1 Report for

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Daily Report for Wednesday, November 23, 2016

1 Report for

Wednesday,

November 23, 2016 Azar 3, 1395

Highlights, Page 2 News Briefs, Page 3

Other Stories, Page 3

The blessings of US’ aggressive foreign policy under Trump. Page 5 Future outlook for the strategic triangle of Iran, China and US. Page 8

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2 Highlights

 Strategic analyst Diakou Hosseini argues that Trump’s anticipated aggressive foreign policy is a blessing in disguise for Iran. (See Page 5)

 Under present conditions, the important issue is the future outlook for the strategic triangle among Iran, China and the United States. (See Page 8)

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News Briefs

* Ebtekar newspaper reports that there are no specific statistics about crimes by foreigners in Iran. Iranian police have refused to give statistics about crimes committed by foreigners inside Iran.

* Ebtekar newspaper reports that Iran’s Legal Medicine Organization says that 53 persons have died due to carbon monoxide poisoning since the start of the Iranian year [started March 20].

* Mardom Salari newspaper reports that police in Alborz Province have arrested two persons for possessing four kilos of marijuana.

* Mardom Salari newspaper reports that Minister of Health Seyyed Hassan Ghazizadeh Hashemi says that Iran’s palm oil imports have decreased by 50% in the past two years. This, he said, was done in line with Iran’s policy to [positively] modify Iranians’

consumption of sugar and salt.

* Mardom Salari newspaper reports that as Tehran expands its metro system, fuel consumption by cars have fallen by 14 billion liters and air pollutants have been reduced. No period is stated in the news item.

* Mardom Salari newspaper reports that Iranian cyber-police have warned that Iranian families to take the children’s internet addiction seriously.

* Mardom Salari newspaper reports that police in Garmsar (Semnan Province) have impounded a car which had been fined a total of 59,250,000 rials for traffic violations.

* Aftab News website reports that 18 persons have been injured and two persons died in various accidents across Iran.

MPs react to cancellation of Motahhari’s speech in Mashhad

Mardom Salari reformist newspaper reports that Majlis Speaker Ai Larijani has said that the cancellation of Motahhari’s speech in Mashhad was regrettable.

Mohammad Reza Aref warned against the violation of rights that are clearly outlined in Iran’s Constitution. All officials have the right to speak in public places, and no discrimination in this regard is acceptable, he added.

Abdolkarim Hosseinzadeh, Fatemeh Saeidi, and Fatemeh Zolqadr were among other lawmakers who showed reactions to the issue.

Hosseinzadeh referred to the concerts cancelled in Mashhad based on Alamolhoda’s decrees, and said,

“Was Motahari’s speech also considered a concert that was called off?”

MP and member of Majlis Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh says that the cancellation and other similar incidents show that there are no laws to prevent occurrence of such events.

Motahari’s lawyer announced on Tuesday morning that a lawsuit has been filed against the prosecutor of Khorasan Razavi province following the cancellation of his speech.

According to Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA), Mostafa Tork Hamedani said the lawsuit was filed on Tuesday and submitted to the Special Court for Government Employees.

News agencies on Sunday published a letter by Motahari

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to President Hassan Rouhani, in which he revealed that his speech had been called off based on a letter received by prosecutor of Mashhad.

“I hope the letter had not been sent by Mr.

Alamolhoda, the Friday Prayers leader of Mashhad. It is not clear to me how this issue is related to the prosecutor or the Friday Prayers Imam,” he said.

“Those who are responsible in this regard are the governor-general and the Security Council, but they seem to be powerless,”

Motahari went on to say.

Office of Ayatollah Alamolhoda, the senior cleric in Mashhad, later showed reaction to Motahari’s letter, “Ayatollah Alamolhoda do not care about such speeches and ceremonies, and preserves the right to take legal action against the person who raised accusations against him.”

Alamolhoda’s office further threatened that Motahari will be sued if he does not take back his words.

Polish cemetery in Iranian port city to be restored

Efforts are underway to restore the cemetery of World War II Polish refugees in northern Iranian port city of Bandar Anzali.

“Polish engineers and experts visited the cemetery about eight months ago to estimate the cost and credits required for

repairing the tombs of more than 600 polish soldiers and civilians,” said Simon Terhouspian, the Armenian Bishop of Bandar Anzali, according to a report by state-owned Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA).

“Then the Polish charge d`affaires visited the cemetery along with an Iranian foreign ministry official and some Polish engineers to start the restoration,” he added, mentioning that the program includes flooring, repairing the tombs and painting the walls.

During the Second World War, in 1942, a number of Polish refugees arrived in Bandar Anzali. They had a difficult journey through the former Soviet Union because of hunger, illness and cold temperature; therefore, 639 Polish people died and were buried in a place around the town’s main cemetery.

The 70th anniversary of Polish refugee`s entry was celebrated in Bandar Anzali`s Polish cemetery on October 9, 2012, in the presence of 80 Polish people including Poland`s Ambassador to Iran, Minister of War Veterans’ Affairs, Chairman of the Commission for Communication with Polish Expatriates and a Senator, some veterans, the World War II refugee survivors and victims’ families.

