ISSN 2502-0722 Issue 32/ February 2018
ASEAN 2018:
Towards Resilience and Innovation in Uncertain Times Making
Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN Special Mahathir’s
Second Coming +
INFOGRAPHIC ASEAN ROUND-UP
ASEAN 2018: Towards Resilience and Innovation in Uncertain Times
Making Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN Special
Mahathir’s Second Coming
Infographic Our Eyes Initiatives
MIKTA: Unlocking Global Solutions Unlocking the Solutions: MIKTA and The Call of Global Security Challenges in The 21st Century Complex Strategic Environment
ASEAN Round-Up
ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Singapore for Annual Retreat
ASEAN to Focus on Food, Sustainability to Boost Tourism
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13 13 9
14 15
18
18
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Project Supervisors Rahimah Abdulrahim Executive Director, The Habibie Center Hadi Kuntjara
Deputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center
Editor in Chief A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi Thinking ASEAN Team
Askabea Fadhilla Fina Astriana Muhamad Arif Hana Hanifah Rahma Simamora Tongki Ari Wibowo Vierna Tasya Wensatama Wirya Adiwena
A note from the editor
Dear readers:
Welcome to the February 2018 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!
The ten ASEAN Foreign Ministers recently gathered in Singapore earlier this month for their annual Retreat. Being the first major regional event of the year, the gathering kicked off Singapore’s chairmanship of ASEAN under the theme of ‘Resilience and Innovation’
and gave an opportunity for them to exchange views on regional and international developments. In this sense, our lead article by Amanda Huan and Sarah Teo (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU)) looks at
‘ASEAN 2018: Towards Resilience and Innovation in Uncertain Times’ and discusses the key challenges facing the region in the coming year as well as assesses the potential effectiveness of resilience and innovation as this year’s themes.
Meanwhile, our second article, by Dr. Nicholas Farrelly (Australian National University (ANU) College of Asia and the Pacific) focuses on the ASEAN-Australian dialogue partnership in light of the Special Summit that will be taking place in Sydney next month;
the first time Australia will host such an event on their soil.
Our last article is by Badrul Hisham Ismail (IMAN Research) and entitled, ‘Mahathir’s Second Coming.’ His article looks at some of the key issues that will shape Malaysia’s 14th General Election, in particular the impact of former Prime Minister Mahathir and his
decision to lead the opposition against the ruling Barisan Nasional which he once led.
As usual, we present an infographic that this month looks at the
‘Our Eyes’ intelligence initiative involving Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand.
Don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@
habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, input, or prospective submissions.
Happy reading!
Best regards from Jakarta
Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.
The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non- governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.
The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non- governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.
The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.
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Port of Singapore Source: Zairon/Wikimedia Commons
ASEAN 2018:
Towards Resilience and Innovation in Uncertain
Times
Amanda Huan, Senior Analyst with the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore
Sarah Teo, Associate Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architecture Programme at RSIS, NTU
S
ingapore assumes the ASEAN chairmanship at a time when the strategic environment grows ever more complex.Uncertainty over Sino-U.S.
relations in the region coupled with developments surrounding traditional and emerging challenges present a complicated picture. Amid these regional dynamics, Singapore has adopted the twin approaches of resilience and innovation to ensure regional stability and promote continued development in ASEAN. This article will discuss the key challenges facing ASEAN and its member states, as well as assess the potential effectiveness of resilience and innovation as principles in steering ASEAN through the coming year.
Uncertainties facing ASEAN and East Asia
In East Asia today, one could identify three key uncertainties that characterise regional dynamics. The first uncertainty is the trajectory of Sino-U.S. relations and its impact on the broader regional order. Several of Singapore’s top political figures have pointed out that this major power relationship is the most important bilateral relationship, not only in East Asia, but also in the world.1 While the United States remains the preeminent economic and military power globally, the Trump administration’s approach to East Asia has rattled governments across the region, who are concerned about U.S.
commitment to their security and regional stability.2
Meanwhile, a rising China has sought to expand its strategic weight in the region by putting in place elements of its preferred regional order centred on its leadership – for example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These Chinese initiatives do offer an alternative to the status quo – arguably premised on ASEAN-led multilateralism and the U.S. hub-and-spokes system – even if it is unclear at this point how Beijing’s charm offensive would ultimately change the region.
The second uncertainty involves longstanding security challenges in East Asia, namely the South and East China Sea disputes and the Korean Peninsula tensions. The latter two issues exert more of an indirect – but not necessarily minimal – impact on ASEAN, while several ASEAN countries are directly involved in the South China Sea disputes as claimant states. To be fair, recent developments have
suggested a reduction of tensions in all three flashpoints. For instance, ASEAN and China have agreed to start talks on the fine print of the Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea, and there are plans to hold an inaugural ASEAN-China maritime exercise.
While these are undoubtedly positive developments, it remains unclear what will happen in the longer term. In the South China Sea, states – both claimant and non-claimant – would ultimately want to preserve their own interests, some of which clearly differ from one another.
Similarly, the respective stakeholders in the East China Sea dispute and the Korean Peninsula also continue to hold differing interests and agendas. It is thus not inconceivable that the progress in these issues would again come to a halt, affecting the environment that ASEAN operates in.
Last but not least, newer threats driven by developments in technology have also increased the uncertainty faced by regional states. Counter-terrorism efforts, in particular, have been complicated by the cyber dimension. Social media platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube and Telegram, have been used by extremist groups to recruit new members, disseminate propaganda and gather intelligence. The
‘fake news’ phenomenon, facilitated by the widespread use of social media, is also an increasing concern given that the spread of false information, or even disinformation, can undermine public trust in governments and public institutions.
The urgency to establish cyber norms and behavioural standards is real, given the speed at which these technologies are being developed and utilised. A study by international consulting firm A.T.
Kearney, released in January, found that ASEAN’s spending of 0.07 percent of its gross domestic product on cybersecurity fell short of the global average of 0.13 percent.3 Without adequate resources and capacity to combat cyber threats, countries leave themselves vulnerable to cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, which can cripple entire nations as shown in the case of Ukraine in June 2017.
To manage the impact of the aforementioned uncertainties, Singapore has therefore adopted two themes for its ASEAN chairmanship year: resilience and innovation.
