A roadmap to permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula
Jonathan Yeung
Submission for the /nd University Student Peace in Korea Essay Competition, /< July /?/@.
Word count: /@DE
Introduction
On $% June )*)*, much of the international community looked on with horror as North Korea blew up its joint liaison office with South Korea in the border town of Kaesong (BBC News, )*)*). Hopes and aspirations of inter- Korea rapprochement, rebirthed since the Kim–Trump Singapore Summit and Moon Jae-in’s historic visit to Pyongyang in )*$O, went up in flames.
Permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula seems farther away than ever.
Despite the apparent hopelessness of the current situation, I argue that a permanent Korean peace is indeed possible, but only through careful
diplomacy that addresses the DPRK’s deepest needs and views the North as a viable economic partner rather than a faltering nuisance. I begin by setting out a realistic vision of what “permanent peace” might look like. I then lay out a roadmap to achieving that peace, examining what it would take to convince the DPRK to sign on to yet another peace process. I will conclude by offering a few thoughts on the limited short-term but powerful long-term role of soft power in promoting understanding between the two Koreas.
The contours of a permanent peace
Ever since the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in $XYZ, the DPRK and ROK have settled into an uneasy truce. Tensions, however, are prone to erupt at any time, and indeed have erupted regularly in the past. In
$X%O, DPRK agents came close to assassinating South Korean President Park Chung-hee. North Korean inflitration tunnels were discovered below the Demilitarised Zone in the $X\*s to X*s (Specia, )*$\). North Korea has invested its state coffers into developing advanced missiles (e.g. the Hwasong missiles) and nuclear weapons. The so-called ‘Demilitarised’ Zone, which separates the two Koreas, remains one of the most heavily fortified borders in the world. The two Koreas have not achieved a peace that is “permanent” in any sense of the word. Both sides remain wary of and prepared for an imminent attack. A roadmap to permanent peace is desperately needed.
Before we can lay out a plan for peace, however, we must first consider what “permanent peace” means. More precisely, what state of affairs would qualify as a “permanent peace”? Would having more stable and peaceful relations between the DPRK and ROK qualify as permanent peace? Or should
we be satisfied with nothing less than full unification, transforming the peace process into a domestic issue, similar to what is the case in Germany? These two options need not be mutually exclusive. While the eventual unification of the two Koreas is a right and indeed important goal, we must also recognise that its attainment is very far away as things currently stand. I will therefore focus on a first step towards unification: establishing a permanent framework of inter-state peace between the DPRK and ROK.
Two elements will be key to this inter-state peace. First, a formal peace treaty between the DPRK and ROK must be signed. As long as there is no peace treaty, the two Koreas are still technically at war, meaning conflict is only a stone’s throw away. Signing a peace treaty will enable international parties to hold the two Koreas accountable, making it much harder to initiate new hostilities. Second, a comprehensive treaty of economic cooperation must be agreed upon that specifies how North and South Korean businesses can cooperate. Piecemeal or ad-hoc agreements, as have been the case so far, are too weak to be sufficient. International Relations scholars of the liberalist and neo-liberalist persuasions have long noted that economic interdependence discourages states from hostile behaviour and fosters cooperation (Keohane and Nye, $X\)). Robust and specific trade and commercial links between the two Koreas would heighten the economic costs of initiating conflict on both sides. But this inter-state peace must be built in the right order: a peace treaty first, then an economic cooperation treaty. As long as there is no peace treaty, South Korean businesses would still find the risk of imminent conflict too high for making any signficant cross-border investments.
Convincing North Korea: dampening external and internal threats
So how do get to a stage where a peace treaty would be amenable to North Korea? Kim Jong-un, like most other authoritarian leaders, is most concerned about one thing: the survival of his regime. The Kim regime’s need to buttress itself against both domestic and external threats has guided its policy
decisions for decades, at least since the end of Soviet aid in $XOX.
Domestically, the DPRK is facing major economic troubles, especially since the beginning of the COVID-$X pandemic. To halt the spread of the virus, the DPRK has virtually closed its border with China and cut off trade;
the extent to which this actually stemmed the spread of COVID is unknown, but experts agree that the DPRK is now facing a major shortage of
commodities (BBC News, )*)$b). Indeed, Kim Jong-un recently made the rare public admission that North Koreans were facing a “tense” food situation (BBC News, )*)$a). Economic downturns ultimately seed discontent and dissatisfaction towards the regime, threatening Kim’s rule. To see this truth Kim only needs to look across the border to the Chinese Communist Party, which managed to head off calls for regime change by delivering breakneck economic growth in the $XO*s to )***s.
Externally, the DPRK faces the threat of military intervention or invasion.
Kim knows full well that in the game of realpolitik, sovereignty is not always guaranteed. Even if a full scale Korean War-esque counter-invasion is now unlikely, Kim will have learnt from western operations in weak states like Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan that the western powers are unafraid to topple leaders and regimes when they think it expedient. To avoid sharing the same fate, the DPRK has been shoring up its military for years. And knowing full well that its conventional weapons will never match up to those of the United States, the DPRK has perceived nuclear weapons as the crowning guarantee against military incursions, greatly heightening the costs for other countries to intervene. The presence of twin threats—both external and internal—explains Kim Jong-un’s “Byeongjin Path [병진노선]” (lit. ‘simultaneous
advancement’) policy of pursuing both economic (domestic) and military (external) growth at the same time, which he only recently set aside upon the alleged completion of the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities (Yi and Kimiya, )*$O, pp. l–X).
