FROM THE EDITORS
BOARD OF EDITORS Edy Prasetyono Evi Fitriani
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asean insights
asean insights is a quarterly newsletter which aims to
provide important insights on ASEAN issues. The newsletter is published by ASEAN Study Center, LPPSP, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, with the support from the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN.
The content of asean insights does not reflect the official opinion of the Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN.
Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN
Dear Readers,
S outheast Asia is home to over 600 million people; it is a diverse and fast- changing region that is experiencing progress across many aspects of sustainable development. Within the frame of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, ASEAN countries have managed to reduce poverty (from 17% in 2006 to 7% in 2013) and improve economic opportunity, especially for women and children. Up until today, ASEAN has continuously encouraged more inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth to take place in its member countries despite various obstacles at domestic and regional levels.
In this second edition, ASEAN Insights focuses on the issue of sustainable development.
We feature seven commentaries and four youth articles from talented scholars, professionals, and youths across the globe. We hope that this ASEAN Insights edition can give you some new perception on sustainable development in ASEAN.
Enjoy the reading!
Yours,
Spotlight
T
hrough an online video conference, the Economic Ministers of the ASEAN member states, Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand met on 27 August 2020 for the 8th Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Ministerial Meeting.The meeting is indeed important for the preparation of the 4th RCEP Summit that is expected to be held in November this year and the future of RCEP itself.
Chaired by the Minister of Industry and Trade of Viet Nam, H.E. Tran Tuan Anh, the meeting has become a place for economic ministers from RCEP countries to exchange their views and expectations regarding the development of RCEP.
Related to the current pandemic situation, the ministers acknowledged that the COVID-19 global pandemic had affected trade and investment performance among RPCs. They have the same perspective that this challenge made it imperative for countries in the region, including those participating in the RCEP negotiations, to not only keep their markets open, particularly for essential goods and services, but also boost joint cooperation and collaboration in the fight against the COVID-19 global pandemic.
Further, the ministers shared the view that the signing of the RCEP Agreement would enhance business confidence, strengthen the regional economic architecture, and maintain the stability of the regional and global industrial chains and supply chains. It would also show the region’s support for an open, inclusive, and rules-based multilateral trading system. Finally, they also expected that the signing of the RCEP Agreement would bring a significant role in bringing back the growth and stability of the regional and global economy in the post-pandemic recovery.
The Ministers were pleased with the significant progress made towards finalizing the RCEP Agreement for signing at the 4th RCEP Summit in November this year. They also reiterated that the RCEP remains open for India’s participation since it had participated in the RCEP negotiations since they were launched in 2012.
In addition, they also recognized India’s potential to contribute to the region’s prosperity.
source:https://asean.org/joint-media-statement-8th- regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep- ministerial-meeting/
The Path to Wider and Tighter Partnership:
Seeing Progress of RCEP Agreement Finalization
photo:asean.org
September
2020 CONTENTS
03 ASEAN Updates
08 Opinion
Improving Quality of Korea’s Contribution to Support Sustainable Forest and Peatland Management in South East Asia | By Ibnu Budiman
05 Opinion
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) & ASEAN in the Context of COVID-19 Pandemic | By Rizky Widian
01 Spotlight
The Path to Wider and Tighter Partnership: Seeing Progress of RCEP Agreement Finalization
22 Spotlight
Data as New Oil: STORMEA Development and the Effort in Bringing Bigger AEC’s Benefits to Indonesia
Strengthening the Ties: ASEAN & Republic of Korea Look Forward to Further Partnership
04 Spotlight
ASEAN-Republic of Korea Announced Its Joint Initiatives in Bolstering the Economic Connectivity in Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak
14 What They Say About ASEAN?
Interviewee: Nuki Agya Utama
(Executive Director at ASEAN Centre for Energy)
28 Youth’s View on ASEAN
Interviewee: Ruthra Mary R,
Malaysian Ambassador of ASEAN youth organization (Student at Universiti of Malaya)
32 Korean Mission Updates
The 2nd Korean Attaches' Meeting in charge of Infrastructure and Smart City in ASEAN
The 13th APT Ambassadors' Meeting
2 asean insights • vol.3 no.2 September 2020
10 Opinion
The Future of Nuclear Security: Engaging North Korea via the ARF | By Mutti Anggitta
12 Opinion
The “New Normal” for People’s Mobility in South East Asia | By Lie, Liliana Dea Jovita & Sylvia Yazid
16 Opinion
New Southern Policy and Republic of Korea-Indonesia Defence Cooperation | By Adhi Priamarizki
18 Opinion
Why Anti-corruption Matters? Palm Oil Governance and Sustainable Development in ASEAN |
By Ni Nyoman Asti L. Metami Asak
20 Opinion
ASEAN in 2020: Another Stumbling Block of Global Energy Crisis | By Wildan Faisol
24 Opinion
“Brain Death” in ASEAN's Human Security Agenda:Time to Revive? | By Abid A. Adonis
26 Youth Opinion
The ASEAN-Republic of Korea Creative Cities Network Development: Opportunities and Challenges |
By Muhammad Fatahillah
29 Youth Opinion
ASEAN Monetary Integration: Provides Stability, but Lags Behind Free Trade | By Ikhlas Tawazun
30 Youth Opinion
When Two Currents Meet: Utilizing Common Grounds as a Stepping Stone to Reciprocal ASEAN-Korea Cultural Exchanges | By Adila Nurul Ilma
asean updates
July-September 2020
High-Level Dialogue on ASEAN Post-Pandemic
Recovery tele conference
ASEAN Plus Three, East Asia Summit, and
ARF Senior Officials Mee�ng
tele conference 3rd ASEAN Smart
Ci�es Network Annual Mee�ng tele conference
20th Mee�ng of the ASEAN Commission on the Promo�on and Protec�on
of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC)
tele conference
ASEAN 53
rdAnniversary
jULY 10
1
20-21 JULY
2
JULY 28
3
JULY 30
4
aUGUST 8
5
Indonesia’s Independence Day
36th ASEAN Commi�ee on Disaster Management
Mee�ng
tele conference
Singapore’s
National Day
ASEAN SeniorOfficials Mee�ng on Youth tele conference
52nd ASEAN Economic Ministers’
Mee�ng and Related Mee�ngs
Tele conference
AUGUST 9
6
aUGUST 11
7
AUGUST 12
8
august 17
9
25-28 August
10
Malaysia’s National Day
11th ASEAN Connec�vity Symposium tele conference
Cross Sectoral and Cross Pillar Consulta�on on the Narra�ve of ASEAN
Iden�ty
tele conference
Viet Nam’s National Day
August 28
11
august 31 31 august
12 12
september 2
14
4 asean insights • vol.3 no.2 September 2020
Spotlight
O
n 29 August, 2020, Economic Ministers from ASEAN member states and the Republic of Korea (ROK) met virtually on the occasion of the 17th ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM )-ROK Consultations. The consultations concluded with the announcement of ASEAN-ROK joint initiatives in bolstering the economic connectivity between the two parties in response to the COVID-19 outbreak.This effort is a follow up on the Joint Statement of the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit adopted on 14April, 2020.
