Theoretical Interpretations on Emotions and Perceptions

1. Perception Gap: How Does Each State View Each Other?

Korea (both North and South) views Japan as an invader or an aggressor, based on the history of two Japanese invasions―one in 1592 and the other in 1910. For Koreans, Japan is under enormous debt as the war criminal,

41. For more information about the identity of Zainichi Koreans, refer to: David Chapman, Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity (New York: Routledge), 2008.

42. Yoshia Goto, “‘There is No Discrimination in Japan’: Survey Results Show Statement is Far from True,” Mainichi Japan, February 21, 2021. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/

20210220/p2a/00m/0na/015000c.

43. Bumsoo Kim, ““Blatant Discrimination Disappears, But ...”: The Politics of Everyday Exclusion in Contemporary Japan,” Asian Perspective (The Johns Hopkins University Press), Vol. 35 No. 2 (2011): 287-308.

and believes that ‘sincere’ apology is crucial for reconciliation. At the same time, as the history shows, diplomatic agreements between the two countries are regarded as an individual action that have not been approved by the Korean people as a whole; hence they have no significant meanings or effects at all.

Moreover, the ongoing political disputes are shaking the already fragile ties between them even more: Japanese politicians’ continuous tributes to the Yasukuni Shrine―the Shinto shrine where the war criminals of the Pacific War (who are regarded as the sacred heroes in Japan) are buried―are regarded as disrespectful provocations to neighbors (not only Korea, but also China);⁴⁴ the territorial dispute over Dokdo, or Takeshima as the Japanese call it, has risen as a new conflict in the 21st century;⁴⁵ and the issues of compensating forced laborers and comfort women still remain as a core trigger of drastic conflict.⁴⁶

Japan, on the other hand, views Korea as a ‘reneger’, one who keeps breaking promises. So far, there has been multiple contacts between South Korea and Japan (Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965, the Kim-Obuchi Declaration in 1998,⁴⁷ and Japan-South Korea ‘Comfort Women’ Agreement in 2015), as well as two major statements from Japanese high officials―the Kono Statement in 1993,⁴⁸

44. Michiaki Okuyama, “Disputes Over Yasukuni Shrine and Its War Dead in Contemporary Japan,” Religion Compass (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.), Vol. 3 No. 1 (2009):

58-71.

45. Paul Huth, Sunwoong Kim and Terence Roehrig ed., The Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute:

South Korea, Japan and the Search for a Peaceful Solution (Leiden, The Netherlands:

Koninklijke Brill NV), 2021.

46. Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider, “Japanese Colonial Rule, Forced Labor, and Comfort Women,” Divergent Memories (Redwood City: Stanford University Press), 2020: 195-213.

47. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century, October 8, 1998. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html.

and the Murayama Statement in 1995.⁴⁹ In Japan’s point of view, the South Korean government is not capable of delivering agreements or statements to its own public, affected by the public emotion too easily, and changes its position in each and every administration, despite Japan’s continuous efforts to develop cooperative relations.

Legal dispute of how to deal with South Korea after the WWII also lies as one of the key issues. Although Japan was in inescapable debt of reparation after its defeat in the WWII, it did not consider Korea as one of the recipients of any form of compensations. Korea was Japan’s colony as it was annexed in 1910 and had been under occupation until the day of surrender in 1945; it leads to a question if Japan should pay the reparation to Korea, which is not a ‘victor’ of the War.⁵⁰ In extreme sense, some might interpret that Korea was also a part of Japan―as it had been under Japan’s control. While moral dispute of compensation would still be valid despite Korea’s position during the WWII, it is true that the status between South Korea and Japan was not equivalent to that between the U.S. and Japan.⁵¹

48. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, “The Kōno Statement: Its Historical Significance and Limitations,”

Denying the Comfort Women (Routledge), Vol. 1 (2018): 17-39.

49. Rwei-Ren Wu and Kazuhiko Togo, Japan and Reconciliation in Post-War Asia: the Murayama Statement and Its Implications (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2013.

