Project Supervisors Rahimah Abdulrahim
Executive Director, The Habibie Center Hadi Kuntjara
Deputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center Managing Editor
Ray Hervandi
Thinking ASEAN Team A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi Askabea Fadhilla Fina Astriana Muhamad Arif Rahma Simamora Wirya Adiwena
A Note From the Editor Articles
Toward Deeper Economic Integration: Balancing National Interests with Goals of the ASEAN Community
ASEAN Deals With Volatile Markets
An Unfinished Journey:
Military Reforms in Indonesia and Myanmar
Infographic: The Rohingya Refugees’ Festering Injustice ASEAN Round-Up
What the Jakarta Attack Means For Indonesian Terrorism
Myanmar Presidential Vote to Start on March 17 as Transition Talks Drag On
Vietnam’s Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong Keeps His Post
Contents
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5
12
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12 7
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A note from the editor
Dear readers:
Welcome to the February 2016 issue of Thinking ASEAN!
To start this month’s issue, Dr. Siwage Dharma Negara, a Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, highlights some key challenges for deepening ASEAN economic integration. His essay argues that wide development gaps across the ASEAN member states will pose serious challenges for deeper regional economic integration.
Umar Juoro, Head of the Supervisory Committee of Bank Indonesia, follows in the second article by overviewing the recent volatility in markets across Southeast Asia and how ASEAN countries can deal with it.
ASEAN governments have the space to make necessary, if painful, policy adjustments in response. Otherwise, Umar points out, the project of ASEAN integration may slow down.
Lastly, Muhammad Arif, Researcher at the Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Center, rounds out this month’s issue with his review of military reforms in Indonesia and Myanmar. History and self-perception of the two nations’ militaries, he posits, are important variables in our attempt to understand the military reluctance to step out of politics.
For our infographic, we present several important numbers that may skip our attention in the noise around the humanitarian problem that is the Rohingya refugee issue. For our ASEAN Round-Up, we highlight several recent articles on the recent terror attack in Jakarta, Myanmar power transition and changes (or not) in Vietnamese politics.
Please do not hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, suggestions or prospective submissions.
Happy reading!
Best regards from Jakarta,
Ray Hervandi Managing Editor
Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.
The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.
Toward Deeper Economic Integration:
Balancing National Interests with Goals of the ASEAN Community
Singapore’s port is one of the busiest in the world.
Photo Credit: Noel Reynolds.
Dr. Siwage Dharma Negara is a Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
December 31, 2015, officially marked the full implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2015 blueprint. The aim of the blueprint is to create a single market and production base for the free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor. With full integration, the ASEAN economy is expected to generate a huge market pool supported by a population base of 635 million and a combined GDP of US$2.6 trillion, making it the fifth-largest economy in the world.
To date, ASEAN economic integration is an evolving project and will remain so over the next decade. Even though the ten ASEAN member states have agreed to establish a more integrated regional economy by January 1, 2016, much more still needs to be done to achieve the ultimate goal of an integrated and cohesive ASEAN community.
A closely integrated regional economy is one of the key pillars of the ASEAN community. This means deeper economic integration among the ten member states. Deeper economic integration will require member states to cooperate and coordinate their national interests with those of ASEAN Community’s goals. The challenge going forward will put the member states’ political will to the test in aligning their national laws and policies with ASEAN’s priorities.
This essay highlights some of the key challenges for deepening ASEAN economic integration. It argues that wide development gaps across the member states will pose serious challenges for deeper regional economic integration.
This is because ASEAN advancement in any of its goals is determined by the pace of its lowest common denominator.
Some Positive Trends
ASEAN member states have made significant progress in terms of tariffs elimination. Today, duties were eliminated on 99.2 percent of tariff lines for the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Meanwhile, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam will continue reducing their tariff lines to 0-5 percent until 2018.
In terms of investment, ASEAN member states have agreed on an investment framework to attract investors and help those who are doing business in the region through the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). In 2014, the total FDI inflows to the region reached US$136 billion, or almost 12 percent of the global FDI of US$1.228 trillion. This includes the increasing intra-ASEAN FDI, which accounts for 18 percent of the total FDI flows.
With respects to services trade, ASEAN member states have agreed to work together under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). Under this liberalization framework, ASEAN member states agree to gradually ease restrictions to cross-border trade in at least 80 subsectors.
Three broad sectors are defined according to ASEAN priority in liberalization: priority integration sectors, logistics services and other services.