ASEAN 2018: Resilience and innovation
The two themes are interrelated and aim to reinforce cooperation across ASEAN’s political-security, economic, and socio- cultural communities. The combination of resilience and innovation could also be treated as a juxtaposition of ASEAN’s historical foundations with a forward- looking Association responding to new regional and global trends.
The theme of resilience harks back to the origins of ASEAN, when the five founding member states established the regional body at a time of great uncertainty and mistrust. The concept has been found in ASEAN discourse since the 1970s, for instance in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and in the development of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The concept may be traced to the notion of national resilience that was proposed by Indonesia, during the founding years of ASEAN, as a key element for national and regional stability. This form of resilience is achieved by strengthening each member state’s capabilities and enhancing their self-sufficiency and development. National resilience is followed by a collective or regional resilience.
Meanwhile, the theme of innovation focuses on building the capacities of ASEAN and its member states through the use of new technology and practices.
Innovation is thus about preparing ASEAN for the future. Together, both themes contribute towards buffering ASEAN against crises and allowing the institution to tackle problems in a more cohesive manner. Past examples of ASEAN’s resilience and innovation are reflected in its responses to the Asian Financial Crisis, SARS, and terrorist attacks.
Considering the current regional environment, Singapore has proposed initiatives for ASEAN to strengthen resilience and promote innovation against threats. The projects will cut across the economic, security, and socio-cultural domains. For example, in the security sphere, Singapore is looking specifically at projects that will target common threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, and climate change. Negotiations on the COC in the South China Sea will also continue.
On the socio-cultural front, Singapore has highlighted human capital development as one key area to boost regional capacity.
Sixty percent of ASEAN’s population of 628 million are below the age of 35. Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, refers to this statistic as a
demographic dividend that ASEAN has yet to harvest, and stresses the importance of investing in the youth by equipping them with the relevant skills and knowledge.4 In the economic field, trade and connectivity are key areas of focus. There is a strong emphasis on trade facilitation, particularly for small and medium enterprises, as Singapore looks towards the realisation of an ASEAN-wide Self-Certification regime and the ASEAN Single Window. Singapore has also announced that it would step up its efforts in achieving the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as part of the long-term aim of achieving a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. These initiatives are also meant to contribute towards narrowing the development gap between ASEAN countries.
With an eye on capitalising on mega- trends, Singapore is looking at innovative ways to enhance ASEAN’s connectivity and economic might. This includes focusing on e-commerce and other digital economy-related plans. Another key part of Singapore’s plans is the proposed ASEAN Smart Cities Network that aims to increase connectivity and enable the smooth and rapid flow of ideas and solutions across the region.
Focusing on resilience and innovation is thus aimed at boosting ASEAN’s capacity to respond to changing regional realities, as well as safeguarding regional prosperity and stability over the long term. The pursuit of these twin themes, however, will have to contend with complex issues from within the Association itself that might undermine these efforts.
Challenges from within ASEAN First, the trends of rising nationalism and populism have appeared to seep into the foreign policy-making of several ASEAN countries. While there is a natural reflex for countries to prioritise their national interests, the challenge is to ensure that these national-level agendas align with, or at the very least do not contradict, broader regional goals. The rise in nationalism and populism is complicated by the politically diverse voices – within the respective ASEAN countries – that play a part in shaping foreign policy.
This means that even at the domestic level, consensus is often difficult. Striving for any kind of collective, ASEAN-level voice thus becomes more of a challenge.
The divided response of ASEAN member states to the Rakhine crisis in Myanmar
is an exemplification of this difficulty. As a resolution to the Myanmar issue is unlikely to be reached anytime in the near future, this might well be a major stumbling block to ASEAN unity.
Related to the challenges of a diverse ASEAN – and even though Singapore’s proposed initiatives aim to close the development gap between member states – the development gap among Member States, alongside infrastructural issues, will serve as a barrier for an even implementation of its plans. The prioritisation of capacity-building in the cyber domain and the push for an ASEAN Smart Cities Network, for instance, might not fit well with the agendas of emerging economies within the Association.
Moreover, the development gap does not exist just among countries; it is also necessary to address the socio-economic gap within countries.
Additionally, the heavy emphasis on economics as a key tool for community- building may be inadequate. A survey conducted of about 3,000 citizens of ASEAN countries in October 2017 by Singapore-based Blackbox Research found that Southeast Asians lack an “emotional connection” to the ASEAN project.5 Only 38 percent of the respondents held a favourable opinion towards the Association, while 53 percent felt that their country has benefited from ASEAN’s existence.6 There thus remains a need to address the ‘soft’ side of community- building.
At a broader strategic level, it is also important for ASEAN to strengthen engagement with all the key regional players to ensure that they, too, continue to have an interest in maintaining regional stability. This is imperative in light of the Sino-U.S. competition for leadership in the regional order. ASEAN-led platforms in which the major powers are participants, such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus, are already well established. The task ahead would be to ensure that ASEAN remains the hub of the multi-layered regional arrangements, and that its concerns and agenda are not sidelined amid major power interests.
In all, at the heart of Singapore’s 2018 ASEAN chairmanship is a beckoning to remember the Association’s beginnings and to build upon the successes that have followed, especially in the current climate characterised by regional uncertainty.
During an event to launch Singapore’s
ASEAN chairmanship, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong spoke of how ASEAN was not simply a “security anchor”
for the region but also a community that
“support[s] one another through difficult times” and “work[s] together to solve common problems and improve the lives of our peoples”.7 Pursuing collective resilience and innovation is thus essential in contributing to the long-term viability of the ASEAN project, but the success of this approach would depend on whether the Association can overcome its internal challenges to maintain unity, and consequently centrality in the regional architecture.
