ASEAN Insigh ASEAN issues.
and Political S from the Miss
From
Dear readers
Recent globa by one of ou potential to b would be the largest in 20 to accelerate ASEAN remai
This newslet Republic of K commentarie inaugural edi the challenge FISIP Univer Riefqi Muna regional secu from the W challenge to are personal from the com related to AS
Finally, we d development
Happy readin
hts is a monthly . The newsletter Sciences, Univer sion of the Repub
the Ed
,
al development ur contributors become a powe e world’s 7thlar 50. The implem e this trend. D in as series of q tter, supported Korea to ASEAN
es on the deve ition, we invited es faced by ASE rsitas Indonesi
from the Ind urity architectur World Bank exp be tackled by t and do not ne mmentaries, w
EAN.
do hope that th t of a more peac ng and enjoy AS
newsletter whic r is published by rsitas Indonesia, blic of Korea to
ditors
brings ASEAN in this edition, erful driver of g rgest economy mentation of AS Despite this gro
questions for th d by the gene N, is aiming at p elopment of AS d contributors f EAN. Edy Prase a, elaborated A donesian Institu re. On the econ plores ASEAN
the association ecessarily reflec we also provide
he insights in th ceful and prosp SEAN!
ch aims to provi y ASEAN Study C
, with the suppo ASEAN.
into global sp , ASEAN memb global economic with a potent SEAN Communi owing importa e general public erous hands o
roviding easy‐t SEAN to the g from different b tyono from the ASEAN’s tradit ute of Science nomic aspect, D members’ disp . Of course, the ct the view of t e a short upda
his newsletter erous region.
Shofwan
ide important in Center, Faculty o ort
otlight. As high ber countries h
c growth. Comb ial to become ty in 2015 is ex ance, many asp
c.
of the Mission to‐digest but in general public.
backgrounds to e ASEAN Study tional security (LIPI) looked ayu Nirma Amu parities as im e ideas presente
the institutions te of importan
may contribute
Managing Al Banna Choi
nsights on of Social
C
A Tr Is AS of in Di fo A Re Ko AS an Vi So Th Co AS De AS hlighted
ave the bined, it the 4th xpected pects of
of the sightful In this o look at Center, issues.
at the urwanti portant ed here s. Apart nt news
e to the
Editor, iruzzad
Board o Edy Pr
Evi F Bantart Managi Shofwan
Choi Financia Yuni Re Support Agus Catur A
Darang Sah
ontents
rticles raditional Securi
sues Facing ASE SEAN and the No f Regional Securi
Asia
issipating Dispar r ASEAN Econom
SEAN Update eviewing ASEAN orea Cooperatio SEAN Fights aga nd Terrorism
ietnam and Chin outh China Sea R hailand Turmoil oup
SEAN Defence M efence Cooperat SEAN Communit ASEAN
of Editors rasetyono Fitriani
o Bandoro
ing Editor n Al Banna iruzzad
al Manager eti Intarti ting Team Aryanto Putr hdana Candra
ity
EAN
otion
ity Architecture
rity: The Case mic Community
es N and South
n
inst Cybercrime
na Dispute over Raising Up
and Military
Ministers tion towards
ty 2015 Vol 1/June/
and Its Chall
ro a
1
4
7
11
e 11
11
12
12 /2014
enges
TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES FACING ASEAN | Edy Prasetyono 1
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been remarkably successful in managing inter‐state relations and in providing modalities for the engagement of external powers in the region. It has proven to be effective in building confidence and in preventing conflicts among the member states. The association has also been the driving force in the process of broader security and economic multilateralism in Asia Pacific such as the ARF, ASEAN+3, East Asian Summit, and the newly launched Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
It should be noted, however, that new developments in international relations have put Southeast Asian countries in the corner. Some have been able to make adjustments, while others have been constrained. Domestic factors, due to democratization process in some member states, come to the front that has to be taken into account in the foreign policy formulation. This has caused sensitivity in the member states’ interactions in dealing with
regional and bilateral issues such as border, environmental issues, illegalmigrants and human trafficking, and other issues. The second factor is the fact that traditional issues such as border conflicts, territorial claims, power projection would remain in the game. In addition to this, competition for energy resources, the safety of supply line, and maritime security will be at the top of security agenda shaping regional strategic configuration in the future. This has been demonstrated in recent developments of conflicts over the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Claimant states and external powers have taken more assertive approach to these territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Intra‐ASEAN Conflicts
ASEAN have been successful in promoting peace and stability in a region. Politically speaking, it has developed a set of norms and values
shaping the member states’ behavior towards the realization of ASEAN’s goal and objectives. No one believes that an open war would ever occur between ASEAN’s member states. The likelihood of accidental or inadvertent war arising between putative adversaries is extremely low (Fook Weng Loo, 2005). All of these norms for peaceful internal and external relationships have been laid down in Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN Charter, and ASEAN Community project with its operational implementation formulated in the plan of action and blue print of the community.
