Project Supervisors Rahimah Abdulrahim
Executive Director, The Habibie Center Hadi Kuntjara
Deputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center Managing Editor
Ray Hervandi
Thinking ASEAN Team A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi Askabea Fadhilla Fina Astriana Muhamad Arif Rahma Simamora Wirya Adiwena
A Note From the Editor Articles
Obama’s Vietnam Visit: A First Step Toward Unspooling the South China Sea Disputes?
The Peace Process: A Priority in Myanmar’s Transition to Democracy
Constraints for CLMV Integration in the ASEAN Economic
Community
Infographic: The Journey of Aung San Suu Kyi
ASEAN Round-Up
China, ASEAN Celebrate ‘Diamond Decade’ of Relations
Late To The ASEAN Game, Putin Pitches Energy and Arms
PM Raises Doubts on ASEAN Economic Community
Contents
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4
12
12
12 7
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10
A note from the editor
Dear readers:
Welcome to the June 2016 issue of Thinking ASEAN!
This month’s issue features three articles focusing on Mainland Southeast Asia. Dr. Truong-Minh Vu, Director of the Center for International Studies at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, returns with a commentary on President Obama’s recent visit to Vietnam and how it might affect the South China Sea disputes.
Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Khin Zaw Oo, who represented the Myanmar armed forces in the peace
negotiations and is now part of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee, provides us with a valuable and rare perspective on Myanmar’s peace process as the country transitions to a democracy.
For our third article, Fina Astriana, Researcher in the ASEAN Studies Centre of the Habibie Center in Jakarta, looks at the constraints that are keeping back the CLMV countries—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam—from integrating further in the ASEAN Economic Community.
To round out this month’s issue, we review Aung San Suu Kyi’s remarkable life journey as a leader of Myanmar and highlight several news articles on Sino-ASEAN relations, Russian engagement with Southeast Asia, and Cambodia’s rising doubts with the ASEAN Economic Community.
Please don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have suggestions or prospective submissions.
Happy reading!
Best regards from Jakarta,
Ray Hervandi Managing Editor
Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.
The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.
Obama’s Vietnam Visit: A First Step Toward Unspooling the South China Sea Disputes?
President Barack Obama announced the lifting of the wartime arms embargo on Vietnam during his trip to the country in May.
Photo Credit: Getty Image.
Dr. Truong-Minh Vu is Director of the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, and co-editor of the book Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters—Territo- rial Disputes in the South China Sea (Springer, 2016).
President Barack Obama’s historic visit to Vietnam in late May laid a robust foundation that could secure US- Vietnam cooperation in the long term. More importantly, Obama’s trip to Vietnam was part of the US pivot to Asia.
There are reasons to believe that closer defense relations between the United States and strategic partners in the region can moderate China’s behavior in the South China Sea.
Although Obama visited Vietnam just several months before leaving office and at a time when he is considered by many as a lame-duck president, this trip has both symbolic and substantive significance. First and foremost, the United States finally agreed to fully lift its four-decades-old lethal-arms embargo on Vietnam, thereby removing one of the last vestiges of the Cold War and paving the way for closer defense cooperation between two countries.
Second, both countries also deepened their economic relations as VietJet reached a groundbreaking $11.3 billion deal with Boeing, purchasing 100 Boeing’s B737 MAX 200 aircrafts, and agreed on another $3 billion worth of Pratt
& Whitney engines.
At the same time, General Electric and the Vietnamese government have agreed to cooperate in the field of wind energy. To deepen people-to-people ties, Vietnam allowed the Peace Corps to enter the country to teach English in Vietnamese schools and both sides mutually agreed to grant one-year, multiple-entry visas for short-term business and tourism travelers from both countries. There is no doubt that these arrangements will make it easier for both Vietnamese and Americans to connect, to share ideas and build long-term partnerships.
Undoubtedly, the visit signals a desire in both countries to deepen cooperation and their willingness to tackle thorny issues. Taking steps to address Washington’s concerns about human rights, Hanoi will receive the Peace Corps and has granted Fulbright University Vietnam permission to operate as the country’s first nonprofit, independent university, not subject to any constraints by the central government on its curriculum.
For the sake of domestic economic development, the new leadership needs to take advantage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which will create further incentives for deepening relations with the United States.
