1 Report for

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Daily Report for Tuesday, February 21, 2017

1 Report for

Tuesday,

February 21, 2017 Esfand 3, 1395

* Highlights, Page 2

* News Briefs, Page 3

* Natural disasters and Iran. Page 3

* It has gotten difficult for Islamic Republic. Page 4

* Erdoğan’s strategic mistake. Page 4

* Three members of Ahmadinejad cabinet step in for presidential elections. Page 5

* Evolution of Iran-Russia Axis in Trump Era. Page 9

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2 Highlights

 The reformist newspaper Hamdeli writes that officials and factions are too busy criticizing each other, instead of effectively and efficiently managing natural disasters. (See Page 3)

 The former president Ahmadinejad may have been banned from running for the election, but members of his cabinet are stepping in for the competition.

(See Page 5)

 Analyst writes that in view of Iran’s rising power in the Middle East, the exercise of convergence between Iran and Russia and going beyond small-scale

cooperation toward large-scale strategic collaboration can be considered as an achievement for Iran and Russia during the four-year term of Trump.

(See Page 9)

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3 Briefs

* Farsi-language conservative Fars News Agency and Mashregh News website have said that Rouhani government has allowed import of 6,344 tons of soft drinks in the 10 months since the start of current Iranian year [started March 20, 2016]

“during the first year of JCPOA”.

They write that the soft drinks were imported from Turkey (62%), Netherlands (19%), Republic of Korea (7%), Germany, Austria, Armenia, Poland, UAE and Denmark.

* Farsi-language hardline conservative newspaper Javan refers to formation of anti-Iran regional coalition and notes that Rouhani government had claimed that JCPOA would mitigate threats against Iran. But, it writes, it is the government’s actions that have facilitated formation of regional anti- Iran coalition. Javan is seen as a mouthpiece for IRGC.

* Farsi-language Fars News Agency writes that conservative member of Tehran City Council Masoumeh Abad took a potshot at the government over severe air pollution in Khuzestan Province situation, by saying that how many ministers should resign for failing to resolve the situation. Please recall that reformist city councilors had called for Tehran Mayor Ghalibaf’s resignation over Plasco Building incident.

* Farsi-language Fars News Agency writes that police have confiscated smuggled goods estimated at 100 billion tomans in Bushehr Province and arrested four smugglers.

* Farsi-language Aftab News website writes that there will be severe air pollution in Tehran, Qazvin, Isfahan, Karaj, Tabriz and Mashhad until end of current week.

Natural disasters and Iran

Newspaper blames all factions for failing to come up with effective plans to deal with natural disasters.

Farsi-language reformist newspaper Hamdeli asks why Iran is so much more devastated by natural disasters as compared to other countries. It writes that Iran is among top 10 countries with the most natural disasters. It goes on to write that of the 47 natural disasters that can occur across the world, such as earthquake, flood, and ..., 35 of them can occur in Iran! Therefore, it would be logical to make necessary preparations to mitigate the damages and loss of lives.

Under such circumstances, what are policies and preparedness of the Iranian officials and managers? How up to safety and other standards are the buildings, especially newly-built and those are being built?

Are any studies carried out about the location’s vulnerability before new buildings are constructed? Are students being taught about natural disasters and what to do during the disasters? What percentage of budget is allocated to natural disasters? The answers to these questions clearly show that the people and the officials do not give much importance to such matters, that they consider natural disasters as an exceptional occurrences that happen to other people!

The reaction by the press and society to natural disasters is stereotypical and based on political considerations.

After each incident, specific organizations are criticized without keeping in mind that other organizations also have duties in regard to that incident. Also criticisms are politically motivated, criticism an official if he is from other faction, or defending or carefully avoiding blame if that official is one’s own faction. It is possible that there may be superficial and ineffectual changes after an incident, unfortunately something which is true for all factions.

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4 It has gotten difficult for Islamic Republic

Concerted regional and international coalitions seem to be forming against Iran, which bodes ill for Iran.

Farsi-language hardline conservative newspaper Kayhan writes that America has told the governments of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel that it would any anti- Iran project and measure. It goes on to write: Initially we had thought that regional actions against Iran would be more effective than any international action against Iran. Based on this, if a unified regional front is formed against Iran, things would get tougher for Islamic Republic.