But, geopolitical disputes in the region rooted, in territorial claims and resource access, are present. In particular, many maritime boundaries in the region are ill‐defined, resulting in maritime territory and resources disputes. With the states increasingly being dependent upon sea routes and natural sources for their economic survival, especially energy sources, territory and borders become sensitive issues for many states in the region.
More crucially, with the increasing trans‐national threats and separatism and the need to protect natural resources, territorial issues have come to the front as important national security agenda, particularly as the region accommodates important sea routes and is located in a strategic position open to external interference (Prasetyono, 2007). Thus, in the new international environment, they signify two aspects: competition for natural, particularly energy resources and their importance for international trade route. It should be noted that the domestic sensitivity to the territorial disputes have been very high over the past few years.
Perhaps the sensitivity to geopolitical issues pertains to a traditional notion of sovereignty shaped by a deep‐
seated historical animosity and different perceptions of threat. This has been complicated further by the pervasive involvement of external powers in the region.
TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES FACING ASEAN
Edy Prasetyono
Royal Cambodian Navy officers observe flight quarters during a ship tour, 2011 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES FACING ASEAN | Edy Prasetyono 2
Lingering suspicions between sub‐
regional powers accountable for regional rivalries in the past continue to persist. Relations between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia might prove illuminating. Their relations have been undergoing ups and downs characterized by dynamic domestic factors revealing the history of Southeast Asian politics. A similar pattern can be seen in the relationship between the Burmese, the Thai, the Khmer, and Vietnamese beset by rivalries, animosity and suspicions.
Barry Buzan has rightly used the term security complex to describe this regional security in Southeast Asia (Buzan, 1988).
To a lesser extent, this also explains a particular degree of the logic behind the current trend of military modernization in the region, although it remains far from being labeled as a regional arms race. The case of Indonesia’s lost of Sipadan and Ligitan islands to Malaysia and the dispute over Ambalat water have created awareness among Indonesian defence establishments of the importance of on the outer islands and sea boundaries and the need to develop air and naval forces in the future. The perception that the importation of sands from Indonesia has been to enlarge Singapore’s territory affecting its border to Indonesia reflects such a geopolitical calculation. A notion of maritime and mainland Southeast Asia also underlines historical legacy of inter‐state relations which have shaped states’ perceptions in the region. It might be exacerbated further by imbalanced ASEAN connectivity with strong Chinese presence in mainland Southeast Asia. Geopolitical and geo‐
economic gap between mainland and maritime Southeast must be seriously taken into account by ASEAN in the future.
Relations with External Powers
From its inception, one of the basic ideas of the establishment of ASEAN is to find modalities for ASEAN’s relations with external powers. It has never been designed to exclude external powers from the region. Geo‐
strategic and geo‐political position of Southeast Asia has made it
unthinkable to close the region from the interests of major powers. This was a region central to the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and will remain so in the future strategic interaction of the major powers. With this geopolitical predicament, the countries in the region have always been caught in the middle way of making policy response by maintaining a balance between bilateralism and multilateralism with some adjustments where necessary and by preserving the degree of autonomy and sovereignty in their foreign policy.
ASEAN established the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a set of norms and values and code of conducts in states’ interactions. The TAC is thus the first political undertaking to build mutual confidence and trust and to prevent conflicts. Another set of norms, but more practical than political in nature, is the SEANWFZ which underlines ASEAN’s global commitment to nuclear non‐
proliferation regime in Southeast Asia.
It is true that economic crisis hit Southeast Asia severely causing dramatic political and regime changes in some countries. ASEAN, however, has recorded much progress in economic recovery. In fact, the crises served as a catalyst for a deeper economic integration of ASEAN member states. ASEAN also maintains its key role as the driving force for broader political and security cooperation and decided to move towards an ASEAN community and championed ASEAN Plus Three cooperation as an integral part of the process of East Asia community building.
In addition to that, the development in international trade shows more significance of sea routes of ASEAN countries for transportation services.
This trend gets stronger as international trade is now more dependent on sea transportation. The World Bank estimates that the international trade volume through sea will increase from 21,480 billion tons in 1999 to 35,000 billion tons in 2010 and to 41,000 billion tons in 2014 (Ghosh, 2004). As far as sea routes are concerned, Indonesia seems to have
been increasingly under pressures to open a west – east route of SLOC.
The relations among major states in the region are also directed by the scenario of how significant the maritime area is for their interests.
Aside from Japan and the United States, China will become more dependent on the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Ombai Wetar, and the northern area before reaching the South China Sea. Most of China’s oil import passes through these lanes, and this number will get higher because China will import more oil in the future. This means that China will become more dependent on the sea lanes in Southeast Asia, in particular Indonesia. Hence, China’s tendency to increase its power projection to Southeast Asia is inevitable.
For its interests in Southeast Asia, China has made significant progress.
China has signed FTAs with ASEAN and ASEAN individual countries. China also launched a soft face of diplomacy.