The paradoxic key to getting the DPRK to sign a peace treaty is, therefore, to reduce the domestic and external threats against North Korea. If
Pyongyang perceives that its very survival is no longer at risk in the medium term, it would be far more willing to open up and engage to ensure its survival in the very long term. A primary tool to ensure the long-term survival of a regime is to acquire international recognition: concluding a peace treaty and economic agreement with South Korea would boost the DPRK’s international legitimacy and prompt other countries to see it as a ‘normal state’.
Reducing the threats impending upon North Korea might seem like a ridiculous idea to those who advocate for containing a seemingly erratic and dangerous regime. Many would further argue, on moral grounds, that we should not be propping up a brutal regime like the North’s. These arguments certainly have merit. I am, however, unconvinced in the first instance that the current strategy of containment is making the North any less dangerous—the more we corner Pyongyang, the more it will feel the need to resort to drastic measures. On the contrary, by pulling Pyongyang into normal diplomatic and economic relations, we are giving it far less reason to deploy desperate measures; it would have much more to lose. Futhermore, from the moral angle, it is unclear whether the current strategy is punishing the DPRK regime itself—the North Korean people may be bearing the brunt of international sanctions, while Kim Jong-un and his associates continue to enjoy lavish dinners and opulent lifestyles.
So how can we reduce the threats impending upon the North Korean regime? We should begin by dealing with the external threats: Pyongyang has demonstrated that it is willing to sacrifice economic wellbeing if it feels that its military security is in danger, as was shown by the collapse of the Six- Party talks in )**X. First, I assert that the international community needs to accept (reluctantly) that North Korea is now a nuclear power. It is
undoubtedly a scary prospect that a regime such as the DPRK has its hands on the most destructive weapons known to mankind—but it is a reality we have no choice but to work with. There is no longer much point in constantly berating or sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear programme; rather, by lowering the heat, we can make it less likely that the DPRK will ever think about using its nuclear capabilities. Second, the powers in the region (namely the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China) need to make a clear and explicit agreement never to violate the North’s territorial integrity. This will lower the North’s fear of a Libya-style intervention. Third, the United States needs to reduce its military presence on the Korean peninsula. Proximity is a key factor here—if the US concentrates its armed forces further away in the region, for instance in Japan or the Philippines, then we can reduce the
perceived threat on the North without sacrificing the ability to repel any North Korean attacks. All in all, the international community needs to pursue a
policy of rational de-escalation. Like it or not, the Kim regime is probably here to stay—we need to nudge it towards a willingness to engage.
The international community can then help assuage the domestic threats to the DPRK regime. Once the external threat is lowered, Pyongyang will no doubt focus its energies on improving the domestic economy, bolstering satisfaction and shoring up support for the government. The first step the international community can take to help is strategically lift some of the sanctions on North Korea. Sanctions pose a major obstacle to economic cooperation between the two Koreas—most sanctions, except the ones dealing with the export and import of weapons, should be reduced or removed
altogether. The second step is then to (re-)foster strategic partnerships between North and South Korean businesses. President Moon Jae-in’s administration has in fact taken concrete steps in this direction: when Moon visited Pyongyang in )*$O, he brought along the heads of four South Korean conglomerates (Pollack, )*$X); he also pushed for investments in road and railway projects which would link the two Koreas (Kim, )*$O). Unfortunately, UN sanctions means that major companies like Samsung and Lotte are as yet unable to operate in North Korea (Ibid.).
Once the external and domestic threats to the Kim regime’s survival are sufficiently dampened, then the DPRK’s optimal strategy will be to agree to a peace treaty and comprehensive economic cooperation treaty to shore up the gains they have made. The current Armistice Agreement would be absolutely insufficent to guarantee that the powers surrounding North Korea would not return to an aggressive footing; the existing economic framework would not guarantee a sustainable flow of investment and goods into the country. It will be clear to the DPRK that only a full peace treaty, then an economic treaty, signed between the two Koreas would consolidate the DPRK’s long term interests.
The potential of soft power
But what of soft power? Some argue that North Korean society can be transformed from within by an influx of South Korean popular culture or democratic ideals. Others say that unofficial links between the two Koreas, like joint sports teams, carry great symbolic importance. I am more hesitant
about the potential of soft power in promoting permanent inter-Korean peace, at least in the short term. The Kim regime is currently extremely wary of any cultural imports from South Korea, as evidenced by its recent crackdown on South Korean slang and TV dramas (Bicker, )*)$; Yonhap, )*)$). Any attempts to penetrate the North using soft power is likely to draw suspicion and distrust from the DPRK authorities. In the long term, a more normalised and porous border would ensure an immense amount of cultural exchange and soft power influence. The time for soft power to play a major role, however, has not yet come. We must focus on state-level diplomacy.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have sought to present a clear roadmap towards permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. While Korean unification is the ultimate guarantor of permanent peace, I have argued that building a sustainable framework of inter-state peace between the DPRK and ROK is a first step.
Both a peace treaty and a comprehensive economic treaty between the two Koreas will be key. To make the DPRK amenable to signing a peace treaty, I contend that we must, paradoxically, help the Kim regime combat external and domestic threats to its survival. Ultimately, a strategy of waiting for North Korea’s collapse has not and will not work—like it or not, the Kim regime is here to stay. If we want permanent peace, we have to be prepared to work with Pyongyang and guarantee its security.
References
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