In addition, ASEAN member states have agreed to work jointly toward facilitating the free flow of skilled labor in the region. Mutual Recognition Arrangements (MRAs) have been concluded in eight professions to facilitate the movement of ASEAN professionals in these areas through recognition of their qualifications. The eight professions under the MRA are engineers, architects, physicians, nurses, dentists, accountants, surveyors and tourism professionals.
All in all, ASEAN has traditionally looked outwards and maintained strong economic partnership with its trading partners. In this respect, ASEAN has signed free-trade agreements (FTA) with China, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Aside from individual FTA with the six trading partners, ASEAN is currently negotiating a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) scheduled to be completed this year. With a combined market of about US$21.2 trillion, which is about 30% of global GDP, the RCEP has the potential to further transform the region into a ‘mega’
market of about 3.4 billion people (covering almost half of the world’s population).
Key Challenges
Despite the achievements in the last decade, ASEAN economic integration remains a work in progress. This is because various national laws and policies meant for protecting domestic interests hamper the progress towards ASEAN community’s goals. It is well known that the region has seen an increase in non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as quotas, import licensing requirements and discriminatory government procurement rules, which effectively dampens the flow of goods.
According to the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database, ASEAN’s biggest economies have been increasing NTBs since the global financial crisis. The GTA database shows that between 2009 and 2013, a total of 186 NTBs were implemented by ASEAN member states. Moreover, a study by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) shows that Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam have the most restricted index in terms of NTBs.
In addition to various NTBs imposed for trade in goods, services trade also remains restricted in ASEAN. Most member states still maintain high restrictions in the services sector. A study by Balboa and Wignaraja (2014), using the World Bank’s services trade restrictions database, showed that the middle-income economies in ASEAN, in particular Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, have ‘virtually closed’ to ‘completely closed’ policy regimes in professional services.
The lack of progress in services trade indicates that despite the rhetoric of the ASEAN community, member states continue to privilege national interests above regional aspirations. Member states are often reluctant to align their national laws and regulations with AEC commitments. A study by TDRI argue that the lack of political commitment of member states contribute to the slow progress in this area. This can be seen by the fact that countries only offer to liberalize services that are not ‘too important’. In addition, there is also no commitment to address behind-the-border issues to create effectively competitive markets.
Table 1:
Select Development Indicators for ASEAN Member States
Country Ease of Doing Business Rankings 2015
Competitiveness Rankings 2015
FDI Inflows (US$
Million) 2014 Brunei
Darussalam 101 NA 568
Cambodia 135 90 1,727
Indonesia 114 37 22,276
Laos 148 83 913
Malaysia 18 18 10,714
Myanmar 177 131 946
The Philippines 95 47 6,201
Singapore 1 2 72,098
Thailand 26 32 11,538
Vietnam 78 56 9,200
Total ASEAN 136,181
World 1,228,283
Source: World Bank, World Economic Forum, ASEAN Secretariat
Finally, the wide development gap between the ASEAN-6 and CLMV countries remains the biggest obstacle toward the realizing of an integrated and cohesive community in the region. Table 1 underscores the striking development gap
within ASEAN. Based on the World Bank’s Doing Business index, Singapore ranks first in the ease of doing business while Myanmar is ranked 177 out of 189 countries. Likewise, in terms of overall global competitiveness, which includes infrastructure and institutional quality among others, Singapore is much ahead of other member states. The wide disparity makes it an uphill task to contemplate a strong convergence of regional interests.
Countries with lack of infrastructure, for instance, will not be able to reap the benefits from greater economic integration in the region. This will in turn dampen their motivation to align their national laws and policies with ASEAN’s liberalization goals.
Managing Domestic Interests with Regional Commitments Further economic liberalization commitments under the AEC will naturally face domestic oppositions especially when these domestic policies run counter to regional commitments.
For example, the policy to support local industries often discriminate against foreign firms. Rather than opting for protectionist measures as a means to support domestic industries, member states are better served by improving trade facilitation and harmonization measures. The former, for example, can significantly lower trade costs. The 2015 OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs) indicates that “full”
implementation of the Trade Facilitation Area (TFA) would reduce trade costs for the ASEAN group of countries by 16.9 percent on average.
This is however easier said than done. In order to improve trade facilitation, member states need to secure resources, including technical, human and financial resources, which they may not have in abundance. Generally, the less developed the country is, the bigger the risk that the country will face serious resource constraints. Special attention needs to be given to the CLMV countries to help support trade facilitation implementation.
In view of this, ASEAN must think innovatively to mobilize resources in the region.
