Project Supervisors Rahimah Abdulrahim
Executive Director, The Habibie Center Hadi Kuntjara
Deputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center Managing Editor
Ray Hervandi
Thinking ASEAN Team A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi Askabea Fadhilla Fina Astriana Muhamad Arif Rahma Simamora Wirya Adiwena
A Note From the Editor Articles
After the South China Sea Arbitration Decision: Why It’d Make Sense For China to Negotiate with the Philippines Now
Smooth Waters Ahead or Rising Tides of Uncertainty? Philippine Foreign Policy Under President Rodrigo Duterte The South China Sea and ASEAN Unity:
A Cambodian Perspective
Infographic:Timeline of ASEAN- China Relations After the Cold War ASEAN Round-Up
The Verdict: Philippines Wins Arbitration Case vs China
Thitinan Pongsudhirak—Tribunal Ruling Against China Will Test ASEAN Unity ASEAN to Keep Mum on South China Sea Ruling: Diplomats
Contents
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5
13
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13 8
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11
A note from the editor
Dear readers:
Welcome to the July 2016 issue of Thinking ASEAN!
The July 12 release of the arbitral tribunal decision on the South China Sea in favor of the Philippines has put relations between China and Southeast Asian countries at a crossroads. Those that lock horns with China in the South China Sea may find the ruling to work in their favor as it does for the Philippines. For those with little interest in the South China Sea, the ruling has the potential to upend regional relations with China, especially now that China is shedding its strategic ambiguity.
In any case, the arbitral decision is a test for ASEAN unity. Given China’s importance to every country in Southeast Asia, what happens after the tribunal judgment will have bearing on the future trajectory of ASEAN. As such, we decided to invite two writers, from the Philippines and Cambodia, to expand on the thinking behind their respective countries’ foreign policy in relation to China and ASEAN.
Dr. Lowell Bautista, Lecturer at the School of Law of the University of Wollongong, opens this month’s issue with a piece on the breaks and continuities of Philippine foreign policy under newly installed President Rodrigo Duterte. In particular, he highlights several comments the president has made about China and the South China Sea.
Mr. Cheunboran Chanborey, a Cambodian PhD candidate in International Political and Strategic Studes at the Australian National University, contributed the second piece of this month’s issue. While it has little interest in the South China Sea disputes, Cambodia was sucked into the issue most prominently at the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Phnom Penh. In this piece, he traces Cambodian understanding of the South China Sea disputes.
For the final article of the issue, I made the argument that now, in the aftermath of the arbitral tribunal decision, represents a critical moment for settling the South China Sea disputes. Although China is hardening its position in response, it should not be blind to the opportunity that the Philippines is now open to bilateral negotiations, which is what Beijing has always urged.
Our infographic this month looks back at relations between China and ASEAN since the end of the Cold War. The ASEAN Round-Up section, meanwhile, highlights different responses to the arbitral tribunal decision from different national perspectives.
Please don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have suggestions or prospective submissions.
Happy reading!
Best regards from Jakarta,
Ray Hervandi Managing Editor
Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.
The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.
After the South China Sea Arbitration Decision:
Why It’d Make Sense For China to Negotiate with the Philippines Now
Ray Hervandi is Managing Editor of the Jakarta-based Habibie Center’s Thinking ASEAN and Senior Editor of TEMPO English magazine.
Bilateral Meeting between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines at the East Hall, Great Hall of the People, 2011.
Photo Credit: Official Gazette of the Philippines.
A lesson from the aftermath of the recently released arbitral tribunal decision1 on the South China Sea disputes is that might should not always make right. Following on its denial2 of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, however, China wasted little time afterwards in disregarding the ruling.3 In the South China Sea, it is now conducting combat air patrols4— perhaps a prelude to declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone over the South China Sea—and moving ahead with naval military exercises.5 China continues to do what it wants in the South China Sea, without concern for international judgment.
On July 12, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague—a multilateral mechanism for addressing disputes under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—issued an arbitration ruling on the dispute between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea.
Central among the findings of the tribunal is its conclusion that “there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line.’”
In other words, China’s Nine Dash Line, according to the tribunal, became irrelevant when it ratified UNCLOS in 1996. Given China’s assertive stance6 toward the tribunal and rejection of its ruling, the centrality of the Nine Dash Line to its expansive claim in the South China Sea, and the tribunal’s legally binding7 but ultimately unenforceable decision under UNCLOS, this ruling rightfully raises questions about China’s future status as a signatory to the convention.
The tribunal, furthermore, found in favor of the Philippines on almost all of the 15 issues8 Manila raised for the tribunal’s consideration. The issues ranged from the lawfulness of Chinese actions in the South China Sea, harm to the marine environment, to the aggravation of the dispute. The judgment, in short, is an unambiguous censure of China’s all-embracing claim in the South China Sea.