It published a defence white paper in response to criticism that China military lacked transparency. China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 and earned more goodwill in the region by acceding to the ASEAN TAC in 2003. To large extent, with all of these initiatives, China has succeeded in persuading ASEAN that China does not pose an immediate security threat.
But, it seems that China has not dispelled all suspicions that China as a great power could in the future dominate the region.
Another importance of Southeast Asia to China is that it crucial to Chinese strategy of promoting multi‐polarity, thus countering US rebalancing strategy. Thirdly, ASEAN is also potential ally in resisting the Western pressures on liberalization and human rights. Finally, Chinese approach to ASEAN would make it more difficult for Taiwan to strengthen its political ties with ASEAN. With all of these circumstances, it is in the heart of Chinese interests to negotiate with ASEAN on Code of Conduct in the South China Sea as it a litmus test for Chinese behavior towards ASEAN and the territorial disputes.
TRADITIO
The sa India w strateg security initiativ Chief becam the sig the A Peace, Prospe East A 2005. F South C Japan h assertiv many Historic connec Indian of com oil imp throug Southe econom econom China‐A Japan‐A Econom been operati countri Japan’s Japan’s upgrad Politica serve a In light remain region.
bilatera keep th has bee Asian c lost its the A Rebala underli its pre Brown, Deepa of the U the mo to repla there involve regiona East As On th
ONAL SECURIT
ame trend is b which sees ASE gic partner fo y interests.
ves have bee among these e summit‐leve ning of the TA ASEAN‐India
Progress, rity, and India sia Summit in Further, India h China Sea sinc has also been ve foreign p factors expla cally Southeas cting the Pa Ocean vital fo mmunications.
ort from the M h Southeast east Asia mically attra mic interests
ASEAN FTA, ASEAN mic Partnersh
involved i ions in S ies signifying s security ro s defence a ded to be a mi ally, Japan‐A
s a balance to t of these deve
s the import Its militar al alliances h he stability of t
en more pessi community bu interests in th ARF, the U ncing Asia Pa nes US guara esence in the , Adamson, w Ollapall, 2013 US is so import oment is ready ace it as the s
must be som e the US in t
al initiatives, sia Community he US side
TY ISSUES FA
being followe EAN as a pote or economic For that, s n taken by In e were the el partner in 2
AC, the signin Partnership
and Sh
a’s inclusion in n Kuala Lump has been prese
e 2002.
demonstratin policy. There aining this tr st Asia is a br acific Ocean
r Japan’s sea‐l Most of Japa Middle East pa
t Asian wa
will rem
active Japa . Being left Japan laun Comprehen ip. Japan has n peacekee Southeast A g an increa le in the reg gency has b nistry for defe ASEAN relat
China.
elopments, th tant actor in
y presence ave been abl the region. Wh mistic toward ilding and rece he effectivene US launched acific strategy
antee to main e region (Su with Mochizuki 3). Thus, if the tant that no on y and has cap stability guara me modalitie the various re particularly y (Wanandi, 20 it seems
ACING ASEAN
d by ential and some ndia.
India 2002, ng of for hared n the ur in ent in
ng its are rend.
ridge and anes nese asses aters.
main nese t by ched nsive also eping Asian asing gion.
been ence.
tions
e US the and e to hile it East ently ss of d a that ntain utter, and e role ne at acity ntor, s to ecent the 007).
that
reb new reg by Vie Con To Firs pos cap effe dis two inst fro Thi the reg pra inte con cen reg reg Jap US adr ass effe reg are ope lan cou alw pur BIB Foo
“Tra Sou Asia Pra and pre Con Stu Jan Buz Sec Sou
| Edy Prasetyo
balancing polic w US flexible gion that wou
Southeast A etnam.
nclusion: Imp ASEAN, the st, ASEAN m sition by de pacities and m
ective decision pute‐settleme o aspects are titutional tran m an associat is is essentially e relevance of A gional organiz actical issues eractions in t nsolidation w ntral position gionalization gion. Offensive pan, and India , could pote rift and d sociation not ectively and gional develop e thus real as en geopolit
dscape wh untries and ways have leg
rsue in the reg
BLIOGRAPHY
ok Weng L ansforming the utheast Asia”.Co
a, Vol. 27/3.
setyono, Edy.
d Policy Respons sented at the In nsortium on N dies in Asia (NT uary 2007.
zan, Barry. 1988 curity Comp utheast Asia. Vol
ono
cy appears to s e engagement
ld be openly Asian states, i
licationsfor AS implications a
must consolid veloping inst mechanism, pa n‐making proc ent mechanism e the most im nsformation of
tion to a com y an effort to m ASEAN as an
ation able to arising from the region. S will put ASEA n in the
in the Asia e diplomacy o a, not to men ntially make ivided shou be able to timely to the
ments. The ch Southeast As ical and here intra‐
external pow gitimate inte ion.
