1 Report for

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Daily Report for Wednesday, May 3, 2017

1 Report for

Wednesday, May 03, 2017

Ordibehesht 13, 1396

* Highlights, Page 2

* News Briefs, Page 3

* Saudi official attacks Iran. Page 3

* Battle between ignorance and knowledge. Page 3

* In defense of Ghalibaf. Page 4

* Exploring Trump’s regional policy in West Asia. Page 5

* Saudi-Iranian rivalry fuels potential nuclear race. Page 7

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2 Highlights

 One of the regional policies of Trump in West Asia, about which most analysts and experts have no doubt, is to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional allies. (See Page 5)

 Saudi Arabia is developing nuclear energy and potentially a nuclear weapons capability. (See Page 7)

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3 Briefs

* Farsi-language newspaper Shargh writes that senior spokesman of Iranian armed forces Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri says that Iranian armed forces have asked election authorities to ask the presidential candidates to refrain from commenting on defense and military issues, because it is not within their expertise.

* Farsi-language newspaper Shargh writes that Director of Isfahan provincial Justice Department Dr.

Ahmad Khosravi-Vafa says that Isfahan judiciary will open a case against reformist Ghulamhussein Karbaschi for his remarks that Iran can solve the Syria through diplomacy, rather than by sending weapons and military personnel to Syria. This remark, Khosravi-Vafa said, is an insult to Iranian personnel in Syria.

* Farsi-language Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf tells Tasnim News Agency that if elected, he would form

“Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade”. He said that diplomacy should be at the disposal of trade. This would require changing the structure of the Foreign Ministry. He said that unfortunately the trade and economy have not played much of an important role in the Foreign Ministry.

* Farsi-language Tasnim News Agency writes that Eshaq Jahangiri says that it is important that centers of science and innovation must be further developed. He said that knowledge cities should be created in order to facilitate development of Iranian society and help solve Iran’s current

“mega-challenges”.

Saudi official attacks Iran

Farsi-language BBC Persian news website writes that Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince and defense minister Mohammed bin Salman aid that dialogue with Iran was impossible because of its belief in the Imam Mahdi, the so-called hidden imam, who many Shiites believe is a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who will return to save the world from destruction.

“Their stance is that the awaited Mahdi will come, and they need to create a fertile environment for the arrival of the awaited Mahdi, and they need to take over the Islamic world,” he said. “Where are the common points that we might be able to reach an understanding on with this regime?”

He said Saudi Arabia would fight what he called Iran’s efforts to extend its influence. “We are a primary target for the Iranian regime,” Prince Mohammed said, accusing Iran of seeking to take over Islamic holy sites in Saudi Arabia. “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we’ll work so that the battle is for them in Iran.”

Farsi-language BBC Persian writes that Saudi Arabia is a critic of Iran’s nuclear deal. After Trump became president, it writes, a number of Saudi officials have expressed hope that pressures on Iran would increase.

Battle between

ignorance and knowledge

Farsi-language reformist newspapers are focusing their criticism towards Ghalibaf and his electoral promises, which the reformists perceive as being unrealistic and deceptive.

Minister of Housing and Urban Development Abbas

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Akhoundi writes in the reformist newspaper Etemad that ‘certain candidate’

is giving baseless and unsupported statistics and promises.

He writes that even Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani has reacted to these baseless electoral promises. Larijani has said the promise by Ghalibaf about increasing cash handouts is impractical.

He said that candidates’ use of populism is not conducive to productive debate. Such populism, he said, include the talk about 4% and 96%, as presented by Ghalibaf.

Such a perceptive, he said, can only serve to create the mentality of ‘you are either with me or against me’. This effective shuts the door to dialogue.

It is difficult to deal with this phenomenon. He writes that we can see what happened in America. Many politicians and even Trump’s fellow Republicans got together against what they said Trump’s ‘nonsense’, but they were unsuccessful.

