Regional inequality is high in the Middle East and North Africa
Despite relatively low within-country inequality, the Middle East and North Africa is among the most spatially unequal regions in the world. Although most of its countries are middle income, their spatial inequality is high and rising compared with countries else-where in the world, else-where inequality generally decreases with rising income and urbanization (figure 2.1).1
Spatial variables consistently account for at least half of all the reported variation in eco-nomic opportunities in most Middle East and North Africa countries (World Bank 2011).
Disparities between subnational regions account for a larger share (63 percent or 6 percentage points) of inequality in household
consumption in the Middle East and North Africa than in the rest of the world. Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Yemen show the starkest regional inequalities.
Most of the region’s 444 million people live near coasts, where they are closer to interna-tional markets and where economic activity is concentrated. People and economic activity have naturally concentrated in places that are better endowed: closer to coasts and markets and farther from remote deserts (map 2.1).
These natural endowments—land suitability, resources, or coastal access—mattered to the concentration of people and activity. Natural geography in the Middle East and North Africa explains 42 percent of the variation in economic activity, as measured by nighttime lights (table 2.1). This is higher than in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa but quite a bit lower than in Europe and Asia, suggesting that the FiGURE 2 .1 inequalities within most Middle East and North Africa countries exceed those of global peers
Middle East and North Africa Rest of the world
0 20 40 60 80 100
YEM 2014 YEM 2014
YEM 2005 IRQ 2006
IRQ 2012
IRQ 2006
IRQ 2012
IRN 2014 IRN 2014
EGY 2012 EGY 2012
TUN 2010 TUN 2010
TUN 2005
IRN 2009 DJI 2012 IRN 2009
JOR 2008
JOR 2006
LBN 2011 JOR 2010
JOR 2008 JOR 2010
JOR 2006 LBN 2011
MAR 2006
MAR 2006 MAR 2000 DJI 2012
MAR 2000 YEM 2005TUN 2005
10,000 20,000 30,000
10 20 30
Between-region inequality (%)
0 10 20 30
Between-region inequality (%)
GDP per capita (US$, PPP)
a. By GDP per capita b. By urban share of population
Urban share of the population (%)
Source: Middle East and North Africa Poverty database (MNAPOV), Team for Statistical Development, World Bank.
Note: Each point corresponds to a country’s data for a particular year. (For a list of countries and survey years, see annex 2A.) Inequality between subnational regions was calculated based on a country’s first administrative level (for example, governorates, provinces, and so on). PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) of Columbia University, “Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Administrative Unit Center Points with Population Estimates, Revision 11.” doi:10.7927/H4BC3WMT.
MAP 2.1 Middle East and North Africa populations are concentrated in the areas closest to international markets
Algeria
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Libya Morocco
Oman Syrian Arab
Republic Lebanon
Israel West Bank and Gaza
Jordan Tunisia
Yemen, Rep.
Sudan Belarus
Benin
Bulgaria
Burundi CameroonCentral African Republic
Chad
Congo Croatia Czech Republic
Congo, Dem. Rep.
South Sudan
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia France
Gabon Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guinea–Bissau Guinea
Hungary Ireland
Italy
Kazak
Kenya Lithuania
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Monaco
Niger
Nigeria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda São Tomé and Príncipe
Seychelles Somalia
Spain
Togo
Turkey Turkmenistan
Uganda Ukraine UK
Tanzania
Uzbekistan Serbia
Rabat
Algiers Tunis
Tripoli
Cairo
Baghdad
Sanaa
Djibouti
Tehran Iraq
Bahrain Qatar Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates Kuwait
Riyadh
Abu Dhabi Muscat Damascus
Amman Beirut
Population density per km2 (0–10]
(11–50]
(51–2,000]
(2,001–5,000]
(5,001–25,000]
0 500 1000 km
Abu Dhabi
TABLE 2.1 Economic activity benefits more from natural geography in the Middle East and North Africa than in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America but less so than in other regions
percent
Region Share of economic activity explained by natural geography (%)
East Asia and Pacific 56
Europe and Central Asia 65
Latin America and the Caribbean 33
Middle East and North Africa 42
North America 59
South Asia 58
Sub-Saharan Africa 31
World 53
Source: World Bank calculation based on Henderson et al. 2017.
Note: Lights at night are used as the measure of economic activity because such data are measured consistently worldwide at the same spatial scale.
Henderson et al. (2017) applied a set of 24 physical geography characteristics—including those primarily important for agriculture and those primarily important for trade—in the analytical model.
