1 Report for

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Daily Report for Wednesday, June 21, 2017

1 Report for

Wednesday, June 21, 2017 Khordad 31, 1396

* Highlights. Page 2

* News Briefs. Page 3

* Mashhad mayor in trouble. Page 3

* Iraqi PM arrives in Tehran for high-level talks. Page 3

* Striking at the heart of American plan. Page 4

* U.S. shoots down second Iran-made drone in Syria. Page 4

* Iranian hard-liners use Tehran attacks to snipe at Rouhani. Page 5

* Pakistan’s views on development of Chabahar. Page 9

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2 Highlights

 Though Iranian hard-liners have quickly seized the June 7 terrorist attacks in Tehran as an opportunity to rally forces, it is unclear whether their security- focused discourse will gain steam. (See Page 5)

 As evidence to Pakistan’s argument, they cite considerations and challenges related to development of Chabahar such as India’s impractical promises, the bureaucratic red tape in India, the challenge of connecting rail and road routes to Chabahar port, the slow pace of development of Chabahar in comparison to 45 billion dollars invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the fact that development of Gwadar port is already way ahead of that of Chabahar.

(See Page 10)

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3 Briefs

* Farsi-language newspaper Shargh writes that Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei says that Iran got missiles from Libya and North Korea during Iran-Iraq war, when Iraq was firing missiles at Iranian cities.

* Farsi-language Tasnim News Agency writes that IRGC forces have killed Jalil Qanbar Zehi, a leader of Ansar al Furqan, during an operation in Qasr-e-Qand County, Sistan and Baluchestan Province. Ansar al Furqan is a Sunni Baluch militant group designated by Iran as a terrorist organization.

* Farsi-language Tasnim News Agency writes that an Iranian hospital director killed in Syria. Hamid Ghannadian served at the Syrian front as a director of a field hospital when he was killed on June 17.

* Farsi-language newspaper Shargh writes that Majlis’ security chief has been changed. The short news item does not mention the reason for the change nor names.

* Masoud Behnoud, a London-based Iranian journalist, historian and writer, said in his Twitter account, “I believe that, in this situation, it is wrong to adopt a policy of appeasement and show any kind of weakness in the face of Trump’s moves and strategies.

Appeasement works and is good at the negotiation table. At this stage, the world understands the language of pride better.”

* Farsi-language website Aftab News write that Arak Province judicial officials say that police have arrested five gangs with 67 members in the province in the past three months who had illegally produced 14,839 liters of alcohol.

Mashhad mayor in trouble

Farsi-language Etemad newspaper writes that the Prosecutor of Supreme Audit Court of Iran Fiyaz Shoja says that Mashhad Mayor Solat Mortazavi has received a sentence that bars him from holding the office of mayor because he obstructed audit of the office of Mashhad mayor last year. Shoja said that Mortazavi has appealed the sentenced and therefore the sentence has been temporarily been suspended.

Despite the sentence, Mortazavi denies that he has been barred from holding the office of Mashhad mayor. He argues that the case against him is still ongoing and final verdict has not been issued so far. Mortazavi belongs to the principalst camp. He has served as Deputy Interior Minister for Political Affairs during Ahmadinejad’s government.

Iraqi PM arrives in Tehran for high-level talks

Heading a high-ranking delegation including five ministers of his cabinet, the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi arrived in capital Tehran and was welcomed by Iranian Minister of Industry, Mine, and Trade Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh at Mehrabad airport. He was later officially received by Iran’s First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri. Etemad newspaper writes that visit was aimed at discussing “post-Daesh era”.

Before his visit to Iran, al-Abadi held talks with Saudi officials in Jeddah. He is also slated to leave Tehran for Kuwait on the last leg of his three-nation regional tour.

Earlier, Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi said said that Abadi’s visit to Tehran was on the agenda, but the recent developments in the region and the significance of relations between the two neighboring countries were the reasons for which the visit is being made at this time.

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4 Striking at the heart of American plan

Farsi-language hardline conservative newspaper Kayhan refers to Sunday’s missile strike and writes that Iranian missiles hit an area in Syria that the Americans were planning to occupy under the pretext of Daesh’s presence and supporting the Daesh. They hoped to disrupt the alliance between Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. It was at this time that the ‘Resistance Front’ took two actions that would disrupt America’s long-term plans.