In the consultations which were co-chaired by the Minister of Industry and Trade of Vietnam, H.E. Tran Tuan Anh, and the Minister for Trade of ROK, H.E. Ms.
Yoo Myung Hee, economic ministers from ASEAN and ROK acknowledged the impact of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic which has affected the lives of many people and economies in the region.
In order to bring back growth and stability in the economic sectors, the ministers reaffirmed their commitment to take collective actions in mitigating the economic impact of the pandemic and ensuring
macroeconomic and financial stability. By keeping the markets open for trade and investment and ensuring the supply chain connectivity, particularly ensuring the unimpeded flow of essential goods such as medical supplies, medicines, and food in the region in accordance with the WTO rules and refraining from introducing or maintaining measures that could disrupt the flow of essential goods and services, the economy is hoped to heal.
Further, during the consultations, the ministers also underscored the importance of coordinated efforts in promoting economic and social resilience in the region, including through the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement in 2020.
Source:https://asean.org/joint-media-statement-17th- aem-rok-consultations/.
ASEAN-Republic Of Korea Announced Its Joint
Initiatives in Bolstering the Economic Connectivity
in Response to the COVID-19 Outbreak
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) &
ASEAN in the Context of COVID-19 Pandemic
Opinion
photo:unsplash/chuttersnap
T
he COVID-19 virus has infected millions of human populations. Policies to contain and defeat the virus have been implemented. The initiatives such as lockdown and advanced social distancing have limited the mobility of people and thus affecting the flow of goods, services, and ultimately, the economy itself. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects that the global economy will have shrunked by three percent by the end of 2020. At the micro level, the pandemic also affects vulnerable small and medium-sized businesses. Many international organizations and state governments acknowledged this impact and are preparing strategies to alleviate the burdens of the vulnerable population under the pandemic. In Southeast Asia, there have been a declaration and several ministerial meetings by ASEAN countries for more collective steps to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts. These talks and commitments also included China, Japan, and South Korea, the ASEAN Plus Three Countries.In the ongoing rampage of the virus, several governments in the region started to loosen up the lockdown and advanced social distancing policies.
For example, in Indonesia, the concept of Adaptasi Kebiasaan Baru (formerly known as New Normal/
Normal Baru) has been implemented. Municipalities, such as Bandung, began to construct strategies to restart their economy. At the same time, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam have tried to do the same. The Philippines are trying to gradually ease the lockdown. These policies reflect the need to rejuvenate the already slowed down economy. Long before this need appeared due to the pandemic,
there is a development initiative by China called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) . At first glance, this initiative certainly could help the countries in the region to restart their economy through investment and infrastructure projects in the BRI frameworks.
Nevertheless, the realization of the cooperation itself is easier to be said than done .
The need to restart the economy in the region In order to contain the pandemic and recover their economy, countries in the region need resources such as financing, and infrastructures. At the very least, they need sustainable financing for key government services. They also need to prepare appropriate incentives for small and medium-sized businesses.
After all, it is important to sustain or even enhance the flow of goods and services for their economy. In other words, the revival of small and medium-sized businesses, investment, and connectivity through sufficient infrastructures at their foundation could help to rejuvenate trades.
This is also reflected at the regional level. For example, an infographic by ASEAN emphasizing the potentials of ASEAN Connectivity to help mitigate the impacts of COVID-19 for ASEAN members. For ASEAN, resilient infrastructure is one of the keys to sustainable socio-economic growth. In addition, investment in critical infrastructure to facilitate movement of goods, services and labor need to be increased. The continuation of the flow of essential goods and supply chain efficiency is needed for ensuring ASEAN trades.
Last but not least, the importance of strengthening the digital economy is rising, especially to empower micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).
6 asean insights • vol.3 no.2 September 2020
photo:unsplash/Ashkan Forouzani
In regards to the ASEAN Connectivity itself, ASEAN members and China have emphasized the significance of synergy between the BRI and the region’s Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. This is reflected in the ASEAN-China Joint Statement on Synergizing the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in November 2019.
The Joint Statement reaffirms the commitment of China to support ASEAN connectivity by synergizing it with the BRI frameworks. This statement also encourages China to actively support the development and financing of ASEAN infrastructure and promote connectivity cooperation in the projects like railways, roads/highways, ports, airports, power and communication.
Thus, if we take a look back at the condition after COVID-19 pandemic, the need of Southeast Asian countries, especially ASEAN members, to restart their economy is compatible with China’s interest to implement the BRI initiatives in the region. In other words, the BRI clearly has positive implications for ASEAN efforts for economic recovery and mitigation of the pandemic negative effects. In fact, this is not a new perspective. There are already arguments that express the potentials of the BRI for Southeast Asia.
Despite that, there are also arguments stating that the BRI could not be easily implemented because of several challenges. The next part of this article will detail several of those challenges.
The BRI and Trust Issues in the Region
As the previous part shows, the interest of ASEAN members seems to be in line with China’s.
Nevertheless, there are several obstacles ahead for the BRI initiatives to be utilized by countries in the region. First, debt sustainability (including the issue of debt trap), a more transparent mechanism, and the perceptions toward China’s ambitions are the several issues surrounding the BRI initiative. So far, there is a growing concern that the BRI and the trade imbalance between ASEAN countries and China could lead to the increasing China’s economic leverage.
