commitment period. Because such a Party has an unreliable reputation in the previous commitment period, the buyers would become wary of purchasing AAUs from such a Party. So its AAUs would be automatically devalued in the subsequent commitment period, thus putting pressure on such a Party to strengthen its compliance and avoid over-selling its AAUs.
It should be pointed out that the effective functioning of the above traffic light option depends very much on how early the non-compliance problem is raised and on how quickly the decision is made to switch on they yellow light for transfers from Party. If addressed inappropriately, the time lag between the two moves could severely undermine the effectiveness of this option.
commit-ment period, it should be required to acquire additional AAUs to cover its excess tons of emissions during a “true-up”period of not longer than six months. In case it does not acquire enough AAUs to cover its shortfall, its assigned amounts in the subsequent commitment period should be reduced by the amount more than an amount by which its actual emissions exceed its assigned amounts in the previous commitment period (Environmental Defense Fund, 1998). This penalty has to be imposed on such a non-complying Party, partly because the atmosphere is negatively affected by the additional amount by which it exceeds its allowed levels, and party because the delayed response will imply more GHG emissions emitted into the atmosphere than what would otherwise have occurred , thus leading to additional warming. As such, this punishment signals Parties that an “emit now, pay later”
strategy for controlling their GHG emissions over time would be inevitably expensive and potentially risky, thus operating as a strong deterrent to non-compliance. It implicitly requires that the assigned amounts in the subsequent commitment period be negotiated well before the previous commitments period commences so that those Parties that are found to be in non-compliance with their commit-ments at the end of the previous commitment period are unable to strategically use non-compliance to affect negotiations about their assigned amounts in the subsequent commitment period. Moreover, given the fact the Parties can always choose to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, the credibility of the punishment could be assigned.
Fourth, at the end of the commitment period, if a Party's emissions have exceeded its initial assigned amounts by a certain margin, a compliance reserve requirement would be imposed on all its sales in the subsequent commitment period. Such a reserve requirement could be linked to the level of non-compliance. If a Party has seriously violated the emissions caps, a buyer beware liability should be imposed on all its sales in the subsequent commitment period on a “last in, first out”basis.
Because such a Party has an unreliable reputation in the previous commitment period, the buyers would become wary of purchasing AAUs from such a Party. So, its AAUs would be automatically devalued in the subsequent commitment period, thus putting pressure on such a Party to strengthen its compliance and avoid over-selling its AAUs.
Fifth, at the should be pointed out that although our focus in the article has been exclusively on Article 17 trading, Article 4 bubble also raise an accountability issue. Although originally conceived as a way of allowing the European Community as a regional economic integration organization (REIO) to accommodate the internal burden sharing of the Kyoto commitments among its member states, the final wording under Article 4 is framed in general terms. This might create potential loopholes in
meeting the Kyoto obligations. In the case of a REIO bubble, each REIO member and the organiza-tion itself are held accountable for the failure to achieve the required reducorganiza-tions for the REIO mem-ber. Under the terms of the agreement notified to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, the incentive for non-compliance is offset by the joint responsibility of both the individual members are the regional organization with enforcement powers means that the seller countries are solely responsible for their own non-compliance. As discussed in Article 17 trad-ing, these countries may have as incentive to fall short of compliance. To ensure the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol, it is thus desirable to assign some from of joint responsibility for non-REIO bubbles too. However, the countries concerned within a non-REIO bubble should be left to work out an arrangement to bring the whole group into compliance.
Acknowledgements
This article formed part of the presentations at the International Workshop on Market-based Instruments and International Trade, Amsterdam, 19-20 March 1998; the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Workshop on International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading, a Side-Event of the Eighth Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies o the UNFCCC, 8 June 1998, Bonn; the World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, 25-27 June 1998, Venice; the European Union Workshop on Domestic Tradeable Quotos, 1-2 July 1998, Brussels; and the Ⅸ Pacific Science Inter-Congress, S-Ⅲ-2 Economics of Sustainable Development, 16-18 November 1998; Taipei; as well as at a seminar at Renmin University of China, 9 December 1998, Beijing. We would like to thank partici-pants in the above workshops, congress and seminar, Daniel Dud다, Erik Haites, Frank Jushua, and Tom Tietenberg for useful discussions and comments on an earlier version of the article. Financial support from the Netherlands Organizations for Scientific Research is gratefully acknowledged. The usual caveat applies.