The first step was the departure of the Syrian army and its allies from the eastern borders and the second step was the Sunday’s missile strike.

Kayhan writes that Iran’s missile strike at the heart of the aforesaid area, the countdown has started for the operating of clearing the area of the American military.

Kayhan writes that with this Resistance Front’s show of force, America has changed its tune.

Kayhan writes that the coordination between Iran and Iraq, and the latter’s announcement of this coordination is noteworthy. Kayhan accuses America of totally ignoring rights and opinions of people of the country it occupies [inferring that Iraq sides with Iran because of American violations]. The missile strike clearly showed that Iran can carry out missile strike any time it wants.

U.S. shoots down second Iran-made drone in Syria

On June 20, an American aircraft shot down an Iranian-made armed drone approaching U.S.-led coalition forces in southern Syria, the U.S. Central Command said in a statement. “The armed pro- regime Shaheed-129 UAV was shot down by a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle at approximately 12:30 a.m. after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on Coalition forces,” the statement added.

The incident was the latest in a series of dangerous encounters between pro-Syrian regime forces and the American military and its allies in Syria. It was the second time the coalition is targeting an Iranian drone in less than two weeks. On June, U.S. officials said an American aircraft shot down an Iranian drone after it dropped munitions near coalition forces near al-Tanf border crossing. The region is manned by the U.S. military, which trains and advises Syrian rebel forces to fight the Islamic State.

Although the U.S. military stresses that its primary focus is to defeat the Islamic State in Syria and the broader region, the latest encounters mark an escalation between the U.S. military and pro-Damascus forces and raise the possibility of more confrontations between the U.S. military and Iran – and perhaps also Russia – in Syria in the near future. The incident came just days after an American aircraft shot down a Syrian regime warplane after it had dropped bombs near U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria.

Recently, American forces have targeted Iranian-supported militia forces advancing toward the al-Tanf region as well.

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5 Iranian hard-liners use Tehran attacks

to snipe at Rouhani

 In the aftermath of the June 7 terrorist attacks in Tehran claimed by the Islamic State (IS), Iranian Reformists and moderates have sought to overcome the heightened factional divisions lingering from the recent presidential elections.

 Rather than a cause for national unity, the attacks in Tehran marked the beginning of a new bout of political infighting. The easiest and most vulnerable target for hard-liner attacks is anyone who opposed Iranian involvement in Syria.

 In a tweet amid the terrorist attacks on June 7, Tavakoli lambasted Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the Reformist former mayor of Tehran, for his remarks on April 30

denouncing Iranian military engagement in Syria and advocating a solution based on political negotiations.

 Kayhan, the hard-line daily whose editor-in-chief is appointed by the supreme leader, has condemned the United States for its purported support of the terrorists while criticizing Rouhani’s emphasis on constructive engagement with the world, writing in an editorial on June 10, “The events of the Wednesday [June 7] removed the facade of the Americans and exposed their true nature to the [Iranian] people.

 As such, the attacks in Tehran have provided hard-liners with a post-election relief of sorts, as they have sought to reunite their forces and mobilize their shattered rank and file for a fresh standoff with the Rouhani administration.

 Raisi and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf promised to multiply the monthly cash handouts that most Iranians receive, and they waged a multifaceted defamation operation against Rouhani by disclosing several documents about the alleged corruption of the Rouhani administration in the live TV debates.

 In this vein, the terrorist attacks in Tehran have provided hard-liners with a pretext to frame their new discourse around national security.

 Indeed, Khamenei has leveled two different yet connected rounds of attacks on the Rouhani administration after the June 7 attacks.

 If anything, given Khamenei’s decision to not focus on national security in the

aftermath of the attacks while increasing verbal assaults on Rouhani suggests that the scope for hard-liners to fully seize the opportunity is indeed limited.