This is also related to the concern that the BRI could at some extent undermine the centrality and unity of ASEAN. There is also a concern that the ASEAN- led regionalism could be weakened by the BRI and the bilateral approach of China. In this case, China is known for its bilateral approach in regional affairs as in the case of cooperation in the South China Sea.
In this regard, the South China Sea disputes also at some point contribute to the challenge for the implementation of the BRI initiative. In the COVID-19 context, there is a concern of China’s adventurism. The West Capella standoff could be a good example for it.
Moreover, the disputes themselves have a deep root in history. Many efforts and initiatives have been tried out, but there has not been a resolution until today.
Conflict management is the very least the claimant countries can do to prevent the disputes erupted into an open war. In these waters, China’s maritime power has a rather significant advantage compared to that of the Southeast Asian countries that border with the South China Sea. Aircraft Carriers, military and paramilitary ships and the island reclamation are among China’s power in the South China Sea.
Coupled with China’s growing assertiveness and its intrusion in neighboring countries (even in Indonesia that has no claim toward the South China Sea), China’s power could increase the security dilemma in Southeast Asia. As Robert Jervis argues when the security dilemma is significant, the chance of cooperation could be diminished.
Second, there is a growing sentiment toward China’s investment, for example, the rejection of Chinese workers to Sulawesi, Indonesia. Some experts argue that is partly because of China’s and investors’
elite-oriented approach. from the other reason for the rejection as stated by Xue Gong (2018) is that Chinese companies lack sensitivity to the local people and culture in Southeast Asia. The cultural differences make it difficult for Chinese businesses to capture a bigger picture of the local work culture.
This could lead to a conflict with local workers.
There are arguments saying that some of Chinese companies are frustrated because local laborers are not motivated enough by the financial incentives and thus force them to bring in more workers from China. This step was criticized by the local population because it could reduce employment opportunities for the locals.
In short, countries in the region have concerns regarding China’s intention. China’s intention to promote BRI and its assertiveness in South China Sea would both increase its economic and political leverage that could eventually lead the region to China-centered integration.
If we take a look from a more theoretical perspective, the existence of those issues is not quite surprising.
After all, in the anarchical international system, it is possible if countries try to save themselves at the expense of others (self-help) rather than cooperating with each other. In other words, the Beggar-thy- neighbor is possible as history told us in the case of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Misperception and the fear of being exploited could affect the incentives to cooperate between ASEAN members and China.
Moreover, some experts also argue that the world after COVID-19 would be less cooperative, a grim picture of international relations. These challenges perhaps sound cliché since the concerns of Southeast Asian countries toward China’s intention is not exactly new. Nevertheless, in this very condition of COVID-19 Global Pandemic, China needs to do something to capitalize the existing common interest between China and Southeast Asian countries in regards of the implementation of the BRI initiative for the sake of helping regional economic recovery.
The Significance of Trust Building
As it was mentioned before, the anarchical international system makes it difficult for states to cooperate. This is also reflected in the concerns of Southeast Asian countries toward China and the BRI.
Nevertheless, both Southeast Asian Countries and China need the BRI to be implemented. Southeast Asian countries need to rejuvenate the economy and China needs to realize the BRI initiative to spread its influence further.
However, it is still not enough to increase the chance of cooperation. According to Robert Jervis’ theory, there are at least three things that would increase the chance of cooperation. First, something that increases the gain of cooperation. Second, something that decreases the incentives to exploit each other or something that makes no cooperation costly.
Lastly, something that increases the expectations of countries that their counterparts are willing to cooperate.
In this regard, China needs to increase positive expectations of its counterparts in Southeast Asia.
In other words, China needs to show to Southeast Asian countries that the BRI is not designed to exploit others and that China is actually willing to cooperate through cooperative, rather than assertive behaviors, especially under the COVID-19 pandemic condition.
There are at least two important issues that should be considered by China in order to synchronize the
need of the Southeast Asian Countries with the BRI initiative. The first and foremost is of the security dilemma. Even before the pandemic, Southeast Asia countries always have concerns and worries regarding China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. In this case, China should lighten its assertiveness in the South China Sea. Conflict management, rather than resolution through maintaining status quo could lessen the concerns in the surrounding waters. In other words, China needs to consider Southeast Asian states’ perspective on China’s assertiveness in the region. This step could be a way for China to decrease concerns on security in the region and thus, to ease up the negotiation and implementation of the BRI initiative.
The second issue is strengthening public diplomacy with a more people-to-people approach. This is not to say that China should abandon its previous elite-oriented diplomacy altogether. China should implement both elite and people oriented approaches accordingly in a balanced manner.
This, in turn, would build more trust on the goodwill of Chinese investment and trades not only among Southeast Asian elites, but also its people. This step could be one of the ways for China to further assuage the security dilemma and avoid criticisms from the Southeast Asian countries.
Thus, it is important for China to build more trust within the Southeast Asian countries. China should show that China’s overall intention through BRI and its regional security behavior is not aggressive or exploitative. In order to do that, China needs to convince not only the elites, but also the people of Southeast Asia. All of these would help China to build more trust and to finally implement the BRI initiative, while at the same time Southeast Asian countries could utilize its development initiative to recover their economy from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Author Rizky Widian
Lecturer at The Department of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University
rizkywidian23@unpar.ac.id
Improving the Quality of Korea’s Contribution to
Support Sustainable Forest and Peatland Management in South East Asia
Opinion
H
eavy smoke from forest and peatland fires could adversely impact public health and increase risk of contracting the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Heavy smoke can pose a health threat to the community, particularly those ailing from asthma or acute respiratory infection. The impact could be dangerous for asthma patients when exposed to COVID-19. Hence, precautionary steps against forest and land fires are required, not only during COVID-19 pandemic, but also for the long term as the frequency of pandemic is predicted to increase in the future.The devastating Indonesian wildfires in 1997, 2015, and 2019, which largely occurred in carbon-rich and fire-susceptible peatland, released more than 4 Gt of CO2 emissions1 and resulted in air pollution and haze problems. These environmental problems had negative humanitarian and economic impacts [2].