Source: Middle East and North Africa Poverty database (MNAPOV), Team for Statistical Development, World Bank.
Note: Each point corresponds to a subnational region. Of the economies shown, only the Republic of Yemen is a low-income economy (US$1,025 or less in gross national income [GNI] per capita) according to World Bank classifications. Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza are lower-middle-income economies (US$1,026–US$3,995). Jordan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iraq are upper-middle-income economies (US$3,996–US$12,375). PPP = purchasing power parity.
100 80 60 40 20
0 10 20 30
g. Tunisia, 2010
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
100 80 60 40 20
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
d. Morocco, 2006
0 10 20 30
100 80 60 40 20
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
a. West Bank and Gaza, 2011
0 10 20 30
100 80 60 40 20
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
b. Yemen, Rep., 2014
0 10 20 30
100 80 60 40 20
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
c. Djibouti, 2012
0 10 20 30
100 80 60 40 20
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
f. Egypt, Arab Rep., 2012
0 10 20 30
100 80 60 40 20
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
e. Jordan, 2010
0 10 20 30
100 80 60 40 20
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
i. Iran, Islamic Rep., 2014
0 10 20 30
100 80 60 40 20
h. Iraq, 2012
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to electricity (%)
0 10 20 30
FiGURE 2 .2 Access to electricity has converged except in low-income economies of the Middle East and North Africa, where the poorest regions remain underserved
region defies the global association of coastal proximity with better and cheaper access to global markets (Malik and Awadallah 2013).
Even so, those who could most benefit from concentrated economic activity in the Middle East and North Africa tend not to live in those areas. Within countries, the bot-tom of the welfare distribution is concentrated in particular areas—often lagging areas. For example, almost 85 percent of Egypt’s bot-tom 40 percent lives in rural Upper and Lower Egypt. In Iraq, most of the bottom 40 percent lives outside the capital city region of Baghdad and the relatively prosperous Kurdistan region.
Only 14 percent of Tunisia’s bottom 40 percent live in the largest urban metropolitan area of Grand Tunis; in Morocco, only 6 percent live in its effective economic capital, the Casablanca-Settat region;2 and in the Islamic Republic of Iran, only 4 percent live in Tehran.
Spatial disparities also exist in access to public services and infrastructure
The spatial disparities extend to service cov-erage rates, which are lower in areas with lower consumption expenditures as well as in low-income countries in general (figures 2.2 and 2.3).
This lagging coverage—in electricity, education, road networks, health services, and even ade-quate water and sanitation— potentially exacer-bates inequality of opportunity and creates poverty traps that can have lifetime and inter-generational repercussions. For example, in rural areas of the Middle East and North Africa, an estimated 28 million people lack access to electricity (Krishnan et al. 2016).
In addition, people living in poor regions of the Middle East and North Africa (often rural areas) have limited access to road
networks and therefore lower access to mar-kets, schools, clinics, and other public services. Only 22 percent of the region’s rural population live within 2 kilometers of an all-weather road (World Bank 2010). These areas with limited connections to the centers of economic activity are left out from the world of opportunity and growth, and this could potentially end in political discontent.
In regions with unrealized economic potential, these connectivity constraints also reduce the chance of developing local
100 80 60 40 20
0 10 20 30
g. Tunisia, 2010
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP) 100
80 60 40 20
0 10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP) 100
80 60 40 20
0 10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
10 20 30
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population completing primary school (%)Population completing primary school (%)Population completing primary school (%) Population completing primary school (%)Population completing primary school (%)Population completing primary school (%) Population completing primary school (%)Population completing primary school (%)Population completing primary school (%)
100 80 60 40 20
0 100 80 60 40 20
0 100 80 60 40 20
0
100 80 60 40 20
0 100 80 60 40 20
0 100 80 60 40 20
0
d. Morocco, 2006
a. West Bank and Gaza, 2011 b. Yemen, Rep., 2014 c. Djibouti, 2012
f. Egypt, Arab Rep., 2012 e. Jordan, 2010
i. Iran, Islamic Rep., 2014 h. Iraq, 2012
FiGURE 2 .3 Primary school completion remains lower in the poorest regions of the Middle East and North Africa, except in the islamic Republic of iran
Source: Middle East and North Africa Poverty database (MNAPOV), Team for Statistical Development, World Bank.