Both the 12th Party Congress Resolution and the working agenda of the Central Committee meeting emphasize the interconnectedness between domestic conditions and foreign policies and how foreign policies can be implemented to serve domestic needs. However, this time around, leaders stress in particular the importance of the nation’s participation in the TPP trade agreement for domestic stability and economic growth. Obama’s visit also helped to further lock in Hanoi’s commitment to the TPP.
Obama’s visit was hugely popular with the Vietnamese people, many of whom crowded the streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City to welcome him. Newspapers and the online sphere were filled with positive comments about Obama’s embrace of the local culture and food and his open and relaxed style. Photos of Obama eating bun cha and posts about his sensational speech in Hanoi have been flooding the newsfeed of millions of Vietnamese Facebook users in the past weeks. Vietnam is a young nation with countless young men and women looking toward the West, and the United States in particular, for everything from democracy to blockbuster movies. In twenty or thirty years, it is these young Vietnamese men and women who will decide the fate of Vietnam, not the current leadership.
In an age of globalization, when people are more politically active than ever, it would be vital to secure the support of the young and educated population.
While the United States denies the trip had anything to do with China, Obama’s remarks in Hanoi made it clear that Washington wants to counterbalance Beijing’s attempts to dominate the South China Sea. The decision to fully lift the lethal arms embargo on Vietnam is the highlight among various agreements reached by both sides.
Symbolically, this move is important because it sends a robust and unambiguous signal to China that their “gunboat diplomacy”
in the South China Sea has backfired. At the same time, it shows Chinese leaders that Vietnam is now important enough strategically for the United States to set human-rights concerns aside and move forward in defense cooperation.
The lifting of the US lethal weapons embargo is a crucial starting point for a more robust defense cooperation. Although hardly a game changer, the recent breakthrough is politically and symbolically significant and therefore acceptable to both sides for now. It signals that a “cooperative strategy for 21st-century sea power”1 will continue to emerge in the region, and it will not be easy for Beijing to apply a divide-and-conquer strategy.
There would be joint maritime patrols between the US and Vietnamese navies and a more robust US commitment to
ensuring maritime security and stability in the SCS in the event of Chinese aggression.
From a public-relations perspective, the addition of one or several parties would constitute a legitimizing factor to induce China to clarify its claims and accept the jurisdiction of international tribunals. The timely award on jurisdiction and admissibility2 by the tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) provides renewed impetus to confront Chinese territorial claims under international law.
PCA is expected to issue a ruling very soon. Substantially, given the reality of state practice in the South China Sea, it is doubtful whether China can prove that it has met the conditions to establish historic rights in the South China Sea. In any case, the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides very limited support for historic rights as the basis for a state to claim a vast body of water beyond UNCLOS’ legal framework.
It will be difficult for China, therefore, to uphold its claims to historic rights over the entire South China Sea.
Given the power discrepancy between China and its neighbors, the United States is understandably the sole resort to assert a legal resolution in the South China Sea disputes. All claimants seek the moral high ground. With sustained and unequivocal international support, including from the United States and the PCA decision, ASEAN may achieve greater collective resolve to address worrying trends in the disputed waters and reassert its relevance. What is important is for ASEAN members to explore all possible multilateral options, which can contribute to the management, if not resolution, of the disputes.
For example, they could collectively leverage the prospect of joint patrols to convince China to revisit its current policy and consider necessary de-escalation mechanisms, such as a freeze on ongoing construction activities and the negotiation of a Code of Conduct.
Endnotes
1. U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Coast Guard (2015, March). ‘Forward, Engaged, and Ready: A Cooperative Strat- egy for 21st Century Seapower.’ Retrieved from: www.
uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CS21R_Final.pdf 2. Permanent Court of Arbitration (2015). ‘Arbitration Be-
tween The Republic of the Philippines and The People’s Re- public of China’. Retrieved from: www.pcacases.com/web/
sendAttach/1503
The Peace Process: A Priority in Myanmar’s Transition to Democracy
A Myanmar citizen voted in the 2012 by-election.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
Lt. Gen. (retired) Khin Zaw Oo represented the Tatmadaw in the peace negotiations and is now a member of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC). Before retirement in 2015, he was the commander of the Bureau of Special Operations 4 and also served as the Chairman of the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd., a military-owned conglomerate with extensive business interests in Myanmar.