50. The reparation-compensation convey different meanings under South Korean law.

Reparation (배상, baesang, 賠償) is a payback of illegal actions, while compensation (보상, bosang, 補償) is a payment when legal actions cause damages or losses. Based on the definitions, South Korea is not among the recipients of ‘war reparation’ – which can only be claimed by the victors of the War. The Korean definitions of reparation and compensation from: National Institute of Korean Language.

https://www.korean.go.kr/front_eng/main.do.

51. South Korea views the Japanese occupation over the Korean Peninsula was made through illegal annexation; claiming that the treaty was not approved by the emperor of Joseon, as well as it was forcefully made against the emperor or the government’s sovereign will. Therefore, the whole history of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea would be illegal, which can be subject to legal lawsuit for ‘reparations’ against Japan. For

2. Theoretical Interpretations

A. Constructivism

The South Korea-Japan relations shows that not all politics are driven by rationality. Politics, especially democracy, projects collective wills of the people within; and they are not always necessarily rational. Emotions are mostly regarded as a discouragement for reasonable decisions in the arena of politics and diplomacy; however, it is merely a rhetoric before real decision-making progress. States’ leaders elected through democratic procedure are bound by the will of the people, and they are obligated to fulfill what they have been expected to engage. Through the lens of academic observation, some policies or decisions might seem unreasonable, irrational, or even completely nonsense; however, for politicians, it might be a rational trade of give and take―as they win the election, they provide what the people have wanted in return, and build up mutual trust for their power or rule to be kept.

As such, the emotion is a core element embedded under the mutual interaction between the policymakers and the constituents, and it throws a theoretical challenge to two major theories of realism and liberalism, as they both emphasize the premise of rational state. Realism claims that a state will not challenge against the stronger, unless it is prepared.⁵²

more information about South Korea’s legal perception of Japanese annexation, refer to: Yeong-don Loh, “The Legal Validity of the Convention between Korea and Japan of 1905,” Journal of Korean Political and Diplomatic History, Vol. 28 No. 1 (2006):

57-86.

52. Realism emphasizes the significance of power in international order – explaining the dynamics of hegemony and rising power, balance of power, political decisions in nation-state level. Early realists include: Thucydides, Sun Tzu (孫子), Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolò Machiavelli, etc. For more information about realism, refer to: John J.

Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” International Relations (London: SAGE Publications), Vol. 23 No. 2 (2009): 241-56. Also see works of Stephen Walt, Hans

Liberalism emphasizes the role of institutions, promotion of cooperation and mutual trust.⁵³ Under both theories, rationality is a bedrock of state’s decision for conflict or cooperation.

Constructivism, on the other hand, views the world with different perspective. The core values of constructivism are social norms, collective values, and sentiments; and rationality is not a prerequisite. It claims that the individuals tend to gather based on their kinships, and the concept of the state is merely one of many levels of analysis (this is a key difference from realism and liberalism – as they see state as the basic level of analysis).⁵⁴ Therefore, the national identity, a collective entity, can spur antagonism against the other, especially if the group is tied with specific history of conflict. As Alexander Wendt stated, the status of anarchy is what states make of it, and self-help and power politics are socially constructed.⁵⁵

Constructivism can explain the clash of South Korea and Japan based on their emotions beneath complex international system. Realists would argue that the conflict between the two is nothing but an exhausting quarrel, and criticize the negligence of failing to see much bigger conflict between the U.S. and China; and liberalists would also diagnose the situation negatively, claiming that the export regulation and the reactionary boycott is not helpful at all for further economic cooperation. However, despite

Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz.

53. Liberalism in broad sense supports the idea of free market system, democracy, role international institutions, and mutual interdependence. Early liberalists are mainly from the age of enlightenment, such as Immanuel Kant, John Locke and Adam Smith.

For more information about liberalism, refer to: John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press), 2005. Also see works of G. John Ikenberry and Robert Keohane.

54. For more information about constructivism, refer to: Peri Roberts, Political Constructivism (London: Routledge), 2005.

55. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press), Vol. 46 No. 2 (1992): 391-425.

such concerns of reasons, the animosities of Koreans toward the Japanese and vice versa are real, expressed not only through public movements but also via actual policies.