Endnotes
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, ‘Transcript of Keynote Address by Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan at the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference Policy Dialogue: Geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific Region - Opportunities, Challenges and Perspectives’ (Press Room, 6 November 2017) <https://www.mfa.gov.sg/
content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2017/201711/
press_201711060.html>; Albert Wai, ‘Good US-China ties vital to global security and prosperity, says PM Lee’
(Today, 24 October 2017), <https://www.todayonline.com/
singapore/pm-lee-urges-washington-and-beijing-maintain- stable-and-constructive-relationship>
2 Javier C. Hernandez, ‘Trump’s Mixed Signals on South China Sea Worry Asian Allies’ (The New York Times, 10 May 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/world/asia/
trump-south-china-sea-allies.html>
3 Aqilah Allaudeen, ‘Singapore leads Asean in its cyber security policies, but the region needs to work together:
Report’ (Business Insider Singapore, 23 January 2018)
<http://www.businessinsider.sg/singapore-leads-asean-in- its-cyber-security-policies-but-the-region-needs-to-work- together-report>
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, ‘Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Speech and Question and Answer Session at the 15th ASEAN Lecture, “ASEAN: Next 50”, at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’ (Press Room, 5 December 2017) <https://
www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/
pr/2017/201712/press_20171205.html>
5 Blackbox Research, ASEAN Turns 50: A Study of Southeast Asian Perceptions, p. 30 <http://www.blackbox.com.sg/
category/white-papers-and-public-research>
6 Ibid., pp. 11, 16.
7 Lee Hsien Loong, ‘PM Lee Hsien Loong launched Singapore’s chairmanship of ASEAN 2018 at the Experience ASEAN carnival at Bishan-Ang Mo Kio Park’ (Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, 12 January 2018)
<http://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/pm-lee-hsien-loong- experience-asean>
Dr Nicholas Farrelly, Associate Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. He has published widely on Southeast Asian political and social topics and was the founder of New Mandala, a website on regional affairs established in 2006.
A general view of the reopening of Australian Parliament Source: arstechnica.com
Making Australia’s
Relationship with ASEAN
Special
T
he March 2018 ASEAN- Australia Special Summit will provide a sublime, Sydney harbourside backdrop for what should be Australia’s next big foreign policy push. It will require some nimble footwork from all partners, but the outcome is likely to reinforce the suggestion, coming increasingly loudly from Canberra, that the ten countries of Southeast Asia will be central to the economic success and security outlook of the land down under.Such interaction at the elite political level is a good start, but it is now unavoidable that Australia will need a concerted, bipartisan, multi-generational push, right down to the local level, if it wants to be taken seriously as a close friend of the Southeast Asian region.
For now, there are distinct points of friction; especially when it comes to political systems. Australia is proud of its robust democratic institutions, its relatively vigorous free press, and overall adherence to the rule of law and due process, and to the vision that there is a “fair go” for all. While some elements of that lofty self-perception sustain real damage, from time-to-time, Australians share a general expectation that this system, with all its checks-and-balances, and push-and-shove, is what makes us strong.
It is the contrast with prevailing attitudes in Southeast Asia that presents an opportunity for Australian speech-makers and speech-writers. There is no point in ignoring the elephant at the table.
Southeast Asia has no deep tradition of representative democracy, peaceful transfers of power, or adherence to human rights norms. Where there are exceptions, those exceptions tend to reinforce what has proved a long, historical tendency, in every Southeast Asian society, towards authoritarian rule. While Australians will be diplomatic and generous in public, there is no reason to overlook the dictatorial preferences of most Southeast Asian elites, even those who have, like Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi, tended to present themselves in a democratic style.
Today’s most important exception is Indonesia, where a series of elected governments, including the one led today by President Joko Widodo, have sought to entrench a political, cultural and social system infused with a democratic spirit.
It remains rough-and-tumble, and there are so many areas where Indonesians
themselves find cause for concern.
Contradiction often prevails.
What that contradiction also means is that even the most authoritarian of the ASEAN group face rapid change: the product of astonishing generational, technological, economic and, yes, political mega-trends.
Many Australians have missed this point.
Indeed, too many Australians still labour under the misapprehension that their northern neighbours are destitute and ineffective, deserving of charity, at best, or pity, at worst.
The challenge, for Australians, is getting to grips with the changes in ASEAN societies that will, before long, make them powerful and prosperous in ways not conceived by previous generations. Southeast Asians may also, as such, be much less inclined to accept a hectoring tone from Australian voices.
Australians should have already accepted that the un-democratic preferences of Southeast Asian elites are unlikely to change in any dramatic fashion. While there are active anti-government movements in most countries and opposition groups can mobilise large numbers of people for street demonstrations, there is little apparent momentum for radical shifts.
The case of Malaysia helps to illustrate the point, where the same government has been in power since independence from Britain in 1957. Of course, the top personalities have changed, occasionally, but the strength of the regime has never truly come under threat. There will be another election this year but, with current conditions, a change of government seems unlikely. And even a change in elected leaders does not necessarily bring about other shifts.
In recent memory, both Myanmar and Thailand have seen power handed over after election wins, and yet the controlling interests in society—nationalists and militarists in Myanmar, and royalists and militarists in Thailand—have hardly moved.
Southeast Asia’s leaders understand the lack of real sanction for authoritarian behaviour, a situation which encourages draconian approaches where they are deemed essential to regime survival.
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Brunei, to name four of the ASEAN ten, are among the world’s most hardline autocratic regimes.
Their relative stability offers advantages, we are often reminded, for economic growth and social development. The expansion of economic activity in a country like Vietnam is, in this light, astounding. That recent success helps to reinforce a vision of national life that need not pay too much heed to the suggestions of well-meaning outsiders about the need for dramatic political reform.
From the outside, whether that is from Australia or elsewhere, most of the activism that occurs nowadays targets the vulnerable margins of ASEAN. Rather than confronting the troubling authoritarian preferences of big city elites, much attention focuses on labour rights, women’s issues and environmental custodianship.
This shift means that full-throated attacks on undemocratic regimes rarely gain much attention. Even outrageous policies of exclusion and persecution—like those aimed at the Rohingya in Myanmar—
and state-sanctioned violence—the recent purges of “drug traffickers” in the Philippines are an example—generate relatively mild concern.
Instead, activists and their supporters appear content to find opportunities for incremental change and steady progress towards polite targets, like the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
Even large and potent humanitarian and advocacy organisations are very reluctant to lose their access to vulnerable populations and so are prepared to accept that some awkward topics, like the Rohingya, are off-limits, for now.
The Southeast Asian countries have, in this respect, succeeded with one of their long- term priorities: the universalisation of the cherished “non-interference” principle.
Among themselves, this means that difficult and potentially dangerous issues are only discussed behind closed doors, if at all. For non-ASEAN countries, the notion of “ASEAN centrality” has implied a general acceptance of these Southeast Asian rules of the diplomatic game.