Finally, ASEAN member states need to provide adequate policy measures to mitigate the adverse effects from deeper economic liberalization. Currently, most member states do not have adequate mechanisms to protect and support businesses most affected by adverse effects from intense competition. Singapore has proven that it is possible to embrace trade liberalization and reach out to affected businesses and workers by helping them to upgrade and move resources into more competitive sectors and activities. Rather than shunning competition, a more beneficial approach would be to strategically support local industries and workers to adapt to and leverage on trade liberalization.
Conclusion
Fundamentally, greater policy coherence among ASEAN member states is critical to achieving deeper economic
integration. That said, member states need to align their national laws and policies with the regional commitments. The basic philosophy is that to achieve ASEAN Community goals, member countries cannot sidetrack regional consensus in favor of national interests. In addition, ASEAN member states must provide effective assistance programs for the adversely affected groups.
Technical and financial assistance programs would be useful to help trade-impacted industries, firms, and workers to make strategic adjustments to improve their global competitiveness.
Last but not least, ASEAN should work together to overcome its resource constraints and solve the wide development gap between member states. Technical assistance and capacity- building programs, especially for the CLMV countries are very important. Addressing this problem will be the key to creating a more integrated and cohesive ASEAN community.
ASEAN Deals With Volatile Markets
Interest rate adjustments by the Federal Reserve in Washington, DC, have created new volatility in ASEAN’s financial markets.
Photo Credit: Wikipedia.
Umar Juoro is Head of the Supervisory Committee of Bank Indonesia.
The financial market is experiencing high volatility as commodity prices plunk, China’s economy is slowing down and the Federal Reserve has adjusted interest rates to a higher level. Capital that came into emerging markets during the quantitive easing period is returning to developed economies. ASEAN economies are also influenced strongly by the financial market volatility. Last year, the economies of Malaysia and Indonesia experienced a strong hit, as the Malaysian ringgit depreciated by 15.5 percent and the Indonesian rupiah depreciated by 11 percent. Meanwhile, the Thai baht depreciated by only 4.7 percent and the Philippine peso only by 2.1 percent. Likewise, capital markets in Malaysia went down by 5.1 percent, Thailand by 9.2 percent, Indonesia by 14.9 percent and Singapore by 15.1 percent in 2015. The ASEAN economy as a whole is expected to grow around 4.7 percent in 2015. Singapore is expected to grow slower at around 2 percent, Thailand is expected to grow around 4 percent and Indonesia around 4.8 percent. Meanwhile, other countries experience relatively high growth: the Philippines is estimated to grow at 5.8 percent, Vietnam around 6 percent and Cambodia around 7 percent. Unlike Malaysia and Indonesia that very much depend on commodities, those other ASEAN countries are more diversified in their economy structures, especially open for foreign direct investment (FDI) and get involved in the global supply chain.
In 2016, ASEAN’s economic growth is also projected to be around 4.7 percent, as the level of growth of ASEAN members will not be much different from 2015. The economic condition in China and persistent low commodity prices still negatively impact Indonesia and Malaysia, which are expected to grow around 5.3 percent and 4.7 percent respectively. Vietnam, the Philippines, Myanmar and Cambodia are expected to grow above 6 percent in 2016. On the other hand, Brunei, Singapore and Thailand will likely perform unsatisfactorily in 2016.
With economic growth close to 5 percent, ASEAN next year will exhibit a relatively high rate as India and China will at the same time grow above 6 percent. While China is experiencing direct volatility in the capital and foreign exchange markets, India is getting a lot of attention from investors as the alternative of China. ASEAN should try to attract similar attention from investors. As the Federal Reserve is likely to increase interest rates just twice instead of four times, and with the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan in negative interest rate territory, capital is flowing again to emerging economies. The Indonesian rupiah and Malaysian ringgit show significant appreciation and their capital markets also show significantly increased activities.
However, the ASEAN economy should not be a victim of volatility in the financial market. ASEAN should instead focus more on the development of its real economy through trade and investment. Stimulus from government spending is very important at a time of a slowing global economy. The significant increase of government spending in the Philippines, Vietnam and Myanmar facilitate private investment especially FDI and support higher growth. Indonesia and Thailand are seriously pursuing higher government spending, especially for infrastructure development.
Indonesia and Malaysia should reduce their dependent on commodities. Indonesia used to rely so much on crude palm oil (CPO) and coal, while Malaysia on CPO and oil. The decline of commodity prices has a significant impact for the two countries, both for their government revenues and private consumption.
The impact might even extend to their bank credit quality in the form of higher non-performing loans.