China’s Dual Strategy
As the dust from all this commotion settles, interestingly, China is pursuing a dual strategy in the South China Sea. Almost immediately after the tribunal decision was issued, Beijing responded with an official statement9 that clarified its view on its claimed territory sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. The statement explains10 five aspects of the Chinese position:
1. China’s historical claim to territorial sovereignty and “relevant rights and interests” over islands in the SCS,
2. Its actions to uphold said sovereign rights and interests since 1949,
3. Four elements of the its rights and interests in the South China Sea:
- Sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea,
- Internal waters, territorial seas, and contiguous zones based on those islands,
- Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) & the continental shelf based on those islands,
- Historic rights,
4. Its opposition to other countries’ occupation of some of the Spratly archipelago, and
5. Its commitment to freedom of navigation for international shipping
The official statement represents China’s strongest and clearest assertion of its claims in the South China Sea. Its 1998 EEZ and Continental Shelf Law11 refers to historic rights but neglects to mention the Nine Dash Line. China’s diplomatic note12 to the United Nations in 2009 presents a map with the Nine Dash Line but is silent on historic rights. In another note13 to the United Nations in 2011, China claims the EEZ and the continental shelf around the Spratly Islands but makes no reference to the Nine Dash Line or historic rights. Despite years of international pressure to have Beijing clarify its claims in the South China Sea, only an international ruling, it seems, is able to bring that about.
Talk to Manila Now
At the same time, China is also indicating willingness to negotiate on the South China Sea, albeit only with the Philippines for the time being. In a white paper14 Beijing published the day after the tribunal’s decision came out, China frames the status quo vis- à-vis the Philippines as having “reached consensus on settling their relevant disputes in the South China Sea.” Nevertheless, it also complains, “The Philippines has repeatedly taken moves
that complicate the relevant disputes” in the next section of the white paper.
Armed with the most leverage it has had over China in recent years, the Philippines, too, is eager to start talks with China on the brewing dispute. Its newly installed President Rodrigo Duterte is mulling over sending15 former President Fidel Ramos to China to start negotiations. Candidate Duterte freely talked16 about bilateral talks with China even if Manila’s arbitral tribunal strategy and effort to multilateralize the South China Sea disputes failed to bear fruit within two years. During his campaign, he even raised17 the idea of Sino-Philippine joint exploration and toyed with “shutting up” about the dispute if only China provided the Philippines with infrastructure construction around the country.
If Beijing can hold its nose and negotiate with Manila despite the arbitration, the change of policy in Manila, the most assertive of the claimants, plays directly into its hands as bilateral negotiations are what it has urged all along. Beijing has a window of opportunity in President Duterte to settle as many standing issues as possible. Chalking up a mutually acceptable negotiation process with the Philippines will be an accomplishment for a China intent on securing the South China Sea for itself. For Beijing, it would be a case of one down, four to go: Brunei, Malaysia, Taipei and Vietnam.
Failure to carry out negotiations successfully with a Manila emboldened by the tribunal decision, on the other hand, will polarize the South China Sea disputes further. If bilateral negotiations cannot work between China and post-tribunal Philippines, why should other claimants to the South China Sea disputes expect any better for themselves? On this multilateralizing path, third-party countries, the United States in particular, are bound to insert themselves in the South China Sea disputes especially since the other prong of China’s strategy is a hardening of its territorial claims.
Endnotes
1. https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7
2. h t t p : / / n e w s . x i n h u a n e t . c o m / e n g l i s h / 2 0 1 6 - 07/12/c_135507764.html
3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/
philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china 4. h t t p : / / n e w s . x i n h u a n e t . c o m / e n g l i s h / 2 0 1 6 -
07/18/c_135522387.htm
5. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-hold-military- exercises-in-south-china-sea-raising-tensions-1467542325 6. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-hold-military-
exercises-in-south-china-sea-raising-tensions-1467542325 7. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/annex7.htm
8. http://blog.crisisgroup.org/worldwide/2016/07/12/
landmark-south-china-sea-ruling-could-revive-negotiations 9. h t t p : / / n e w s . x i n h u a n e t . c o m / e n g l i s h / 2 0 1 6 -
07/12/c_135507754.htm
10. h t t p : / / n e w s . x i n h u a n e t . c o m / e n g l i s h / 2 0 1 6 - 07/12/c_135507754.htm
11. h t t p : / / n e w s . x i n h u a n e t . c o m / e n g l i s h / 2 0 1 6 - 07/12/c_135507754.htm
12. http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf
13. http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/
mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf
14. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/
node_7239601.htm
15. http://www.wsj.com/articles/philippines-duterte-wants- ex-president-ramos-to-meet-with-china-on-maritime- dispute-1468520651
16. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippine- presidential-front-runner-duterte-says-he-will-hold-talks- with-china-over
17. http://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/nation/04/11/16/
duterte-willing-to-back-down-on-sea-dispute-with-china
Smooth Waters Ahead or Rising Tides of
Uncertainty? Philippine Foreign Policy Under President Rodrigo Duterte
Bangkerohan Bridge in Davao City where President Duterte previously served as mayor for 22 years.
Photo Credit: Jeffrey Pioquinto/flickr.
Dr. Lowell Bautista is Lecturer at the School of Law and Staff Member at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong.
The Philippines is in the midst of a transition. The astonishing rise and decisive victory of newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte marks a significant turning point in the landscape of Philippine politics. Duterte’s inimitable style outraged his critics, embarrassed imperial Manila’s entrenched elites, and triggered disquieting ripples across the globe to an audience unaccustomed to the foul-mouthed, tough-talking, long-time mayor of Davao City in southern Philippines. But the Philippine electorate, angry and despondent, economically disenfranchised, and frustrated with perennial problems of corruption, crime and illegal drugs, massively supported his incendiary campaign. The resounding protest vote that catapulted Duterte into victory is a clear call for change from a nation weary of traditional politics and broken promises.