These impacts were also felt in neighboring countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines and Thailand.
Officially, among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, the problem is referred to as transboundary haze pollution [3].
Since 2010, Korea-Indonesia Forestry Centre (KIFC) has been working to support efforts to overcome the transboundary haze pollution through joint projects such as Korea-Indonesia Forest Management Unit/
Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+).
After the recurrent fires in 2015 and in 2016, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia paid more attention to the importance of forest and peatland conservation and restoration in mitigating climate change and noted the role of Indonesia-Korea
collaboration on strengthening forest governance in Indonesia. Korean government identified aspects and possible activities that the Government of the Republic of Korea might carry out in peatland restoration and rehabilitation efforts in Indonesia. In May 2016, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Peatland Restoration and Forest Fire Prevention Cooperation.
Following the MOU signing, Korea Forest Service (KFS) and the Korean Embassy to Indonesia in collaboration with Peatland Restoration Agency conducted a few events2 such as seminar, discussion, and field visit in preparation of writing the proposal of Korea-Indonesia Collaboration Project on Peatland Restoration and Forest Fire Prevention.
In one of the seminars, Korea SG Consulting, a South Korean-based environmental NGO, suggested that Indonesia conduct a socioeconomic survey by interviewing local residents living near the restoration land and involving them in mapping the project before carrying out the restoration. It is important to know their expectations and what incentives they expect from the government and stakeholders.
This suggestion is later partly done by Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG) in facilitating peatland restoration activities.
In 2017-2018, Korea-Indonesia Collaboration Project on Peatland Restoration was implemented in Jambi, by BRG and partners. In June 2019, this project was presented in Asia Pacific Forest Week (APFW) in Korea. Korea Forest Service (KFS), as one co-organizer of APFW, together with the FAO, expressed their genuine support for Indonesia’s efforts to take the lead in the implementation of peatland restoration as part of the Global Peatland Initiative.
1Global emissions bring climate disaster.
2A Seminar on Peatland Restoration in November 2016 in Jakarta. On the same day, Korea Forest Service (KFS) and Peatland Restoration Agency conducted a bilateral meeting, discussing about the plan for the Korea-Indonesia collaboration on peatland restoration and forest fire prevention. In the following day, on 9th November 2016, KFS Team and Peatland Restoration Agency Team conducted a field visit to South Kalimantan. On 26 – 28 December 2016, a Team from Peatland Restoration Agency and the Ministry of Environment dan Forestry visited Korea and conducted a discussion with Korea Forest Service about the Proposal of Korea-Indonesia Collaboration Project on Peatland Restoration and Forest Fire Prevention
8 asean insights • vol.3 no.2 September 2020
After APFW, in October 2019, the Ministry of Forestry Indonesia and Korea signed a new agreement for cooperation under KIFC and Asian Forest Cooperation Organization (AFoCO). This new cooperation will focus on peatland management by supporting International Tropical Peatland Centre (ITPC) that is based in Indonesia. The activities will include applied research in topics such as zero burning peatland management.
In 2020, KIFC started a cooperation with one of Korindo Group’s business units in oil palm plantation division, to give a joint support towards peatland conservation activity in the project area of REDD+, in Kampar Peninsula, one of the largest peatland forests in Riau Province. The purpose of the cooperation is to reduce greenhouse gasses, and increase knowledge of the apparatus. This cooperation includes three types of activities. First is area mapping using a method of taking aerial photos in the 14,722-ha project area.
The result from this method is used to identify areas prone to issues so it could be a source of analysis to do preventive actions. Second is maintaining the security of the project area to protect the project’s assets on the field. Third is giving training to increase the ability of the staff of company and Forest Management Unit (FMU) in implementing their duties on the field.
This training includes techniques in biomass data collection above the ground, measurement of peat thickness, and social and economic data collection.
Experts from several universities and within the country are involved as facilitators in this training. In carrying out these three activities, the company and FMU create a synergy with Korea SG Consulting. The company is also committed to continue to support and contribute to environmental and forest conservation in several regions such as Kalimantan and Papua.
Another company, South Korean conglomerate POSCO International also stated that they would commit to a policy of “No Deforestation, No Peatland, No Exploitation” (NDPE) in its palm oil operations in Indonesia’s Papua province.
Synergizing efforts
The abovementioned history of cooperation between Korea and Indonesia in forest and peatland management shows that it has involved multi- stakeholders in the governance. Yet, the efforts are still fragmented in different projects, partners, and locations. The quality of intervention is also still relatively low. Peatland restoration in Jambi has not yet shown a significant impact as the province still suffered from devastating fires in 2019.
To improve the quality of support, Korea should integrate or connect the different projects, either among projects supported by Korean fund or with other projects in surrounding areas. Forest and peatland governance require landscape management approach in its whole project life cycle. For example, planning for peatland restoration must consider different area functions and authorities. Methods for the planning also require ground truthing, not only aerial photos/remote sensing.
In terms of support for ITPC, Korea should also have coordination with ASEAN, especially with the ASEAN framework on Transboundary Haze and the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency (AADMER) that serves as a common policy platform for disaster management. AADMER’s 2016-2020 Work Programs highlight land and forest fires as a regional priority for disaster management development [5].
Korea can help promote best practices and lessons learned from Indonesian peatland management to other Southeast Asian countries with peatlands, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Some peatlands in these countries are vulnerable to degradation and deterioration which could exacerbate transboundary haze pollution.
Peatlands in Philippines and Malaysia require risk assessment and restoration.. Peatland restoration in Indonesia can be adapted in degraded peatlands in other Southeast Asian countries. These efforts will accelerate the AADMER work program for post- disaster recovery and mitigation plans and tackle transboundary haze in the long run.
Author Ibnu Budiman
Ph.D Candidate at Wageningen University and Research
photo:unsplash/spencer watson
Opinion
T
his paper offers two arguments. Firstly, it argues that it is crucial for the international community to engage North Korea to be involved in enhancing nuclear security, not only at the East Asia level, but also at the global level .The main reason for the first argument is that North Korea now is a de facto nuclear weapons state. This means that the country has nuclear materials, technology, and expertise; therefore, it is to a certain extent, vulnerable to nuclear security threats. According to the IAEA (2019a), nuclear security is “the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities”.