In defense of Ghalibaf

The Farsi-language conservative pro- Ghalibaf newspaper Sobh-e Nou criticizes all those who are accusing Ghalibaf are giving unrealistic and populist electoral promises. It goes on to write that state- owned newspaper [Iran] and other newspapers such as Jomhouri Islami have been transferred into unofficial election headquarters for the current president [Rouhani]. These newspapers, it writes, do not fear law or even God Himself! It also

accuses of state-owned television IRIB of appearing to be supportive of the government.

It also writes that certain officials are stepping beyond their prerogative. It specifically criticizes Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani for his remarks two days that raising cash handouts was not possible.

Sobh-e Nou accuses him of misusing his position and Majlis podium to speak against Ghalibaf.

It writes that Larijani criticizes Ghalibaf’s promise of ‘providing financial assistance’

to the economically vulnerable Iranians, calling this promise as populism, even though President Rouhani had said the debate that the government is increasing financial assistance to the Iranians who are under the umbrella of the Imam Khomeini Relief Fund. It writes that the sixth development plan does not mention such an increase. It asks why Larijani criticizes Ghalibaf’s promise, while not criticizing Rouhani’s similar decision.

Moderate conservative MPs close to Larijani have formed an election HQ in support of Rouhani. Larijani has gradually distanced himself from the hardline conservatives. Furthermore, Larijani has reportedly said that Rouhani is his comrade and likely to be re-elected.

Larijani was influential in parliament’s approval of the nuclear deal.

Furthermore, ‘centralist’ conservatives like Larijani may also be worried about Raisi, around whom many of Ahmadinejad’s ministers can be seen. Their presence may mean return to Ahmadinejad’s days if Raisi is elected.

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5 Exploring Trump’s regional policy in West Asia

 Mounting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran: One of the regional policies of Trump in West Asia, about which most analysts and experts have no doubt, is to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional allies.

 Making effort to rebuild relations with traditional allies of the United States in the region: A few months into Donald Trump’s presidency, one can see that his foreign policy team is bent on improving Washington’s relations with such traditional allies as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Zionist regime.

 In conclusion, it seems that the United States’ regional policy under Trump’s

administration is continuation of the country’s interventionist policy, and save for the management of relations with Russia, it is characterized by a Republican approach, which calls for mounting pressures on Iran and mending fences with traditional allies of the United States in the region.

Iran Review news website. Hossein Ajorlou. West Asia analyst: The regional policy announced and followed by the United States under President Donald Trump in West Asia has been among major topics of discussion for West Asia analysts.

Although no single opinion can be offered on this policy, there are certain points, which are noteworthy in this regard.

During the short period during which he has been in the White House, measures taken by Trump have been aimed at continuation of the United States’ interventionism in this region. However, Trump’s interventionism is of a selective and purposive type in line with general approaches taken by Republicans, so that, no clear-cut foreign policy or doctrine can be extracted of it. However, one can generally opine that Trump’s future doctrine will be based on a nationalistic and non-ideological viewpoint and a pragmatic approach to various regional issues.

As a result, it is not exactly clear what reaction he will show in the face of the ongoing issues and crises in international system. Nonetheless, some highlights of Trump’s regional policy in West Asia can be enumerated as follows:

Mounting pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran: One of the regional policies of Trump in West Asia, about which most analysts and experts have no doubt, is to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and its regional allies. Considering

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restrictions on issuing visas for Iranian citizens; projection and contradictory remarks on the implementation of Iran’s nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); and intensification of non-nuclear sanctions against Iran, which are in one way against the spirit of the JCPOA, can be considered as various components of this policy.

Making effort to rebuild relations with traditional allies of the United States in the region: A few months into Donald Trump’s presidency, one can see that his foreign policy team is bent on improving Washington’s relations with such traditional allies as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Zionist regime. Relations with these countries had become problematic under former US president, Barack Obama, due to US criticism of human rights situation in some of these countries, conclusion of the JCPOA with Iran as well as Washington’s passive policy in Syria. In line with Trump administration’s new policy, the United States has been increasing support for Saudi Arabia in its war on Yemen, and at the same time, has supported the constitutional referendum in Turkey, backed policies adopted by the Zionist regime’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and thrown its weight behind military action against Syrian army following a chemical attack on Syrian town of Khan Shaykhun.