Duterte’s Brand of Diplomacy
However, in the sombre stage of global diplomacy where tradition, protocol and etiquette are primordial values, the raw honesty, populist theatrics, impulsiveness and frivolity of President Duterte may not be received with delightful enthusiasm. His rhetorical blusters, which so far included graphic anecdotal allusions to his philandering and genitalia, necrophiliac jokes, endorsement of extrajudicial killings, and relentless tirades against the Catholic clergy, may have endeared him to the Filipino masses but these playful witticisms have also proven unpopular to outside spectators.
Even before he was officially sworn into office, the series of diplomatic faux pas that peppered the Duterte campaign trail makes it obvious that he is not a foreign policy maverick. His “apparent endorsement” of extrajudicial killings was strongly condemned by United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon who was “extremely disturbed” by his antagonizing remarks against journalists in the Philippines.1 Duterte’s earlier scathing statements that corrupt journalists deserve to be killed also earned heavy criticisms from UN special rapporteurs on human rights.2 Malacañang dismissed the incident as a misinterpretation of the president’s statements, which were allegedly taken out of context and based on the wrong premise. The heated war of words was ignited by Duterte’s previous
unprovoked attacks against the institutional ineffectiveness of the UN for its failure to end violence in the Middle East and Africa, and for its hypocrisy on issues concerning climate change that fail to impose sanctions on industrialized countries whose carbon footprint cause greater damage to the environment.3 A Pattern of Breaking Tradition
The new Philippine president, the country’s first chief executive from Mindanao and the first city mayor to jump straight to the highest elected post in the land, finds no qualms in breaking tradition. His recent inauguration convincingly proves this. On June 30, 2016, in austere rites devoid of the usual pomp and pageantry and sans elected Vice President Leni Robredo who was sworn in in a separate ceremony, the 16th president of the Republic of the Philippines took his oath at Malacañang Palace before law school fraternity brother Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Bienvenido Reyes and a small cadre of diplomats and select guests.
He is beholden to no one and does not treat any institution, whether local or foreign, too sacrosanct to be disparaged if he deems such is merited. In his own words in his inaugural speech,
“I have no friends to serve, I have no enemies to harm.”4 He pokes fun at Manila’s oligarchs, constantly derides the Catholic church, threatened to dissolve Congress and defy the judiciary, if they dare stand in his way. He has recently entreated the military’s top generals whom he believes to be protectors of the country’s drug lords to step down lest he humiliate them and forcibly oust them from their posts. He unapologetically offers an iron fist whilst bragging about it. His emblematic cavalier attitude and his bombastic style and rough language may not have universal appeal, but he may just be the knight in shining armor that the Philippines needs. Or so his multitude of supporters and those prudently and patiently willing to give him the chance to prove himself earnestly believe and are waiting on him to deliver his mantra that true change and transformation is finally coming to this country.
General Currents of Foreign Policy Under the Duterte Presidency
The Philippine constitutional structure is essentially presidential in orientation, which vests overwhelming power and authority upon the chief executive. The president is the chief architect of Philippine foreign policy, and as such customarily determines the cadence and course of the country’s external relations. This places a heavy burden upon the shoulders of President Duterte who needs to have a solid grasp of geopolitics, foreign relations and international law. The capricious plethora of foreign policy issues that await the president’s decisive action is exceptionally complex and daunting. This job is certainly not for the faint- hearted, of which Duterte, sometimes to a fault, is clearly not.
Beware the fatal combination of audacity and hubris.
It does not take great imagination to envisage that Philippine foreign policy under President Duterte will be profoundly different from the previous Aquino administration. The priorities, philosophy, and dynamics that inform the policies of Duterte will be fashioned and influenced by his background as a local politician from southern Philippines, predicated on his anti- establishment position as a virtual outsider in national politics and practically a neophyte to the intricacies of foreign policy and international relations. However, he has the temperament, experience and pragmatism essential to leadership in foreign policy matters.
Duterte’s early pronouncements give a strong impression that the immediate focus of his administration will be largely inward-looking: addressing insurgency in southern Philippines, restoring peace and order, curbing crime rates, eradicating illegal trade in drugs. The laundry list is long and some of them not very popular: shift to federalism, constitutional change, opening festering national debate on whether to allow a hero’s burial to former President Ferdinand Marcos. Foreign policy was never a central issue in the presidential elections, neither were economic platforms or national security. And even in his inauguration speech, President Duterte cautiously chose to encapsulate them in general terms brushing aside specifics for the time being, but assuring everyone that his economic, financial and political policies shall be supplied in due time.5 In crafting Duterte’s foreign policy blueprint, he needs to consider the three interconnected pillars upon which Philippine foreign policy rests: national security, economic security and the protection of the rights and interests of Filipinos overseas. His more amicable, less confrontational position in respect to the South China Sea, contrasted with his brazen contempt of the United States, represents a radical shift in longstanding foreign policy alignments. This departure requires a delicate balancing act and will be met with strong opposition and may signal instability to the rest of the region especially within ASEAN.