Malaysia has a strong basis for manufacturing so it can shift from being overly dependent on commodities. Indonesia, on the other hand, needs to put in more effort to revitalize its manufacturing sector. For Indonesia, it is also important to revitalize its food agriculture sector. Indonesia should enter the global supply chain in manufacturing. For food, Indonesia should develop food estates and husbandry in commercially viable ways.
As China’s cost of production creeps higher, investors will shift their target market to ASEAN, especially to Vietnam and Indonesia. Vietnam has been very open to FDI, while Indonesia only recently started making serious effort to liberalize the economy with policy packages that attract FDI. For ASEAN in general, investment, especially FDI, is still the main factor for economic growth. It is the challenge of ASEAN to attract even more FDI now that it is formally integrated in a single market as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). After all, the goal of the AEC is to develop a competitive single market and strengthen cooperation among the country members through reducing tariffs and the free movement of capital and (skilled) labor across ASEAN internal borders. However, many of ASEAN members are still reluctant to open up their economies despite their commitments under the AEC. Indonesia, in particular, gives mixed signals over its commitment to the AEC as it does not see the AEC as a priority. What is more disconcerting is the low level of uniformity of views among policymakers vis-à-vis the AEC.
However, other ASEAN countries are moving forward with the US-initiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam have signed up for it because they want better access to the US market and those of the other signatories, especially Japan’s. Although the US Congress still has to ratify the TPP, signing up for it is very alluring, so much so that President Joko Widodo committed Indonesia to it during his US visit last November. Clearly, many ASEAN countries are more concerned with external economic cooperation than those that are internal to ASEAN. The gap in the effort to align with TPP requirements and AEC commitments is but one example. This
is understandable because ASEAN members trade more and accept FDI more from outside ASEAN. Although China does not participate in TPP, it is becoming very important for ASEAN trade and investment.
Nevertheless, to sustain its credibility as a viable single market, the AEC should be the priority. ASEAN member countries have committed themselves to the project, and there is no reason to backtrack. The AEC can move forward even as ASEAN members individually sign up for other FTAs like the TPP. Concerns of uncompetitive domestic industries can be overcome by restructuring the sector. Not all industries can be competitive, and this should be accepted as a consequence of the single market creation. The point of view that looks at the AEC as a threat rather than an opportunity, whether among politicians or businessmen, will have to evolve.
An Unfinished Journey:
Military Reforms in Indonesia and Myanmar
Muhamad Arif is a Researcher at the Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Center.
A unit of the Indonesian military hunts for rats in the paddy fields of Java.
Photo Credit: Antara Foto.
In Indonesia and Myanmar, two Southeast Asian countries with long histories of military involvement in politics, the armed forces are trying to maintain or expand their roles in civilian activities. The nature of civil-military relations, influenced by the historical development of the militaries in both countries, explains the resistance of the Indonesian military, known as the TNI, and Myanmar’s Tatmadaw to relinquish their sociopolitical roles. The accomplishment of the military reform agendas in Indonesia and Myanmar is an essential part of the democratic transition.
Democratic transitions in Indonesia and Myanmar set off in the late 1990s and the early 2010s respectively. Despite the time and magnitude gap, Indonesian and Myanmar democratic transitions are very much welcomed by their respective domestic audiences as well as the international community. After 32 years under the Suharto’s New Order regime that, despite economic development, brutally suppressed and persecuted peaceful political dissenters and opposition, Indonesia embarked on democratization when Suharto stepped down in 1998. In Myanmar, a nominally civilian government was introduced in 2011, marking the gradual progress towards democracy in a country that for more than five decades endured military rule and domination. Democratic forces are now replacing the old authoritarian structures in Myanmar after the 2015 general election won by the pro-democracy National League for Democracy (NLD) party.
In both Indonesia and Myanmar, however, one faction from the old structures seems less interested to fully leave the political stage: the military. In Indonesia, recent development shows that the military is still influential in the day- to-day politics and its involvement in civilian activities is anything but diminished. Similarly, in Myanmar the military is still reluctant to relinquish its veto power and has managed to convince the democratically elected government to share power in the post-authoritarian administration.
A Brief History of TNI and Tatmadaw Reforms
The history of TNI reforms began in the late 1990s as a byproduct of the democratic transition that took place in the country. Amidst manifold nationwide pressures, compounded by acute economic crisis, Suharto, who led an authoritarian regime for 32 years, stepped down in 1998. The military, whose rise and institutionalized domination were owed to Suharto’s backing, abandoned its patron and together with democratic forces watched him tragically dethroned.
A strong faction within the military, led by the then Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto and Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, withdrew their support for Suharto in return for securing military participation in the post-authoritarian governments.1 In addition to that, Indonesian first post-authoritarian administration under President B.J. Habibie allowed the military to set the course of its own gradual reform.