Many Australians may be reluctant to accept these ASEAN expectations, and yet the weight of numbers and argument has shifted dramatically to the Southeast Asian side. If Australia ever opts out of ASEAN facilitated discussions, then the most notable costs will be carried by decision- makers in Canberra, not in Putrajaya, Naypyitaw or Vientiane. In fact, in many of the ASEAN capitals, Australia does not rate highly, if at all, as a factor worth long- term policy consideration.
Australia will, therefore, need to work harder and with wisdom, if it wants to maintain its influence in this increasingly vibrant region.
Indonesia is the place to start, partly because of its current democratic credentials, but also based on its immense scale and potential. For this century, Australia probably has no more important relationship than the one it enjoys with Indonesia. The challenge, for politicians and bureaucrats on the Australian side, however, is to reconfigure their worldview to accept that Indonesia will, probably, never reciprocate.
As the emerging Southeast Asian regional power, Indonesia will play with the world’s great powers, and Australia, as such, will only be a peripheral concern. For that reason, Australians should double down on Indonesian language studies, and on cultural and political literacy. But they will almost inevitably find an excuse for why that still proves too difficult.
Instead, other parts of Southeast Asia will remain preferred partners in the years ahead. In this respect, links to Singapore are also essential to Australian success in the region, and it is the one ASEAN country where most Australians immediately feel almost at home. Its orderliness, wealth and can-do attitude offer a refreshing vision of the region’s future for those prepared to look closely.
It helps the Australian cause that our economies and societies are
complementary, in crucial respects. That complementarity has made it possible to bed down the 2016 Australia-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, a rejuvenated model of cooperation, which includes significant defence components, With other Southeast Asian countries, there is latent potential for further interaction and much-expanded collaboration. Australian government statements are clear on the need to broaden and deepen relations, primarily through commercial, educational, cultural and personal connections. These will need to start with young Australians. They are those who have the most to gain through a lifelong appreciation of working closely with Southeast Asia.
For example, the New Colombo Plan, designed to offer young Australians a chance to experience Asia-Pacific societies, has proved hugely valuable for reinforcing people-to-people links. The idea is that these links will create lasting bonds, at professional and personal levels, between Australia’s next generation of leaders and their counterparts across the region.
It is no surprise that Southeast Asia has proved a focus of New Colombo Plan activity, with thousands of students benefiting from a chance to learn in the region. Many have gravitated towards the bright lights of Bangkok, Singapore and Jakarta, while others have been supported to take less well-trodden paths.
The New Colombo Plan has, for instance,
encouraged a new cohort of young Australians to build relationships with Myanmar. Studying at local Universities and working closely with Myanmar civil society organisations, these students are setting a high standard for all who hope to help shape the interface between Southeast Asia and Australia over the long-term.
Australia is also increasingly presenting a Southeast Asian face to the world. Leaders like Senator Penny Wong, the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hieu Van Le, the Governor of South Australia, Tim Soutphommasane, the Race Discrimination Commissioner, and Auskar Surbakti, a prominent journalist, are the vanguard of a shift in the Australian experience.
Australians are Southeast Asian too.
Over the decades ahead, a wide range of prominent roles in business, politics, community advocacy, journalism and the bureaucracy will be filled by those whose families migrated from Southeast Asia in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
Making the most of their contributions to Australian society will be an ongoing priority and one that may require some shifts in existing Australian practice.
Their skills—especially in cultural and linguistic terms, but also when it comes to delicate political and economic matters—
offer immense value. Making the most of culturally and linguistically diverse communities could prove one of Australia’s foremost advantages in the century ahead.
Within the Australian government, there are clear signals that Southeast Asia now
Indonesia is the place to start, partly because of its current democratic
credentials, but also based on its immense scale and potential. For this century, Australia probably has no more important
relationship than the one it enjoys with
Indonesia.
matters more than ever. The diminution of United States influence, combined with the isolationist retreat signaled by Brexit and the rampant, muscular ascendency of China, provide every reason for a whole new approach to Southeast Asia, for making Australian ties with ASEAN special.
Military links will provide some of the ballast that Australians will rely on in the years ahead. While these relationships can prove controversial, and it is important that they get criticism, where appropriate, they also offer a distinctive element to Australian cooperation with the Southeast Asian region.
The blunt reality is that in all ten countries the armed forces maintain a range of significant security and political roles.
Generals and colonels have to be taken seriously, as do the Corporals and Captains who take their orders. Australia’s long history of training and mentoring regional
defence and security officials provides ballast when it counts. Relationships between Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies and their ASEAN counterparts are a further dimension that needs sustenance. Australian security, in the long term, will be grounded, in all manner of ways, on how well Australians can work alongside their neighbours.
And nowhere will that cooperation be more critical than in commerce and business. In the business community in Australia, there are still questions about when the next big boom of Southeast Asia focused activity will come. China, for now, remains the primary target for such volumes of Australian exports, and for a vast array of investment opportunities, that it can be hard for any individual Southeast Asian country to match up. But, as a group, ASEAN has scale and excitement that will require the best that Australian business has to offer.
Getting the relationship between ASEAN and Australia right will always be a balancing act and one where fancy footwork comes in handy. All partners understand the constraints of such interaction, but where there are appetites for collegial and well-informed partnership, there is every chance that a whole new set of possibilities can emerge.
Australians should therefore be proud of the relationships that have developed, and the Special Summit will showcase the depth of those existing connections.
Working creatively and constructively with ASEAN will, in the future, give Australia a chance to maintain a positive influence on the lives of hundreds of millions of people and the big dreams that many can now dream for themselves.
Opera House view from Mrs Macquarie’s Chair Source: structuresxx/Shutterstock
Badrul Hisham Ismail, Programme Director, IMAN Research
Mahathir Mohamad at his office in Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur
Source: Olivia Harris/Reuters
Mahathir’s Second Coming
P
olitics is an old man’s game, and in Malaysia, it appears to be exclusively so. Most top leaders in Malaysian politics from both ends of the political spectrum are well over the retirement age. And then there’s Mahathir.Approaching a century old, Mahathir has been active in politics since before Malaysia’s independence, with the climax of his career being the longest-serving Prime Minister. His career did not shy away from controversy, and he was often accused of being a dictator and manipulative, among others. He stepped down as Prime Minister of Malaysia in 2003. But even after his retirement, he maintains to be a key and controversial figure in local politics; commenting on current issues and the state of the nation head-on in his trademark caustic way. In recent years it would seem that he’s entering another pinnacle in his post-premiership career as the new leader of the opposition.