Duterte has laid down his administration’s wide-ranging 8-point economic agenda, which ensures continuity of the Aquino administration’s macroeconomic policies, tax reform, increased infrastructure spending to support the country’s agricultural sector, attract foreign investments by reducing crime and corruption.6 No objections to these sweepingly broad economic policy directives, but the devil will always be in the detail. There are other pressing economics and trade issues that need to be addressed in the immediate future including the country’s integration with Southeast Asia under the ASEAN Economic Community framework, and other broad trade and economic initiatives such as the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) within APEC, or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as an alternative to the TPP, or even China’s Maritime Silk Road
“One Belt, One Road” initiative. The challenge is for Duterte to strike the right balance among these multiple and competing initiatives alongside the pressures of foreign-driven interests in a way that would not cost him to compromise what he believes are Philippine national interests.
The South China Sea Dispute
Manila’s longstanding territorial and maritime disputes with China over the West Philippine Sea will definitely be among the most immediate and intricate foreign policy challenges facing Philippine President Duterte. His position on this issue solidly rests on his views about China. At the moment, the imminent test of how Duterte will successfully navigate the turbulent waters of the South China Sea is how he could restore the currently precarious bilateral relationship with China whilst maintaining robust security and defense relations with the United States. This requires a delicate balancing act and no easy feat to accomplish.
In sharp contrast to Duterte’s popular image of being fearless, volatile and unpredictable, his conciliatory and amicable position towards China seems a conundrum. On the exterior, it is worrisome that whilst Duterte has indulged the public by spur of the moment histrionics, including a remark to ride a jet ski to plan a Philippine flag on Chinese-occupied artificial islands, he
has yet to reveal any concrete foreign policy directive towards China and the country’s disputes over the South China Sea.
The outgoing Aquino administration has consistently maintained a hard-line policy towards Beijing over the South China Sea dispute and, in stark contrast, warm relations and deepening security ties with Washington and Tokyo. In the Southeast Asia, if not the whole of Asia, Manila has emerged as the most outspoken opponent of Chinese provocative actions in the highly contested South China Sea, including a tense standoff over Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and more recent occupation and development of features in the South China Sea. The former incident brought bilateral relationship between the two countries at its lowest since the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, prompting Manila to file an arbitral case in 2013 against Beijing over its controversial nine-dashed line. The highly anticipated ruling of arbitral tribunal is now available and, as most analysts predict, unfavorable to China.
Duterte’s election pronouncements on China and his views on the South China Sea disputes appear to be diametrically at odds with the current design and trajectory of Philippine foreign policy on these important issues. Duterte favors directly negotiating with China and willing to shelve contentious issues of sovereignty in exchange for Chinese economic concessions.
He espouses joint venture on oil and gas exploration with China whilst eschewing the issue of ownership if necessary.
Duterte is opposed to the idea of going to war with China and he does not advocate the use of legal avenues to enforce the Philippine claim. Instead, he prefers a multilateral approach that will bring rival claimants and even extraregional powers to the negotiating table. These views, albeit not necessarily novel, do not seem subversively treasonous and definitely signal a radical shift in Philippine-China relations under the Duterte presidency.
A Pivot in Philippine-China Relations
The direction of Philippine-China relations under the Duterte presidency is still amorphous at this stage. The paucity of any solid, long-term and categorical statement from the president on the South China Sea—nay on foreign policy in general—under his administration makes gazing at the crystal ball particularly difficult. At best, Duterte’s rhetoric suggests a more amicable and conciliatory diplomatic stance between Manila and Beijing.
In some ways, this could be a good thing. The two countries could focus their energies and resources on infrastructure and economic activities that are mutually beneficial. On the other hand, the softening of Manila’s stand against an increasingly aggressive and expansionist China could expose cracks in the unstable regional security architecture and further weaken concerted efforts of extraregional powers such as the United States and Japan to counterbalance China’s provocative military posturing, as well as subvert ASEAN initiatives to rally behind a unified position against an assertive China. The rapid shift in defense posture could further increase the risk of miscalculations and provocations on the ground, and undermine longstanding efforts that reinforce a rules-based approach in resolving the South China Sea disputes.
The Arbitral Tribunal Decision
The first litmus test of where the populist strongman stands on the issue of the South China Sea came on July 12, 2016 when The Hague-based Arbitral Tribunal issued its final award on the arbitration case filed against China with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013. And at a critical time in the nation’s history when the rest of the world is waiting for how the Philippines will proceed after the overwhelming arbitral tribunal victory, there was disquieting silence from the chief executive. The newly
appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Perfecto Yasay, issued a terse statement calling for “restraint and sobriety” following the Philippines’ landmark win. There is a sense of muted jubilation in Manila without any triumphalist fanfare, in keeping with the President’s clear “no taunt, no flaunt” instructions. Duterte’s silence could be disconcerting and rather uncharacteristic, but possibly the prudent and judicious approach at this difficult time.
There are challenging and real work ahead on more contentious issues of sovereignty, maritime delimitation, reparations and fisheries enforcement and multilateral negotiations. For the time being, Duterte’s deliberate decision to be cautiously tight- lipped, averting the possibility of any unintended callous or inflammatory statements, should be respected.
