Tightening Environmental Standards and Innovation Off s e t s
환경규제의강화와기술혁신을통한 차감효과
Jaemin Park Research Fellow, STEPI*
Ph.D., The Ohio State University
I . I nt r o d uction
I I . W h a t is the Porter Hy p o t he sis ?
I I I . T h e Market Size, M o d ern i z a tion, and the Big Pu s h I V . Ag g r e g ate Market Sp i l lovers and Pr of it a b le
I n ve st ment Decision V . C o nclu sion
목 차
C o nten t s
Science and Technology Policy Institute(STEPI), 26 F. Specialty Construction Center, 395-70 Shindaebang-Dong, Seoul 156-010, Korea
I
.I n t r o d u c t i o n
When assessing environmental or other regulatory programs, economists and other policy analysts have traditionally used the approach that consists of comparing the beneficial effects of regulation with the costs that must be borne to secure these benefits. The vast majority of economic analysis of regulation are based upon the assumption that regulations increase pro- duction costs. Porter(1991, 1995) has dis- puted this seemingly straightforward con- tention. The Porter hypothesis claims that tough environmental regulation in the form of economic incentives can trigger innova- tion that may eventually increase a firm’s competitiveness and may outweigh the short-run private costs of this regulation.
He emphasizes that a number of industrial sectors subject to the most stringent domestic environmental regulations have improved their international trade perfor- mance, among them chemicals, plastics, synthetics, fabrics and paints.
In his view, economists have failed to appreciate the capacity of stringent envi- ronmental regulations to induce innovation.
This view has been warmly received by reg- ulators and by policymakers. However, at the same time, the hypothesis has been criticized by economists on the ground that if profit-increasing opportunities exist, firms do not need an extra incentive to adopt
them(For a more detailed explication of e c o n o m i s t s’skepticism, see Oates et al.
1993, Palmer and Simpson 1993, Jaffe et al. 1995, Palmer et al. 1995.).
In a recent paper, Palmer et al.(1995) cautiously agree with Porter on a number of matters. For example, early estimates of regulatory compliance costs are likely to be biased upward because of unforeseen tech- nological advances in pollution control or prevention and that regulations have some- times led to the discovery of cost-saving or quality-improving innovation. However, on this second point they do not find a general observation in favor of Porter. They formal- ize the basic point that addition of con- straints on a firm’s set of choices cannot be expected to result in an increased level of profits. Nevertheless, two potential ele- ments, which could give rise to innovation offsets following the imposition of tighter standards, are identified. One possibility is strategic behavior involving interactions between polluting firms or between these firms and the regulator. The second possi- bility is the existence of opportunities for profitable innovation in the production of the firms output that for some reason have been overlooked and that would be realized in the wake of new and tougher environ- mental regulations. This argument turns out to be a bit more complicated than it appears because finding empirical ways to detect the presence and magnitude of such
opportunities is as hard as detecting the capacity of tough environmental regulations to induce their innovative realization.
In this paper, I do not rely on the Palmer perspective. I think private competition is enough to bring them the efficiency edge. I doubt a little that firms are pervasively perched off from their efficiency frontiers. In addition, the model does not allow for any sort of strategic interaction. Given these assumptions, I search the elements missing from Palmer’s model that could explain the mechanism, which potentially creates initial innovation offsets and cumulative economic growth.
I I . What is the Porter Hypothesis?
There have been some recent suggestions in the literature that regulations may actu- ally stimulate growth and competitiveness.
This argument-articulated mostly by P o r t e r1 ) - has generated a great deal of interest and enthusiasm among some influ- ential policy makers.
Indeed, Porter accuses mainstream envi- ronmental economics, with its static mind-
set. He argues that the conflict between environmental protection and economic competitiveness is a false dichotomy stemmed from a narrow view of the sources of prosperity and a static view of competi- tion. He is eager to point out static models failed because they did not appreciate the power of innovations.