From such a definition, alienating North Korea does not seem in line with the aim of the international community to sustain international nuclear security.
This paper underlines the importance of engaging North Korea as a de facto nuclear weapons state. As Shin and Lee (2018) argue, engaging North Korea and treating it as a normal state is a crucial initial step to trust-building.
North Korea needs to feel welcomed and respected as a normal sovereign state by the international community to be able to think that it is okay to open itself and work together with other countries to sustain international nuclear security. Whether the international community should legally recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state is beyond the scope of this paper.
Another reason why it is important to engage North Korea is that coercion did not work on the country. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has dominated the global nuclear non-proliferation agenda for about three decades.
In efforts to deal with North Korea as a nuclear non- proliferation challenge, the international community (led by the United States) has persisted with the coercive non- proliferation approach for also about three decades. As George (2003, p. vii) notes, “Coercive diplomacy employs threats of force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo its encroachment.” Coercion usually involves three main features: diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military threats against the targeted states. All of these types of coercion have been implemented on North Korea, but such a long period has only shown the limits of coercive non-proliferation approach.
Considering the failure of the three-decade coercive non- proliferation approach against North Korea, the second argument this paper would like to offer is that the most viable way to engage North Korea today is through a multilateral path via the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
The Future of Nuclear Security:
Engaging
North Korea via the ARF
photo:unsplash/justin novello
The collapse of the Six Party Talks in 2008 made the ARF the only regional multilateral institution acting as a diplomatic bridge connecting North Korea with the other parties involved in the Korean Peninsula crises, including the United States, South Korea, China, and Japan. The ARF has also managed to maintain and nurture channels of communication not only between North Korea and the aforementioned rivals, but also among states in the Asia Pacific region.
As an ASEAN-led initiative, the ARF is known for its neutrality, and North Korea seems comfortable with it.
Since July 2000, North Korea has been a participant in the ARF. In 2008, North Korea acceded to the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Furthermore, since 2010, North Korea has sent its foreign minister to be a regular participant in the ARF summits as well as to visit individual ASEAN member states to hold direct bilateral talks (Tan, et. al., 2017). Through preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures, the forum facilitates political and security negotiations among states in the Asia Pacific region. The forum appears to be a key player in maintaining, if not strengthening, the order, peace, and security in the Asia Pacific region. As Acharya (2003, p. 332) also acknowledges, the ARF “fulfills the expected function of institutions in lowering transaction costs, providing information and preventing cheating”.
However, some label the ARF as merely a “talk shop”
(Jones and Smith, 2007). Such labeling seems on point since the establishment of the ARF is resulted from the cooperative security concept. In the ARF perspective, any interstate conflict has to be concluded through a peaceful process, such as through long dialogues and continuous negotiations. Thus, the forum has avoided an openly confrontational stance. The use of coercive methods, force, or “the continuation of diplomacy by other means” is not even considered an option.
The lack of sanctions or enforcement mechanisms limits the ARF to find ways to compel the member states to comply with all the norms, values, rules, and regulations, as well as to punish those that are noncompliant. All of these “weaknesses” of the ARF may explain North Korea’s regular attendance at the ARF meetings.
The international community should take advantage of the ARF as a venue to construct and develop diplomatic relations with North Korea, and to later
engage the country to be part of the international efforts to sustain international nuclear security.
When there is trust, there is an opportunity to work together. The ARF currently consists of twenty-seven member states: the ASEAN member states; the ASEAN dialogue partners (the United States, Russia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the European Union); Bangladesh; Sri Lanka; Pakistan; Mongolia; East Timor; Papua New Guinea (as an observer); and North Korea.
Via the ARF meetings, all the member states can communicate and share their best practice in developing their “design basis threat”, which is
“the capabilities of potential insider and external adversaries who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear and other radioactive material or sabotage” (IAEA, 2019b). These countries can also invite North Korean’s officers who work at the nuclear regulatory body, hospitals, customs and border control, and other offices related to nuclear security, to attend various trainings and workshops in order improve their knowledge on the latest nuclear security threats and how to improve North Korea’s capabilities to sustain its own nuclear security.
References
Acharya, Amitav. 2003. Regionalism and Multilateralism.
Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific. Eastern University Press: Singapore.
George, Alexander. 2003. “Foreword”. In Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin. The United States and Coercive Diplomacy. United States Institute of Peace Press:
Washington.
IAEA. 2019a. “Nuclear Security: Protecting against Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” Accessed from https://www-pub.
iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/PDFplus/2009/36489/p36489/
Top%205%20A.%20Nilsson.pdf
IAEA. 2019b. “Design Basis Threat (DBT).” Accessed from https://www.iaea.org/topics/security-of-nuclear-and- other-radioactive-material/design-basis-threat
Jones, David, and Michael Smith. 2007. “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving
Author
Mutti Anggitta
Lecturer at The Department of International Relations,
BINUS University
The “New Normal”
in People’s Mobility in Southeast Asia
Opinion
A
s one of the earliest areas affected by COVID-19, ASEAN member countries have issued various policies, mainly focusing on the mobility limitations or movement restrictions.Immediately after the cases of infection started to rise, all of the ASEAN member countries decided to close their borders and impose travel restrictions, only allowing their own citizens to enter their countries by following strict health protocols. In Malaysia, the government has implemented ‘movement control order’. In Singapore, the government utilize ‘circuit breaker’ – the term which is used to refer to their own social restriction order. In Indonesia, some of the local governments began to impose ‘large-scale social restriction order’, with Jakarta as the first city to implement it. Several other countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, have implemented stricter movement restriction order, by imposing curfews under the military and police supervision. Even though they have different terms, the movement restriction order basically encourages people to stay at home and conduct their activities from home, including work from home, except for those who are considered as essential workers. As the pandemic approaches half a year, changes in all aspects of life began; we have to figure out how to “live with”
the virus. The “temporary” claim for the movement restriction policies need to be reviewed since no one can actually come up with exact time frame when to significantly lift these restrictions.