Note: Each point corresponds to a subnational region. Of the economies shown, only the Republic of Yemen is a low-income economy (US$1,025 or less in gross national income [GNI] per capita) according to World Bank classifications. Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza are lower-middle-income economies (US$1,026–US$3,995). Jordan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Iraq are upper-middle-income economies (US$3,996–US$12,375). PPP = purchasing power parity.
agglomeration economies. In Egypt, for instance, shipping goods for short distances within the nation’s most lagging region is more expensive than shipping to more-distant urban centers. Shipping general cargo from Aswan to Qena or Fayoum, for instance, can be more expensive than shipping to Cairo or Alexandria, both farther away. In addition, even where transport networks are relatively extensive, their poor quality and limited capacity hinder the impact of economic growth (World Bank 2010).
Even where access to basic services is con-verging, quality remains a major challenge. To be sure, the Middle East and North Africa has made marked progress in building physical infrastructure for service delivery and in expanding basic access to health and education. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and other oil exporters will be able to meet their national infrastructure needs if they maintain investment spending at the rates prevailing in the 2000s, although oil importers—such as Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia—will fall short (figure 2.4).3
However, the region has been unable to ensure quality in the delivery of these services.
There are therefore large spatial disparities and deficiencies in the quality of infrastruc-ture services, with lagging regions suffering particularly from insufficient investment and low quality. And dissatisfaction with the qual-ity of delivery is pervasive across all services.
Overloaded electricity networks, traffic con-gestion, and port overcrowding are just a few examples of overwhelmed infrastructure net-works (Devarajan 2016; World Bank 2019a).
In Iraq, for instance, electricity provision varies greatly. In 2012, although 99 percent of house-holds were connected to the public electricity grid, less than 10 percent of households in Baghdad and the central and southern gover-norates received more than 12 hours of power a day (World Bank 2014a). As for the local or site-specific infrastructure, the quality of water and sanitation services is poor, and localities face gas and other energy shortages (World Bank 2014a). Needs vary across the region.
Access to safe water is an example where large spatial disparities remain despite some convergence in the share of people with access to an improved water source ( figure 2.5). The water and sanitation sector is critical for survival and growth, and the water crisis is one of the greatest threats to the region (WEF 2015). In Middle East and North Africa countries, 61 percent of their populations live in areas with high or very high levels of surface water stress— exceeding the global average of about 35 percent (World Bank 2017a).4 And more than 71 percent of the regional GDP is generated in areas with high or very high levels of surface water stress, more than triple the world average of 22 percent (figure 2.6). Economic losses from inadequate water supply and sanitation in the region’s countries are stark (figure 2.7).
Water quality matters. If not managed prop-erly, improved infrastructure can become an efficient distributor of disease. Systematic con-tamination of improved sources, which includes all protected sources,5 is common because of inadequate maintenance of infra-structure, interrupted supply, and improper dis-infection. But contamination also occurs during transport to and unsafe storage within house-holds (Bain et al. 2014; World Bank 2017d).
Source: Estache et al. 2013.
Note: “Total investment spending” refers to public expenditures. More recent data for the region project similar needs in terms of GDP per capita but slightly lower spending.
a. The oil importing economies include Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza.
b. The non-GCC oil exporting economies include Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Yemen.
c. GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council countries, comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
FiGURE 2 .4 Projected infrastructure needs and financing in the Middle East and North Africa
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Middle East and North Africa
Average share of GDP (%)
Oil importersa Non-GCC
oil exportersb GCCc Gap
Infrastructure needs, average through 2020 Total investment spending, average 2000
Population with access to improved water (%)
c. Djibouti, 2012 100
80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to improved water (%)
f. Egypt, Arab Rep., 2012 100
80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to improved water (%)
b. Yemen, Rep., 2014 100
80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to improved water (%)
e. Jordan, 2010 100
80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to improved water (%)
100 80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
h. Iraq, 2012
Population with access to improved water (%)
a. West Bank and Gaza, 2011 100
80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to improved water (%)
d. Morocco, 2006 100
80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
100 80 60 40 20
0 5 10 15
g. Tunisia, 2010
Average daily consumption per capita (US$ 2011, PPP)
Population with access to improved water (%)
Source: Middle East and North Africa Poverty database (MNAPOV), Team for Statistical Development, World Bank.
Note: Each point corresponds to a subnational region. An “improved” drinking-water source is defined as one that, by nature of its construction or through active intervention, is protected from outside contamination, in particular from contamination with fecal matter (World Bank 2017a). Of the economies shown, only the Republic of Yemen is a low-income economy (US$1,025 or less in gross national income [GNI] per capita) according to World Bank classifications. Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank and Gaza are lower-middle-income economies (US$1,026–US$3,995). Jordan and Iraq are upper-middle-income economies (US$3,996–US$12,375). PPP = purchasing power parity.