The Chinese government has repeatedly confirmed that it would not honor the award of the tribunal nor consider itself bound by its verdict. In 2017, when the Philippines assumes chairmanship of ASEAN is another occasion in the distant horizon when his leadership on the simmering cauldron of conflict that is the South China Sea will be put under scrutiny. It is still too early in the day to see how a Duterte presidency will respond to China and where he truly draws the line with Manila’s big neighbor.
The unpredictable and volatile nature of the incoming president makes it even harder to calculate his position.
The competing claims on the South China Sea have made its waters rather turbulent in recent times. But hope always remains buoyant. And the man of the hour is Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte on whose shoulders rests the hope that he can capably navigate the turbulent waters of the South China Sea and sail his country towards smooth and calm waters.
The leadership change in Manila will certainly have significant impact on the country’s foreign policy. It will be radically different and largely driven by the personality of the new Philippine president. On balance, it will be safe to say that the road ahead will by no means be an easy one. But the president has assured his countrymen in his inaugural speech that he is ready to start his work for the nation. He has also reassured the international community that he will adhere to the rule of law and respect the country’s international obligations. Honest and reassuring words from the man who has captured the imagination of the Filipino masses longing for the change he has so cleverly hawked to them. Duterte has to succeed, as one must hope he will, if but to teach a generation that their beloved country could be great again. Duterte needs to fully utilize his political capital along with the goodwill and massive support of the masses, and seize the opportunities that come from his unique leadership and personality style. Overall, the political and economic prospects for the Philippines under the presidency of Duterte look relatively promising, and he will likely exceed expectations.
Endnotes
1. http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/06/10/Duterte-media- killings-extrajudicial-killings-UN.html
2. http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/06/07/un-special- rapporteurs-duterte-stand-assassination-of-journalists.html 3. http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/03/20/united-nations-
hypocrites-carbon-emissions.html
4. http://www.mb.com.ph/full-transcript-inaugural-address-of- president-duterte/
5. http://www.mb.com.ph/full-transcript-inaugural-address-of- president-duterte/
6. http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/05/12/rodrigo-duterte- eight-point-economic-agenda.html
The South China Sea and ASEAN Unity:
A Cambodian Perspective
Close-up of portolan chart of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, [1701-15?] by English cartographer Samuel Thornton.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons/The Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.
Cheunboran Chanborey is a PhD candidate in International Political and Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. He is also a Research Fellow at the Cambodian Institute for Strategic Studies and Lecturer at the Department of International Studies, Royal University of Phnom Penh.
Since 2010, the South China Sea has reemerged as one of Asia’s hotspots due to increasing military tensions between China and other claimant states, especially the Philippines and Vietnam. Diplomatic stalemate between ASEAN and China as well as within ASEAN further exacerbates the uncertainty. The South China Sea has become what The Economist called a “sea of troubles.”1
Clearly, China is being assertive in the disputed areas. Its massive land reclamation, the establishment of new military landing strips, and the deployment of anti-craft missiles are strong evidence for such a judgment. Moreover, despite the absence of major military clashes, China has been assertive in using Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships, civilian fishing ships as well as mobile oil explorations to assert and defend its maritime territorial claims.
China’s growing assertiveness resulted in numerous confrontations with ASEAN claimant states. For instance, confrontation between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal escalated in 2012. In May 2014, China moved a large oil ring into waters near the Paracels, which Vietnam also claims. This resulted in confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese civilian and military ships. In March 2016, Jakarta-Beijing bilateral relations soured due to alleged encroachments by Chinese fishing boats into Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Decoding China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea
There are many attempts to explain China’s military and diplomatic posture in the South China Sea. Donald Emmerson argues that China’s increasing assertiveness derives from Beijing’s three fears and one megaproject.2 The three fears include: (1) the repetition of humiliation that China experienced throughout the 19th century by Western powers—
Britain, France, and the United States—that arrived in China in ships across the South China Sea, (2) attempts by external powers, the United States in particular, to contain the rise of China to assume its rightful place in the world, and (3) the disaffection of the Chinese over Beijing’s handling of the country’s territorial integrity.
Meanwhile, since becoming China’s new leader in November 2012, President Xi Jinping declared the China Dream as a way to achieve a “rich and powerful country, the revitalization of the nation, and the people’s happiness.”3 The goal is to exert China’s primacy in Asia and the world. To this end, offshore dominance, especially in the South China Sea, may be viewed by Beijing as a requisite step forward toward the goal.
The US Involvement in the South China Sea:
Constructive or Divisive?
Another development that must also be considered while discussing about a more assertive China in the region is the American “pivot to Asia,” which has been seen, at least in the eyes of Chinese strategists, as an attempt by Washington to encircle China.
Controversially, at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared publicly that the United States has a national interest in the freedom of navigation and flights in the South China Sea. Since then, military tension has been unabated, and the Philippines and Vietnam have been more assertive both in their bilateral negotiation with China and in using ASEAN as a framework to deal with China. Arguably, Manila and Hanoi might share the same conviction that time is actually on the Chinese side and that it is the right time to push for more compromise from Beijing given the fact that China is not yet a full-fledged superpower and, more importantly, the United States is actively reengaging in Asia. As a result, the South China Sea has always been a hot agenda item in ASEAN meetings and ASEAN-related meetings since 2010.