Kayhan goes on to write that if an international action against Iran reaches the region, then Iran’s friendly relations with regional countries would somewhat neutralize the effects of international anti- Iran action. However, if a regional anti- Iran action takes shape in conjunction with an anti-Iran action by Western countries such as America and Britain, then the Islamic Iran would find it more difficult and tougher to deal with it.

Kayhan writes that things would get really difficult if such a coalition takes shape and continues to hold, showing that coalition members have accepted the risks associated with forming an anti-Iran coalition.

However, good relations between Kuwait and Oman with Iran show that Saudi

Arabia is unable to keep these small countries within its coalition, and Erdogan’s pendulum relations with Saudi Arabia also shows that the hegemonic thinking of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could not convince [Oman and Kuwait] to remain the [anti-Iran] coalition.

Erdoğan’s strategic mistake

Erdoğan is making a strategic mistake in joining American and Israeli coalition against Iran, as it will be resisted by regional people.

Farsi-language reformist newspaper Etemad writes that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is about to commit a strategic mistake in the Middle Eastern region, which is joining the coalition that is being formed by America and Israel.

This is a project that sees Israel and Saudi Arabia form a coalition against the Islamic Republic and they are encouraging all Arab states to join this coalition.

It seems that Turkey has forgotten all of the conflicts between Arabs and Israel and [would help] direct the issue of the occupied territories [Israel] to the detriment of the Palestinians and in favor of the Israelis. There are talks more steps that would be in Israel’s favor, such as adding Sinai Desert to Gaza and forming a Palestinian state in that area, and giving West Bank to Jordan and ....

But surely, it writes, these plans would be resisted by the people in the region and it would be the governments [which support these projects] who would be harmed.

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5 Three members of Ahmadinejad cabinet

step in for presidential elections

 While among the Reformist camp and political moderates there is a strong consensus over endorsing Hassan Rouhani for a second term, it is still not clear whom the Principlist camp will groom as their candidate for the post, though this might be a tactic to curb attacks for the moment from the opposite camp against their ultimate candidate.

 However, three members of his administration announced their intention to run for the presidential election slated for early May 2017, on Saturday and Monday: Hamid- Reza Baghaei, Hamid-Reza Haji-Babaei, and Rostam Ghassemi, all of which served in Ahmadinejads second administration.

 Yekta is a political group formed by a number of key members of Ahmadinejads first and second administration who, unlike Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, enjoy strong ties with the Principlist camp.

 During the late 1990s, when the line-up of Iran’s politics was Reformists vs. moderates and Principlists, Haji-Babaei was a member of Moderate and Development Party whose other members included incumbent president Hassan Rouhani, speaker of the government Mohammad-Bagher Nobakht, and other figures who are now part of Rouhani’s administration.

 Reformist media attributed the decision to Ghasemi’s direct role in obstructing the much-touted Iran Petroleum Contracts, a new lucrative scheme set up by Rouhani administration to encourage international companies bring cash and technology to Iran’s energy industry.

As Iran’s presidential Election Day approaches, the list of aspirants to the presidential office in Pasteur Street, central Tehran, gets longer.

While among the Reformist camp and political moderates there is a strong consensus over endorsing Hassan Rouhani for a second term, it is still not clear whom the Principlist camp will groom as their candidate for the post, though this might be a tactic to curb attacks for the moment from the opposite camp against their ultimate candidate.

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Speculations have been made in the recent months and names are circulating in the media, yet it was only on Saturday that a handful of figures declared their intention to run for the post.

Asked in mid-September 2016 by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei not to run for another presidential election, former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad released a letter ten days ago, announcing, with an undertone of resentment, that he would not support any individual or political group for the upcoming poll. “This is my definite, unalterable stance” he said in his letter. “It may be that some individuals or parties spread rumors about my support for a certain figure in order to serve their collective interests, but hereby I explicitly announce that such news are false and strongly denied, even if stated by my kith and kin.”

However, three members of his administration announced their intention to run for the presidential election slated for early May 2017, on Saturday and Monday: Hamid- Reza Baghaei, Hamid-Reza Haji-Babaei, and Rostam Ghassemi, all of which served in Ahmadinejad’s second administration.

Baghaei, who announced his candidacy on Saturday in his personal Telegram™

channel as an ‘independent’ candidate, was a member of Ahmadinejad’s inner circle, including the enigmatic, controversial Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who came under strongest attacks not by the Reformists, but Principlists doubtful about their political plans and good will.