Y
Loo, Bernard e Strategic Land
ontemporary of S
2007. “NTS C ses in Indonesia naugural Meetin Non‐Traditional
TS‐Asia), Singa
8. “The Southe plex”, Cont l. 10/1 (June).
erve as a t in the received ncluding
SEAN are clear.
date its titutional rticularly cess and m. These mportant f ASEAN mmunity.
maintain effective address m states’
Secondly, AN in a broader Pacific of China, ntion the ASEAN uld the respond e recent hallenges sia is an strategic
‐regional wers will rests to
. 2005.
dscape of Southeast
hallenges
”, a paper ng for the Security apore, 8‐9
east Asian temporary
Ghosh, Cdr P Challenges in Ocean: Respo presented for International S Lanes Securit Maritime Sec Hawaii, Januar
Sutter, Robert Adamson, Tim Mike M. an Balancing Act Asia‐Pacific S International R George Washin
Wanandi, Ju Regionalism a Indonesian Q Quarter).
Edy Pra
Edy Pras the ASEA of Socia Universita senior lec of Intern of Socia Universita
K. 2004. “Mari South Asia an onse Strategie the Center for Studies‐America
ty Institute co curity in Asi ry 18‐20, 2004.
t G., Brown, M mothy J. A.,wit
nd Ollapall, D ts: The U.S. R Stability. Elliot Relations,. Wash
ngton University
usuf. 2007.
nd Global Gove Quarterly, Vol
asetyono
etyono is the D AN Study Cente l and Political as Indonesia. H cturer at the D ational Relation l and Political as Indonesia.
time Security nd the Indian es”, A paper Strategic and an‐Pacific Sea onference on a, Honolulu,
ichael E., and th Mochizuki, eepa. (2013).
Rebalance and t School of hington, D.C.:
y.
”East Asia ernance”. The 35/1 (First
Director of er, Faculty Sciences, e is also a epartment ns, Faculty Sciences,
3
ASEAN AND THE NOTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN ASIA| Riefqi Muna
4
The initiative of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) to promote regional order has developed and gone beyond Southeast Asia and extended to East Asia and the Asia‐Pacific in general. ASEAN has purposefully and conceptually develops concept of regional security architecture in East Asia through the establishment of East Asia Summits (EAS) and other mechanism of dialogues under the formula of ASEAN‐Plus as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that has been established since the mid of 1994.
ASEAN initiative provides an alternative to fill the vacuum of existing formal regional security arrangement in East Asia. In North East Asia for example, there is no such experience of regional cooperation that is able to facilitate countries to cooperate. While in Southeat Asia there is no such regional cooperation that inclusively binds the region together in a regional cooperation. Considering to this condition and in order to create peace and stability in the East Asia, it seems that ASEAN moves to promote regional architecture in East Asia/Pacific directed to avoid the region to fall into the hegemony of major powers. In addition, looking at the plurality of nations in East Asia, the ASEAN initiative for regional security could function as glue in promoting peace and stability through inclusive cooperation. Cooperative security as well as comprehensive security serve as foundation for ASEAN’s cooperation to bring all parties in one basket, so the leaders have similar opportunities to sit and talk in addressing regional and international concern.
ASEAN’s increasingly outward looking for regional security architecture is fundamentally developed on the basis of the ASEAN centrality principle. ASEAN serves as cornerstone for the overallprocess of institutionalization of securitydialogue in the region. However, such a situation poses a challenge for ASEAN as a regional organization that tends to be built on the basis of consensus in its decision making.
This essay intends to address the contribution of ASEAN process in the development of regional security architecture.
Within the current dynamic of political, security and economic of the Asia‐Pacific region, ASEAN has been and is still contributing to the development of security architecture in Asia. There have been many initiatives in the past that addressed the unsuccesful initiatives of Asia region‐wide cooperation. With current proliferation of dialogues channels on politics, economy, social and cultural under the ASEAN flagship, it also shows the positive trends toward deeper regional cooperation. ASEAN has declared to build ASEAN Community to internally build stronger region and externally develop an international regime of security cooperation as an effort to promote stability and peace in East Asia.
Historical Notes
To see current development of ASEAN‐led regional security architecture in the Asia‐Pacific, it is important to see the historical background of the initiatives for security channels.
Previously, the author has elaborated the proposal from the leaders of countries in Asia regarding security cooperation (Muna, 2010).There have been number of proposals for security regime formation in the Asia‐Pacific that could be used as a reflective reference to see current development of security dynamic in the region. The proposals influence Southeast Asian countries to take initiatives to establish their own model of security architecture for the region beyond Southeast Asia(Ahmar, 1992: 65‐77).