The military thus decided to discard the dwifungsi, a doctrine that assigned the military responsibility for social and political development as well as providing the national security.
Wiranto and other reform-minded generals then established the New Paradigm concept, which would guide the reduction of the military’s political role.2 A number of organizational restructurings were also announced, including the liquidation of the TNI’s sociopolitical structure and kekaryaan (the secondment of military personnel to non-military government positions); the separation of police from the military; and the withdrawal of military formal backing of Golkar, the ruling party during the New Order.3
Furthermore, while given the concession to retain its reduced seats in the parliament after the first post-Orde Baru general election in 1999, military withdrawal from the legislature was finalized in 2004.
The agenda of “transforming TNI” has taken place since then.
While making sure that the armed forces are placed, at least legally, under civilian control, the Indonesian government also substantially strengthened the capabilities of the military.
Indonesian defense budget increased more than threefold between 2005 and 2014.
Indonesian intelligence community was also restructured, although the reform came relatively late compared to its counterparts in the military and police. In 2011, the Law No. 17/2011 on State Intelligence was finally legalized by the parliament.
Compared to Indonesia, military reform in Myanmar is more recent. It was unofficially begun in 2010 when the first general election in 20 years was held as the military regime was loosening its control on pro-democratic movement. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won a landslide victory in a poll widely criticized as fraudulent and unfair. The main pro-democracy party, the NLD, boycotted the poll. In 2011, the military junta was officially
dissolved when a nominally civilian government was formed, led by Thein Sein, the chairman of USDP and Prime Minister in the previous administration.
Since the establishment of the quasi-elected government, the Tatmadaw, together with other security agencies –the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) and the intelligence community- undergone a number of reforms. They have adapted to the changing political landscape.4 In his speech at the 70th Armed Forces Day, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing envisaged that the Tatmadaw would be transformed into a strong, fully efficient and modern defense service of the country.5 The police force has also undergone capabilities expansion, performance improvement and cultural reforms, even before President Thein Sein came to office.6 As Myanmar seeks to become more engaged with the external world, there is also optimism with regard to the intelligence community, which spent most of its time suppressing opposition to the military regime, carrying out its duty in a more professional manner.
The condition is undoubtedly better now in Indonesia and Myanmar with regard to the military involvement in politics.
Military reforms in both country have made noticeable changes.
The journey, however, is not yet finished as the TNI and Tatmadaw are still reluctant to fully relinquish their sociopolitical roles.
The Reluctant TNI and Tatmadaw
In Indonesia, recent developments show that the military is still influential in the day-to-day politics and its involvement in civilian activities is everything but diminished.
In the post-reformasi Indonesian politics, the military remains as an important player. Presidents, from B. J. Habibie to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, realized that building a strong support from the military is a necessity in maintaining their rule.7 The need to have a military backup is even more acute in the case of President Joko Widodo who is basically a stranger to the traditional power circles in Jakarta. A former furniture trader without military background and do not belong to any prominent political family, Jokowi had to build from scratch his political power bases in the oligarchic politics of Indonesia.8 With an unmatched infrastructure across the country and the lack of bureaucratic restraints imposed upon it, the military is an attractive option for Jokowi.9
Thus since the very first day in the office, Jokowi “facilitates”
the reemergence of TNI in Indonesian contemporary politics;
a number of retired Army generals were chosen to sit in the cabinet. Jokowi even established a new post, Chief of Staff to the President, for his trusted aide, General (Ret.) Luhut Panjaitan, who has been playing an important role guiding the course and cleaning up the mess made by the inexperienced president.
Breaking with precedent, Jokowi appointed another retired general for the Minister of Defense post. In fact, as one analyst noted, more military figures now “feature prominently in top
civilian positions” than at any time since Indonesia’s transition to democracy in 1998.10 He then appointed Army’s General Gatot Nurmantyo as the commander of the armed forces to replace General Moeldoko in an act of defiance to the tradition of rotating the post among the services of the armed forces.
Outside the cabinet, Jokowi also relentlessly tries to expand the role of the military. Amidst criticism, Jokowi ordered the TNI to assist the Agriculture Ministry to achieve food sufficiency and stabilize the price of staple foods.11 Government’s authorization to increase the TNI’s role in counterterrorism operations, especially in Poso, also does not help to sideline the military from domestic security areas. When the military continued to sign Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) with ministries and state enterprises for the provision of security services, Jokowi turned a blind eye. As one analyst noted, the TNI is trying to test the political waters to see how far it can push its authority and expand its role in the areas that are not its primary concern.12
In Myanmar, despite the rhetoric and appearance, the military is still reluctant to step out of the country’s politics and hand over its power to the civilian government. After all, the military regime spent nearly two decades to draft the new constitution that allowed a democratically elected government to emerge.