Palmer et al.(1995) challenged the Porters argument2 )for being based on sev- eral presumptions-among others, [1] a pri- vate sector systematically overlooks prof- itable opportunities for innovation and [2]
properly designed environmental regula- tions provide the incentives that private competition fails to provide. Citing Rutledge and Vogan(1994) and USDC(1993), they concluded that such offsets pale in compari- son to expenditures for pollution abatement and control. However, innovation effects in response to more stringent environmental regulations are not easily observed, and hence might not find their way into the estimation. Moreover, detecting the poten- tial capacity of tough regulations to induce innovation is much more complicated than estimating realized cost offsets.
1) The idea goes back, at least, to Ashford, Ayers, and Stone(1985). For a recent explication, see van der Linde(1993) and Porter and van der Linde(1995).
2) There are several levels on which the so-called Porter hypothesis may be interpreted. First, some sectors, e.g., environmental services, will benefit at the expense of other regulated firms. Second, environmental regulation can provide some firms with so-called early mover advantages. The notion also renders a stronger interpretation that the imposition of regulations impels firms to reconsider their production processes, and hence to discover innovative approaches to reduce pollution and decrease costs or increase output. In this study, I take the hypoth- esis implying the third interpretation.
At the same time, empirical studies(e.g., Kalt 1988; Tobey 1990; Jaffe et al. 1995;
Ulph 1996) do not find a significant adverse effect of more stringent environ- mental policies. Possible explanations men- tioned are that the compliance costs are only a small fraction of total costs of pro- duction, that stringency differentials are small, and that investments follow the cur- rent state-of- t he-art technology even if this is not required by the environmental regulation in that country.
H o w e v e r, what really distinguishes the Porter perspective from Palmer is that Porter concerns innovation in response to environmental regulation reducing the cost of compliance with pollution control and simultaneously improving the affected prod- uct. Innovation in the response to environ- mental regulation can take two broader forms. The first sort of innovation reduces the cost of compliance with pollution con- trol, but changes nothing on the related products or processes. The second form of innovation occurs when environmental reg- ulation not only leads to reduced pollution, but also improves the affected product or related processes. This second sort of inno- vation is central to the claim that stricter
environmental regulation can generate innovation offsets, which exceed the costs of compliance.
In this paper, I take the Porter hypothe- sis to be the proposition that more stringent regulations of the right kind can lead to economy-wide gain from innovation. More e x p l i c a t i v e l y, the Porter hypothesis is taken to imply that the competitiveness advan- tage of an economy as a whole can be enhanced by the right kind of regulation, which promotes the adoption of better and cleaner production technologies and coordi- nates individual compliances in the way maximizing aggregate benefit from the investment.
I I I . The Market Size, Modernization, and the Big Push
The lack of convergence of per capita income level across countries has attracted the attention of many economists over the years. Facing lack of growth of underdevel- oped countries, Rosenstein-Rodan devel- oped a theory of circular relationships as its explanation for the stagnation in his famous article on Eastern Europe published in 19433 ). The doctrine of “big push”
3) Nurske (1953) attributed the origin of the balanced growth to John Stuart Mill’s (1877) reformulation of Say’s Law: “Every increase of production, if distributed without miscalculation among all kinds of produce in the pro- portion which private interest would dictate, creates, or rather constitutes, its own demand.”
explains the tendency of an economy to set- tle into the state of poverty and at the same time identifies the possible forces that may help to lift the economy out of the state toward a rapid economic progress.
According to this theory, in a lower stage of economic development, the inducement to apply modern efficient methods of large- scale production is limited by the small size of the market or small purchasing power of the people. This is in turn due to low pro- d u c t i v i t y. The low productivity, however, is a result of insufficient application of modern technologies, which in its turn caused by the small market size. Any individual entrepreneur in any particular industry cannot break away from this circularity.
This is because the output of a single i n d u s t r y, produced by the new technology, cannot create its own demand because the marginal propensity of consume on its own products is less than one. This explanation also provides a key explaining a way out of this circularity. Note that the difficulty of breaking away relates only to individual incentives. Since the increased efficiency in one industry would generate the demand for the products of other industries, the dif- ficulty would vanish with more or less syn- chronized application of modern technolo- gies in a wide range of industries.
Following Rosenstein-Rodan’s pioneering works, many economists devoted their intellectual sparrings over the idea, and it consequently leads to many interpretations.