ASEAN and the Notion of Regional Security Architecture in Asia
Riefqi Muna
ASEAN Defence Ministers at the 8th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) (Source: asean.org)
ASEAN AND THE NOTION OF REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN ASIA| Riefqi Muna
5
During the Cold War, when the degree of distrust and hostility between the two ideological blocswas strong, the USSR president, Leonid Brezhnev, proposed Asia‐Collective Security Scheme (SCSS) on June 8, 1969(Pavlovsky, 1972). Of course it could be understood that this proposal was not popular as in the Cold War context. Fifteen years later, in February 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed an “All Asian Security Regime and an All‐Asia Conference”, and he rejected the idea of hegemony in Asia by saying: “No state would be in a position to take on the role of a guarantor of strategic socio‐economic and political security of Asia”(Ahmar, 1992: 67). Gorbachev called several times for the establishment of a type of security regime in Asia. He once said: “Asia and the Pacific, whose inhabitants make up half of the world's population, face a host of economic, ethnic, social, religious, environment, and other highly complex problem. No country can cope with these single‐handedly. Therefore, we feel that the idea of a multilateral forum on security and cooperation remain as relevant as ever. Sooner or later, life will make us accept that idea”(Ahmar, 1992: 69).
At the time, Gorbachev's proposal was among the strongest idea to establish security cooperation in the Asia‐Pacific region. However, as major powers in this region were cautious toward this proposal, the idea did not receive any support.
Interestingly, countries in the region recognised the need for a mechanism to address political and security issues, but were hesitant to receive Gorbachev's ideas. Significantly, Gorbachev prediction in his statement has now become reality, although in different process and model (Muna, 1995).
Other countries also proposed to build security architecture in the Asia‐Pacific. In 1981, Mongolia called for a “convention on mutual non‐aggression and non‐use of force in relations among countries in the Asia and the Pacific region”(Ahmar, 1992: 69). The Mongolian view was that the implementation of this proposal should be “supported by corresponding guarantee by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Ahmar, 1992: 69).
In 1988, the Republic of Korea (RoK) proposed a Peace Consultative Meeting among six countries in Northeast Asia in flexible multilateral talks. In 1993 RoK proposed what was called a “mini CSCE” that was introduced by Foreign Minister Han Sung‐joo to build a security regime in Northeast Asia(Lim, 2014). In promoting multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, South Korea drew inspiration from the European experience and put forth the following six principles:
(1) respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) nonaggression and non‐use of force,
(3) non‐intervention in domestic affairs, (4) peaceful resolution of disputes, (5) peaceful coexistence, and
(6) respect for democracy and human dignity.
The Canadian proposal was a specific one, as the focus was labelled as a sub‐region on North Pacific. The Canadian Foreign Minister at the time, Joe Clark, proposed security talks in the North Pacific, including the U.S., the former Soviet
Union, Japan, the two Koreans, China and Canada to apply the concept of security regime in North Pacific. Although the NPCSD has not yet produced remarkable result on official policy, it has provided valuable knowledge for the formation of security regime in Northeast Asia. Australia also came with proposal in 1990 for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSA) modelled after CSCE(Evans and Grant, 1991: 111‐112), but did not receive wide support from Asian countries.
Japan also contributed to the table of thinking on security in the Asia‐Pacific region with the concept of a “Multiplex”
mechanism in Asian context which was based on four pillars(Soeya, 1994).Japan’s initiative, known as Nakayama’s proposal, reflected Tokyo’s policy of a ‘multiplex mechanism’.
A multiplex mechanism was composed of bilateral and multilateral arrangements and frameworks of cooperationdesigned for a variety of purposes. It has four pillars: (1) economic cooperation; (2) diplomatic efforts to settle sub‐regional conflicts and disputes; (3) a broad range of (bilateral) security arrangements and cooperative relations;
and (4) a regional political dialogue.
At that period of time, the proposal also came from the US.
Although at the beginning the US preferred its own bilateral model, and “refused” a kind of multilateralism in the Asia‐
Pacific(Solomon, 1990), Washington later supported this process as shown by its attitude toward the ARF and APEC, as stated by President Bill Clinton on his speech in the White House before departing for APEC Summit in Bogor, Indonesia(Clinton, 1994). In this regard, the US recognised the significance of the creation of a separable sub‐regional security dialogue, but such dialogue should be developed in close consultation with the U.S. Allies(Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 1995).
ASEAN’s Inclusive Approach
The above historical notes show examples of the difficult process of building cooperative security regime in Asia/Pacific region. Many proposals have been advocated, butnone of them was able to be materialised.
Significantly, ASEAN has also received severe criticisms both from inside and outside region. From the inside, many criticize ASEAN for being too slow in dealing with its agenda. ASEAN is also perceived as being too elitist and state‐centred rather directly serve the people's interest of Southeast Asia nation.
The external criticisms to ASEAN generally related to the attempt to compare the ASEAN process with, for example, European process which is more structured and well defined target such as the EU.
With the absence of any single country in the Asia‐Pacific that is able to gear the regional security cooperation, ASEAN has been able to act with less controversy in designing and facilitating the process of security cooperation beyond its original geographical footprint of Southeast Asia. ASEAN has developed wider forum of security with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) inaugurated in 1993.