The military, however, did everything it could to make sure that the new constitution cannot strip it out of political power. In fact, the 2008 constitution was written specifically to guarantee the Tatmadaw a central place in national affairs, a position reaffirmed in 2013 by both the president and the armed forces Commander-in-Chief.13 In the constitution, the Tatmadaw is still recognized as an autonomous institution free from any civilian control or oversight, a concrete defiant to the democratic principle of civilian supremacy over the military.14 Indeed, “while paying lip service to the new democratic order, the military continues to adhere to anti-liberal ideas and to frame its power aspirations in nationalist rhetoric.”
The quasi-elected government eventually held a relatively fair and just multiparty election in 2015 amidst mounted pressure.
The pro-democratic party of NLD, under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, expectedly gained a landslide victory. On a nationwide basis, the NLD won more than 77 percent of the contested parliamentary seats, providing Suu Kyi with a majority in both houses of the parliament.15
The triumph of the NLD, however, does not mean the collapse of military influence in Myanmar polities. In fact, the Tatmadaw seems to be prepared for the expected outcome. The 2008 constitution rules that 25 percent of all parliamentary seats are allocated to the armed forces. The military, therefore, has made sure that it retains a veto power in the country’s politics as any change of the constitution –including the provision that bans Suu Kyi from presidency for having foreign spouse and children- requires a super majority of more than 75 percent votes to pass. The military has also prepared to balance the domination of NLD in the parliament by posting more senior and experienced officers to sit in both houses.16
Moreover, the Tatmadaw also retains power in the executive branch. In Myanmar, the Commander-in-Chief has the power to appoint Minister of Home Affairs, Border Affairs and Defense, three posts that allow the military to maintain close proximity with the people and thus engage in civilian activities. Worse is that in Myanmar, unlike in other democratic systems, the military commander-in-chief is not appointed by nor is accountable to the president. This, at least in theory, would open up the space for the military to act independently of the civilian authorities when it deems necessary.
Same History, Same Behavior
How to understand the reluctance of the militaries in Indonesia and Myanmar to step out of politics? One variable might explain the similarity: the history-shaped perceived role of the militaries.
The history of TNI cannot be detached from the history of the state of Indonesia itself. In fact, at least as it claims, the Indonesian military was instrumental in achieving the state independence as well as the later development of Indonesia.
TNI, in other words, plays role in the state-making and state- building of the country. Its experience in the state-making and -building process later serves in shaping the threat perception and ideological basis for the TNI to involve actively in the sociopolitical life of the country. In his seminal work of The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Harold Crouch notes that the Indonesian military, since the early years of its inception, never regarded themselves merely as a state instrument concerned with security matters.17 Instead, the TNI has always regarded itself as both “military force” and “social-political force.” The New Order then institutionalized this ideological basis of the TNI. We then witnessed the TNI dominated Indonesian politics for more than three decades. It is thus understandable if the TNI is so inclined to regain its non-military role even after the collapse of the New Order.
Like the TNI, the military of the modern Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, emerged from the struggle against colonial powers.18 Its emergence and early development were instrumental in shaping the perceived role to involve in Burmese politics in the subsequent years. The following observation of Burmese military therefore can also portray the reality of the TNI.
“It has forged an identity for itself based on its perceptions of its past, present, and future roles in the country; has created myths of its efficacy and place in the society; and has attempted to convince the populace hat its vision is the correct, indeed the only, one.”19
The early development of Tatmadaw is also influential in forming the perceived superiority of the military vis a vis the civilian authorities. Like Sudirman in Indonesia who dissented the civilian leaders for refusing to take up arms against the Dutch, the leaders of Tatmadaw developed a perceived greater strength in nation-building when it regained the control of secessionist Shan state in 1950s. Tatmadaw started to associate democracy with political infighting and national disorder since
then.
What Does All This Mean For Democratization?
“Quis custodiet ipos custodes,” Plato asked. Who will guard the guardians? The paradox is that the military, the very institution created to protect the polity, has sufficient power to threaten the polity. It is one, if not the highest, necessity in the countries in democratic transition like Indonesia and Myanmar to make sure that the military is professionalized—trained, paid and tasked to do only what it is meant to—and bound by a democratic rule and not abuse its power.