References
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■주요 에너지 지표
■1차 에너지원별 소비
■에너지 수입
■원유 수급
■주요 석유제품 소비
■LNG 수급
■무연탄 수급
■유연탄 수급
■세계 연료탄 가격
■세계 LNG 수출국별 Netback 가격 비교
■세계 지역별 기준원유 현물가격
■미국 API 상업용 석유 재고
자료: 한국석유공사
<표 1> 주요 에너지 지표
자료: 에너지경제연구원, 통계월보
<표 4> 원유 수급 자료: 에너지경제연구원, 통계월보
<표 3> 에너지 수입 자료: 에너지경제연구원, 통계월보
<표 2> 1차 에너지원별 소비
(단위 : 천 TOE)
생 산 소 비 에너지/GDP 해외의존도 석유의존도
(천 TOE) (TOE/백만원) (%)
2002 35,521 208,636 0.32 97.14 49.09
2003 38,861 215,066 0.32 96.87 47.60
2004p 39,924 220,797 - 96.58 45.65
2004 10 3,329 18,333 - 96.24 46.12
2004 11 3,387 18,729 - 96.41 45.61
2004 12 3,705 21,592 - 96.90 45.03
석탄 석유 LNG 원자력 수력 기타 합계
2002 49,096 102,414 23,099 29,776 1,327 2,925 208,636
2003 51,116 102,380 24,194 32,415 1,722 3.241 215,066
2004p 53,127 100,783 28,398 32,679 1,465 4.345 220,797
2004 10 4,735 8,464 1,954 2,699 88 414 18,354
2004 11 4,451 8,543 2,468 2,787 84 397 18,729
2004 12 4,845 9,723 3,436 3,090 84 413 21,592
석 유 LNG 석 탄
(백만 배럴) (백만 달러) (천 톤) (백만 달러) (천 톤) (백만 달러)
2002 1,019 25,139 17,470 3,950 68,519 2,403
2003 1,025 30,104 19,434 5,035 69,958 2,445
2004p 1,021 37,754 22,095 6,503 76,365 4,124
2004 10 89.2 3,667 1,968 652 6,789 395
2004 11 104.2 4,291 1,901 647 6,318 368
2004 12 96.1 3,810 2,288 733 6,536 410
수입 정제 재고 중동 의존도 도입단가
(천 배럴) (%) ($/bbl, C&F)
2002 790,992 786,805 10,177 73.31 24.23
2003 804,809 782,951 14,339 79.45 28.74
2004p 825,790 825,405 15,324 78.13 36.15
2004 10 75,211 72,289 12,293 82.84 40.27
2004 11 88,693 73,447 27,457 77.77 39.98
2004 12 74,540 76,282 25,574 80.65 37.87
<표 5> 주요 석유제품 소비
(단위 : 천 배럴)
자료: 한국석유공사
<표 6> LNG 수급
(단위 : 천 톤, $/톤)
<표 7> 무연탄 수급
(단위 : 천 톤)
자료: 산업자원부 자료: 한국가스공사
<표 8> 유연탄 수급
(단위 : 천 톤)
자료: 산업자원부
휘발유 등유 경유 B-C유 LPG 납사
2002 64,078 58,464 138,045 116,907 91,415 245,309
2003 60,484 52,874 145,366 111,361 88,606 252,417
2004p 58,210 43,243 144,534 101,216 88,465 262,871
2004 10 4,704 3,261 12,110 8,615 7,252 22,222
2004 11 4,778 3,690 12,252 8,778 7,359 22,955
2004 12 5,270 6,654 14,046 9,423 8,009 23,365
수입 소비
물량 단가 발전 도시가스 기타 재고
2002 17,470 226.1 6,509 11,194 65 426
2003 19,434 259.1 6,468 11,978 165 1,063
2004p 22,095 294.3 8,818 12,510 516 1,062
2004 10 1,968 331.3 635 834 34 1,796
2004 11 1,901 340.5 677 1,187 35 1,818
2004 12 2,288 320.5 802 1,739 102 1,602
공급 소비
생산 수입 가정상업 발전 산업 기타 재고
2002 3,318 3,879 1,175 2,558 3,954 0 10,101
2003 3,298 4,640 1,191 2,710 4,680 0 9,527
2004p 3,191 4,251 1,385 2,356 4,396 0 8,894
2004 10 287 465 253 160 473 0 9,125
2004 11 266 249 268 145 264 0 8,999