On 15 October 2015, a total of eight ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar signed a historic Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the Union government. Ending the long-running and ongoing internal conflict, which started soon after the country’s independence in 1948, is one of the most important issues for all Myanmar’s key stakeholders including the newly elected government of National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
The NCA provides a framework for Myanmar’s peace process from ceasefire monitoring and verification to political dialogue. It cannot easily be altered since the endorsement by the Union parliament has made it binding beyond 2015.
In addition, some key elements of its signatories—be they the government, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) or the EAOs—do not wish to reopen the negotiations on the NCA.
On the contrary, the ensuing political dialogue is a work in progress and can be negotiated and improved upon within the boundaries set out in the NCA. As the initial steps of the political dialogue, its steering committee namely the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) has been established. Its main decisionmaking body, the first Union Peace Conference (UPC), was convened in January 2016. During the process, the participants of the political dialogue reached an understanding that change cannot be enforced but should be agreed upon by all of them through negotiations. However, more remains to be done.
Progress So Far
Many aspects of the UPDJC and the UPC have been reviewed since the signing of the NCA. For instance, the UPDJC’s original tripartite structure included the government, the EAOs, and political parties. Along the process, the Union parliament and the Tatmadaw, which had been placed below the government in the peace dialogue structure, have now been recognized as separate stakeholders in their own rights. “Ethnic representatives” and “relevant individuals,”
the two additional categories, albeit with lesser number of delegates, have also been added for more inclusiveness.
Similarly, there is scope to improve many aspects of the UPC:
its design, agenda, breakdown of participants, decision-making mechanisms and timeframes, to name just a few. The timing of the first UPC in January 2016 was dictated by the terms of the NCA, which required the political dialogue to begin within 90 days from the signing of the nationwide ceasefire.
The first UPC was undertaken in January 2016 by the administration of former President U Thein Sein. By then, the NLD had won a landslide victory in the November 2015 general elections. The second UPC will have to be organized by the new government. Given the massive election win and the legitimacy Aung San Suu Kyi and her party bring to the peace process, it is believed that the second UPC will carry a stronger mandate than its predecessor. It should also pay close attention to the following four proposals which were agreed upon in the first UPC:
1. to conduct the next round of political dialogue as soon as possible,
2. to achieve 30% women’s participation in future conferences, 3. to acknowledge those that made the NCA and political
dialogue possible,
4. to complete the political dialogue process in three to five years.
Despite its shortcomings and to its credit, the first UPC was careful to avoid any lasting commitments that would bind the incoming government. Significant preparations, which need to occur before the next UPC, have not yet commenced. For instance, it is not clear when the second convening will take place or how the political dialogue will move forward. Ultimately, it will be for the new Union government to make these decisions.
It should be noted that a delay in restarting the political dialogue could damage the trust that has been built between NCA signatories. The political dialogue complements the ceasefire work—EAOs signed the NCA on the understanding that political talks to address the root causes of the conflict would soon follow. The fragile ceasefire in turn depends on the success of the political dialogue.
Current Priorities
National-level political dialogues. They are consultative assemblies to be held by “state and regional governments, ethnic armed organizations, or civil society organizations, either individually or jointly” on five topics identified in the NCA:
politics, social, economic, security, and land and the environment.
The purpose is to develop recommendations for the UPC and to enable participation of the grassroots organizations and individuals not otherwise represented in the UPC. While they do not have decisionmaking power, these dialogues can become a basis for constitutional reform in Myanmar, maintain the momentum for the political dialogue in the absence of a date for the next UPC, and broaden public participation in the peace process. It is imperative for them to begin as soon as possible.
Dialogue with non-signatories. That only eight of the sixteen EAOs negotiating with the Government have signed the NCA is one of its main criticisms. We need to find a way to bring the
non-signatories into the peace process. For now, there is an impasse. The non-signatories have called for “inclusiveness” of all the EAOs while some of them have not been recognized. The Kokang, for instance, has been in fresh armed conflicts with the Tatmadaw since February 2015.