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Al-Monitor news website. Mahmoud Pargoo. Mahmoud Pargoo is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University in Sydney. He writes on the Middle East and Islam: In the aftermath of the June 7 terrorist attacks in Tehran claimed by the Islamic State (IS), Iranian Reformists and moderates have sought to overcome the heightened factional divisions lingering from the recent presidential elections. Indeed, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Mohammad Reza Aref and Mostafa Tajzadeh among many other Reformist politicians have called for national unity. In contrast, conservative and hard-line politicians have not missed the opportunity to target their rivals. Even as bullets were flying inside parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a political offensive against moderate President Hassan Rouhani kicked off. Rather than a cause for national unity, the attacks in Tehran marked the beginning of a new bout of political infighting.The easiest and most vulnerable target for hard-liner attacks is anyone who opposed Iranian involvement in Syria. Indeed, conservatives have used the Tehran attacks to reiterate once again that if Iran had not been involved in Syria and Iraq, it would’ve been fighting IS in the streets of the Iranian capital on a daily basis. Noteworthy among these voices is Ahmad Tavakoli, a conservative former member of parliament. In a tweet amid the terrorist attacks on June 7, Tavakoli lambasted Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the Reformist former mayor of Tehran, for his remarks on April 30 denouncing Iranian military engagement in Syria and advocating a solution based on political negotiations.

Another pivotal theme of hard-line rhetoric has been the strident defense of the role of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in protecting the country.

The IRGC was fiercely criticized by Rouhani during the recent election campaigning over their ever-increasing involvement in the Iranian economy as well as interference with foreign policy and domestic politics. Ironically, instead of questioning the IRGC over their flagrant failure in preventing the infiltration of terrorists into parliament in the heart of Tehran, the IRGC has been heralded as heroes on state-run TV and in the conservative media.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Rouhani’s efforts to engage in regional diplomacy have additionally been targeted. Kayhan, the hard-line daily whose editor- in-chief is appointed by the supreme leader, has condemned the United States for its purported support of the terrorists while criticizing Rouhani’s emphasis on constructive engagement with the world, writing in an editorial on June 10, “The events of the Wednesday [June 7] removed the facade of the Americans and exposed

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their true nature to the [Iranian] people. … Was Daesh [IS] not created during the [2013-15] nuclear negotiations?”

That hard-liners have acted so promptly in using the June 7 attacks as an opportunity to slam the moderates is not surprising. Just a month ago, their all-out and powerful election machine was crushed by Rouhani, who secured 57% of votes on May 19, far ahead of Ebrahim Raisi, his main conservative opponent. As such, the attacks in Tehran have provided hard-liners with a post-election relief of sorts, as they have sought to reunite their forces and mobilize their shattered rank and file for a fresh standoff with the Rouhani administration. Thus, their reaction to the attacks should be analyzed in the context of their exasperation in the aftermath of the elections.

The conservatives’ defeat in the May 19 vote was defining, for it signaled the ideological dead end and lack of powerful discourse in their camp.

After the death of Khomeini in 1989, no hard-line candidate has been able to win a presidential election by emphasizing revolutionary and religious-conservative values.

The first president after the demise of Khomeini, the late Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, was at the center of the political spectrum; his successor, Mohammad Khatami, was a fervent Reformist. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, though conservative in theory and practice, was first elected in 2005 on the back of economic populism rather than by stressing the social and cultural policies of the hard-liners. Rouhani also won office in 2013 and last month by portraying himself as the only viable alternative to the conservatives, whether on social and cultural issues or foreign policy.

Even before the May 19 polls, the conservatives were aware of the inability of revolutionary slogans to mobilize voters. Thus, they hijacked Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric.

Raisi and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf promised to multiply the monthly cash handouts that most Iranians receive, and they waged a multifaceted defamation operation against Rouhani by disclosing several documents about the alleged corruption of the Rouhani administration in the live TV debates. Furthermore, they tried to dissociate themselves from extremist social and cultural approaches and to depict a more moderate image. Even Raisi, the conservative finalist, met with an underground rapper who is popular among the youth. The photos of the meeting went viral on social media. The hard-liners’ loss in the elections, however, indicates that even incorporation of moderate and Reformist themes into the public image of conservatism will not necessarily strengthen their voter base. Therefore, a reshuffling of their whole discourse has now been put in place.

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In this vein, the terrorist attacks in Tehran have provided hard-liners with a pretext to frame their new discourse around national security. If anything, as in many other parts of the world, conservatives have proven to be masters of this exercise.

Though national security seemed to be an initial conservative response to the Tehran attacks, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may not be following the same line.