Nobody knows the real reason why Mahathir is back (or still) in politics. Some say it is to protect his legacy, others say it is to pave the way for his son’s political career, which is in limbo after being sacked from the Chief Minister of Kedah’s position.
There are many who say he is truly honest and sincere in setting the country back on the right path. For the opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan (PH), and their main supporters from civil society groups such as the Bersih movement, Mahathir joining the coalition signals two things: the opposition couldn’t decide on a leader after the absence of Anwar Ibrahim, and they lack the confidence in being able to perform better than the previous election.
Crisis in Leadership
Ever since Anwar Ibrahim was put back in jail, the opposition coalition have
been facing a major leadership crisis. The coalition of civil society organizations and politicians, connected by their trust and belief in Anwar, is fraying by the day.
Problems have risen, such as the intense disagreement between Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Pan Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), the internal fighting in PAS that resulted in an exodus and the creation of Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH), and of course the very public quarrels within PKR’s leadership, to name a few.
Then there was the shadow of the General Election of 2013. The opposition coalition, known as Pakatan Rakyat (PR) at the time, won more than 50% votes, but failed to takeover the Parliament. More importantly, they failed to garner majority support from the Malay community. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back, so to speak – how could they take over Putrajaya and rule Malaysia sans Malay support?
This is where Mahathir comes in. Desperate to get someone who can hold the remaining opposition coalition together, and at the same time trying desperately to appeal to Malay voters, Mahathir became saviour of the opposition. His background, experience and statesmanship is the perfect recipe to reach the opposition’s goals. A new coalition was announced in 2015 – Pakatan Harapan (PH) – with Mahathir leading the pact.
While this has been claimed as a pragmatic step by the opposition coalition for the coming General Election, it also signals the unhealthy culture of personality- driven politics that continues to dominate the Malaysian political scene. For many opposition supporters, especially the youth, a vote for the opposition also meant a vote against the personality-driven, patronage culture that is embedded in local politics.
PH’s new strategy is considered ‘bonkers’
by Malaysia’s youth, and serious questions on their viability as an alternative force of change have risen.
Whether Mahathir can galvanize Malay support towards PH is something that is yet to be proven. What is already happening, however, is the split among opposition supporters. The idea of Mahathir joining the opposition, let alone leading them, doesn’t sit well with many people. This is proven by the fact that up until now PH machinery still has to convince their supporters that having Mahathir is a wise decision and strategy on an almost daily basis. For certain, this does not bode well for PH. They are spending more time and energy on persuading their members instead of promoting their manifestos and future plans for the country.
When Will The Old Man Just Stay Home?
The protest towards Mahathir and his new old crew under the recently formed Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU), is also manifested through the recent call to spoil votes. This is something that has happened during previous elections, but the call to spoil votes was never really picked up by anyone. However, this time there are more serious talks among the youths. The #Undirosak movement—a call to spoil votes in the upcoming elections to boycott contesting political parties—is gaining momentum, and is frightening the Opposition parties. The reality is that a huge chunk of opposition supporters are not happy with Mahathir’s presence and they have only themselves to blame.
In the past few elections, the opposition coalition have been focused on unseating the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), at all costs, on the pretext that they are
Nobody knows the real reason why Mahathir is back (or still) in politics. Some
say it is to protect his legacy, others say it is to pave the way for his son’s political
career...
the better candidate to run the country.
As flimsy and turbulent the coalition is, Malaysians long for a change and saw them as a viable option than the current ruling coalition. This is mostly due to the fact that the opposition politicians are not guilty of the crimes that the ruling party is accused of committing.
But with Mahathir and his crew in the picture, the situation is different.
Voters who are looking for a change do not see that Mahathir will bring change to Malaysia. This is the dilemma the voters are in at the moment. As aptly put by the columnist Hafidz Baharom, Barisan Nasional and Pakatan Harapan are like Samsung and Apple. “Apple runs on Samsung chips, and both models using the same batch of chips burst into flames due to a defect.”1
Machiavellian Is His Operative The question on Mahathir’s motivation still lingers. It is important for us to remember that instead of joining the existing political parties within the opposition coalition, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) or Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH), Mahathir set up his own party – a Malay political party where all the key members are disgruntled UMNO members. BERSATU, as what the party is informally known, can be seen as just another UMNO.
Why did he do this? Does he have no trust towards the other parties? Does he think that by creating this new, UMNO- esque party, he can garner the much needed Malay support for the opposition?
Again, we can only speculate. However, what he can do is something that we can ponder on. By being independent of other parties, Mahathir can operate on his own, collaborate and make deals with other
groups. He can even leave the opposition coalition post-election, if it’s favorable for him. In Malaysian politics, Mahathir is the father of u-turns.
If this were to happen, it will have an impact that will last beyond the 14th General Election. It will be more than just business- as-usual where status quo prevails. In a study done by IMAN Research, Malaysian youths have a high level of cynicism towards politics in the country. Their trust towards the political process has dropped after the previous General Election. At the same time, youths are feeling more disempowered and lack the ability to make any changes. This recent development is only fueling into that perception, which will lead to further disengagement of youth in the political process.
The cynicism and apathy come as no surprise when all political contenders have made very little sustained effort to sell their vision of governance and progress (despite large-scale campaigns ala TN50, Gabungan Kiri’s Manifesto, or PH’s 2018 Shadow Budget). Beyond the stock pieties on good governance, equitable development, and shariah-compliance, it is unclear what exactly is the vision that voters are supposed to vote for this coming election that would shift away from the country’s still-communal politics.
Mahathir isn’t the only one among the old guards who have not been able to position themselves beyond communalism and political patronage. Indeed, the same line of thinking also affects younger Malaysian politicians. This arguably could be in response to the electorate wish for change but only in doses that they are comfortable with, but it could also be a sign of the lack of desire for a total political change in the society.