2004 12 262 405 247 96 445 0 8,894
수입 소비
원료탄 연료탄 제철 발전 시멘트 기타
2002 17,660 46,980 20,097 40,143 5,669 2,355
2003 17,676 47,642 20,509 41,630 6,060 2,339
2004p 18,954 53,151 20,839 45,512 5,309 2,318
2004 10 1,707 4,617 1,818 4,004 457 186
2004 11 1,695 4,374 1,691 3,848 486 200
2004 12 1,783 4,348 1,802 4,215 472 223
<표 10> 세계 LNG 수출국별 Netback 가격 비교 (US$/MMBtu)
주: 수입터미널 도착 기준으로 산정 자료;World Gas Intelligence, 최근호 주: ARA를 제외한 타지역 가격은 FOB 기준 자료; Platts, ICR 최근호
<표 9> 세계 연료탄 가격
(US$/metric 톤)
국가/지역 Kcal/kg Sulf.(%) Ash(%) 3월 4/4분기 평균
유럽, ARA(CIF) 6,000 1 16 64.20 - 66.80 75.56 - 77.95
남아공, Richard Bay 6,200 1 16 44.00 - 46.50 56.88 - 59.83
미국, Baltimore 6,950 2.5 12 NA NA
호주, Newcastle 6,300 0.8 13 50.00 - 52.50 51.85 - 54.37
중국, Qinhuangdao 6,200 0.8 10 52.20 - 54.30 55.18 - 57.41
인니, Kalimantan 6,300 1 10 48.20 - 50.25 51.00 - 53.42
러시아, 태평양 6,300 0.4 15 51.46 - 54.42 54.67 - 58.08
수출국
미국, Everett(Boston) 벨기에, Zeebrugge 일본, 소데가우라
2/25 1/28 2/25 1/28 2/25 1/28
카타르 5.16 7.50 5.07 3.54 4.42 4.32
오만 5.28 7.62 5.18 3.65 4.54 4.43
아부다비 5.26 7.61 5.12 3.59 4.47 4.37
인도네시아 4.90 7.13 3.62 3.01 5.01 4.90
말레이시아 4.87 7.10 3.65 3.04 4.96 4.84
호주 4.99 7.22 4.68 3.16 4.87 4.76
트리니다드 6.21 8.56 5.64 4.10 3.38 3.29
알제리 6.05 8.41 5.92 4.38 3.34 3.25
나이지리아 5.78 8.13 5.54 4.00 3.75 3.65
<표 11> 세계 지역별 기준원유 현물가격
(단위 : US$/bbl)
자료: 한국석유공사 외
자료: API, Moneyline Telerate Inc.
<표 12> 미국 API 상업용 석유 재고
(단위 : 천 배럴)
구 분 WTI Brent Dubai OPEC Basket
2002년 26.17 25.20 25.20 24.36
2003년 31.08 28.81 26.80 28.10
2004년 41.50 38.36 33.74 36.05
04-2/4분기 38.30 35.41 33.24 34.42
04-3/4분기 43.90 41.66 36.23 39.07
04-4/4분기 48.30 44.15 35.77 35.72
11월 48.44 43.01 35.05 38.96
12월 43.22 39.69 34.25 35.70
‘05년 1월 46.84 44.44 37.97 40.24
2월 47.96 45.37 39.91 41.68
2월-4주 50.80 48.00 41.55 43.95
3월-1주 52.72 51.37 43.28 46.59
3월-2주 54.27 53.17 44.85 48.80
3월-3주 55.42 54.77 46.75 50.14
3월 8일 54.61 53.18 44.33 49.01
3월 9일 54.61 54.22 45.47 49.87
3월 10일 53.65 53.55 45.53 49.40
3월 11일 54.63 53.31 44.92 49.20
3월 14일 54.90 53.10 45.75 49.59
3월 15일 55.09 53.98 46.49 50.21
3월 16일 56.46 55.09 46.23 50.78
3월 17일 56.33 55.77 47.90 51.76
3월 18일 56.92 55.91 47.38 51.67
3월 21일 56.76 55.48 47.90 51.76
2005. 3. 11 전년동기 2005. 3. 4 2005. 2. 25
정제 가동률(%) 91.60 94.3 91.6 91.0
휘발유 219,040 240,124 219,040 223,586
중간유분 111,316 109,810 111,316 114,518
잔사유 39,343 41,635 39,343 40,505
원 유 305,902 329,641 305,902 304,295
편 집 인 김 중 구 발 행 처 에너지경제연구원
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