 50-170% to be able to maintain their historical growth. These projections are more or less comparable to Indonesia's individual needs to increase six times the development of its infrastructure. In the utility sector, ASEAN also still has to spur the development of infrastructure and services that regulate the distribution of utilization of clean water, energy, and waste management, because for a metropolitan city as big as Jakarta alone, it is estimated that 96% of the population has no access to wastewater treatment facilities.
As concluding remarks, we would have said that ASCN seems to be very promising and prospective.
As the regional project initiated by Singapore as its ASEAN chairmanship, it is certain that Singapore takes the lead to promote ASCN at a regional level, as shown by the availability of Singapore to be the host for various workshops on smart cities. So far, ASCN has successfully established 33 partnershipsin order to address the opportunities and challenges posed by rapid urbanization and digitalization in the region. Despite its promising nature, ASCN still has to prove itself to become very relevant and beneficial for the ASEAN people. It is because although there is a high quantity of city leaders across the country and the region, they is still generally lack of capacity and capability in promoting and managing their foreign relations. Nevertheless, the biggest critical problem is probably inherent in the basic nature of the ASEAN itself, which tends to be very centralized to the national elites of its member countries since its establishment in 1967. Thus, to what extent ASEAN leaders can share their power to their cities’ leaders to do decentralization in managing their regional affairs is the real question.
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asean insights
The ASEAN Study Center Universitas Indonesia (ASC UI) is devoted to research and discussion on issues that pertain to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an institution and a process.
The Centre aims to provide inputs to ASEAN member states and ASEAN bodies on issues and events that call for collective ASEAN actions and responses, especially those pertinent to building the ASEAN Community. The ASC UI seeks to illuminate ways of promoting ASEAN’s purposes of political solidarity, economic integration and regional cooperation, and finding pragmatic solutions to the challenges on the path to achieving this.
Department of International Relations Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Indonesia Nusantara II Building, 2nd Floor Depok, West Java - Indonesia 16424 Tel/Fax: +62 21 7873744 email: aseanstudiescenter@ui.ac.id http://asc.fisip.ui.ac.id/?page_id=57 Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN
Sentral Senayan II, 23F. JL. Asia Afrika No.8, Gelora Bung Karno Jakarta - Indonesia 10270 Tel : +62 21 5795 1830 http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/asean-en/index.do