Impacts of the policies on migrant workers and refugees
Although all of these movement restricting policies and regulations affect almost everyone from different backgrounds, there are two groups of people who are the most vulnerable to these movement restriction policies and COVID-19-related policies in general. They are the migrant workers and refugees. This becomes a bigger issue for regions like Southeast Asia, in which
some of the countries are known as migrant-sending or receiving countries. Countries like Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, the Philippines, and Viet Nam are known as migrant-sending countries, while Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia are known as migrant- receiving countries. According to International Labor Organization (ILO), there is an estimated 20 million migrants originating from Southeast Asian countries;
among them, nearly 6.9 millions have migrated within the region. Meanwhile, ASEAN, the long-standing regional organization, has also been struggling for several years with refugee problems, especially the Rohingyas. As of July 2019, there was an estimated of more than 740 thousand Rohingya refugees who fled from Myanmar.
There are two main reasons as to why these two groups of people are the most vulnerable to COVID- 19-related policies. First, most of the policies focus on citizens, and not foreigners like migrant workers and refugees. While, in fact, these two groups of people are the ones who have higher risks for contracting COVID-19. According to Dr. Hans Henri P. Kluge, the WHO Regional Director for Europe, migrant workers and refugees have higher risks because of their living conditions. Most of these people live in overcrowded accommodations with limited access to sanitary facilities. This living condition makes it impossible for them to practice physical distancing and other health protocols, such as washing hands frequently since they often do not have clean water and soap..
In addition, they also have limited access to health facilities and medicines, and in some cases, their work contracts do not include proper health insurance.
The second reason is the fact that the border control policies and movement restriction orders have created new problems for migrant workers and refugees.
Migrant workers consist of people who move to other countries or areas in order to find a better job.
12 asean insights • vol.3 no.2 September 2020
art: UN COVID-19 Response
While refugees can be defined as people who are forced to leave their home country due to various reasons such as war, arm conflicts, persecutions, and natural disasters. It is important to note that both of their activities or movements mostly involve crossing national borders. Therefore, border closure and movement restriction orders are detrimental to both these groups.
Erol Yayboke, a Deputy Director and Senior Fellow for Project on Prosperity Development and Project on U.S.
Leadership in Development, argued that COVID-19 can put the movement of people in halt, including the movement of migrant workers and forced migrants.
How does his observation apply in Southeast Asia?
COVID-19 has caused migrant workers to stop moving.
Some of the migrant workers who are expected to depart during this pandemic period had to postpone their departure for an indefinite time because of the border closure. Some of those who are already working in the destination countries cannot go to work due to the movement restriction orders. This is because most of the migrant workers that move within Southeast Asia work in job sectors that are considered dispensable or highly affected by the pandemic. For those who can keep their jobs, the situation might worsen as the social and economic conditions are declining. According to the latest ILO Brief on the experiences of ASEAN migrant workers during COVID-19, some of the migrant workers stated that they were facing employment problems and abuse related to COVID-19, such as threat of contract termination, being forced to work against their will – sometimes without proper personal protective equipment (PPE) –, inability to refuse work during lockdown, being required to take unpaid leave/
sick leave, and even having their passport and other legal documents held by their employers. There were also some of migrant workers who chose to leave their jobs and returned to their home. They aim to find work in their home countries, open a business, or work on a family-owned farm. However, this also becomes difficult because of the border closure and the lack of efforts to repatriate migrant workers by some ASEAN member countries. In other words, the limitation of movement not only prevents potential migrant workers from getting to their destination but also traps those who are already working abroad in a working condition which is worse than before the restriction was applied.
As for the refugees and asylum seekers, as previously stated, there are hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees who fled Myanmar due to the persecution.
Most of them sought refuge in Bangladesh, in the Cox’s Bazar district, where the Kutupalong and Nayapara refugee settlements are located. Because the settlements were overcrowded, from January to March this year, there were several boats with hundreds of Rohingya refugees on that left Bangladesh and headed
to Malaysia. With the closure of the border and fears of COVID-19 transmission from the refugees, the Malaysian authorities forced those boats back to the sea. It was very concerning because the refugees did not have enough food on those boats, or even access to clean water. This kind of situation undoubtedly made the refugees even more vulnerable to the virus.
The ASEAN’s version of the ‘New Normal' After months of lockdown, ASEAN member countries are now entering a new phase called the ‘new normal’.
Countries began to reopen their borders although several health protocols still have to be implemented at least until the vaccine for the virus is found. So now the question is, what does the ‘new normal’ mean for migrant workers and refugees? Borrowing Yayboke's term that ‘faucets turn off more easily than they turn on’, it is important to note that although countries have reopened their borders, some political leaders might use this opportunity to tighten their border controls against migrant workers and even refugees. Last June, the Malaysian authorities considered sending nearly 300 Rohingya Refugees detained after arriving on a damage boat back out to the sea once the ship had been fixed. Moreover, stricter border control orders could trigger an increase in irregular migration,a condition which Yayboke describes as the danger of global migration goes into the shadows. Countries in Southeast Asia have been trying to fight this human trafficking practices for years. With the border still mostly closed, the danger of illegal migration is looming.
This ‘new normal’ condition can also affect the continuity on the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) initiative. One of the main points of AEC is the free movement of workers, whether it is low-skilled or high- skilled workers. However, even though some pathways for migration are still there, the job opportunities might not be available anymore. Especially for the low-skilled workers. As for the high-skilled workers, new work styles such as work from home and the digitalization that are being developed during the pandemic might change the companies’ employment scheme in going forward.
High-skilled workers may no longer be required to move to the country where the company is located. They can do their work remotely and have online meetings. This is most likely what many companies will seek to adopt after this pandemic ends.
Therefore, in this ‘new normal’ phase, a comprehensive cooperation from all stakeholders is needed – whether it is from the government, companies and business owners, or the organizations – to define and agree on the new face of migration within the region. As the condition is continuously “new”, the earlier responses may have expired. Country-based solutions which were taken at the beginning of the pandemic to protect citizens will need to be expanded soon to include the neighbors’.