For the upcoming General Election, the Malaysian voting population is expected to make a leap of faith and choose between an opposition coalition increasingly driven by disgruntled former UMNO members-- yet newly repented--and startled UMNO members who are trying their level best to protect and strengthen their hold on power. The title fight between Najib and Mahathir grows increasingly ugly and overshadows the fresh and progressive ideas being expressed on all sides of the political field. This is something ironic, as Malaysia’s elections is a parliamentary one, and theoretically is a platform to choose the party that the electorate feels best represents their interests. Yet the current fight between personalities seem more in line with presidential elections, and basically forcing voters to select the candidate (and by extension party) that will bring less damage to the country.
The repercussion of this pickle that we are in is a high possibility of low voter turnout. Malaysia have always enjoyed high voter turnouts, with nearly 85% of registered voters came out to vote in the last General Election.2 Looking at the development of the current climate, this might not happen. As a result, we might see the ruling coalition regaining a two-third majority in the Parliament. And, whichever side of the political spectrum one is at, this is not a good development for the country.
Endnotes
1 http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/
article/why-pakatan-is-freaking-out-over-undirosak-hafidz- baharom
2 http://elections.thestar.com.my/story.aspx?file=/2013/5/7/
nation/13077204#.WmhM3JP1WRt
Mahathir isn’t the only one among the old guards who have not been able to position
themselves beyond communalism and
political patronage.
Imagine ASEAN
at your fingertips
thcasean.org
1. Comprised of the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
2. Arguably the most comprehensive intelligence alliance post-World War II
3. Five Eyes cooperation with Denmark, France, Norway and the Netherlands is dubbed as ‘The Nine Eyes’
4. ... While Nine Eyes cooperation with Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden is informally known as ‘Fourteen Eyes’
OUR EYES
I N I T I A T I V E S
Proposed as a
‘mini-interpol’
by Indonesia in late 2017
Primary task is counter-
terrorism intelligence sharing forum
in the region
Mooted amidst the ISIS attack in Marawi, the
Philippines
Parallel to trilateral security
cooperation between Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines in Sulu-Sulawesi Sea
Senior defense officials will meet every two weeks to swap
information on militant groups and develop a common database of violent extremists
1 2 3 4
5
How can ASEAN Member States get ahead of terrorism? For the region’s Ministers of Defense a part of the answer is to establish a regional intelligence cooperation where senior
officials will meet every two weeks to share information on terrorist groups.
Anastasia Febiola Sumarauw, Bina Nusantara University,
International Relation
Unlocking the Solutions:
MIKTA and The Call of
Global Security Challenges in The 21st Century Complex
Strategic Environment
1st WINNER MIKTA ESSAY CONTEST
Australian Soldiers return fire in a M1A1 Abrams tank during exercise Hamel 15 a sub-mission of exercise Talisman Sabre in Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia
Source: Wikimedia Commons
T
he strategic environment in the 21st century is facing various transnational challenges, such as climate change, global security, and geopolitical rivalries. These phenomena require transnational cooperation which has become the trend in today’s political climate, including through MIKTA. Such forum serves as an informal cooperation, partnership, and a cross regional multilateralism to provide consultative and constructive approaches in the global governance (MIKTA 2015).In the global security domain, MIKTA members are facing challenges such as nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula, wave of refugee from Middle East to Europe, transnational crime in Latin America, terrorism, and maritime security in the Asia Pacific. All these challenges are vital to the national, regional, and international stability. What can MIKTA do to respond the challenges in the complex strategic environment of the 21st century? How can MIKTA unlock solutions for these challenges?
This writing highlights an essential and crucial way for MIKTA to unlock solutions for the global security challenges:
formalizing the partnership through an agreement with a set of normative function and mechanism. Why is it requisite for MIKTA to establish a normative mechanism and framework? There are 3 reasons why.
First, it is a platform or stronghold to realize its goals. Assessing global security challenges, like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, needs to begin with mechanism and formal attributes.
An organization with a clear mechanism and framework could effectively identify and address the issues. It would produce more significant results than an informal partnership. The formalization of the group alleviates the implementation process within operational and tactical level. For example in 2015, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has proposed a counter-terrorism cooperation through exchanging intelligence and legal data information. The proposal included measurement such as prevention, early detection, legal conduct, and rehabilitation (Wisnu 2015). The proposal is merely an idea, until it comes up with implementation and results.
Second, it needs to determine the focus of cooperation as it will only work if MIKTA is focused on particular and
specific activities or functions. These are currently performed by states but would be performed more effectively in some wider contexts (Brown and Ainley 2005, 119). MIKTA needs to focus on a particular domain to stress and maximize its approaches on priority issues, such as natural gas, security, or economy- security interlinked issues, that could build the confidence of the partnership (Cassidy 2017). For example, through MIKTA cooperation with the International Energy Agency (IEA) to discuss natural gas and reviewing the gas-security issues (International Energy Agency 2017).
Moreover, issues in global security domain are multilayered, dimensional, and dynamic.
It needs a thorough approach with comprehensive mechanism to implement for it might involve the armed forces as state’s legitimate use of force.
Finally, the formalization of the partnership is a holistic approach to provide mutually desired resolution and a form of preventive diplomacy with each member’s capability and agreed normative function.
In its formal form, the organization could focus its concern on long-term crisis and challenges more than short-term ones.
The distribution of power in organizational form challenges the traditional modes of conducting foreign policy, transforming into a new kind of soft power and diplomacy, which is more effective (Hurrell 2006). For example, BRICS countries agreed to cooperate in trade and business, as they are under a similar or equivalent influence in the international political- economic system (Armijo 2007).
The three reasons above briefly explain why is it necessary for MIKTA to formalize the partnership. MIKTA’s member countries share the belief in providing a more influential role in world affairs (Hurrell 2006). Moreover, the members share 3 characteristics that could boost formalization: democratic system; being middle, constructive, and regional powers; and an open market (Schiavon and Domínguez 2016). On the calls for contribution to resolve global security challenges, the partnership will undoubtedly face challenges in the future.
This writing identifies 2 types of challenges that MIKTA will face.
Internal Challenges
MIKTA countries are diverse geographically and socially, although the three members are in the Asia Pacific, but each represents widely different condition of politics, economy, and socio-culture. This
causes different prioritization to happen.