That, however, is only part of the story. Military reform is not only about placing the military fully under the civilian democratic control. Instead, it also entails the necessity to build a strong and functional civilian authorities under which the military is subordinated. For the military subordinated under weak civilian authorities could be as dangerous as the one that openly dominate and rule the political system.
The relevance of military very much depends on the local contexts; courses and prioritized agendas of military reforms are different from one country to another.21 As Indonesia and Myanmar are now certainly in a different stage of reform, what prescribed for one might not work for another. But one thing for sure is that placing the security apparatus, including the military, within a democratic political system is a prerequisite of a fully democratic political system. Therefore, as noted by Sukma and Prasetyono, the end result of democratic transition in Indonesia, and Myanmar in this case, will to a greater degree be determined by the success or failure of security sector reform.22 In fact, the redefinition of role and military involvement within the context of democratic transition will determine the course of democratization itself.23
Notes
1. Marcus Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, Policy Studies (Washington, D.C., 2006), viii.
2. The New Paradigm consists of four principles: (1) the armed forces does not need to be at the forefront of politics, as it was in the Orde Baru, (2) the military will no longer occupy key positions, but instead will only influence the process of decision making, (3) that influence will be no longer be exercised directly, but only indirectly, and (4) the military will share roles in political decision making with non-military partners.
3. Mary P. Callahan, Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond, Occasional Paper (Monterey, 1999), 19–22.
4. Andrew Selth, Burma’s Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming?, Regional Outlook (Brisbane, 2013), 7.
5. “Speech Delivered by Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, Senior General Thayaysithu Min Aung Hlaing at the Parade of the 70th Armed Forces Day Held on 27th March, 2015,” The Global New Light of Myanmar, 2015, http://globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/
speech-delivered-by-commander-in-chief-of-defence-services- senior-general-thayaysithu-min-aung-hlaing-at-the-parade-of-the- 70th-armed-forces-day-held-on-27th-march-2015/.
6. Selth, Burma’s Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming?, 15.
7. See for instance Leonard C. Sebastian, “Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and His Generals” (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007).
8. See Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Jokowi’s First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 51, no. 3 (2015): 349–68.
9. Stanley Weiss, “A Dangerous Game of Military Politics in Indonesia,” The World Post, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
stanley-weiss/a-dangerous-game-of-milit_b_8806936.html.
10. Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Under Suharto’s Shadow: Jokowi and the Indonesian Military,” Foreign Affairs, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/indonesia/2015-08-12/under-suhartos-shadow.
11. Nani Afrida, “Army to Join Efforts to Accelerate Food Sufficiency,”
The Jakarta Post, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2015/01/09/army-join-efforts-accelerate-food-sufficiency.
html; Nani Afrida, “Jokowi Warned against Inviting the Military into Politics,” The Jakarta Post, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2016/02/03/jokowi-warned-against-inviting-military-politics.
html.
12. See The Expanding Role of the Indonesian Military, IPAC Report, vol.
19 (Jakarta, 2015).
13. Selth, Burma’s Security Forces: Performing, Reforming or Transforming?, 12.
14. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957).
15. Jurgen Ruland and Maria-Gabriela Manea, “The Politics of Military Reform in Indonesia and Nigeria,” in The Politics of Military Reform:
Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria, ed. Jurgen Ruland, Maria- Gabriela Manea, and Hans Born (New York: Springer, 2013), 4.
16. For the first time, three two-star generals will sit in the parliament, in addition 12 brigadier generals and 11 colonels. This stands in stark contrast with the previous composition where the military parliamentarian were mainly lower ranking officers. Renaud Egreteau, “Myanmar Military Chief Revamps His Parliamentary Team,” Nikkei Asian Review, 2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/
Viewpoints/Myanmar-military-chief-revamps-his-parliamentary- team?page=1.
17. See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Itacha:
Cornell University Press, 1978).
18. More on the history of Myanmar military see Mary P. Callahan,
“Burma: Soldiers as State Builders,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 413–29; Mary P.
Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003).
19. David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2001), 69.
20. Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 106.
21. Tim ProPatria, Reformasi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia (Jakarta:
ProPatria, 2004), 18.
22. Rizal Sukma and Edy Prasetyono, Security Sector Reform in Indonesia:
The Military and the Police, Working Paper Series, Working Paper Series (The Hague, 2003), 9.
23. Tim ProPatria, Reformasi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia, 6–7.
Almost a year after that fateful day when Rohingya refugees were let onto the shores of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the issue continues to fester. The refugees took a long and perilous journey that risks being stranded in the middle of the ocean for months. Today, there is still no solution for the situation or a common plan to prevent the tragedy from reoccurring. This infographic revisits the issue as Southeast Asia may face a similar humanitarian disaster again this year.