In the meantime, it is worth noting that the longer the non- signatories stay out of the NCA, the greater the gap will develop between them and the signatories, which does not bode well for peace. A possible solution for this deadlock is for all the recognized EAOs to sign the NCA for the practical reason that doing so will not require them to give up their weapons or territories. Instead, inking the NCA will give them official and due representation in the political dialogue. After all, the stated aim of the EAOs is to find “political solutions through political means.” The signing of each new EAO will create an enabling environment which encourages the undecided to participate.
This resonates well with the step-by-step nature of the peace process where one does not get to the destination overnight.
There are also fundamental differences among the non- signatories. In theory, there will be fewer complications in persuading groups such as the New Mon State Party and the Karenni National Progressive Party, which have signed bilateral ceasefires with the government. They have not fired a shot in years. In comparison, it is likely to be difficult for the government to encourage the the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) which is currently engaged in a conflict with the Tatmadaw to join the NCA club.
On the whole, Myanmar’s peace process cannot afford to wait for the ethnic version of “inclusiveness”—a “one for all and all for one” approach. If this approach is pursued, the process of ceasefire will be interminable because, under such conditions, the government will not be able to realistically consent to all the different demands from the various ethnic groups. Therefore, pragmatism is needed for us to move forward because all the signatories to the NCA, whether existing or new, will enjoy the same rights and no arbitrary privileges. When they start participating in the peace process will not alter the NCA because it is a done deal as it stands now.
Northern Shan and Kachin States. Conflicts have been most severe in these regions, which hold the key to Myanmar’s peace process. The non-signatories that are based in these states include the United Wa State Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or the Kokand, the Shan State Army- North and the Kachin Independence Organization and the TNLA. It is not clear what have held them back from the deal, although some analysts have pointed to the Chinese influence or vested personal interests related to the lucrative war economy.
There have been outbreaks of violence between the signatories and non-signatories from the area, which is a source of threat to the precarious peace process as well as a concern for the civilians living in this restive region.
Lessons Learned
As Myanmar’s peace process transitions to the next stage, there are a few issues we can learn from the progress so far:
Flexibility should be the middle name of Myanmar’s peace process as most players, including the new government, are new to it.
Deepening relationships, developed during the negotiation process, is gradually replacing the initial distrust among the key stakeholder groups. Old friendships have been rekindled in some cases; in others, old enemies have become friends. Trust and understanding are essential if peace is to be maintained.
Improving internal dynamics between the government and the Tatmadaw is required. While both are committed to and have done well in navigating Myanmar’s democratic transition and the peace process, their actions are sometimes disjointed.
The Government will need to build its own working relationship with the Tatmadaw.
An officially designated team to support the Chief Negotiator, who has the authority to make decisions on behalf of the Government, is necessary.
Home-grown peace process is the main reason for Myanmar’s success while we have benefitted from the international players who have brought in much-needed expertise and financial support.
Active regional engagement, especially with China and India, is crucial in securing peace for Myanmar as most of the EAOs based in the bordering regions with these two countries remain outside the NCA. There should also be closer cooperation with our ASEAN neighbors such as Thailand and Laos which share borders with Myanmar in regions where active armed conflicts have been raging.
Hopes for the Future
Myanmar’s peace process has come a long way in the past four years, from former President Thein Sein’s olive branch to EAOs in August 2011 to the first UPC held in January 2016. Despite the reality of ongoing war in Northern Shan and Kachin States, the NCA has laid a solid foundation for peace. And the ensuing momentum of the peace process needs to be maintained. If the peace process continues to move forward with the same vigor demonstrated to date, Myanmar will have a unique opportunity to end the armed conflict.
There were times we as players in the peace process felt a race against time, with no opportunity to sit back and reflect on what we had achieved, or how it could had been done better.
As the newly elected NLD government takes the helm of the country, the time is ripe for an objective and holistic review of the peace process.
Constraints for CLMV Integration in the ASEAN Economic Community
Fina Astriana is a Researcher at the ASEAN Studies Center, the Habibie Center, Jakarta.
Business representatives from the region during the ‘Creating the ASEAN Economic Community’ session at the Annual Meeting 2015 of the World Economic Forum at Congress Centre, January 23, 2015.
Photo Credit: World Economic Forum.
Many argue that the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will bring benefits for ASEAN member states. However, the benefits of economic integration will not be automatically and immediately felt by Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam—informally known as the CLMV countries—since there is a development gap between them and Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—collectively known as the ASEAN Six.