For example, South Korea is initiating the partnership to maintain its independence from the geopolitics rivalry in East Asia, particularly China, North Korea, Japan (Cassidy 2017). While Mexico is also trying to build its independent government from United States’ hostile policy in border security, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and NAFTA. For Australia, MIKTA is another trade and business instrument to heighten its status between other G20 countries (Clark 2015). For Indonesia, MIKTA is an initiative for confidence building and partnership to increase its role and influence in the region. Finally, for Turkey MIKTA could help solve its problems such as human security, refugees, and terrorism. The different challenges and priorities from each member countries make it hard for the group to address mutual geopolitics and geostrategic issues.
Another challenge is that domestic instability could highly influence the cooperation. Instability from issues such as insurgencies, political issues, economic recession, maritime security, population growth, urbanization, underdevelopment, public preferences, even crimes could avert government’s focus from outward looking policy into inward looking policy.
Such case happened when President Trump decided to exclude US from partnership and involvement in international system thus withdrawing from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) which the US itself initiated under Obama’s presidency.
These internal challenges require responsibility and commitment from MIKTA countries to spend more diplomatic efforts to address major global challenges, such as terrorism and nuclear disarmament (Jongryn 2015). Mistrust and conflictual background, in such case as the Indonesia-Australia diplomatic clash in the past need to be cast aside. MIKTA countries need to focus more to capacity and confidence building for the group to work. Moreover, it is necessary for the members to synergize and synchronize the rational calculations of mutual gain through negotiation and dialogue to reach consensus.
External Challenges
The challenges also come beyond state boundaries. There are external challenges that influence the shape of countries’
foreign policy and partnership behavior, such as refugee crisis, cybersecurity, and nuclear proliferation issues. These pose more long-term impact compared
to internal challenges. These external challenges require longer process to enable countries to take actions, depending on each countries development and the capability in multiple sectors-- science, information, and technology--to enable them conduct suitable assessment and approach to handle the issues (Gurry 2013).
The current trending issues, such as terrorism threat and nuclear proliferation are beyond borders and multilayered. A single approach as how the US declared through its military campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 could not solve the challenges. Instead, it causes an endless military operations, precipitate other forms of rebellion, and caused the mass migration of refugee or asylum seekers to the Eurasia.
The changing nature of geopolitics is another aspect beyond the state border, presenting challenges for the organization to adapt. The failure of MIKTA to adapt to the dynamic nature of geopolitics and to enforce its values could diminish its effectiveness, lose its members’ trusts, decrease its potential capabilities, and in longer terms would fatally dissolve the organization. This case happened to SEATO in 1977 when the pact could not adapt to the rivalries of the great powers during the Cold War era.
Conclusion
Overall, the most important step for MIKTA to unlock solutions for the global security challenges is by formalizing the partnership through an agreement with a set of normative function and mechanism. This is the most prominent step arguably for three reasons: 1) it is a stronghold that will allow it to realize its goals; 2) it will only work effectively if it
is focused on specific spectrum; and 3) it is to provide mutual desired resolution.
Within the process itself, this writing highlight 2 categories of challenges that the partnership will undeniably face:
internal and external challenges. These challenges are complex and dynamic; it demands multilateral approaches instead of individual and exclusive ones. The future of MIKTA is in its contribution, specifically the challenges influencing the members within the complexity of 21st century strategic environment.
Bibliography and Further Readings
Armijo, Leslie Elliott. 2007. “The BRICS countries as analytical category: Mirage or Insight?” Asian Perspective 31 (4): 7-42.
Brown, Chris, and Kirsten Ainley. 2005. Understanding International Relations. 3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cassidy, Fikry. 2017. MIKTA’s Next Steps. September 27. Accessed November 20, 2017. https://thediplomat.
com/2017/09/miktas-next-steps/.
Clark, Helen. 2015. Australia, MIKTA and the Middle Power Question. April 20. Accessed November 20, 2017. https://
thediplomat.com/2015/04/australia-mikta-and-the-middle- power-question/.
Cooper, Andrew F. 2015. “Beyond the middle power model:
Cana in a reshaping global order.” South African Joournal of International Affairs (Routledge) 22 (2): 185-201.
Flake, Gordon, and Wang Xu. 2017. MIKTA - The Search for a Strategic Rationale. Report, Perth USAsia Centre, Perth USAsia Centre.
Gurry, Francis. 2013. “Challenges for International Organizations and Multilateralism.” Lakshman Kadirgamar Memorial Oration 2013. World Intellectual Property Organization.
Hurrell, Andrew. 2006. “Hegemony, liberalism, and global order:
what space for would-be great powers?” International Affairs 82 (1): 1-19.
International Energy Agency. 2017. Examining the future of natural gas in MIKTA countries. September 29. Accessed November 20, 2017. https://www.iea.org/newsroom/
news/2017/september/examining-the-future-of-natural-gas-in- mikta-countries.html.
Jongryn, Mo. 2015. MIKTA, Middle Powers, and New Dynamics of Global Governance. 1st Edition. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Kinsella, David, and David L. Rousseau. 2008. “Democracy and Conflict Resolution.” In The SAGE Handbook on Conflict Resolution, by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I.
William Zartman, 475-492. Sage.
MIKTA. 2015. About MIKTA. May 22. Accessed November 20, 2017. http://www.mikta.org/about/vision.php.
Navari, Cornelia. 2008. “Liberalism.” In Security Studies: An Introduction, by Paul D. Williams, edited by Paul D. Williams, 29-43. London: Routledge.
Schiavon, Jorge A., and Diego Domínguez. 2016. “Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA):
Middle, Regioal, and Constructive Powers Providing Global Governance.” Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies (John Wiley &
Sons Australia, Ltd) 3 (3): 495-504.
Tomes, Robert R., and Christopher K. Tucker. 2014. Human Geography: Socio-cultural Dynamics and Challenges to Global Security. United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation, US:
USGIF, 246.
Wisnu, Arkhelaus. 2015. Indonesia Propose Counter- Terrorism Cooperation with MIKTA. September 28.
Accessed November 20, 2017. https://en.tempo.co/read/
news/2015/09/28/055704383/Indonesia-Propose-Counter- Terrorism-Cooperation-with-MIKTA.