ASEAN A ARCHITE
Since (PMC) extern mecha Pacific In ess multila to find ASEA ASEAN Asia co of cen aims t direct and st ASEAN dialog region maxim ASEAN It is al strateg socio‐
Asia. W the p securit succes Furthe coope that is magni Streng decisio manag Finally securit contex enviro Coope require
Dr. R ASEAJaka
AND THE NO ECTURE IN AS
the concept ) was launche nal partners,
anism of dialo c.
sence,Solomo ateralism to a d another prob
N Centrality:
N’ssuccess in onfronts serio ntrality is subs to keep the le major power
ability.
N has been t ue that help n. However, it malist point of N is successfu so important gic culture ta cultural, geop Within this ba osition of w ty cooperati ssful manner.
er developme ration requir s able to ma itude of iss gthening AS on making is ging regional y, ASEAN has ty regime, in xt, the role onment and eration (TAC)
ement to buil
Riefqi Muna is AN Research G arta. He could
TION OF REG SIA| Riefqi Mu
t of ASEAN ed to provide it has been ogue on polit
on rejected address secur
blem”.
: A Challenge promoting re ous task to ma
stantial for A evel of coope r games that
he significant p to promote
t is importan f view have di ul.
t to take into aken from th political, and ackdrop, it wi what are poss
on that cou
ent of ASEAN es better and anage a quic ues related SEAN secreta
an imperativ architecture.
s, or at least h stead of form of major p respecting
) that they d trust and co
s a senior fello Group (ARG), C d be reached a
GIONAL SECU una
post‐Ministe e forum for d
able to deve ics and securi
the ideas rity in Asia‐Pa
e Ahead egional securit
aintain its cen ASEAN‐led ini ration in the may hamper
t driver for m e confidence t to note tha ifferent persp
account the e fast changi economic con
ll be more rea sible and do uld take pla
N model of d stronger AS ck phase of to major p
ariat and it ve for better r
has tried, to de mal security in power in cre the Treaty have signed onfidence in E
ow at Pacivis G Center for Po at riefqi.muna
URITY
erial Confere ialogue with elop an array ity for wider A
by saying t acific as “solu
ty architectur ntrality. The is tiativesif ASE region and av regional secu
any initiative building in at minimalist pective on whe
crucial aspec ing and comp ntext in a dive alistic to stan oable process
ace in a m
regional secu SEAN institut change and
power relatio ts leadership
role of ASEAN
evelop a regio nstitution. In eating condu of Amity d is a necess East Asia.
Global Civil So litical Studies a@gmail.com
ence the y of Asia
that tion
re in ssue EAN void urity
es of the and eter
ct of plex erse nd in s of more
urity tion the ons.
p in N in
onal this cive and sary
Bib
Ahm Dev Pro Inst Nat
Clin the
Dep (199 Asia Dep Inte
Eva 199
Lim Kor http ean
Mu Arc Aca
Mu ASE ber 201
Pav Inte
Soe Pol Jou http evo
Sol Eco 1(10
ociety Studies s, Indonesian I and twitter: @
bliography
mar, M. (1992) velopment an
ceeding of the titute in Asia an tions Institute f
nton, P. (1994, 21st Century. U
partment of D 95). East Asia S a‐Pacific Secu partment of ernational Secu
ans, G. a. (1991 90s. Melbourne
m, W. (2014, J rean
p://www.brook n
na, R. (1995 hitecture in So ademy, UNSW.
na, R. (2010). R EAN's Contribu lin.org/fileadm 10_web_ks.pdf
vlovsky, V. (197 ernational Affai
eya, Y. (1994, icies on Coop rnal of Int ps://digitalcolle olving_interest.
omon, R. H. ( onomic and Dif
0), 243‐249.
s and a resear Institute of Sc
@RiefqiMuna
. Security and D nd Prospects
e Beijing Confe nd the Pacific (p for Disarmame
, November).
U.S. Dispatch S
Defense, Office Strategy Report
urity. Office Defense. De
urity Affairs.
1). Australia's F : Melbourne Un
une 3). Region Question.
kings.edu/~/me
5). Cooperative utheast Asia. C .
Regional Format ution to the P min/contents/pro
72). "Collective irs, 25.
June 3). The E perative Securi
ternational A ections.anu.edu
1990, Novemb ffer in Security
rcher at ciences,
Disarmament i –Southeast ference: Confer
pp. 65‐77). New nt Research.
U.S.‐Asia Econ Supplement, 5(9
e of Internatio t: America's Per
of Internation partment of
Foreign Relatio niversity Press.
nal Multilatera Retrie dia/research/fil
e Security an Canberra: Aust
t of Military and Process. . Retr
oducts/projekt_
Security" the
Evolution of Ja ity in 1980s a Affairs, 87‐95 u.au/bitstream/
ber ). Asian Se y. US Departm
n Asia and the Asian Perspe rence of the R w York/Geneva:
nomic Engagem 9).
onal Security rmanent Interes nal Security Defense, Of
ns in the World
lism In Asia A eved
les/papers/2009
nd Regional S tralian Defence
d Security Coop rieved fromww _papiere/Muna
Way to Peace
apanese Think and 1990s. Au 5. Retrieved /1885/39965/3/J
ecurity: Integra ent of State D
6
Pacific:
ectives”.