Bandar Anzali is located 40 kilometers northwest of Rasht, the capital city of Gilan province in northern Iran.

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5 The blessings of US’ aggressive

foreign policy under Trump

Khabar Online conservative news website. Reportedly close to Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani: After Donald Trump’s upset victory that came as a shock to the whole world, all observers are now eyeing candidates for decision-making institutions. Some analysts are concerned that an aggressive itinerary on US foreign policy may be back on track. That is, in comparison with the Obama administration at least, one should expect Trump’s America to use more aggressive methods in dealing with foreign policy issues. Should this worry Iran? It would have been better for the Islamic Republic to be able to establish more amicable ties with the US, but for the time being, where hostility remains between the two countries, an aggressive superpower that raises the possibility of war is more adaptable to Iran’s national interests. The United States aggressive approaches will:

1. Induce fear of the superpower’s intentions among big powers, impelling them to seek balancing leverages. The less war-inclined the superpower, the more assured the other powers and the less strict they will be geopolitically. In such circumstances, they would prefer to enjoy the bright side of the status quo. However, if China, Russia and the EU, feel intimidated by US’ unilateral measures, they would prepare themselves for strategic cooperation or undermining the US’ military apparatus. Hence, Iran will find its natural defensive shield in the global geostrategic hierarchy.

2. Prevent any power vacuum or aggravating competition among countries that are neither capable nor responsible to control the situation. United States’ withdrawal from regions previously accustomed to US’ intervention will jumpstart efforts for domination in a space void of power. In addition, US’ allies, who have maintained their security relying on US military forces, will inevitably try to guarantee their security on their own. This will in trun frighten their regional rivals, and will fuel destructive regional competitions. An aggressive interventionist tendency could eliminate these possibilities.

3. Make it more difficult for the superpower to establish consensus in order to advance its goals against weaker countries because big powers will be concerned that the superpower’s success in doing so will combine with its aggressive nature of the foreign policy, in turn leading to unfavorable measures that transfigure power balance

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in global levels. From their viewpoint, a wiser option will still be obstructing and controlling the consequences of America’s aggressive tendencies.

4. Will increase caution over likely miscalculations, particularly if, like in our age, the dismantling of the status quo in the world order is overwhelmingly viewed as unfavorable by other countries. Avoiding involvement in big wars is a powerful incentive to adopt caution and abstain from aggressive measures.

5. Will reinforce the tendency to maintain the status quo even within the territory of the superpower itself, since all the big powers fear that they may be relegated to a lower status as a consequence of a likely major war. This logic will reduce adventurism among big powers and boost stability.

6. Will shrink ‘grey zones’ of conflicts. With an aggressive superpower that is willing to use military forces, fewer of such zones will remain which could magnet proxy wars.

7. Will improve respect for deterrence in a militarized global system. Every competitor should be alarmed by the prospect of being the next in line or exposed to the threat of likely wars. Once consolidated, deterrence will reinforce stability and security.

8. Lessen the rivals’ trust in the credibility of US’ promises. It is simply because the superpower’s powerful competitors, aware of its capabilities and aggressive motivations, should think of the day Washington violates its commitments and resort to force in persuading its rivals. Thus, it is wiser for these countries not to trust US’

promises.

9. Weaken the reliance and obedience of US allies because they should be worried to be dragged into wars that not only have no benefits for them, but also could impose heavy costs on them.

10. Increase expenditure in foreign policy, hence less resources to renovate US’

domestic infrastructures. Its mid-term consequence will be the accelerated exhaustion of US’ domestic resources of power.

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11. Reduce trust in US’ leadership in the global system and encourage efforts to architect a new global system, more in line with the multipolar world, less dependent on the United States.

12. Deteriorate domestic differences within the US, which will in turn lead to the emergence of new equilibriums within.

13. Increase the possibility that the US falls prey to costly and flawed decisions. In a state of zero-sum perpetual hostility between Iran and the US, i.e. while the US remains Iran’s greatest national security threat, whatever is unfavorable for the US is favorable for Iran.

14. Reinforce anti-American sensations globally and more particularly in the Muslim World. This will mobilize forces in line with the interests of United States’ enemies that could target its vital interests without US’ rival having to pay the costs.

15. Gradually weaken the leverage of economic sanctions, a constituent of multilateral diplomacy. Big powers have been complying with the US’ sanctions regimes in the hope to reduce the likelihood of wars. If the US foreign policy becomes so entangled in an aggressive, unilateral approach that sanctions fail to prevent use of force, even US’ allies will prefer to move towards balance in the opposite direction instead of accompanying it.

As history testifies, George W. Bush’s aggressive foreign policy not only failed to give the United State the superiority it desired, but also served as the beginning of an end to international monopoly. It even deepened the rift between the country and its European allies on the one hand and led to formation of a new front in Eurasia including China, Russia, and Iran on the other hand. It was after such failures that the United States’ authority reached its lowest since the Second World War while US’

debts skyrocketed beyond its GDP. It was in the same era that an unprecedented divide dominated US’ domestic scene, adding to the confusions of the US society. If Iran could skillfully avoid its victimization in the course of US’ aggressive foreign policy, it will still be able to pursue major interests in Trump’s America.