FiGURE 2 .5 Access to a safe water source lags behind in the poorest regions of the Middle East and North Africa
36%
61%
World Middle East and North Africa
a. Share of population living in areas with high or very high water stress
22%
71%
b. Share of GDP generated in areas with high or very high water stress
Source: World Bank 2017a.
Note: Water stress arises when water withdrawals for human, agricultural, and industrial uses are relatively high compared with the level of renewable water resources—in other words, when the ratio of water withdrawal to water availability is high. Estimates of surface water stress do not account for withdrawals from groundwater and nonconventional water supplies.
FiGURE 2 .6 Far higher shares of population and economic activity are exposed to high or very high water stress in the Middle East and North Africa than in world averages
Insufficient water provision impedes the growth of lagging regions through two channels: First, it reduces quality of life and directly affects human resources and capacities. People cannot effectively partici-pate in economic production when they have insufficient or unsafe water to drink.
Second, lack of safe water impedes already limited economic activity in lagging regions. When factories face limited or unreliable water supply (similar to the effect of unreliable energy supply), it greatly hinders productivities and makes it eco-nomically unviable for companies to oper-ate in lagging regions. These lagging regions with limited local infrastructure usually have difficulty in attracting and retaining private investment.
In this regard, policies followed by govern-ments in the region tend to benefit wealthier households more than the poor. Despite
water scarcity, water service fees in the Middle East and North Africa are very low, and its water subsidies are the highest in the world (Berglöf and Devarajan 2015). These policies not only promote resource degrada-tion and aggravate fiscal deficits but also compound vulnerabilities and further disad-vantage the poor and marginalized. Water subsidies typically benefit wealthier house-holds more than poor househouse-holds, and wealthier areas benefit more than poorer neighborhoods from subsidized water (Berglöf and Devarajan 2015).
As such, poor households may be located in areas unserved by utilities, requiring residents to buy water of dubious quality from vendors in the informal sector at prices much higher than those paid by the rich. Even when the poor have access to piped water, they capture a smaller share of the benefits from subsidies because they use less water (Whittington et al.
FiGURE 2 .7 Economic losses from inadequate water supply and sanitation in the Middle East and North Africa vary by economy
Regional GDP Bahrain Lebanon Qatar Israel Jordan Iran, Islamic Rep.
United Arab Emirates Kuwait Saudi Arabia Morocco Egypt, Arab Rep.
Oman Tunisia Algeria Djibouti West Bank and Gaza Iraq Yemen, Rep.
Libya
0 1 2 3 4 5
Economic losses from inadequate water supply and sanitation (% of GDP) Sources: Hutton 2013; Sadoff et al. 2015.
Note: Data are from 2010.
2015). Social inclusion protection of the poor and marginalized populations must be central to the delivery of water services and protection from water-related risks.
More important, water scarcity could lead to political instability and conflict if not dealt with properly. In addition to the existing challenges, sudden population spikes due to a large refugee influx have further strained the infrastructure in many of the region’s cities.
Additional demand for basic services by refu-gees puts heavy pressure on public spending, further stresses infrastructure services, and may create potential resentment between the host communities and the refugees. For example, in the northern border towns of Jordan, water supply used to be available three times a week, each time for two hours.
Since the refugee influx, service has been reduced to once a week for only one hour.6
If refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) flow into leading subnational regions,
the shortage in infrastructure services may slow down economic growth. If they continue to come to lagging or poor regions, the exist-ing problems of limited infrastructure invest-ment and public services could be exacerbated and regional gaps in income and economic performance further widened.
Spatial inequality sits at the heart of conflict and climate fragility
Violence and climate risks are associated with higher spatial inequalities (figure 2.8).
Instability and turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa have reached new levels in the past decade (box 2.1). Because flood and drought risks are also increasing, challenges surrounding economic and regional integra-tion are piling up. Compounded violence and climate shocks result in instability, under-mining existing institutions and affecting ser-vice delivery. The demand for serser-vices cannot
Sources: Middle East and North Africa Poverty database (MNAPOV), Team for Statistical Development, World Bank; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) database, https://
www.acleddata.com/; and World Resources Institute’s Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas, https://www.wri.org/resources/maps/aqueduct-water-risk-atlas.