Management of relations with Russia with regard to West Asia developments:

Under former US president, Barack Obama, tensions soared high between the United States and Russia with regard to West Asia developments, especially the crisis in Syria. As a result, American and Russian officials failed to resolve their differences despite holding a number of bilateral meetings. However, despite certain remarks by some Republican figures, who have called for serious treatment of Russia, and although tensions are still high between the two sides, Trump is trying to overcome differences between Washington and Moscow.

In conclusion, it seems that the United States’ regional policy under Trump’s administration is continuation of the country’s interventionist policy, and save for the management of relations with Russia, it is characterized by a Republican approach, which calls for mounting pressures on Iran and mending fences with traditional allies of the United States in the region.

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7 Saudi-Iranian rivalry fuels

potential nuclear race

intpolicydigest.org. By James M. Dorsey. Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S.

Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and three forthcoming books, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Creating Frankenstein: The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism and China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom.

 Saudi Arabia is developing nuclear energy and potentially a nuclear weapons capability.

 The Saudi focus on nuclear serves various of the kingdom’s goals: diversification of its economy, reduction of its dependence on fossil fuels, countering a potential future Iranian nuclear capability, and enhancing efforts to ensure that Saudi Arabia rather than Iran emerges as the Middle East’s long-term, dominant power.

 Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, asserts that Saudi Arabia’s close ties to the Pakistani military and intelligence during the anti- Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s gave the kingdom arms’ length access to his country’s nuclear capabilities.

 “Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue, especially when the country was under sanctions,” Mr.

 The Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said in a just published report that it had uncovered evidence that future Pakistani “assistance would not involve Pakistan supplying Saudi Arabia with a full nuclear weapon or weapons; however, Pakistan may assist in other important ways, such as supplying sensitive equipment, materials, and know-how used in enrichment or reprocessing.”

The report said it was unclear whether “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may be cooperating on sensitive nuclear technologies in Pakistan.

 The report concluded that the 2015 international agreement dubbed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to curb Iran’s nuclear program had “not eliminated the kingdom’s desire for nuclear weapons capabilities and even nuclear weapons There is little reason to doubt that Saudi Arabia will more actively seek

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nuclear weapons capabilities, motivated by its concerns about the ending of the JCPOA’s major nuclear limitations starting after year 10 of the deal or sooner if the deal fails,” the report said.

 Rather than embarking on a covert program, the report predicted that Saudi Arabia would, for now, focus on building up its civilian nuclear infrastructure as well as a robust nuclear engineering and scientific workforce.

 Saudi Arabia’s nuclear agency has suggested that various steps of the nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, processing, and enrichment, would lend themselves to local production.

Saudi Arabia is developing nuclear energy and potentially a nuclear weapons capability.

The Saudi focus on nuclear serves various of the kingdom’s goals: diversification of its economy, reduction of its dependence on fossil fuels, countering a potential future Iranian nuclear capability, and enhancing efforts to ensure that Saudi Arabia rather than Iran emerges as the Middle East’s long-term, dominant power.

Cooperation on nuclear energy was one of 14 agreements worth $65 billion signed during last month’s visit to China by Saudi King Salman. The agreement is for a feasibility study for the construction of high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) nuclear power plants in the kingdom as well as cooperation in intellectual property and the development of a domestic industrial supply chain for HTGRs built in Saudi Arabia.

The agreement was one of number nuclear-related understandings concluded with China in recent years. Saudi Arabia has signed similar agreements with France, the United States, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and Argentina.

To advance its program, involving the construction of 16 reactors by 2030 at a cost of

$100 billion, Saudi Arabia established the King Abdullah Atomic and Renewable Energy City devoted to research and application of nuclear technology.

Saudi cooperation with nuclear power Pakistan has long been a source of speculation about the kingdom’s ambition. Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, asserts that Saudi Arabia’s close ties to the Pakistani military and intelligence during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s gave the kingdom arms’ length access to his country’s nuclear capabilities.