Although the United States does not exert any claim, it has interests in the South China Sea, which include, but not limited to: (1) freedom of navigation; (2) commitments to its allies in the region, and (3) attempt to prevent regional hegemony.4 To protect its interests in the region, the United States has strengthened its security cooperation with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. It has also increased joint military exercises with the regional countries and operated maritime patrol aircraft to challenge China’s assertiveness in the disputed area. The US engagement in the South China Sea, in turn, gives ASEAN claimant states leverage in pursuing a firmer stance toward China, which is not supported by ASEAN non-claimant states due to their desire to maintain close ASEAN-China relations. As a result, ASEAN’s division on the issue has been evident.
Hun Sen’s Rebuke Against “Unjust Accusations”
Inevitably, disagreement within ASEAN on the South China Sea caused a political crisis during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’
Meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012 as the foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in ASEAN’s history. The failure—known in ASEAN circles as the Phnom Penh Fiasco—has allegedly been interpreted as the result of enormous Chinese pressure on Cambodia: Beijing allegedly blocked any mention of the South China Sea in the joint communiqué.5
More recently, the ASEAN-China Special Foreign Ministers’
Meeting in June 2016 in Yuxi, China was concluded without a
joint press conference by the co-chairs of the meeting—China and Singapore, ASEAN-China Coordinator—due to a lack of agreement on the South China Sea. Following the meeting, it has been reported that, under Beijing’s pressure, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar forced the recall of the ASEAN joint press statement by withdrawing their support on the statement, which was to be released separately from the host, China.
Earlier in April 2016, China has reached a four-point consensus with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos that territorial disputes in the South China Sea were “not an issue between China and ASEAN as whole.” Subsequently, Beijing has been accused of dividing ASEAN to preempt any ASEAN consensus on the verdict by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the Philippines’s South China Sea case against China just issued on July 12, 2016.
In defending his country’s position, Prime Minister Hun Sen recently rebuked that, “Cambodia has again and again become a victim of the South China Sea issue because of unjust accusations.”6 He added that the Phnom Penh Fiasco took place not because of Cambodia. The reason was, as he said, “They bullied Cambodia,” referring to pressure from two ASEAN claimant states—the Philippines and Vietnam—to incorporate their strong wordings in the joint communiqué. He also blamed some ASEAN claimant states for “trying to drag Cambodia into the dispute,” saying that “They have a dispute, but they get Cambodia to be responsible.”
Cambodia’s position on the South China Sea is aimed at: (1) continuing implementing the declaration of conduct (DOC); (2) urging ASEAN and China to make the utmost effort to finalize the code of conduct (COC); and (3) encouraging countries concerned to discuss and resolve their issue because ASEAN is not a court. Prime Minister Hun Sen stated that, “ASEAN cannot measure land for them…the South China Sea is not an issue between ASEAN and China.”
With regard to the PCA’s verdict, Prime Minister Hun Sen has revealed a clear position that Cambodia would “not make any joint declaration to support the decision of the court.” The Philippines has gone too far in unilaterally bringing the South China Sea to the court without seriously anticipating the action’s implications on ASEAN and ASEAN-China relations.
Hun Sen made it clear that, “It is the Philippines who sues China.
Let the Philippines deal with it. Why call for ASEAN’s support?”
Prime Minister Hun Sen also called upon major powers outside the region to refrain from “pouring the oil into flame and try to keep detente in relations on the South China Sea.” He referred to “one of the major powers outside the region”—widely taken to be the United States—has lobbied ASEAN members to jointly support the PCA’s ruling.
Cambodia Between ASEAN and China
Clearly, the South China Sea constitutes today’s most difficult foreign policy dilemma for Cambodia since ASEAN and China are both crucially important for the kingdom’s security and economic development. Since becoming an ASEAN member in 1999, Phnom Penh has attached a great importance to the integration of Cambodia into the regional grouping. In fact, ASEAN has always been the cornerstone of Cambodian foreign policy. Cambodian policymakers were convinced that ASEAN
would be a crucial platform through which their country could safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as promote its strategic and economic interests.
Earlier this week, Prime Minister Hun Sen reminded again four main factors encouraging Cambodia to join ASEAN.
First, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference would help Cambodia, which is sandwiched by its “two giant ASEAN countries—Thailand and Vietnam,” to address its external security challenges. Secondly, a consensus-based ASEAN would ensure that “Whether the country is rich or poor, big or small, every member has one voice equally.” Thirdly, Cambodia would stand to benefit from ASEAN in terms of “economic construction, socio-economic development and connectivity.”
Finally, Cambodia would benefit from ASEAN’s “big diplomatic outreach to partners.”
Prime Minister Hun Sen’s recall of reasons for Cambodia’s membership in ASEAN can be understood as an expression of doubt in contrast to his past conviction on the role of the regional organization. First, it seems that Hun Sen’s confidence in ASEAN has gradually faded due to the grouping’s ineffective response to the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict between 2008 and 2011. In response to Cambodia’s urge for help, what ASEAN and its member states did was the encouragement for Phnom Penh and Bangkok to bilaterally resolve the dispute. In fact, the border dispute was never tabled as an agenda of the ASEAN Summits until Prime Minister Hun Sen broke protocol, possibly out of his frustration, and raised the issue at the ASEAN Summit in May 2011.
