Performance Goal Statement: By September 30, 2017, achieve key milestones to promote arms control and nonproliferation by implementing the President's Prague Agenda of steps toward a world without nuclear weapons; impeding missile proliferation threats; and strengthening implementation and verification of international arms control agreements.
Performance Goal Overview
To realize the President’s long-term policy to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, the Department must: ensure that weapons-usable nuclear material is secured worldwide; halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; heighten transparency into the capabilities of countries of concern; and develop verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations of obligations and enforcement methods sufficiently credible to deter such violations. Specifically, among the arms control and nonproliferation priorities the Department will pursue are:
• Bolstering the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the entire global nuclear nonproliferation regime, given that traffickers and terrorists seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
• Ensuring implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that will certify that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful.
• Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear or radiological materials and biological agents.
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• Protecting the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners from the threat of ballistic missile attack.
• Reducing the impact from the accumulation of destabilizing conventional weapons, including by destroying excess Man-Portable Air Defense Systems and small arms and light weapons, securing and managing their inventories, and controlling their proliferation to unstable regions and terrorists.
• Continuing to implement the New START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, and to foster compliance with existing nuclear-related treaties.
Performance Goal Progress Update
Key Indicator: Number of countries that have signed, received Board of Governors approval of, and/or brought into force NPT/IAEA Additional Protocols
FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 Baseline
FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017
Target N/A N/A N/A 3 3 2 2
Result 17 13 9 3 3
Indicator Analysis
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard program monitors nuclear material and facilities worldwide to provide assurance that nuclear material is not diverted to make nuclear weapons. The Additional Protocol (AP) amends and enhances comprehensive safeguards agreements that countries conclude with the IAEA, and gives the IAEA additional authority to verify a state’s safeguards obligations. The authorities provided by the AP are critical for the Agency to provide assurances on the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in a state. The United States urges all states to adopt an AP. As of October 2015, 147 countries have an AP in force or approved. It can take years for a country to move such a legal agreement through its
legal/parliamentary procedures, and some countries are refusing to adopt an AP for political/security reasons.
Out-year targets are modest because most countries prepared to adopt an AP have already done so.
Indicator Methodology
Data are collected and provided by the IAEA.
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Strategic Goal 2: Strengthen America’s Foreign Policy Impact On our Strategic Challenges
Key Indicator: Number of countries that have ratified the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
Baseline FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017
Target N/A N/A N/A 7 3 3 2
Result 8 7 12 13 8
Indicator Analysis
Ensuring the security of nuclear materials and facilities is a key IAEA mission, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is the only legally-binding international instrument in this area. In 2005, an Amendment to the Convention was adopted. Whereas the obligations for physical protection under the Convention covered nuclear material during international transport, the Amendment makes it a legally binding requirement for states to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and
transport; it also provides for expanded cooperation among states to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material and mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage. The United States urges all states to ratify the Amendment and in 2015, the United States ratified it. The goal is that with this success the pending 2016 Nuclear Security Summit will encourage additional states to ratify. As of December 16, 2015, 91 countries have ratified (and Euratom acceded). Eleven additional ratifications are necessary to bring the Amendment into force. Out-year targets are reduced because most countries prepared to ratify have already done so.
Indicator Methodology
Data are collected and provided by the IAEA.
Key Indicator: Number of ballistic missile defense interceptors deployed as part of regional missile defense approaches
FY 2013
Baseline FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017
Target N/A 0 24 24 24
Result 0 0 24
Indicator Analysis
In FY 2015, the United States continued to make progress in deploying missile defense interceptors around the world to defend U.S. troops, allies and the U.S. homeland. In 2015, the United States completed deployment of
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Strategic Goal 2: Strengthen America’s Foreign Policy Impact On our Strategic Challenges
major military components, including up to 24 interceptors, at the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System in Romania, a key element in Phase II of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Romanian site also was handed over to the operational commander for future integration into the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense architecture. In addition, the last of four U.S. Aegis BMD capable ships was deployed to Rota, Spain as part of Phase II of the EPAA, increasing the number of interceptors into the region. The United States continues to move forward with its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners on developing a Gulf-wide BMD architecture, including a Ballistic Missile Early Warning system, in accordance with U.S.-GCC Camp David Deliverables. Finally, an additional U.S. BMD capable ship was deployed to Japan, increasing the number of interceptors available.
Indicator Methodology
Data are collected and provided by the IAEA.
Key Indicator: Amount of Chemical Weapons Convention prohibited schedule chemicals decreased around the globe (in metric tons)
FY 2013
Baseline FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017
Target N/A 59,914 MT 62,000 MT 64,000 MT 66,000 MT
Result 56,247 MT 59,400 MT 64,437 MT
Indicator Analysis
In 2015 significant progress was made in chemical weapons destruction by the two major possessor states – Russia and the United States-and Libya. Russia completed destruction operations at four sites. A fifth facility is projected to complete destruction of the Russian stockpile in 2020. Libya destroyed one of its remaining Chemical Weapons precursor chemicals and in December 2015 was installing equipment to destroy another.
Indicator Methodology
Data are derived from reports submitted by possessor States Parties to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and developed by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.
Performance Indicator Change from FY 2015 APP