Lie, Liliana Dea Jovita
Post-graduate students in International Relations,
Parahyangan Catholic University
Sylvia Yazid
Lecturer at The Department of International Relations,
Parahyangan Catholic University
Author
What They about Say ASEAN?
The following questions are directed to
Nuki Agya Utama
Executive Director at ASEAN Centre for Energy
C
Could you tell us what ASEAN Center for Energy (ACE) is?ACE is a think-tank organization, a catalyst as well as aknowledge hub for ASEAN member states (AMS).
We were established by the initiatives ofthe energy ministries from ten AMS around 20 years ago. They asked us to focus on the whole spectrum of the energy sector, not only on fossil fuel, but also the energy supply and demand, power sectors, and also nuclear power. We also deal with geopolitical cost of energy, the social issues, as well as the environmental impacts of the energy. And, one of the important things we have been doing is scenario and planning, in which we are overseeing and predicting the energy demand and supply for upcoming decades. Those are some of our work.
We understand that every AMS has different commitment towards sustainable energy. How do AMS cooperate with each other in the energy sector?
It is always an issue whether AMS can agree on something or work together,but ASEAN can be a good role model for other regions in terms of coordination and cooperation. Energy sector is one of those sectors in which they can get along. We agree on having consecutive meetings annually.
Those consecutive meetings are supported by either multilateral or bilateral meetings. ACE is a knowledge
hub and catalyst on these activities. The big output we have is the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation. It follows the value that we have: no country is left behind. For example, in the terms of energy efficiency, not all countries have advanced technology to increase energy efficiency in their power or industrial sector. With this cooperation and coordination, we bring together experts from advanced countries and less advanced countries to work together in increasing the efficiency. Of course, these efforts are also supported by dialogue partners, international organizations, and other country-based organizations.
Regarding ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025, how does ACE progress? What have we achieved from it?
This year is the end of phase one of APAEC (2016- 2020), and the second phase will start in 2021. Now, we are very busy preparing the draft. The achievement from phase one is very good and is well appreciated from all AMS. Everything is almost completed (95%).
The ones remaining have already been prepared to be held later this year. I’m convinced that we can complete it at 100% this year, and we can start the second phase next year. APAEC has focused on seven program areas: Regional Energy Policy and Planning (REPP), ASEAN Power Grid (APG), Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP), energy efficiency, clean coal technology, and nuclear civilian energy
14 asean insights • vol.3 no.2 September 2020
Many other countries, including our dialogue partners, and several international organizations are interested in APAEC. They want to start cooperation and collaboration with us on how to proceed with the APAEC in the benefit of AMS.
Listening to your answer, it seemed that everything was running smoothly. Yet, do we still have homework to accomplish the APAEC goals?
We still have a lot of homework on the renewable energy sector. We plan to increase renewable energy use or production? To or by? 23% by 2025, and currently, we have increased the amount of renewable energy to or by? 14,6%. Looking at the possibility of achieving the current target in 2025, we have a lot of homework to do. However, I need to tell you that we have achieved the 20% target on energy intensity by this year. Energy intensity is the amount of energy that we need to provide in order to increase some percentage of GDP. To measure energy intensity, we divide the energy use by the GDP. Now, we have up to 24% reduction. It means that we have 4% reduction beyond the target, and the member states agree to increase this target up to 30% by 2025.
Regarding the APAEC, does AEC have any plans to accelerate its success?
The success of APAEC in phase one will be continued in phase two. One of the success stories in the APAEC phase one is the development of ASEAN Power Grid. We successfully integrated the electricity transmission among Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.This success story was shared to countries
in the region, and they are looking into it. It could be a good example on how to build cooperation in the energy sector in the region. As you may know, it is very difficult to connect transmission of one country to another,but we successfully connected it not just bilaterally but multilaterally. Lately, our study on APG with the algorithm optimization model already oversees the possibility to connect all the peninsula as well as the Philliphines, Brunei, Sabah, Sarawak and Kalimantan.
In your opinion, how’s the future of energy in ASEAN?
The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the energy sector very hard. The declining demand for fossil fuels, demand for electricity, and the declining economy make it difficult for the energy sector to grow. It is the first time in history that the energy sector areimpacted by two factors at the same time, supply and demand. In ASEAN, we have a very big challenge to become self-sustained energy suppliers since the member states will be having very high energy demand in the next 20 or 30 years. The market is very big, but at the same time we cannot rely on fossil fuels because of the declining resource and reserve that we have. It is predicted that in the next 20-30 years, we are going to import almost all of fossil fuels we need. Today, we have been importing oil and soon we will import gas and coal.
Consequently, it is very important to think further about being self-sustained energy suppliers.
New Southern Policy and Republic of Korea-Indonesia
Defence Cooperation
T
he introduction of the New Southern Policy (NSP) by President Moon Jae-in of Republic of Korea (ROK) during his state visit to Indonesia in 2017 marked ROK’s renewed foreign policy commitment to ASEAN member states and India.Diversifying ROK’s economic cooperation, elevating bilateral ties with ASEAN, and reinvigorating regional cooperation fuelled the necessity of formulating the NSP. 1The objectives were translated into three pillars: ‘people community’, ‘prosperity community’, and ‘peace community’. The third pillar, ‘peace community’ slates the intention to tighten diplomatic engagement and defence cooperation. 2Furthermore, the activities under this pillar cover collective responses to tackle terrorism and ensure cyber and maritime security and collaboration to safeguard peace in the Korean Peninsula.3
Being the largest country, both in terms of territory and population amongst ASEAN member states, Indonesia certainly has been the primacy of the NSP in Southeast Asia region. The upgrade of ROK-Indonesia strategic partnership to special strategic partnership and Indonesia being the first ASEAN country to form a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEPA) with Seoul underpinned such priority. The special strategic partnership propelled defence cooperation between the two countries, particularly defence industry cooperation. The formulation of NSP provides a great momentum for Seoul and Jakarta to further tighten the existing collaboration in defence sector. This article aims to examine existing ROK-Indonesia defence cooperation and offer recommendations to bolster the engagement under the NSP framework.