In Ahmadinejad’s second term as president, Baghaei initially served as head of the Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts and Tourism Organization of Iran. Two years later, in 2011, was appointed as Ahmadinejad’s deputy in executive affairs. He also held the portfolio of secretary of the Supreme Council of Iran’s Free Trade, Industrial, and Special Economic Zones. In all his positions, he came under close scrutiny of Reformists and Principlists, for his dubious managerial conduct in both economic and political dimensions. In summer of 2016, he was detained by the judiciary and spent 7 months in prison. His charges were never announced clearly, though speculations addressed financial corruption.

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The two other nominees, Hamid-Reza Haji-Babaei and Rostam Ghasemi, did not personally announce their decision, but were introduced by the Yekta Front as their favorite candidates. Yekta is a political group formed by a number of key members of Ahmadinejad’s first and second administration who, unlike Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, enjoy strong ties with the Principlist camp.

Haji-Babaei, a veteran MP and currently a representative from Hamedan constituency, served as Minister of Education in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second cabinet, setting a record for gaining the highest number of confidence votes for the portfolio. He is also a founding member of the Popular Front of Revolutionary Forces (PFRF), another recently-established group of Principlist figures who aim to forge consensus inside the camp to push Rouhani out of the Pasteur Office in 2017 elections.

This is not the first time Haji-Babaei warms up for the presidential election. He had similar goals in 2013, though had a change of mind later, in his own words due to the high number of Principlist candidates. However, in a recent gathering launched to lay out the goals and strategies of the group, Haji-Babaei asserted that the core strategy of PFRF was to secure 51 percent of votes in the upcoming presidential election. During the late 1990s, when the line-up of Iran’s politics was Reformists vs. moderates and Principlists, Haji-Babaei was a member of Moderate and Development Party whose other members included incumbent president Hassan Rouhani, speaker of the government Mohammad-Bagher Nobakht, and other figures who are now part of Rouhani’s administration. However, he resigned from the party after less than four years sensing its rapprochement with the Reformist camp.

The third candidate, Former IRGC commander Rostam Ghasemi served as Minister of Petroleum in Ahmadinejad’s cabinet during the last two years of his second administration. In his ministerial term, Ghasemi had to take helm of Iran’s critical oil industry in its toughest years, with stringent US-led sanctions imposed on the industry, limiting Iran’s exports to one million barrels a day and depriving the country of its lifeline of revenue and forex reserve. Prior to his position as minister of oil, Ghasemi was serving as head of Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the economic arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and one of the country’s largest contractors active in a diverse range of business lines, including development of massive oil & gas fields in the Persian Gulf.

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A few months after Rouhani administration began its term, Ghasemi was appointed by Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri as advisor in Iraqi affairs, assigned with handling economic affairs with Baghdad. He was dismissed by Jahangiri in February 2016, however. Reformist media attributed the decision to Ghasemi’s direct role in obstructing the much-touted Iran Petroleum Contracts, a new lucrative scheme set up by Rouhani administration to encourage international companies bring cash and technology to Iran’s energy industry. The contracts came under severe attack by Principlists for their supposed undermining Iran’s ‘economic independence’, handling rich energy resources to international companies with dubious intentions, and marginalizing domestic companies, whom in absence of foreign rivals, had taken control of exploration and production projects.

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9 Evolution of Iran-Russia Axis in Trump Era

 Following recent cooperation between Iran and Russia in Syria and the brilliant outcomes that their cooperation had in restricting the reach of extremist elements of Daesh in the region, many experts have come to the conclusion that Russias active military presence in a country different from member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States is indicative of a change in Moscows foreign policy and Middle Eastern policy.

 In the latest policy document released by Russia, for the first time after the fall of the former Soviet Union, Iran has been named as a country, which enjoys enough

potential for all-out expansion of relations.

 It seems that at the present time, Iran and Russia are in conditions when they can learn a lesson from the useful experience of cooperation in Syria and extend that cooperation to various other fields.

 The United States, under the rule of Trump, is apt to help conditions governing Irans relations with Russia fare in such a way that the axis made up by the two countries will continue to work in the Middle East even after the crisis in Syria is over.

 In view of Irans rising power in the Middle East, the exercise of convergence between Iran and Russia and going beyond small-scale cooperation toward large-scale strategic collaboration can be considered as an achievement for Iran and Russia during the four-year term of Trump.