Research : United
ment in
Affairs.
st in the Affairs, ffice of
d of the
And The from 9/8/kor
Security e Forces
peration:
ww.swp‐
a_BCAS
in Asia.
ing and ustralian from Japan_
ation in Dispatch,
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti DISSIPATING DISPARITY THE CASE FOR ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 7
Asia is a continent leading global growth. If it continues to grow at an average of 6% annually in twenty years, it is expected to overtake the United States and the European Union altogether (Rhee, 2014). In particular, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members have the potential to become a powerful driver of global economic growth. Combined, it would be the 7thlargest economy – with a collective Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $2.4 trillion– with a potential to become the 4th largest in 2050 (Vinayak et al, 2012).While sitting on an enormous natural resources potential and demographic dividend, a significant proportion of more than 600 million people living in ASEAN countries remains engulfed in poverty. Poverty level is still alarmingly high in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV countries), while countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines are facing growing income inequality.
Since its inception in 1967, economic cooperation has been ASEAN’s core strength and is perceived as one of the means to promote inclusive economic growth. While integration started with the 1977 Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), in 2003 it is agreed that a unified market and production base should be created (Chia, 2013), to bring countries to better economic development.
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is then conceived to foster closer integration of ASEAN economies though envisioned free flow of goods, services, investment
skilled labor and freer flow of capital entering into force in 2015 (AEC Blueprint, 2008; Chia, 2013).
Such integration is expected to bring about a more competitive environment to attract investments, jobs, and better livelihood for ASEAN population.
With less than one year ahead of its implementation, there are still diverging opinions on whether AEC will achieve its objectives, and most importantly whether a more inclusive growth can be delivered.
Inclusive growth is salient as it is enshrined as one of the pillars of the Community: “A region of equitable economic development”.
Prevailing Regional Disparity
Understanding regional disparity is important to ensure that the benefits of regional economic integration propelled by AEC is shared equally among ASEAN citizens, or lessen the gap between the richest and the poorest
members of ASEAN. It is also important to understand the extent of disparity to identify regional vulnerability against internal and external shocks – learning from the Eurozone crisis (Thuzar, 2012).
For the purpose of the analysis ASEAN members are divided into three groups (Bock, 2014): 1) the richest, which consists of upper middle income countries (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Singapore); 2) the middle income emerging economies (Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines); and lower income countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam – although information on Myanmar is not available).
According to Figure 1, there are two important observations: 1) even though the rise of GDP per capita in wealthiest countries is growing at a much faster rate; but 2) in terms of the rate of wealth disparity (income inequality), the gap between the richest and the poorest countries is declining.
Dissipating Disparity The Case for ASEAN Economic Community
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti
Figure 1. Regional Disparity in ASEAN (Bock, 2014)
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti DISSIPATING DISPARITY THE CASE FOR ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 8
This only means that while remaining at low GDP per capita, the poorest countries are growing unequal – at the same rate of the richest countries!
Fostering regional integration becomes challenging when members have different economic size; are at different income level and stages of development.
Leading up to a single market, has ASEAN economic cooperation only benefitted few? A model developed by Chia (2013) estimated that Singapore and Brunei – two of the smallest and richest countries in ASEAN will enjoy the most benefit from AEC.
This can be explained by the nature of economies and extent of intra trade.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2007 (Chia, 2013) indicated that 70% of trade within ASEAN related to assembly of parts to be exported to the United States (US) and European Union (EU). While intra trade rose to
$598 billion in 2011, nexus of trade remains in ASEAN 5 countries i.e.
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines (ADB, 2013).
Table 2 illustrates that if that is the case, it is mostly Singapore and Thailand which are making the most out of not only sourcing for materials for their production, but also making ASEAN as a market for their assembled goods. Why Singapore is benefitting more than Thailand in percentage of GDP from the AEC?Singapore will benefit from AEC as it has already been acting as a production and trade hub in the region. The integration will enable Singapore to source materials without trade barriers, and market high value manufactured goods without constraints. Thailand, on the other hand, markets mostly agricultural products within ASEAN, thus GDP contribution is less than that of Singapore.
What about Brunei? Brunei will benefit mostly from sourcing of materials from within ASEAN.
Consumers will benefit from reduced price.
Singapore is also a leader in terms of connectivity; it tops World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) in 2012 – enabling the country and the region to effectively distribute goods within the region
and beyond the borders of ASEAN
‐ while other countries are still grappling with reducing cost of transporting and handling of goods into and outside of their borders (Mustra, 2012 and ASEAN, 2014).
This is certainly key in making the most out of unified market and production base.
In order to tap the potential offered by AEC, therefore, learning from Singapore, it is important for countries – particularly the CLMV countries to attract investments
from high technology
manufacturing firms, and to improve logistics. Both will require significant public investment in human infrastructure and in physical infrastructure.