Instead of exacerbating the sense of emergency and aggravating the threat of terrorism, which could have been used to seek more prerogatives and impunity for the IRGC, Khamenei belittled the attacks by calling them “firecrackers.” Moreover, he chose to reiterate his usual revolutionary rhetoric and Islamic values to slam Rouhani.

Indeed, Khamenei has leveled two different yet connected rounds of attacks on the Rouhani administration after the June 7 attacks. First, only a few hours after the attack, he gave the green light to his supporters to engage in fiercer assaults on the government based on its allegedly nonrevolutionary social and cultural policies but also its permissive conduct of foreign affairs. He gave the revolutionary elements a fire-at-will formula so that they no longer needed to wait for the orders of a central command, meaning Rouhani’s government, which, he suggested, is not vigilant to the real threats to the Islamic Revolution. On the other hand, on June 13 he meaningfully warned Rouhani of the fate of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran who, after assuming office in 1980, was impeached by parliament and dismissed by Khomeini, “In 1981, the then president bipolarized society and divided the people into two groups of opponents and proponents. That experience must not be repeated.”

Disappointed with the results of the May 19 elections and with the inability of revolutionary discourse to win voters, the hard-liners have focused on finding a more instrumental way to go around their crisis and revive their energies. The Tehran attacks have provided them with the opportunity to achieve precisely these objectives.

However, the question of whether new rhetoric centered on national security will provide conservatives with the impetus to regain lost momentum remains unclear. If anything, given Khamenei’s decision to not focus on national security in the aftermath of the attacks while increasing verbal assaults on Rouhani suggests that the scope for hard-liners to fully seize the opportunity is indeed limited.

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9 Pakistan’s pessimistic and optimistic

views on development of Chabahar

 On the opposite, Iran’s Chabahar port is only about 140 kilometers from Pakistan’s Gwadar port, but due to deep waters around it and the natural state of its shores, the port can accommodate ships with a capacity of over 100,000 tonnes.

 As evidence to their argument, they cite considerations and challenges related to development of Chabahar such as India’s impractical promises, the bureaucratic red tape in India, the challenge of connecting rail and road routes to Chabahar port, the slow pace of development of Chabahar in comparison to 45 billion dollars invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the fact that development of Gwadar port is already way ahead of that of Chabahar.

 On the other hand, while Beijing has undertaken 80 percent of the cost of developing Gwadar port (more than 1.1 billion dollars) in the form of financial aid and low-

interest loans, India and other actors cannot do this in Chabahar and problems related to India’s foreign liabilities and lack of an extensive effort on the part of Iran to

develop Chabahar port will all work to the benefit of Pakistan’s Gwadar port.

 Proponents of this viewpoint believe that cooperation and rail connection between the two ports, turning Chabahar and Gwadar ports into sister ports, transfer of passengers between Iranian and Pakistani ports, increasing border exchanges through border markets, establishment of a special economic zone in Chabahar port,

development of port and marine infrastructure, physical development of the port, providing grounds for participation of the private sector in development of the port, making effort to attract major shipping lines of the world, development of passenger terminals and maritime tourism, and connecting rail and road routes can increase cooperation between the two ports.

 As a result, they believe that development of Chabahar port will not necessarily lead to isolation of Pakistan’s Gwadar port and argue that boosting economic cooperation between the two ports is better than negative rivalry.

 Some analysts believe that in a bid to reduce importance of Gwadar port, Americans have set their sight on Oman’s port of Duqm, an oil dock in the United Arab Emirates’

Fujairah port, and Iran’s Chabahar port and, therefore, are supporting India’s effort.

 In the same way, despite the fact that unlike Gwadar, Chabahar will remain under Iran’s management and will not turn into a military port for India, Pakistani officials

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are afraid that providing logistical support to India by Iran in Chabahar port will enable the Indian navy to increase its reconnaissance operations close to Pakistan’s borders.

 In fact, Pakistani officials believe in superiority and importance of Gwadar port compared to Chabahar and believe that development of Gwadar port is five years ahead of that of Chabahar port.

 There is no doubt that development of Chabahar will cause the alliance between China and Pakistan to fail in restricting India’s clout in South Asia through the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor, and this is good reason for India to pay more attention to Chabahar port instead of Gwadar port in order to have better and easier access to Central Asian markets.