Iran Review news website. Analyst Hossein Kebriaeizadeh: Following recent cooperation between Iran and Russia in Syria and the brilliant outcomes that their cooperation had in restricting the reach of extremist elements of Daesh in the region, many experts have come to the conclusion that Russia’s active military presence in a country different from member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States is indicative of a change in Moscow’s foreign policy and Middle Eastern policy.

Of course, early signs of this development were on the horizon since a long time ago, but its footprint can be seen in those doctrines that form the basis of Russia’s foreign and military policies. Certain points can be derived after a review of Russia’s declared policies in 1993, 2000, 2010, 2014, and 2016, including through attention to the focus put by Russia’s political and security apparatuses on the Middle East and West Asia regions. The first point is the time interval between release of these documents, which

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has been reduced from ten years to two years and may even decrease to one year in the future. The second issue is the contents of these documents, most of which indirectly owned up to the power and influence of the United States in the Middle East and West Asia. Of course, at the present time, and most probably in future documents, this influence and power will be subject to serious controversy.

However, the issue, which is of high importance, is Iran’s position in Russia’s foreign and security policies in the Middle East. In the latest policy document released by Russia, for the first time after the fall of the former Soviet Union, Iran has been named as a country, which enjoys enough potential for all-out expansion of relations. This comes while throughout the history of turbulent relations between these two neighbors, sometimes the level of pessimism and lack of trust between the two countries has been high enough to prevent expansion of relations between them despite existence of mutual need to those relations. The same psychological and historical obstacles had prevented relations between Iran and Russia from being complete and strategic in nature even in the most crucial junctures of their history.

When it comes to regional issues, relations between these two players have been successful and effective any time they have cooperated in certain areas.

In view of the above facts, it may be too ambitious to talk about evolution of an Iran- Russia axis in the Middle East following the recent instance of military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in Syria. However, it can be also hope-inspiring in that relations between Iran and Russia have not followed the same formula even under similar conditions.

It seems that at the present time, Iran and Russia are in conditions when they can learn a lesson from the useful experience of cooperation in Syria and extend that cooperation to various other fields.

Before this, Iranians always accused Moscow that it was exploiting Tehran’s special conditions and the country’s relative isolation in the region. Therefore, they argued that in comparison with the West, Russians are les trustworthy. However, the experience of cooperation with Moscow in Syria taught Tehran that it must somehow tone down its ideological approach to this issue and instead rely more on the geopolitical logic. This decision will help the Iranian side’s expectations from the Russian side be managed more properly. At the same time, following what happened in Syria, this viewpoint has been strengthened that Russia is a big actor with interests and concerns far bigger than Iran. Therefore, some breaches of promise throughout

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history of the two countries’ relations have not been out of Russia’s ill will, but have been the result of conflict in the extensive interests, which would have spurred any other actor in a similar direction.

Another experience, which caused Tehran’s attitude toward its northern neighbor to become more realistic, was the case of Iran’s nuclear program, the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 group of countries, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and what happened after conclusion and implementation of that agreement.

One year after the implementation of the JCPOA started and despite their commitment to the JCPOA, Iranians believe that they have not achieved the goals of the agreement.

Now, following political changes in the United States, it seems that conditions for the continuation of the JCPOA have become worse and in an unexpected turn of events, the result of efforts made by former US president, Barack Obama, has been handed down to a Republican team topped by an unpredictable president. New US President Donald Trump has likened Iran’s nuclear deal, which has been also taken up by the United Nations Security Council, as a scrap paper and has called for basic revision in the agreement. Therefore, despite what the agreement had predicted about removal of sanctions against Iran, now Trump is even talking about imposing tougher sanctions on the Islamic Republic. All these issues have energized political interactions between these two political actors, namely, Iran and Russia, now that a catalyst factor like Trump has been also added to the equation. The experience of relations between the two countries shows that any time the two actors are faced with problems caused by a common enemy called the United States, those factors, which lead to their convergence, become activated with more force and as a result of distressful conditions faced by them.

The United States, under the rule of Trump, is apt to help conditions governing Iran’s relations with Russia fare in such a way that the axis made up by the two countries will continue to work in the Middle East even after the crisis in Syria is over.

In view of Iran’s rising power in the Middle East, the exercise of convergence between Iran and Russia and going beyond small-scale cooperation toward large-scale strategic collaboration can be considered as an achievement for Iran and Russia during the four-year term of Trump. With a little more optimism, one can even expect Tehran and Moscow to choose cooperation resulting from informed choices over relations based on distress.