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8 Future outlook for the strategic triangle

of Iran, China and US

IRDiplomacy news website. Mohsen Shariatinia. Assistant Professor, Shahid Beheshti University

China’s Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan paid an official visit to Iran recently at a time that international politics is surrounded by ambiguities more than any time before during the past two decades and under conditions when some analysts maintain that the West has reached the finish line. Americans have held an election, which has turned into a problem for other countries, including Iran and China. During his Iran visit, General Wanquan, China’s minister of defense, met and conferred with his Iranian counterpart, Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan, and their negotiations led to the signing of a defense and military agreement between the two countries.

However, under present conditions, the issue, which is considered as more important than the details of the trip and the agreement reached during it, is the future outlook for the strategic triangle among Iran, China and the United States. Relations between Iran and China are both old and new. During more than four decades, which have passed since establishment of new relations between the two countries, the United States has been playing a key role in shaping those relations. In other words, the modern ties between Iran and China have been always trilateral, not bilateral. Before the Islamic Revolution, the United States acted as a catalyst and played a key role in shaping and early strengthening of these relations. Following the revolution and especially during the past decade, the United States has played multiple roles in this regard, the most important of which has been aimed at restricting these relations and creating important impediments on the way of their development, especially in all fields that would go beyond exporting “Chinese goods” to Iran.

Following the conclusion of Iran’s nuclear deal with the P5+1 group of countries, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), this triangle underwent some change. As a result, during the past year, the strategic pressure exerted by the United States on Iran’s relations with China has decreased and Iran has been treading the path toward desecuritization. Apart from that and in a rare course of events, Iran, China, and the United States were expected to rebuild Iran’s Arak nuclear reactor in cooperation with one another, though this project is still far from the beginning. This is why the highest ranking Chinese official traveled to Iran immediately after signing of the JCPOA and following a hiatus of 14 years and even talked about the necessity

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of promoting the strategic partnership between Tehran and Beijing. In other words, during the post-JCPOA era, gradual signs have emerged showing that interactions between Iran and China are becoming bilateral and returning to normal track.

However, now and a relatively short while after implementation of the JCPOA started, the third side of this triangle has changed and this change has posed a key question as to the future outlook for interactions between Iran and China. In the United States, a man has been elected as president whose fame, more than anything else, is owned to his odd remarks and is so unaware and defiant of the international politics that – as put by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker – he thinks Belgium is a village somewhere in Europe! Iran and China have been two main targets of his harsh remarks. On the one hand, he has threatened that he will rip the JCPOA, while on the other hand, he has accused China of trade invasion against the United States, noting that his administration will consider 45-percent tariffs on China’s exports to the United States, which amount to about 500 billion dollars a year. Of course, it goes without saying that the exigencies of election rhetoric in a clamorous society like that of the United States are totally different from exigencies of governing the same society. Another point is that in the United States, the ruling system evidently outdoes any person, though some people like the former US secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, have noted that the election win of president-elect, Donald Trump, would mean the collapse of the social contract in America. However, if Trump makes practical efforts to put in action even part of his harsh promises, the United States will once more enter the context of relations between Iran and China and will be potentially able to cause some form of “back to the future” in these relations. The question is how will China react if Trump starts by focusing on the JCPOA?

It is clear that China will find itself at a difficult crossroads where it will have to choose between interests and responsibility and it is very difficult to predict how it will behave under these conditions. If Trump does not rip the JCPOA, but try to once more securitize the Iran issue and define Iran within such conceptual frameworks as the so-called Axis of Evil and the likes of that, interactions between Iran and China will probably slow down and become difficult and complicated. What would happen to planned cooperation among Iran, China and the United States for the reconstruction of Iran’s Arak nuclear reactor under such hypothetical future conditions? Another scenario, however, which can be thought of is one in which foolhardiness (as an indispensable part of politics) would cause the United States’ foreign policy to go astray and this would provide such reformist countries as Iran and China with unprecedented opportunities across the world. On the other hand, the combination of

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foolhardiness and power would make international politics more prone to catastrophe than any time before. If foolhardiness becomes a feature of the center of the world’s power, its catastrophic effects may afflict Iran and China before and more than others.

In short, relations between Iran and China are on the verge of a profound paradigmatic alteration as a result of this profoundly vague change in the United States. At present, both countries have to hope for the best and plan for the worst. What is clear now is that not only Iran and China, but also the rest of 194 world countries are studying and speculating about this rare phenomenon in international politics; a phenomenon, which takes place but once in several decades.

1 Report for

1

Report for

2 Highlights

3

News Briefs

Other stories

MPs react to cancellation of Motahhari’s speech in Mashhad

4

Polish cemetery in Iranian port city to be restored

5 The blessings of US’ aggressive

foreign policy under Trump

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8 Future outlook for the strategic triangle

of Iran, China and US

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