 While Pakistan has been trying to address the existing security concerns by creating a special security circle to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, China has been trying not to make its presence in Gwadar look like a threat to Iran, because it believes that development of Chabahar port will strengthen Gwadar as well.

As posted on Tabnak news website: Pakistan’s Gwadar port is located along the coast of Makran at an approximate distance of 533 kilometers from Karachi port city and 120 kilometers from Iran’s shores. During the past decade, China has made a lot of investment in Gwadar port and was committed to investing 1.62 billion dollars in that port in 2015. From another viewpoint, Gwadar port is located in the southern part of the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” which is supposed to be made operational through an investment of about 52 billion dollars to connect Xinjiang in northwestern China to Gwadar. The corridor is expected to come on-stream in 2017.

On the opposite, Iran’s Chabahar port is only about 140 kilometers from Pakistan’s Gwadar port, but due to deep waters around it and the natural state of its shores, the port can accommodate ships with a capacity of over 100,000 tonnes. In addition, it has security and is backed by Iran’s economic potential to attract investment in its economic infrastructure. This issue has made Pakistani officials see Chabahar as a potential rival for Gwadar. The following paper discusses Pakistan’s optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints toward development of Chabahar.

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A) Pakistan’s optimistic viewpoint on development of Chabahar

Pakistan and an ineffective rival

In fact, certain circles in China believe that development of Iran’s Chabahar port by India is doomed to fail citing new Delhi’s ambitious and strategic goals. However, Chinese leaders believe that development of Chabahar would not create a practical obstacle to implementation of plans related to revival of the ancient Silk Road. There is also a viewpoint in Pakistan, which argues that before reaching the desirable level of development, Chabahar has a long way to go and when the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor becomes operational, Chabahar would be no threat to Pakistan. As evidence to their argument, they cite considerations and challenges related to development of Chabahar such as India’s impractical promises, the bureaucratic red tape in India, the challenge of connecting rail and road routes to Chabahar port, the slow pace of development of Chabahar in comparison to 45 billion dollars invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the fact that development of Gwadar port is already way ahead of that of Chabahar.

This optimistic viewpoint believes that Pakistan has the upper hand as strategic ally of China and when the two countries’ economic corridor is complete by 2030, Pakistan’s economic growth will increase by 2.5 percent. On the other hand, while Beijing has undertaken 80 percent of the cost of developing Gwadar port (more than 1.1 billion dollars) in the form of financial aid and low-interest loans, India and other actors cannot do this in Chabahar and problems related to India’s foreign liabilities and lack of an extensive effort on the part of Iran to develop Chabahar port will all work to the benefit of Pakistan’s Gwadar port. From this viewpoint, some parities have also mentioned different roles for these two ports and believe that development of either port will not be against the other. Proponents of this viewpoint believe that cooperation and rail connection between the two ports, turning Chabahar and Gwadar ports into sister ports, transfer of passengers between Iranian and Pakistani ports, increasing border exchanges through border markets, establishment of a special economic zone in Chabahar port, development of port and marine infrastructure, physical development of the port, providing grounds for participation of the private sector in development of the port, making effort to attract major shipping lines of the world, development of passenger terminals and maritime tourism, and connecting rail and road routes can increase cooperation between the two ports. As a result, they believe that development of Chabahar port will not necessarily lead to isolation of

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Pakistan’s Gwadar port and argue that boosting economic cooperation between the two ports is better than negative rivalry.

B) Pakistan’s pessimistic viewpoint on development of Chabahar

Pakistan and the geopolitical threat resulting from development of Chabahar As strategic rivalry escalates between China and the United States, presence of China’s economic fleet and naval forces in Gwadar will create new conditions in this energy hub. Some analysts believe that in a bid to reduce importance of Gwadar port, Americans have set their sight on Oman’s port of Duqm, an oil dock in the United Arab Emirates’ Fujairah port, and Iran’s Chabahar port and, therefore, are supporting India’s effort. This is why despite serious opposition of US Senate with India’s investment in Chabahar port, former president, Barack Obama, supported New Delhi’s investment in the Iranian port. Some people in Pakistan believe that a trilateral agreement among India, Iran and Afghanistan over Chabahar will be continuation of the big game among China, the United States, India and Iran and will be a step toward isolation of Pakistan at regional level. Therefore, when it comes to development of Chabahar, Pakistan sees it as a major threat.

