A Roadmap to permanent peace in the Korean Peninsula
Callum J. Moran
Word count: 2114
University of Central Lancashire
Year 2 Undergraduate Student of Asia Pacific Studies: Korean
In this essay, there will be an overview of the actions that can restore peace on the Korean peninsula, along with the unfortunate repercussions that will come with gaining a unified country, including strained neighbourly relations. The difficult social and financial hurdles that will leave Korea fragmented and divided along North-south lines long after the fall of a border, will also be detailed, along with possible ways of relieving them. The importance of
international co-operation will be stressed, along with key partners that could be overlooked in the fight for the rights of all Koreans.
Some would argue that a ‘roadmap to peace’ is unachievable whilst the
unification of the Korean peninsula remains unattained. There are a variety of reasons for this is, ranging from the psychological belief that Korea must be reunited, to the point that the DPRK may never be able to act in a peaceful manner to its neighbours, or the point that even if they could, the suffering of the average North Korean under the current regime does not allow for the term
‘peace’ to enter into the equation until freedom is given to them. It is arguable that peace can only be achieved once the Korean people, under a liberal
democracy, are once again united as one. One document that should be
consulted when deciding how to go about achieving ‘peace on the peninsula’ is the constitution of the ROK. Within the constitution, peaceful reunification is highlighted as one of the highest assumed tasks by the government, with articles 2 and 3 highlighting that even North Koreans are viewed as citizens under ROK law, and later articles detailing all the protections that should be afforded to all citizens (CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA).
The realisation of this is a significantly more difficult feat than that of simply maintaining a productive and co-operative relationship with the DPRK. One reason for this is that there are significantly less factors in the control of the South when it comes to achieving unification, over just co-operation. Whilst the North Korean government would likely not be overly receptive to any co-
operative initiatives proposed, they certainly will not be dissolving their government anytime soon. This means that unity, and the path to it, is likely more so in the hands of the North Korean people than the South. This makes the roadmap to peace, vastly more difficult, as it is clear that in the long term,
unification is needed to bestow peace to all Koreans. This does not, however, mean that nothing should be attempted, nor that nothing can be achieved on this front.
Whilst the goal of reunification is the ultimate goal to stride for, in the short term, securing the lives of the many that are actively attempting to gain entrance to the South is a must, and is of equal importance to the overall peace on the peninsula. This is not only because of moral and ethical reasoning, but also due to the fact that the North Koreans who freely choose to come to the South will be more important in the success of unification as they are actively seeking to join the South, whereas those who remain in the North may include people who do not wish the end of their socialist system. These people may not only be key in convincing others from the North into accepting the changes that are
theorised for their society but will also be needed as informants and models for the South, both to assist in the unification and to get those in the South who oppose unification, onboard with the idea. If these defectors are used to educate and break down barriers that exist between Koreans, the divide and opposition from the South should lessen and the inevitable discrimination of North
Koreans in a reunified society can hopefully be mitigated to a certain extent. It is important to use all the time available to prepare for the joining of the two nations, especially due to the amount of time that the countries have been separated. With the differences increasing by the day, the ROK government should be taking all necessary steps to reduce the stigma attached to that of North Koreans (Yang, 2018). All efforts must be applied in order to create a smooth transition when the day of unification does eventually come.
Many defectors traverse the length of China to cross into bordering Laos,
Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. This is particularly dangerous, as not only does China detain and return defectors, many S. E. Asian countries are known for arresting and deporting them also, with Laos being one example (Lee, 2020). Thailand is seen as the final gateway to the South, a safe haven where they will be deported to South Korea (Wongcha-um, 2017), but to get there, the defectors must first get through the other S. E. Asian countries. Leveraging leniency amongst these countries would be a significantly easier task than getting China on board with protecting defectors and would be very useful in increasing the success rate of defections.
This shows that the inclusion of ASEAN when designing plans for peace on the peninsula is more important than would be initially thought. The ROK is active in its involvement with ASEAN on multiple fronts including security (Levi, 2020) (Overview of ASEAN-Republic of Korea Dialogue Relations, 2021), meaning that it is not out of the realm of possibility that their cooperation in other fields such as assisting defectors from the DPRK with safe passage through their countries.
The idea of the unification of Korea under democracy does not only prompt the issue of how to deal with the North Korean government, but once achieved, provokes the equally unenviable task of dealing with the reaction of the Chinese government, which will likely feel an understandable level of unease at
suddenly having a NATO-aligned US ally on its doorstep. If the collapse of the berlin wall is anything to go by, this collapse could happen seemingly overnight and out of the blue (HASIC, 2019), meaning the Chinese could be even more blind sighted and unpredictable. Evidence of their likely disapproval at being direct neighbours with the ROK is ever-more evident when looking at their protest of the THAAD missile deployment and the operational ability to encroach into the Chinese mainland when used in Korea. China inflicted much economic damage through its retaliation against the South for this (J. Lim, n.d.). A decrease in US- Korea military co-operation is probably envisioned when people think of a world without a divided Korea, however, this may not be the case. If relations with China turn sour, Korea may actually have to rely more heavily upon America to deal with any rising Sino-Korean tensions. With China’s rising influence on the world stage and its long list of neighbourly conflicts, including those in the South China sea (South China Sea, 2021), it could be argued that having the DPRK as a buffer between ROK and China is actually a beneficial situation for Korea. As China is distracted with handling the ever-unpredictable North, it is less likely to turn its attention to the South.