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“By the 1980s, the Saudi ambassador was a regular guest of A. Q. Khan” or Abdul Qadeer Khan, the controversial nuclear physicist and metallurgical engineer who fathered Pakistan’s atomic bomb, Mr. Haqqani said in an interview.

Retired Pakistani Major General Feroz Hassan Khan, the author of a semi-official history of Pakistan’s nuclear program, has no doubt about the kingdom’s interest.

“Saudi Arabia provided generous financial support to Pakistan that enabled the nuclear program to continue, especially when the country was under sanctions,” Mr.

Khan said in a separate interview. Mr. Khan was referring to US sanctions imposed in 1998 because of Pakistan’s development of a nuclear weapons capability. He noted that at a time of economic crisis, Pakistan was with Saudi help able “to pay premium prices for expensive technologies.”

The Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said in a just published report that it had uncovered evidence that future Pakistani “assistance would not involve Pakistan supplying Saudi Arabia with a full nuclear weapon or weapons; however, Pakistan may assist in other important ways, such as supplying sensitive equipment, materials, and know-how used in enrichment or reprocessing.”

The report said it was unclear whether “Pakistan and Saudi Arabia may be cooperating on sensitive nuclear technologies in Pakistan. In an extreme case, Saudi Arabia may be financing, or will finance, an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility in Pakistan for later use, either in a civil or military program,” the report said.

The report concluded that the 2015 international agreement dubbed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to curb Iran’s nuclear program had “not eliminated the kingdom’s desire for nuclear weapons capabilities and even nuclear weapons… There is little reason to doubt that Saudi Arabia will more actively seek nuclear weapons capabilities, motivated by its concerns about the ending of the JCPOA’s major nuclear limitations starting after year 10 of the deal or sooner if the deal fails,” the report said.

Rather than embarking on a covert program, the report predicted that Saudi Arabia would, for now, focus on building up its civilian nuclear infrastructure as well as a robust nuclear engineering and scientific workforce. This would allow the kingdom to take command of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle at some point in the future.

Saudi Arabia has in recent years significantly expanded graduate programs at its five nuclear research centres.

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Saudi officials have repeatedly insisted that the kingdom is developing nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes such as medicine, electricity generation, and desalination of sea water. They said Saudi Arabia is committed to putting its future facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Saudi Arabia pledged to acquire nuclear fuel from international markets in a 2009 memorandum of understanding with the United States. In its report, ISIS noted however that the kingdom could fall back on its own uranium deposits and acquire or build uranium enrichment or reprocessing plants of its own if regional tension continued to fester. It quoted a former IAEA inspector as saying Saudi Arabia could opt to do so in five years’ time.

Saudi Arabia’s nuclear agency has suggested that various steps of the nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, processing, and enrichment, would lend themselves to local production. Saudi Arabia has yet to mine or process domestic uranium.

Saudi insistence on compliance with the IAEA and on the peaceful nature of its program is designed to avoid the kind of international castigation Iran was subjected to. Saudi Arabia is likely to maintain its position as long as Iran adheres to the nuclear agreement and US President Donald J. Trump does not act on his campaign promise to tear up the accord. Mr. Trump has toughened US attitudes towards Iran but has backed away from tinkering with the nuclear agreement.

“The current situation suggests that Saudi Arabia now has both a high disincentive to pursue nuclear weapons in the short term and a high motivation to pursue them over the long term,” the ISIS said.

Saudi ambitions and the conclusions of the ISIS report put a high premium on efforts by Kuwait and Oman to mediate an understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran that would dull the sharp edges of the two countries’ rivalry.

They also are likely to persuade Mr. Trump to try to pressure Iran to guarantee that it will not pursue nuclear weapons once the JCPOA expires in a little over a decade.

That may prove a tall order given Mr. Trump’s warming relations with anti-Iranian Arab autocracies evident in this week’s visit to Washington by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and an earlier visit by Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.