Pakistan and the security threat posed by development of Chabahar

In fact, investment by India in Iran’s Chabahar port has drawn attention from Pakistan and some former Pakistani officials believe that this agreement is a direct threat to national security of their country. From this viewpoint, destabilizing Pakistan’s Balochistan province and increasing security costs of Islamabad in that region is India’s main motivation for circumventing Pakistan’s Gwadar port and the corridor that is attached to it. As a result, some former government officials in Pakistan, including General Yasin Malik, have considered development of Chabahar port by India as a direct threat against Pakistan’s security. On the other hand, it must be noted that Gwadar port can be used to boost military might of Pakistan and China, facilitate Chinese navy’s access to the Arabian Sea and countries located along the northwestern coasts of the Indian Ocean, and change geopolitical map of the region.

In the same way, despite the fact that unlike Gwadar, Chabahar will remain under Iran’s management and will not turn into a military port for India, Pakistani officials are afraid that providing logistical support to India by Iran in Chabahar port will enable the Indian navy to increase its reconnaissance operations close to Pakistan’s

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borders. Another fear in this regard in Pakistan is that India will use Iran’s Chabahar port as a base for espionage operations against Pakistan and also take destabilizing measures in Balochistan province.

In fact, any increase in cooperation between India and Iran in the fields of regional security and defense, which would be pivoted around Chabahar, is considered to be against Pakistan’s national interests. As a result, from this viewpoint, development of Chabahar port is considered as a serious threat to security of Gwadar port, in particular, and Pakistan, in general.

Pakistan and the fear of negative consequences of development of Chabahar In fact, Pakistani officials believe in superiority and importance of Gwadar port compared to Chabahar and believe that development of Gwadar port is five years ahead of that of Chabahar port. However, the point is that possible closing of the common border between Afghanistan and Pakistan will not only lead to 1.5 billion dollars decrease in transactions with Afghanistan, but may also cause a human crisis in parts of Pakistan as a result of food shortages and so forth, because Chabahar would be a more secure and shorter route for Afghanistan than the current routes that cross Pakistan. As a result, it is of strategic importance to Pakistan that the development project for Chabahar will not be implemented. Therefore, many Pakistani officials have frequently described the development of Chabahar port as a rival project to Gwadar in their interviews. There is no doubt that development of Chabahar will cause the alliance between China and Pakistan to fail in restricting India’s clout in South Asia through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and this is good reason for India to pay more attention to Chabahar port instead of Gwadar port in order to have better and easier access to Central Asian markets.

Therefore, India’s plan to invest in Chabahar port is considered by Islamabad as a means for New Delhi to circumvent Pakistan through Iran’s route and have easy access to markets in Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. As a result, Islamabad believes that development of Chabahar will reduce Pakistan’s control over strategic transit routes through diversification of trade and transit routes in the region. From this viewpoint, although the possibility for participation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in this project, granting loans to Iran, or participation of China in Chabahar project is low, the Iranian port can still help India gain more power to play a more effective role in determining the future prospect of Afghanistan and region.

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Encouraging Iran’s participation in Gwadar and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects

Pakistan’s Gwadar port is not yet ready for trade and big parts of countries that make up the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are plagued with unrest. While Pakistan has been trying to address the existing security concerns by creating a special security circle to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, China has been trying not to make its presence in Gwadar look like a threat to Iran, because it believes that development of Chabahar port will strengthen Gwadar as well. Under these conditions, it seems that Pakistan is trying to encourage Iran to take part in the completion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project in order to ensure a more promising future prospect for that project and Gwadar port. From this viewpoint, efforts made to get Iran’s attention during the post-sanctions era can increase the possibility of the success of Gwadar project and the 50-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project due to Iran’s high trade, economic and energy potentialities and its geographic position. Therefore, even low-key presence of Iran in these projects can help Gwadar become a port city equivalent in importance to China’s Shenzhen and the United Arab Emirates’ Dubai over the next ten years. It is for this reason that Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, the speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan, recently invited Iran to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.