The Rohingya Refugees’ Festering Injustice
Dangerous Journeys Across the Sea UNHCR : - 95,000 refugees have travelled
the region since 2014
- 1,100 has died in the journey - Most of them are Rohingya
After Thai authorities started tightening security against people smuggling, refugees who enlisted smugglers are often carried away across the ocean. In 2015, this created an international problem as countries along the Malacca Strait kept the refugees stranded in the ocean before they relented and let fishermen bring them ashore.
“Around 200,000 Rohingya are likely to flee Myanmar again this year.”
- Mohiuddin Mohamad-Yusof
President of the World Rohingya Organisation (WRO) based in New York City, as reported by the Straits Times.
Source: The Strait Times
4,000,000 Rohingya in the world
2,500,000 have fled Myanmar
ASEAN ROUND-UP
What the Jakarta Attack Means for Indonesian Terrorism
East Asia Forum, February 9, 2016
Terrorist attack in Jakarta last month is a significant development for the country’s jihadism. Several aspects of the attack were new for an Indonesian operation: the use of handguns and grenades, the unusual location in that fellow Muslim casualties seemed to expected, the confirmed endorsement from the Islamic State (IS) leadership. It is almost certain that further, probably more lethal, terrorist attacks will occur in Indonesia. Pro-IS jihadists will regard the Sarinah attack as a failure due to the relatively low death toll. Bahrun Naim and in-jail Aman Abdurrahman, who bring a virulent militancy in their jihadism, will continue to draw recruits to the IS cause and persuade followers of the necessity and virtue in ongoing, bloodier attacks.
Read more: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/09/what- the-jakarta-attack-means-for-indonesian-terrorism/
Why it matters: The recent attack in Jakarta confirmed the spread of the Islamic State (IS) network and influence in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Unlike previous Al Qaeda-linked terror attacks that specifically targeted foreigners and symbols of the West, IS’ takfiri doctrine allows its supporters to fight fellow Muslims who disagree with them. More attacks in the future with greater casualties are a distinct possibility. The fact that some of the perpetrators of the Jakarta attack were previously in jail and managed to maintain communication with Aman Abdurrahman, who is in jail, should raise concerns over Indonesia’s counterterrorism strategy. If IS’ intention is regional, then an ASEAN-wide response is needed.
Myanmar Presidential Vote to Start on March 17 as Transition Talks Drag On
Reuters, February 8, 2016
Myanmar parliament will begin its election of the new president on March 17, cutting very close to an April 1 deadline, suggesting talks between Aung San Suu Kyi’s victorious party and the military are likely to take longer than planned. But a top military lawmaker on Monday denied that Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and the armed forces were discussing provisions to change the constitution and allow the democracy champion to become the country’s new president.
Pro-democracy party of NLD, under the leadership of nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in the general election last year. NLD secured 80% of the elected seats in the parliament. Under the current constitution, anyone with foreign spouses and children are banned from presidency. Suu Kyi’s children are British.
Read more: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar- politics-idUSKCN0VH0DX
Why it matters: Myanmar’s 2015 general election was a democratization landmark in a country that had endured decades of military rule. Despite her landslide victory, Aung San Suu Kyi is constitutionally banned from the presidency. A successful outcome of the discussions between her and the Myanmar military will determine whether democratization continues in Myanmar. A more open Myanmar is vital for ASEAN’s regional integration project.
Vietnam’s Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong Keeps His Post
The Diplomat, 28 January 2016
Nguyen Phu Trong was reelected as the Communist Party of Vietnam’s General Secretary for the second term. Trong will hold the most powerful position of the country for the next five years. The party congress also nominated the current Minister of Security Tran Dai Quang and Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phus as the next president and prime minister respectively. Trong’s victory came after his main rival, then Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, withdrew from the race. Many analysts thought Dung’s nationalistic appeal (and his strong ties among the business elite) could him an edge over Trong, but Trong’s hold over the party apparatus remained firm.
Read more: http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/vietnams- party-chief-nguyen-phu-trong-keeps-his-post/
Why it matters: Vietnam’s 2016 Communist Party Congress presented two contenders with different approaches to the economy and foreign affairs: Nguyen Phu Trong and Nguyen Tan Dung. While Trong enjoys a conservative reputation, Dung has proven to be willing to open the country and be tough on China when needed. Vietnam will see some incremental—
conservative—changes in its policy.
The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.
The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.
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The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.
The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.
The green peafowl is a species of peafowl that is found in the tropical forests of Southeast Asia.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