Why Fear Disparity?
How do we classify ASEAN countries according to their stage of development? According to Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 2004) countries are classified into core, semi periphery and periphery countries depending on their economic stage.
AFTA AEC AFTA AEC
$ billion, 2004 price Percent of baseline GDP Brunei
Darussalam
0.2 0.5 2.6 7
Indonesia 1 27.6 0.2 6.2 Malaysia 2.7 5.7 1.4 3 Philippines 0.9 4.5 0.6 3.2
Singapore 2.6 15.1 1.6 9.7 Thailand 1.6 12.2 0.6 4.9 Cambodia 0.3 0.6 2.7 6.3
Lao PDR 0 0.2 0.6 3.6 Myanmar 0 0.6 0.3 4.4
Vietnam 0.9 2.4 1.1 2.8 ASEAN
Total
10.1 69.4 0.8 5.3 Table 1. Growth estimation model (Chia, 2013)
Intra ASEAN imports Intra ASEAN exports
$ million
% distrib
% imports
$ million
% distrib
% exports Brunei
Darussalam 1191 0.4 48.4 1721 0.5 13.9
Indonesia 57254 21.1 32.3 42099 12.9 20.7 Malaysia 52090 19.2 27.8 56050 17.1 24.6 Philippines 15040 5.6 23.6 8635 2.6 18 Singapore 78126 28.9 21.4 127545 38.9 31.2
Thailand 39224 14.5 17 72227 22.1 31.6
Cambodia 2170 0.8 35.4 834 0.3 12.4
Lao PDR 1571 0.6 71.1 960 0.3 55
Myanmar 3250 1.2 47.8 3957 1.2 48.7
Vietnam 20793 7.7 20 13505 4.1 14.2
ASEAN
Total 270710 100 23.6 327532 100 26.4
Table 2. Intra ASEAN trade (adjusted from Chia, 2013).
Dayu Nirma Amurwanti DISSIPATING DISPARITY THE CASE FOR ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 9
Advanced countries such as the US and EU are core countries who consume
materials produced elsewhere and market high value manufactured products. While periphery countries contribute to the global trade through raw materials and labour, semi periphery countries have some ability to produce high value manufactured products.
While ASEAN 6 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) may fit with the definition of semi periphery countries, the CLMV countries are vulnerable to being left out.
Without serious capacity and investment in production despite longer time provided for trade liberalization, CLMV countries can remain becoming supplier of cheap materials while consuming manufactured goods, fulfilling
‘Prebisch‐Singer prophecy’ of dependency (in Toye, 2003).
Why is disparity a concern? Galtung (1971) believes that as Living Condition (LC) gaps widen between the rich and the poor, there will be disharmony of interest – and harmony has been the magic glue keeping ASEAN countries together. While Galtung’s structural theory (1971) explains the imbalance in economicrelations disadvantaging periphery nations, Galtung also underlines the
importance of alignment of interest within
countries to avoid governments being captured by businesses and not serving the interests of the broader society. This is particularly relevant in AEC as there are profound fears that unified production base and market will mean relocation of production, investments, and jobs. Most importantly, citizens of member countries will lose confidence when they feel that they are worse off.
Growing Income Inequalities within Countries
As figure 2 illustrates, the rate of inequality is growing at almost similar rate in the countries with highest GDP per capita (Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam), and the poorest members of ASEAN (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam – data for Myanmar is not available).
Income inequality within a country is measured by Gini coefficient – the closer the figure to 1 or 100%
the greater income distribution gap a country suffers from. The latest figure per country indicates that ASEAN in general is not an equal society to begin with (Table 2).
With unified market and production base fostered by the AEC, it is important that as a
region ASEAN collectively addresses inequality and formulates both regional and national measures to make sure that the least economic disadvantaged group are benefitting from the AEC, and are not worse off. With contravening media opinions on AEC, it is important that governments do not lose support while implementing measures agreed in the Blue Print.
ASEAN Economic Community, More Economic than Sense of Community?
The progress of AEC and its intended objectives can be constrained by ASEAN’s inherent structural limitations. Severino (2012) cited that one of the reasons why AEC has fallen short of expectations is that there is limited alignment of interest between that of regional integration and national interests – and there is no institutionalized mechanism to reinforce the collective interests.
Compared to European Union, institution building in ASEAN is severely lacking, with institutions having limited mandate and resources (Thuzar, 2012). When
Figure 2. Rate of growing inequality (Bock, 2014)
Country Year
Measured
Gini (%)
Cambodia 2009 36
Indonesia 2011 38.1
Lao PDR 2008 36.7
Malaysia 2009 46.2
Philippines 2009 43
Thailand 2010 39.4
Vietnam 2008 37.6
Singapore 2013 46.3
Brunei Darussalam
and Myanmar n/a n/a
Table3: Inequality measured through Gini coefficient in selected ASEAN countries, China and India (Congvilaivan, 2013 and World Bank, 2014)