Although the CLMV countries are given more time to prepare themselves, it indeed remains an immense challenge for them to fully integrate into the AEC and derive full benefits from it given their low development achievements in many areas.
Constraints for the CLMV countries to fully integrate Inadequate Infrastructure Development
In terms of infrastructure development, the CLMV countries lag behind their ASEAN counterparts, particularly Singapore, which is ranked 1st according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2015- 2016.
While Laos has built several infrastructure such as roads, ports, and airports, it still does not have a domestic railway infrastructure.1 This means that Laos does not have adequate infrastructure to support movement of goods within the country itself and to other countries as it has limited infrastructure. In addition, being a land-locked country with inadequate infrastructure has created high transportation costs that lead to high price of goods exported to other countries. This condition reduce Laos’ competitiveness compare to the ASEAN Six.
Cambodia, which is ranked 101st in terms of infrastructure, also has poor infrastructure due to poor maintenance and the long civil war that brought destruction to the country.2 Moreover, Cambodia faces a lack of resources, such as in financing and human resources to support infrastructure development in the country, thus hindering the development of infrastructure.3 Although there are some funds allocated to maintain infrastructure, it has not been well disbursed and used effectively.4 Backward infrastructure has likewise put Myanmar in the lowest rank when compared to its fellow ASEAN member states.
Myanmar is ranked 136 out of 140 countries in the quality of roads. This implies that road connectivity is not well established even with close neighbors such as Thailand and China.
Connectivity is highly important in a regional economic integration. If a country is less connected, it will find difficulties in deriving benefits from regional economic integration. Inadequate infrastructure in the CLMV countries has made them less connected with neighboring countries and has reduced their competitiveness. As such, the CLMV countries will struggle to compete with their fellow ASEAN member states.
Poor Investment Climate
Since the CLMV countries have relatively poor investment climate compared to other ASEAN member states, such as Singapore and Malaysia, they are less attractive for investors.
Therefore, they may not be able to fully benefit from the foreign direct investment (FDI) coming to the region as a result of the AEC. Although ASEAN aims to create a single investment region, most investments rarely go to the CLMV countries.
Instead, they stay mostly in the relatively more developed countries, such as Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.
Investors often come to a country that provides ease of doing business. According to the World Bank’s 2016 Ease of Doing Business survey, Singapore maintains its rank of being the easiest state to do business in, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar lag far behind, globally ranked at 127th, 134th, and 167threspectively.5 Among the CLMV countries, Vietnam has the better ranking as it climbed 3 places to 90th out of 189 countries in the 2016 Ease of Doing Business survey.
Laos is able to provide a low-cost labor force that can attract investors. However, at the same time investors also require highly skilled and educated labor to fill positions at manufacturing or technology companies.6 Unfortunately, there is not enough skilled labor in Laos that match the requirements of investors.
Meanwhile, according to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 2016 report, Cambodia is ranked 127th out of 189 countries, up from 133 in 2014. While the country’s overall ranking increased, starting business in Cambodia still takes time as it requires 7 procedures and 87 days. In addition, in the category of protecting investors, Cambodia dropped two places from 109th in 2015 to 111st in 2016.7
Myanmar has different concerns. As Myanmar was under Western sanctions for a long time, its financial sector is not well developed. According to the Investment Climate Assessment,
the top priority for the private sector in Myanmar is access to finance.8 Aside from that, investors are concerned about law enforcement in Myanmar. If the law has not been fully established, it will create uncertainty among investors.
Although Vietnam is considered as the most advanced among the CLMV countries, it, too, faces challenges in attracting investors. Those barriers include inadequate infrastructure and lack of clear and transparent rules and regulations.9 Vietnam also has problems in its legal system. In particular, it lacks the track record in resolving problems between foreign and local companies.10
Low Awareness and Participation Among Private Sector and Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)
The private sector’s involvement in a regional integration is highly important as private firms are the economic actors that will use the AEC most. Optimal use of the AEC requires private firms to have full grasp of its intricacies. However, this is not the case with private firms and SMEs in the CLMV countries.