Some economists read the “big push”as a story about interactions between the multi- pliers and accelerator. Others interprets it as an argument for balanced growth(e.g., Nurske 1953; Flemming 1955). Still many see it as a solution for low-equilibrium trap emerged from the interaction of income, savings, and population growth(e.g., Myrdal 1957; Kaldor 1970).4 ) H o w e v e r, Rosenstein-Rodan seems to have seen the
“big push”as a way of dealing with the lack of effective demand. If it is the case, the idea of the “big push”renders a passage from the problem that a private competition cannot provide enough incentive to adopt modern processes-even if cost-saving and q u a l i ty-improving technologies are avail- able in the market-because a firm alone cannot break even internally.
There is another dispute along with the doctrine. It may be correct in pointing out the significance of synchronized adoption of modern technologies across industries for initiating and sustaining development pro- cesses. But the implication of the synchro- nization is not precisely defined. This is because the idea does not need to answer
4) Such Mechanism can justify a “big push,”but at the same time validates other development theories such as the cumulative causation model of Myrdal(1957) and Kaldor(1970).
the critical question of whether it is achieved by deliberate organization or coor- dination of individual activities or can be achieved spontaneously by self-motivated entrepreneurs. Whether the government should intervene depends on the extent of internal innovation effects. If an individual firm can break even adopting innovation t e c h n o l o g y, the economy may be able to take off and self-reinforce economic progress in the absence of any coordination or government planning. A program that encourages or a regulation that forces investments on new technology becomes necessary when the individual firm is caught in the trap-even if a great deal of economies of scale is expected near future - because lack of profitability in investment.
I V . Aggregate Market Spillovers and Profitable Investment D e c i s i o n
In the discussion following the appear- ance of the Porter hypothesis a number of attempts have been made to identify the mechanisms that can lead to a mitigation of the cost effect of environmental policy or can even lead to a win-win situation. The dominant argument is that firms are not aware of certain opportunities, and the
external shock through environmental regu- lation may move the firm toward its pro- duction possibility frontier. However, I doubt general applicability of this so- called X- efficiency argument5 ). I consider that private competition is enough to bring them to their efficiency frontier and that innova- tion can be delayed by market competition rather than intrafirm inefficiencies or orga- nizational inertia. I believe that private competition apparently fails to provide incentives for cost- saving and quality- improving innovations. Rather, private competition prevents the innovations. I also disagree with Oates et al.(1993), Palmer and Simpson(1993), Palmer et al.(1995), and Simpson and Bradford(1996) on their rejection of the Porter perspective. Their conjecture of which regulation creates inter- nal efficiency gain from individual innova- tion enough to create innovation offsets is very far from the spirit of the Porter per- spective.
The main goal of this section is to explores Porter’s idea that stringent regu- lations might encourage firms to seek out technological innovation as a means of com- pliance. I analyze this idea in the context of the “big push,”introduced by Rosenstein- Rodan(1943) and discussed by many oth- ers, that policy-induced simultaneous mod-
5) For more detailed discussion on this issue, see Frantz 1989, Gabel and Sinclair - Desgagn 1997, Xepapadeas and Zeeuw 1999.
ernization of many firms of the economy can be profitable for them all even when no individual firm can break even adopting innovating technology alone. In doing so, I draw closely on the analytical framework of Shleifer and Vishny(1988) and Murphy et al.(1989), but that recast it as a problem of pecuniary external economies and strategic c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y6 ). While these studies cap- ture key elements of Resenstein-Rodan’s original theory, they put less emphasis on the importance of necessary coordination.
Reinstating the importance of coordination or government planning poses a significant role in identifying a mechanism proving the Porter perspective valid.
As mentioned earlier, this model abstracts from any sorts of strategic inter- action. Rather, the polluting firm in the model takes competitors outputs and demand curve as given and also takes any regulations as exogenously determined. A hypothetical economy is closed to trade. I define modern technology as a mean of compliance on outcome oriented measures, which induces cost-saving and quality - improving innovations. It is assumed that the technology is readily available.
Consider a one-period economy with a representative consumer, who has Cobb - Douglas preferences ∫lnz(i)d i defined over
a unit interval of goods indexed by i. All goods have the same expenditure shares.