One way of bringing the North back to the negotiating table is to reduce their illicit income. Over the years, the North has lost the strong trading partners that it relied upon to thrive in the early years of their country’s founding. With the USSR having long since collapsed and the communist Eastern block of Europe thoroughly dismantled, the North has increasingly turned to seemingly unlikely countries for their coveted foreign currency. Both recent and longstanding investigations have uncovered dealings with, and in many countries throughout Africa and the Middle East. North Korea’s trading and production of weapons and illegal drugs is a big earner for them (The Mole, 2020). This, alongside other allegations that the North is using ambassadorial and consular staff all over the world as an income stream (The Mole, 2020), highlights the advanced lengths at which the country is prepared to go to, in order to maintain the status quo and keep the country afloat in the face of international sanctions. If there was a significant pressure applied to these countries, and a concerted, multi-lateral effort was put in place to restrict the North’s financial activities in these regions, significant economic strain could be felt in Pyongyang. This, however, is a difficult task at hand due to the countries that North Korea deals with often
being out of reach of both enforcement of sanctions and the effects of sanctions on the countries themselves.
After unification, exogenous factors will not be the only issues faced by the Korean people. There will be a big distrust amongst South Koreans and North Koreans, alike. The vastly richer South will likely leave many North Koreans as unwilling second-class citizens, unless successful intervention and great strides are made by the government of the South to equalise the gap, through such means as welfare programs. South Korea may be less willing to dive right in on the welfare front, as it already faces one of the largest age-based wealth gaps in the world, with almost 50% of elders under the poverty line (Lee, 2014), the government and the South Korean people are going to have to get used to more government funding going towards the less fortunate. However, success of this process will affect the world, and therefore many countries will be looking to support the Koreans. Supranational organisations such as the UN and the EU will almost undoubtedly offer financial support in order to bridge this gap.
Another thing to consider is the quelling of the migrant flow across the northern border, as this is considered to be one of the fears that the Chinese government harbours towards the thought of a North Korean collapse. Reducing the amount of people crossing the Chinese border may help to alleviate any strained
relations that arise during the initial collapse of the DPRK.
An important case study that should be used for prediction and guidance when deciding on how to begin unification is that of the German reunification. This is helpful as it is one of the rare yet similar cases where one people were divided between two ideologies, two systems and ultimately two nations. Whilst the East still faces many lasting effects, both economic and social, this unification process should be seen as a successful operation and almost a ‘best case’
scenario for the Koreans, unless there is a sudden shift in the political and economic situation in the DPRK. A reason for concern especially is the
economic difference. Still to this day in Germany, there is an economic divide with East Germans earning 16.9% less than West Germans (Stark divide in wages between east and west Germany persists 30 years on, 2019). This will be amplified when unification comes to Korea because after forty years of communism, East Germans earned 13 to 12 of West Germans (Kluge and Weber, 2017), whereas in December of 2020, it was estimated a North Korean earns an astounding 127 of what a South Korean makes (Kim, 2020). This really brings home the economic challenges that will be faced and shows the importance of international co- operation in alleviating these differences when the time comes.
Peace on the Korean Peninsula is not something that can come easy and is one of the most complicated geo-political challenges that the world will face, likely in the next century. Before full unification, there are many that perish on the arduous journey to freedom. The South Korean government along with the international community should partake in discourse that will progress
understanding and allow for positive steps to be made in countries where North Korean migrants are forcefully repatriated against their will into harms way, and where necessary, supranational organisations such as ASEAN, NATO, the EU and the UN should be utilised to apply pressure to other countries and supply economic and political assistance to all countries that have a bearing on the migrant crisis that is currently faced. Actions should be taken to pre-emptively mitigate negative repercussions felt between China and Korea prior to
unification, and plans should be drawn up with key strategic allies as to how to deal diplomatically with the sudden change in the political situation in East Asia. The collapse of the GDR and the reintegration of a whole German state should be carefully studied, and plans should be drawn up to account for the differences between cases, especially considering that Korea is in a more difficult situation, most poignantly when it comes to economically. Whilst it is difficult for direct action to be made that will progress Korea to unity, reopening of such facilities as the joint Kaesong facility along with the reintroduction of Koreans through other exchanges is a good way to begin preparing Koreans on both sides. Great lengths will need to be taken, but with the correct steps, Korea and the world can prepare for the bringing of the left behind Koreans into a free and fairer world.
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