In Cambodia, business conglomerates have limited knowledge and so low awareness of the AEC. Coordination between the private sector and the government does not always work. Private firms often complain that most AEC documents are mostly available in English, so it is difficult for them to understand the documents. On the other hand, the government also complains that participation of the private sector in government-sponsored events and workshops on the AEC has been low.11
Similarly, Cambodian SMEs have limited knowledge about the AEC and its implications. Unsurprisingly, most SMEs are afraid that products from companies based in other ASEAN member states are on the verge of flooding their market. They are aware that to win the competition, they have to produce high-quality products that meet the standards in the region. However, it is challenging for small companies in Cambodia to get certifications and meet those standards.12 Meanwhile, Vietnam also faces a similar problem. Its Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) conducted a survey that shows only 40 percent of local businesses in Vietnam are aware of the implications of the AEC. The percentage is relatively low compare to counterparts in the ASEAN Six.13
The issue with the private firms’ involvement in the AEC pivots not only around whether they know how to benefit from it.
The question also extends to whether private firms in the CLMV countries are able to compete with companies in other ASEAN member states. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand have large companies that have become regional players. In the banking industry, for example, Singapore has DBS and OCBC, while Malaysia has Maybank. Those banks have already opened branches in most of ASEAN member states. In addition, in the aviation industry, Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways, and Malaysia’s Air Asia continue to dominate the aviation market in the region.
Meanwhile, the CLMV countries do not have large companies that have strong presence in the region. This raises a concern as to whether companies originating from the CLMV countries will be able to compete with companies from other ASEAN member
states. They have to raise the standards of their services and products in order to compete. However, meeting the standards set by the existing big companies will be challenging. The lack of information and lack of capacity experienced by companies in the CLMV countries will likely hinder their participation in the AEC.
Conclusion
If the CLMV countries are unable to overcome their constraints, they will not likely derive full benefits from the AEC. They will also face the risk of being marginalized in the process of regional economic integration. Uneven development will pose a risk to ASEAN integration.
In order to push for greater participation from the CLMV countries, those countries should resolve their problems to reduce the development gap between them and the ASEAN Six. Successful development of the CLMV countries is not only important for themselves but also for ASEAN integration as a whole. It will be hard for ASEAN to be “a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented, and people-centered ASEAN” as the AEC Blueprint 2025 suggests if some ASEAN Member States are left behind.
Domestic solutions should also be accompanied by regional solutions. The ASEAN Six, along with ASEAN dialogue partners and international organizations, should work together in narrowing development gaps among ASEAN member states.
Comprehensive solutions that come from both the domestic and regional levels should enable accelerated development in the CLMV countries. Without coordinated effort, the CLMV countries are unlikely to reap maximum benefits from the AEC.
Endnotes
1. Michael L. Faye, et.al (2004). ‘The Challenges Fac- ing Landlocked Developing Countries.’ Journal of Hu- man Development, Vol. 5, No.1, March 2004, retrieved from: http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/
JHD051P003TP.pdf, p. 45.
2. M. Sum (2008). ‘Infrastructure Development in Cambodia’.
In N. Kumar (ed), International Infrastructure Development in East Asia – Towards Balanced Regional Development and Inte- gration, ERIA Research Project Report 2007-2, Chiba: IDE- JETRO, pp. 32-84, p. 34.
3. Ibid. p. 59.
4. Ibid. p. 60.
5. World Bank (2016). Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regula- tory Quality and Efficiency. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 5.
6. CSIS (2014, July 28). ‘Laos: Investment Potential and Eco- nomic Challenges’. Retrieved on may 23 from: http://cogita- sia.com/laos-investment-potential-and-economic-challeng- es/.
7. World Bank (2016). ‘Ease of Doing Business in Cam- bodia’. Retrieved on May 24 from: http://www.doing business.org/data/exploreeconomies/cambodia/#close.
8. World Bank (2015, March 24). ‘Removing Barriers to Doing Business Will Help Create a Strong Private Sec- tor in Myanmar’. Retrieved on May 24 from: http://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/03/
24/removing-barriers-to-doing-business-will-help-create- strong-private-sector-in-myanmar.