ROK-Indonesia Defence Cooperation
Existing defence cooperation between ROK and
Indonesia mainly covers arm transfers as well as joint production of military platforms. Furthermore, top brass military officers of the two countries have done exchange of visits regularly. The formulation of strategic partnership in 2006, which was then upgraded to special strategic partnership in 2017, became a foundation for various defence and security engagements between Seoul and Jakarta.
The transfer of T-50 jetfighters, the transfer and joint production of three Chang Bogo-class submarines, and the plan to build 4.5 generation jetfighters under the KFX/IFX programme became the landmark deals on politics and security pillar of the strategic partnership. Nonetheless, the continuation of KFX/
IFX plan remains hazy though recently Indonesia’s Coordinating Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Ministers Mahfud MD expressed the commitment to maintain the project.
In addition to the submarine deal and the KFX/IFX programme, Indonesia procured several Korean made armaments, such as howitzers and armoured vehicles.
Indonesia has also announced the plan to acquire 3 additional submarines from South Korea, which are expected to be delivered by 2026. Meanwhile, ROK bought Indonesian Aerospace company (PT DI)’s flagship product CN-235 transport aircraft (See Table 1). Nevertheless, the arms transfer between the two countries had been done even before the signing of strategic partnership in 2006. For example, in the early 2000s Indonesian navy received a couple of Korean Daesun’s landing ship docks (LSD). The LSD deal involved the production of the two vessels at Indonesia’s navy shipyard company PT PAL with the assistance of Daesun. The Chang Bogo submarine deal also used the same scheme, two of which were manufactured in Korea, while the other in Indonesia.
Opinion
1Choe Wongi. (2019), “Why South Korea Wants to Tie in with ASEAN,” ASEANFocus, issue 6, pp. 12-13.
2Hoang Thi Ha and Glenn Ong, (2020), “Assessing the ROK’s New Southern Policy towards ASEAN,” ISEAS Peerspective, issue 7.
3Sungil Kwak, (2020, January 7), “A View from South Korea,” The Asan Forum, 7 January 2020.
http://www.theasanforum.org/a-view-from-south-korea-3/ .
photo:RAF/Cpl Lee Matthews
16 asean insights • vol.3 no.2 September 2020
Table 1: ROK-Indonesia Major Arms Deal Since 2006 Source: various news articles
Though the strategic partnership and special strategic partnership seemed to cement defence cooperation between ROK and Indonesia, there is still room for improvement. . First, while the existing arms transfer and joint production expanded the marketing area for South Korean defence manufacturers and enabled Indonesia to have new weapon system and adopt cutting-edge defence technology, the know- how of using those new military platforms remains unchecked. Forming regular bilateral military training is one way to transfer such knowledge. ROK- Indonesia bilateral military exercise nevertheless has not yet been the centre of attention in the defence relations of the two camps. For example, there are no records of bilateral exercise between ROK air force and its Indonesian counterpart in the past decade (see Figure 1) though South Korea sent instructors to train Indonesian T-50 pilots.
Figure 1: TNI AU's Bilateral Exercise 2010-2019 Source: various news articles
Second, the ROK-Indonesia arms deal is still pretty much dominated by Korean products. Following the strategic partnership, major arms transfer from Indonesia to South Korea was only that of PT DI’s CN-235 (see Table 1). Indonesia’s limited defence technology became the primary culprit of the arms trade imbalance. Moreover, Indonesia’s finite
financial resource has hindered the country’s plan to expand defence industry sector. The case of KFX/
IFX is one example. Indonesia’s lack of financial commitment has been one of the reasons of the project’s tardy progress.
Maximising NSP Momentum
The renewed commitment of South Korea towards ASEAN state members through the NSP certainly offers promising opportunities to advance ROK- Indonesia defence cooperation. Nonetheless, the two abovementioned issues hinder the two countries from reaping the full benefit of the collaboration.
To overcome the issues, expanding the scope and capacity of defence cooperation is paramount. First , holding bilateral military exercise involving Korean- made defence products can be beneficial for the two countries. The activity provides an arena to not only transfer knowledge, but also to solidify military to military relations. The Indonesian military can get better experience in operating its existing Korean- made platforms. At the same time, the exercise shows that ROK can be an alternative and reliable defence partner in the region.
Second, Indonesia should treat South Korea as a potential defence industry market. Indonesia in general exports mainly raw commodities to ROK, such as coal, nickel, rubber, wood, and timber. The Indonesian authority should use the NSP momentum to sell high technology products to ROK, including defence products. The NSP reflects stronger commitment and willingness of ROK to engage countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia.
Nonetheless, reaping the full benefit of the policy requires effort not only from Seoul but also from Jakarta.
Author
Adhi Priamarizki
Visiting Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Product User Category Year of
Agreement KT Wong Bee Indonesian air
force Arms transfer 2006 CN-235 ROK Coast Guard Arms transfer 2008 Tarantula
armoured vehicle Indonesian army Arms transfer 2009 KH-178 105mm Indonesian army Arms transfer 2010 Chang Bogo-class
submarine Indonesian navy Arms transfer and joint produc�on 2011 T-50 Golden
Eagle Indonesian air
force Arms transfer 2011 KFX/IFX
je�ighters Indonesian air
force Joint produc�on 2011 KH-179 155mm Indonesian army Arms transfer 2012 Chang Bogo-class
submarine Indonesian navy Arms transfer and joint produc�on 2019
Product User Category Year of
Agreement KT Wong Bee Indonesian air
force Arms transfer 2006 CN-235 ROK Coast Guard Arms transfer 2008 Tarantula
armoured vehicle Indonesian army Arms transfer 2009 KH-178 105mm Indonesian army Arms transfer 2010 Chang Bogo-class
submarine Indonesian navy Arms transfer and joint produc�on 2011 T-50 Golden
Eagle Indonesian air
force Arms transfer 2011 KFX/IFX
je�ighters Indonesian air
force Joint produc�on 2011 KH-179 155mm Indonesian army Arms transfer 2012 Chang Bogo-class
submarine Indonesian navy Arms transfer and joint produc�on 2019
0 1 2 3 Australia4
Canada
France
Germany
India Malaysia Netherlands
New Zealand Singapore
Thailand United States
Total