Second, his statement related to the fact that Cambodia has been bullied by some powerful ASEAN members implies his unease at ASEAN’s inability to enforce the principle of non-interference and equal sovereign rights among its member states. Last but more importantly, China, not ASEAN, has become Cambodia’s largest foreign investor and biggest economic benefactor. China is also the biggest provider of military assistance to Cambodia.
Noticeably, China’s military assistance increased remarkably at the time when Cambodia badly needed to build up its defence forces during the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute. Moreover, as for policymakers in Phnom Penh, China is not a threat but a protector of Cambodia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, ensured on many occasions by Chinese top leaders.
In this context, it is important for regional leaders and policymakers to reflect the reality of Southeast Asia and how to move forward. Firstly, it is not unreasonable to agree with a Cambodian scholar, Chheang Vannarith, who argues that, “If the regional and external countries keep pressuring the non- claimant states like Cambodia to build a united front against China, ASEAN will be disintegrated”.7
Secondly, ASEAN-China relationship is not only about the South China Sea. There are many areas of cooperation that both sides stand to benefit from, including trade, investment, tourism, regional connectivity, and joint efforts in fighting against non-traditional security issues.
Thirdly, it is unpractical to consider ASEAN a dispute-settlement mechanism. It has never fulfilled that role even in disputes between its member states. Like Cambodia and Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines tried to initially resolve territorial disputes through bilateral mechanisms but eventually brought the issue to the International Court of Justice. At its best, what ASEAN can do is to be a dispute-avoidance mechanism.
Lastly, there is a dangerous risk of internationalizing the South China Sea, particularly by dragging in external powers. By so doing, ASEAN will lose its neutrality in its relations with major powers outside the region. Moreover, ASEAN’s members might be drawn into great-power competition, which will eventually put ASEAN’s unity at risk, for ASEAN members have different interests in the South China Sea and see the role of external powers through different lenses.
Endnotes
1. See The Economist, “The South China Sea: Sea of Troubles”, 2 May 2015. Available at: http://www.economist.
com/news/leaders/21650122-disputed-sea-growing-security- nightmareand-increasingly-ecological-one-sea-troubles
2. See Donald Emmerson, “Why Does China Want to Control the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 24 May 2016. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/why-does-china-want-to- control-the-south-china-sea/
3. William A. Challahan, “The China Dream and the American Dream”, Economic and Political Studies 1(2014):143-160.
4. See Ronald O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Excusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress”, CRS Report, 31 May 2016. Available at: https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf
5. Kishore Mahbubani, “Beijing in the South China Sea – belligerent or assertive?” Financial Times, 15 March 2016.
Available at: https://next.ft.com/content/58c676ed-f3f4-32ac- b3c9-69efd0ae07fd
6. See Hun Sen’s Remarks at the Graduation Ceremony of the Royal School of Administration, in Phnom Penh, on 20 June 2016. Available at: http://cnv.org.kh/selected-impromptu- comments-graduation-ceremony-royal-school-administration- unofficial-translation/
7. Khmer Times, “Hun Sen: Enough on South China Sea”, 29 June 2016. Available at: http://www.khmertimeskh.com/
news/26635/hun-sen--enough-on-south--china-sea/
A Timeline of ASEAN-China Relations
1991May A Timeline of ASEAN-China Relations.
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attends the 24th July ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, marking the start of the China-ASEAN dialogue.
1994July
China is invited to attend the first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as ASEAN’s consultation partner, and becomes one of the founders of the forum, which started a dialogue on regional security between the two sides.
1995April The China-ASEAN Vice Ministerial Consultation Meeting
is held in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, creating a new mechanism to deepen the dialogue between the two sides.
1996July
At the 29th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, China becomes a full dialogue partner of ASEAN.
December1997 The first informal China-ASEAN Summit is convened in Malaysia, during which it is agreed to establish a good-neighbor partnership of mutual trust for the 21st century. The first ASEAN Plus Three Summit (China, Japan and South Korea) is held in Malaysia.
2002Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues
October
Laos signs on to a Thai-Chinese 700-kilometer road network project that will link Thailand with Kunming.
November
China and ASEAN sign a framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation, in which they agree to launch the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.
China and ASEAN members sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
2003May After four years of negotiations, the FTA between Singapore
and the US is signed in Washington. The Agreement also makes plain Singapore’s intention to keep the US engaged in Southeast Asia so as to balance the rise of the Chinese and Indian economic and political powerhouses. The Philippines agrees to form links between China and ASEAN on free trade issues, though with some reservations.
China and ten other Asia-Pacific countries, including five June ASEAN members, agree to establish an Asian Bond Fund worth more than $1 billion. Thai Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak announces Thailand will form a link between China and ASEAN on free trade issues.
September China accuses Vietnamese gunboats of firing at two of its
fishing vessels in “traditional Chinese waters” in the Gulf of Tonkin, violating agreements on sovereignty and fishing activities in the Gulf.