9. Vietnamnet (2014, June 20). ‘Challenges to Vietnam’s FDI attraction’. Retrieved on May 23 from: http://english.vietn- amnet.vn/fms/business/105509/challenges-to-vietnam-s-fdi- attraction.html
10. Dane Chamorro (n.d.). ‘Vietnam: Opportunity and Chal- lenges’. Retrieved on May 23 from: http://www.iesingapore.
gov.sg/~/media/IE%20Singapore/Files/Events/iAdvisory%20 Series/Vietnam/2_Doing_Business_in_Vietnam_Challeng- es_Risks_and_Rewards_ControlRisks.pdf.
11. Larry Strange (2011). ‘The Political Economy of Prog- ress Towards ASEAN Economic Community 2015 and Broader ASEAN Integration’. Retrieved on May 23 from: http://www.aseancenter.org.tw/upload/files/
OUTLOOK_004_04.pdf.
12. The Phnom Penh Post (2015, March 7). ‘Business in the dark on ASEAN Community’. Retrieved on May 23 from:
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business-dark-asean- community-0.
13. Tuoitrenews (2015, December 12). ‘Is ASEAN Economic Community as good as promoted? Vietnam expert ques- tions’. Retrieved on May 23 from: http://tuoitrenews.vn/
business/32193/is-asean-economic-community-as-good-as- promoted-vietnam-expert-questions.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been an icon of democracy and human rights not only in her country but also in the world. As we witness the struggle of her country to transition progressively with her leadership, as well as her struggle with the challenges of holding that position, This month’s issue of Thinking ASEAN take a look at the life of The Lady.
The Journey of Aung San Suu Kyi
“Security, freedom, dignity: if we had these three we could say that it has been worthwhile being born into this world”
Aung San Suu Kyi, Sakharov Prize Acceptance Speech
June 19 1945, Aung San Suu Kyi was born in Rangoon to Aung San, commander of the Burma Independence Army, and Daw Khin Kyi who was a nurse at the Rangoon General Hospital. When she was two years old, her father was assassinated.
1960, Aung San Suu Kyi studied in New Delhi following her mother’s appointment as ambassador to India. She graduated from Shri Ram College in 1964.
Aung San Suu Kyi continued her education at St Hugh’s College, Oxford, obtaining a B.A. degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics in 1969 and a PhD at the School of Orientation and African Studies, University of London, in 1985.
1972, She married Dr. Michael Aris, a scholar of Tibetan culture. They lived in North Oxford with their two sons.
Suu Kyi began writing a biography of her father. She also writes book for youth in Burma.
1988, She returned to Burma to care for her mother. Her return coincided with political upheaval in the country.
following the resignation of military dictator General Ne Win. In August 15, she wrote an open letter to the government requesting for democratic elections.
On December 27, 1988, her mother passed away On July 20, 1989, she was put on house arrest by the military junta. It is around this time that the country name officially changed from Burma to Myanmar. Suu Kyi continues her campaign for a democratic Myanmar despite pressure by the government.
1990, Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy won a decisive victory on the general election. Aung San Suu Kyi was supposed to be the prime minister of the newly elected government. The military junta nullified the result.
“Those of us who decided to work for democracy in Burma made our choice in the conviction that the danger of standing up for basic human rights in a repressive society was preferable to the safety of a quiescent life in servitude.
Ours is a nonviolent movement that depends on faith in the human predilection for fair play and compassion.”
Aung San Suu Kyi, Please Use Your Liberty to Promote Ours
Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace 1991 Prize. Her sons, Alexander and Kim, received it on her behalf.Aung San Suu Kyi and her party face tremendous challenges to bring lasting freedom, security, and prosperity to the people of Myanmar. Only time will tell the end of her story,
and the future history of Myanmar.
1995
She was released from house arrest.
Her husband passed away. She remained 1999
separated from her sons. 2000
She was put on house arrest again
She was released from house arrest.2002 2003
Suu Kyi was injured during a mob attack, allegedly sponsored by the military junta. After she recovered, she was put on house arrest.
November 7, 2010 Myanmar held its first general election in 20 years. The army sponsored Union and Solidarity
Development Party won majority votes. November 13, 2010
Aung San Suu Kyi was freed. She spent a total of 15 years in detention.
August 19 2011 In a reconciliation talk, Suu Kyi met with President Thein Sein. The held another meeting on April 11, 2012
2015
The National League for Democracy party won by a landslide. She still could not constitutionally for as president. In her stead, parliament elected Htin Kyaw, a close confidante of Suu Kyi.