Each good is produced in its own sector, and two production processes are available for a sector: a traditional method or a mod- ern method. I choose units so that the pro- ductivity of labor in the traditional process is unity in each of the goods. In the modern process, unit labor requirements are decreasing in the scale of production.
H o w e v e r, to move from traditional to mod- ern process, a firm must spend the input of certain units of labor to undertake R&D investment for installing and implementing new technology but also pay a skills or competence premium, v:
(1) w= 1 +v> 1
where w is the competence wage in mod- ern process.
The investment allows each additional unit of labor to produce α> 1 units of out- put. The consumer is endowed with L u n i t s of labor, which he supplies inelastically, and he owns all the profits of this economy. His budget constraint is given by
( 2 )y= Π+ ( 1 +v)L
where Π is aggregate profits.
1 0
6) It is defined as “complementarity of different industries provides the most important set of arguments in favor of a large scale planned industrialization(Rosenstein - Rodan. 1943. p205).”
A producer in each sector decides whether to modernize or to abstain from production altogether. He invests only if he can earn a profit at the price he charges, which equals one since he loses all his sales to the competitive fringe if he charges more.
Demand curves are unit elastic, and so we can calculate demands based on the aggre- gate income. When income is y, the profit of a producer who spendsF to modernize is
(3) π=y
(
1- 1 +v)
- F(1+v) =a y-wF αwhere a is the difference between the price he gets and marginal cost, i.e., markup.
When a fraction n of the sectors in the economy modernize, aggregate profits are
(4) Π(n) =n(a y-wF )
Substituting (4) into (2) yields aggregate income as a function of the fraction of sec- tors modernizing, n:
(5) y(n)= w( L -nF ) 1 -n a
The numerator of (5) is the value of labor used in the economy for actual pro- duction of output, after investment outlays.
The denominator is the average of marginal labor costs across sectors, which is clearly a
decreasing function of n, and therefore indi- cates that an increase in modern sectors raises income. To see this more explicitly, note that
(6) d y(n)
= L-nF d w 1 -n a
That is, as long as marginal cost advan- tage of modern technology is sufficiently larger than fixed costs, an increase in effec- tive wage raises income by more than one for one and consequently the size of other f i r m s’market. In addition, the more firms invest, the greater is the cumulative increase in profits and therefore income resulting from a positive net present value investment by the last firm
(7) d y(n)
= π(n) d n 1 -n a
where π(n) is the profits of the last firm to invest.
When the last sector earns this profits, it distributes it to shareholders, who in turn spend it on all goods and thus raise profits in all industrial sectors in the economy.
Such positive spillover on the demand of other sectors is increasing in the number of firms that participate on the adoption of modern process and in the magnitude of the wage premium, which an individual firm can afford if and only if its own profits are
positive. This means that the profitability of investment depends on there being enough other sectors to adopt new process in a way complying with environmental regulations so that high external economy justifies putting down a coordinated project.
Let us assume that each firm is now con- fronted with stricter regulations. Strict reg- ulation can push firms over the brink into b a n k r u p t c y. At the same time, if it is the right kind of regulations(Porter, 1991), it would encourage the adoption of the mod- ern technology. Equation (6) and (7) depict the pecuniary gains to the polluting firm from undertaking the modern process, which can be divided into two parts. The first gain to the polluting firm is pure demand spillovers. If various sectors of the economy adopt cost-saving and quality - improving technologies simultaneously, they could create income that becomes a source of demand for goods in other sectors, and so enlarge their market and make the move profitable. The second part is the linkage effects that the contribution of innovation of one firm enlarges the size of the market in other firms through backward and forward linkages between related firms. Both effects are pecuniary in the sense that they lower the cost of adopting new process and work through the market rather than productivi- ty change(Scitovsky, 1954; Fleming, 1955).
It is the interaction between individual investment on better and cleaner produc-
tion technologies and pecuniary external economies that gives rise to innovation which cannot be achieved by individual efforts. In fact, simultaneous investment of many sectors can be self-sustaining even if no sector could break even modernizing alone. No exogenous improvement in endowments or technological opportunities is needed to move to modernization, only the simultaneous compliance in the form of investment by sufficiently many firms using the available clean technology, which is cost -saving as well as quality-improving.