October China and ASEAN establish the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity at the 7th China-ASEAN Summit. The Chinese government also announces its joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, Indonesia. China has also expressed its intention to accede to the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ). ASEAN also became the first regional organization to maintain a strategic partnership with China.
2004January
MOU on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues was signed by ASEAN and China in Bangkok.
MayThe Complementary Protocol on the China-Vietnam Agreement on Fishery Cooperation (AFC) in Beibu Bay is signed in Beijing.
September
All ASEAN members unanimously recognized China’s full market economy status.
November
- The first China-ASEAN Expo is held in Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region.
- China and ASEAN also sign a free trade agreement on trade in goods.
- China announces that it will expand the range of preferential treatment to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.
- ASEAN and China deepen cooperation in the transport area with the signing of the MOU on Transport
Cooperation
August2005 Both sides sign an MOU on Cultural Cooperation in
Bangkok.
2006Joint Statement of ASEAN-China Commemorative Summit.
ASEAN and China cooperation has been intensified in health with the convening the First ASEAN-China Health Ministerial.
October
Beijing hosts a seminar on the free trade agreement between China and ASEAN.
January2007 China and ASEAN sign an agreement on trade in services. ASEAN and China adopt a 2007-2012 Plan of Action during the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu.
2008December
Xue Hanqin is appointed China’s first ambassador to ASEAN.
August 2009 China and ASEAN sign a free trade agreement on investment.
November The 1st Formal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) Plus China will be held back-to-back with the AMMTC in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
2010January
The China-ASEAN FTA is established on schedule. With a combined population of 1.9 billion people, the area is the largest among developing countries.
2011November
The 14th ASEAN-China Summit to Commemorate the 20th Anniversary of Dialogue Relations is held in Bali.
An international tribunal in The Hague concluded that 2016 China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to the bulk of the South China Sea. Chinese President Xi Jinping rejected the decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration saying, “China will never accept any claim or action based on those awards.”
ASEAN ROUND-UP
The Verdict: Philippines Wins Arbitration Case vs China
The Philippine Star, July 12, 2016
MANILA, Philippines - The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) under the United Nations ruled in favor of the Philippines in its arbitration case against China over the South China Sea.
The Hague-based international tribunal ruled that China’s nine-dash line claim over the disputed waters is invalid. “[A]s between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention,” the award read. The international tribunal found that it has jurisdiction to consider the dispute between the Philippines and China concerning historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. The tribunal pointed out that there was no evidence that China has exercised exclusive control over the disputed waters or its resources.
Read more: http://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2016/07/12/1602113/verdict-philippines-wins- arbitration-case-vs-china
Thitinan Pongsudhirak: Tribunal Ruling Against China Will Test ASEAN Unity
Nikkei Asian Review, July 13 2016
No matter how Tuesday’s verdict by an international tribunal on China’s South China Sea claim is viewed, and whatever its immediate consequences, the watershed ruling will bring about a “new normal” in Southeast Asia that portends more regional tensions and potential conflict in the longer term.
This “new normal” means that the status quo before Manila took its case against China to the dispute-settling Arbitral Tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in January 2013 will not be restored. China will effectively control the areas it has claimed and in which it has constructed features and facilities, even though the tribunal’s damning ruling suggests it has no legal right to do so. It behooves China now as an aspiring global leader to be satisfied with its neighborhood fait accompli and start to compromise with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations by working toward the group’s proposed rules-based Code of Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea (CoC).
For ASEAN, particularly for the Philippines, the favorable ruling may prove a Pyrrhic victory unless the resilient but divided regional organization can close ranks and put up a united and persuasive stand to rein in China’s maritime claims.
Read more: http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/
Thitinan-Pongsudhirak-Tribunal-ruling-against-China-will- test-ASEAN-unity
ASEAN to Keep Mum on South China Sea:
Diplomats
Channel News Asia, July 14, 2016
KUALA LUMPUR: Southeast Asia will not issue a statement on the rejection of Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea by an international tribunal, regional diplomats said on Thursday (Jul 14), blaming the no-comment on pressure by Beijing. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had weighed whether to speak out on Tuesday’s ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, said Southeast Asian diplomats with knowledge of the matter.
But 10-member ASEAN, whose unity has been increasingly strained in the face of Chinese expansionism, could not find common ground, they said. “ASEAN officials had prepared a draft text but there was no agreement to release a joint statement,” said a Southeast Asian diplomat, adding that China was believed to have leaned on its ASEAN allies Laos and Cambodia to prevent a statement in the highly charged affair.
“Some ASEAN countries are definitely not happy. Beijing’s action can be seen as interference in ASEAN’s centrality,” the source said.
Read more: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/
asiapacific/asean-to-keep-mum-on/2956764.html
Why it matters: Let the news speak for themselves.
Following the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it seems that ASEAN will face a big challenge to its centrality as well as to the stability of the region.
The ruling has shown that Philippines’ decision to go it alone has garnered international support and possibly created a momentum for rules-based maritime security architecture. Meanwhile, China still continues to deny the result of the ruling, and its strong influence in the region will make it difficult for ASEAN country to jointly declare a statement on the issue—not to say support for the Philippines, their fellow member countries.
When one asks what will be of the South China Sea, one must also ask what will become of ASEAN.
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The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.
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The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.
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