The journey, however, has not yet ended.
ASEAN ROUND-UP
China, ASEAN Celebrate ‘Diamond Decade’ of Relations
The Jakarta Post, June 6 2016
Chinese Ambassador to ASEAN Xu Bu has said China and ASEAN will achieve broader and deeper cooperation as they have entered the “diamond decade” of their relations. Speaking in a seminar, which marks the 25th anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations, in Semarang, Central Java, last week, Xu Bu said ASEAN stood out in its neighboring region as the priority of China’s diplomacy. Xu Bu said 2016 was the year, which marked the opening of the ASEAN Community, the starting of China’s 13th Five-Year Plan and the 25th anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations.
Read more: http://www.thejakartapost.com/
seasia/2016/06/06/china-asean-celebrate-diamond-decade-of- relations.html
Why it matters: China is an important dialogue partner for ASEAN, both because of the high volume of economic cooperation and the disputes China has with a number of ASEAN Member States. It is important to use the diamond decade celebrations to truly advance ASEAN – China relations in ways that are peaceful and mutually beneficial for the peoples of China and ASEAN.
One way to do it is to pursue an inclusive maritime law enforcement cooperation.
Late To The ASEAN Game, Putin Pitches Energy and Arms
Jeremy Maxie, Forbes, Opinion, June 1 2016
Overshadowed by President Obama’s trip to Vietnam and Japan, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted a multilateral summit recognizing the 20th anniversary of ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership at the seaside resort of Sochi on May 19-20. This was the first time the summit has been held in Russia; the first was held in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 and the second in Hanoi in 2010.
With only three summits convened in eleven years and with mutual trade just $22.5 billion in 2014—Russia’s relationship with ASEAN is relatively insignificant. By comparison, ASEAN’s top ten trade partners are as follows: China ($350.5.5bn), Japan ($246.2bn), United States ($240.8bn), EU-28 ($206.8bn), ROK ($135bn), Taiwan ($108.3), Hong Kong ($93.4bn), Australia ($68bn) and India ($67.9bn).
Read more: http://www.forbes.com/sites/
jeremymaxie/2016/06/01/late-to-the-asean-game-putin- pitches-energy-and-arms/#2b5b593c4a52
Why it matters: Russia has been increasing its outreach activity in Southeast Asia following other major powers. Will they be an important player in the region? It remains to be seen, especially considering that their economic activities in Southeast Asia is relatively low compared to other major powers. However, it is interesting to note that Russia is a significant player in the region’s arms trade with Indonesia—and India, a couple of blocks away—procuring weaponries from Russia.
PM Raises Doubts on ASEAN Economic Community
The Phnom Penh Post, June 2, 2016
Prime Minister Hun Sen questioned yesterday the extent of the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) commitment towards forming an inclusive economic region as countries continue to compete with each other for agricultural exports and inflows of foreign direct investment. During his speech at the first World Economic Forum on East Asia since the AEC came into effect at the end of last year, the prime minister was quick to note the challenges of regional integration. “We are concerned that the ASEAN Economic Community still has many challenges. If we talk about the one market, it is a big [one], but one should not forget that ASEAN consists of less developed countries and high developed countries,” he said yesterday at the summit held in Malaysia. He explained that for less developed countries striving to climb up the economic ladder, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is essential. “We need to find coordination and partnership, so that we can guarantee that we can all get a piece of the meat,” he said.
Read more: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/pm- raises-doubts-asean-economic-community
Why it matters: ASEAN has not yet delivered for developing countries in the region. The main mantra for ASEAN presence in the region is that its existence is important to maintain peace an stability in the region.
However, for Cambodia, they have witnessed this role put in to stress during the Preah Vihear case. Moreover, ASEAN high economic growth has not really been inclusive. If ASEAN wants to continue to be relevant for all of its member states, it is high time that it answers these challenges.
The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.
The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.
ASEAN STUDIES PROGRAM The Habibie Center Jl. Kemang Selatan No.98, Jakarta Selatan 12560 (P.) 62 21 781 7211 (F.) 62 21 781 7212 www.habibiecenter.or.id www.thcasean.org
facebook.com/habibiecenter @habibiecenter
The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.
The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.
Pagodas and Kyaungs in present day Bagan, the capital of Pagan Kingdom.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