... the most important step for MIKTA to unlock solutions for the global security challenges is by formalizing the partnership
through an agreement with a set of
normative function and mechanism.
The world is looking at ASEAN and
will measure its success on Asean resilience, how it stays on course in its integration efforts and how it responds to emerging issues and developments arising from the
interconnected world.
Lim Jock Choi
Secretary-General of ASEAN
“Singapore’s chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will kick off when the regional bloc’s foreign ministers gather for their annual retreat starting Sunday (Feb 4). The three-day ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ retreat in Singapore will be chaired by Foreign Affairs Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.”
Why it Matters?
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meetings that is held at the beginning of the year is usually used by the ASEAN Chair to explain its priorities for the year and to further discuss recent developments in the region. On this occasion, Singapore, as the Chair for this year, laid out its theme for its chairmanship: resilience and innovation.
One of the main priorities under Singapore’s chairmanship will be the development of a network of ASEAN Smart Cities. It is indeed a challenging task to build smart cities across ASEAN taking into account the different readiness and development gap among the ten countries. The 2017 Smart Cities Index from EasyPark Group ranked Singapore as the world’s number two ‘smart city’
with Malaysia at 84 out of 100 countries.
Besides these two countries, no other Southeast Asian countries are included in the report. This indicates that only Singapore and Malaysia (to some extent) are ready for smart cities and have the capacity to develop them.
Some ASEAN Member States (AMS) have already made plans to build smart cities.
Indonesia is planning to develop at least 100 smart cities in the next two years.
Vietnam has a plan to develop the Nhat- Tan-Noi Bai project, located north of Hanoi. The Vietnamese government aims to build the smart city to become an international financial centre, a business and cultural centre, an exhibition centre, and an ASEAN village. Meanwhile, Malaysia is currently developing the China Smart Creation (CSC) Smart Eco-Valley in Bentong, Pahang. It will be the first official smart city in Malaysia. While some AMS have already started developing smart cities, it is also important for Singapore, as the Chair, to ensure that the development can be accelerated across ASEAN by sharing its experiences and expertise to other AMS.
There is no doubt that under Singapore’s chairmanship, it will push for more economic i n t e g r a t i o n in the region.
However, as the region is also facing numerous challenges in political-security and socio- cultural areas, Singapore will be challenged
to demonstrate its diplomatic capability, especially in addressing long-standing issues, such as the South China Sea (SCS).
Singapore will indeed have a critical role in ensuring the negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC) continue, although Foreign Minister Balakrishnan has mentioned that he did not want to put a deadline on the negotiations. This is especially given when Singapore has its own impediments to resolving the SCS issue. In particular, despite Singapore’s status as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea, Singapore has recently experienced uneasy ties with China.
As the current ASEAN Chair and the country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations, Singapore will be expected to play a constructive role to create a bridge
between ASEAN and China. It is a strategic opportunity for
Singapore to showcase its influence and
diplomatic capability to further foster
A S E A N - C h i n a engagement on the SCS and to preserve stability
in the region.
ASEAN Foreign
Ministers in Singapore for Annual Retreat
Channel News Asia, February 4, 2018
http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/asean-and-eu-love-is- in-the-air
AS E A N R O U N D - U P
AS E A N R O U N D - U P
“Tourism in Southeast Asia is shaping up to revolve around food, focus on sustainable travel and is blasting all international tourism intake predictions out of the water. As the 37th Asean Tourism Forum (ATF) drew to a close last week in Chang Mai, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) looks to be heading into a bright and tasty tourism future.”
Why it Matters?
ASEAN continues to attract tourists and business travelers from all around the world. It offers a wide range of tourist attractions and is home to 37 world heritage sites classified by the UNESCO.
In 2017, there were 125 million tourists coming to the region, higher than the estimated target which was 121 million.
The surge in number of international tourists led to an increase in estimated profit, which was USD 93 billion. Again, the figure is USD 10 billion higher than the target set in 2017. ASEAN will continue to take necessary steps in order to increase the number of tourists coming to the region to 150 million by 2025, as stipulated in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025.
Despite the goal of attracting more tourists to the region, ASEAN should also make efforts to ensure the sustainability of the tourism sector. While at the regional level ASEAN has already endorsed the ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan 2016-2025, which stipulated the importance of sustainable
tourism, each ASEAN Member States have their individual policies in pursuing that matter. In the case of the Philippines, the Philippine Department of Tourism (DOT) plans to promote sustainable tourism by ensuring that 80 percent of tourism- related establishments will be “going green” in the next 10 years. This does not only mean that the area is “green” but also the food too.
Sustainable tourism has become one of the issues that ASEAN governments need to pursue. Although the increase in visitors travelling to the region may bring many economic benefits, such as an increase in tourism earnings, however we cannot ignore the fact that the increase in travelers may also have negative impacts.
When there is a surge in the numbers of travelers to a country, especially those whose infrastructure are not yet ready to a c c o m m o d a t e the travelers, n e g a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s such as damage to the natural environment and heritage sites, might occur. The possible increase of culture clash
ASEAN to Focus on Food, Sustainability to Boost Tourism
Asian Correspondent, February 6, 2018
https://asiancorrespondent.com/2018/02/asean-focus-food- sustainability-boost-tourism/#BQGe3RCOPqV4qgm8.97
between tourists and locals should also be anticipated due to the direct interaction between them. For example, one incident of culture clash happened in Bagan, Myanmar a few years ago. Foreign tourists were reported to have frequently climbed on top of pagodas to get a better view of the sunset and sunrise. In response, the authorities have banned tourists from climbing in order to protect the cultural heritage. Myanmar’s de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, even mentioned that the sunset viewing from the pagodas will have a negative impact on long-term sustainability.
It is important for the governments of ASEAN to cope with the increasing tourist arrival. ASEAN should be able to prepare and to preserve its tourist attractions especially the cultural and
natural heritages. While the economic benefits from the tourism sector seem attractive,
ASEAN should also be aware
that it needs to also protect the local people and culture by creating s u s t a i n a b l e tourism.
Fina Astriana is an Economic Researcher of the ASEAN Studies Program of The Habibie Center
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facebook.com/habibiecenter @habibiecenter The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become
a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.
The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.
Cover:
Marina Bay Sands, Singapore Source: Shuterstock