V. Conclusion
This paper explores Porter’s idea, that stringent regulations might encourage firms to seek out technological innovation as a means of compliance, in the context of the
“big push.”In this paper, I conclude that stricter environmental regulation can gen- erate innovation effects by inducing simul- taneous modernization(i.e., investment on cost-saving and quality improving produc- tion technologies in compliance with new and tougher environmental regulations) of many firms of the economy, which is prof- itable for them all even when no individual firm can break even adopting innovating technology alone. Yet the logic of the “b i g p u s h”does not render a full validation of the hypothesis, it provides the elements which could give rise to innovation offsets
following the imposition of tighter environ- ment standards but missing from other models(e.g, Oates et al. 1993, Palmer et al.
1995), in which increasing the stringency of incentive - based environmental regulations must result in reduced profits for the firm because significance of the market interac- tion and demand spillovers between indus- tries was ignored.
The analysis of this paper has estab- lished some, though by no means all, condi- tions under which stricter environmental regulations can induce the innovation off- sets that arise from new technologies and approaches to production. The principal idea is that the innovation offsets are more likely to occur in economies in which coordi- nated innovative efforts across firms and industries are achieved. This means that the adoption of better and cleaner produc- tion technologies in compliance with regula- tions must be individually unprofitable at a low aggregate level of investment but prof- itable as long as a sufficient number of other firms or sectors share the innovation efforts. Innovative efforts, which improve the affected production processes but not enough to cover the cost of compliance, can create spillover effects which are large enough to offset the total compliance costs.
In other words, even individually unprof- itable investments on clean technologies must have spillover effects on other firms that make innovation in other firms more
profitable. Such spillovers give rise to possi- bility that coordination of investments across sectors, which the government can promote by environmental or other kinds of regulations, is essential for cost-saving and quality-improving modernization.
This study also have some implications for the role of government in designing environmental regulation. First, a program that encourages investments on new tech- nologies and approaches, such as a subsidy on adopting less polluting and more produc- tive production process, to production can substantially boost the innovation offsets even when individual investment appears unprofitable. This study also suggests that a regulation which implements a localized compliance with a relatively short grace period can induce lower innovation effects in terms of per unit compliance costs than a program foster potentially large demand spillovers across firms or sectors. In addi- tion, a program should pose for long enough duration to initiate R&D efforts not only on abatement technology but also on new cost- saving and pollution-reducing production processes. Evaluated by these principles, it is clear that current environmental regula- tions of Korea have often been crafted in a way that deters innovative solution, or even renders them unviable.
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대부분의 경제학자들은 환경규제가 강화되면 생산비용이 증가하고 경제는 위축된다고 한다. 포터 (Michael Porter)는이것을지나치게정태적인분석의결과로 보았다. 포터는적절한형태의환경규제가 기술혁신과생산성향상을유도하고, 이것은동태적인관점에서환경규제의경제적비용을상쇄하는비용 감소효과, 즉차감효과를나타낸다고주장하였다.
이 글에서는 이같은 포터가설(Porter Hypothesis)을 로젠쉬타인-로단(Paul Rosenstein-Rodan)의 빅-푸쉬(Big Push)이론을바탕으로 분석하였다. 이 글에서는 기업의 수익성 모형을 바탕으로 했던 기존 연구에 반하여 포터가 주장했던 차감효과는 개별 생산자의 내부효과이기보다는 경제 주체간의 상호관계 에의해발생되는외생적상승효과에따른것으로보았다.
요약하면, 한 생산자가 환경규제의 강화에 따른 생산비용의 증가를상쇄하기 위해 혁신적인기술을 도 입할 때, 비록 이 생산자의 독립된 투자가 비용을 상쇄하는 충분한 생산성 효과를 나타내지 못하더라도, 여러생산자의동시적기술투자, 특히환경규제와같은정책적요인에의해유발된동시투자와이를통한 일출효과(spillover effects)는규제 강화로 인한비용상승을 상쇄하는 소득 및산업연관효과를유인할 수 있다고 보았다. 이러한맥락에서기술투자에 수반되는 비용으로 인해 개별생산자의신기술 도입이 비경 제적일경우투자에따른산업간・기술간일출효과가확대되도록투자를보조하거나조직하는정책이필 요한것으로본다.
초 록