Note: The figures show residual-on-residual plots with 95 percent confidence intervals. The x-axis depicts the residuals from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the log number of violent events from the ACLED database and water risk from Aqueduct data controlling for population, area, time to access nearest city, economic density, and country fixed effects. The y-axis corresponds to mean log deviation of poverty rate (as an indicator of inequality [Haughton and Khandker 2009]) on the same controls. Each point is an administrative region corresponding to the lowest administrative area with poverty rates available. Most correspond to the first administrative level; Morocco and Lebanon are the second administrative level, province and district respectively; and Jordan is the third administrative level (subdistrict). No data were available for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Libya, and the Syrian Arab Republic.
–5 0
Violence, residuals
Spatial inequality, residuals
5 –2 –1 0
Water risk, residuals
a. Violence b. Water risk
2 1
–2 –1 0 1 2 3
Spatial inequality, residuals
–2 –1 0 1 2 3
FiGURE 2 .8 violent events and water risk are associated with higher spatial inequalities in the Middle East and North Africa
be met when infrastructure or the provision of water, education, electricity, and transpor-tation are disrupted by war or flooding (Brixi, Lust, and Woolcock 2015).
In Iraq, for example, the failure to preserve water resources in the marshes in the south is not only driving displacement but also rein-forcing local perceptions of marginalization and exclusion and perpetuating fragility (Mahdi and Fawzi 2014). Iraqi marshes have a long history of upstream diversions, dam
building, and uncoordinated and fragmented planning in the Tigris and Euphrates basins.
Given the strains placed on host communi-ties through protracted displacement, refugees can potentially catalyze social conflict that diminishes trust in public institutions. There can be a perception that displaced persons compete with the poorest hosts and push them deeper into poverty. Yet the reality is more nuanced. In many areas, the challenges for host communities already existed before the The region is suffering from different types of conflict,
ranging from terrorism, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),a and open civil war and violence—causing large-scale displacement of popula-tions—to sporadic violence stemming from political instability that is largely contained within countries.
In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring revolts, some countries experienced gains while others encountered increased conflict and instability. Several countries are experiencing open civil war, such as Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Yemen. In Iraq, Syria, and the Republic of Yemen, civil war is further aggravated by the presence of terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Qaeda. Other countries such as Tunisia and Egypt have more-contained political unrest with sporadic violence. Finally, in Jordan and Lebanon, social tensions are growing because of the influx of refugees and increasing strains on service delivery.
The recent conflicts in Libya, Syria, and the Republic of Yemen caused large numbers of casualties,
severe destruction of public infrastructure, and cata-strophic humanitarian emergencies (table B2.1.1). In modern conflict, violence is a minor cause of mortal-ity. The burden of losses in modern conflict has shifted from combatants to civilian populations, now the main target of hostilities. Civilian casualties have doubled between 2010 and 2016 alone, with many more deaths caused by unmet medical needs, inadequate shelter, and famine because of conflict (World Bank 2017b).
Civil conflict also leads to breakdowns in food sys-tems, in health and water infrastructure, and in access to these services. These breakdowns often increase the death toll. The frequent outbreaks of measles and chol-era in refugee camps and among internally displaced persons (IDP) populations is another important cause of death. In the Republic of Yemen, food insecurity and the threat of famine placed 17 million people at risk (UNOCHA 2017). From April 2017 to July 2017, more than 2,300 people have died in the Republic of Yemen from cholera (WHO 2018).
BOx 2 .1 The ongoing effects of conflict on people of the Middle East and North Africa
TABLE B2 .1 .1 violence in four current major crises has affected between one-third and two-thirds of the population Country Total population (millions)
Within 2 kilometers from event (2016–18) Displaced
Total (millions) Share (%) Total Share (%)
Libya 6 2 32.2 197,000 3.2
Iraq 36 13 35.4 2,648,000 7.3
Yemen, Rep. 27 13 49.4 2,014,000 7.5
Syrian Arab Republic 19 13 69.1 6,784,000 36.7
Source: Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) of Columbia University, “Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Administrative Unit Center Points with Population Estimates, Revision 11”; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) database, https://www.acleddata.com/; and UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) population statistics, http://popstats.unhcr.org/.
Note: An “event” refers to battles, explosions, and violence against civilians. Events are georeferenced, and a radius of 2 kilometers was taken around each event to count the population within 2 kilometers.
a. ISIL is alternatively referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or as the Islamic State group (IS).