Song-Ok Chu*
Perception has very important meaning and is a characteristic feature in Oriental philosophy, but it has not been fully analyzed by the philosophy. Epistemology in Western philosophy corresponds to pramāṇa-śāstra in Indian philosophy which is a response to the skepticism that denies the possibility of knowledge. Buddhist epistemology does not agree with realism which seeks its source of reality in the outside world. Rather, Buddhist epistemology seeks the possibility of knowledge in the phenomenon world. Usually it has often been blamed because they say that it absorbs the dispute only for dispute sake’s and seeks the experiential truth, but indeed it has also interest in soteriology, for it’s concern about the reality of the object of truth is the subject of ontology, and the possibility to reach to that reality is in fact the problem of enlightenment.
In Buddhist epistemology the existence of the object is established by means of knowledge(pramāṇa). The structure of a cognitive subject and cognitive object is established by pramāṇa theory. In Buddhism there is no cognitive subject, so the structure is divided into three moments. First, the cognitive means(pramāṇa), like perception and inference which give
* Lecturer of Seoul National University
knowledge. Second, the cognizable(prameya) composes the outside order.
Third, the cognitive result(pramā) which is an cognitive episode by which an object is grasped through the authoritative means.
The importance of pramāṇa doesn't lie in the list of the types which gather knowledge, but in the metaphysically important dual nature that it has. Pramāṇa, as Matial mentioned, integrates the concept of ‘cause’ and
‘because’. It offers the justification that makes cognition true and the reasons that cause that knowledge. The means of knowledge and the knowledge which the mean of knowledge results are identical. Therefore pramāṇa has its dual meaning, that is ‘the means of true knowledge’ and
‘true knowledge’.
The metaphysical significance of the dual nature of pramāṇa is that it establishes the metaphysical relationship between the cognitive subject and cognitive object. So it must be considered not as the theory of reference but as transcendental discussion about the condition that makes a judgement true.
In this point of view, the object of cognition is not the object itself but the form of object. Sākāravāda asserts that if it is admitted that the form belongs to the conscience and attributes the characteristics to each conscience then it is not necessary to assume the existence of the object that give the form to conscience. Dignaga’s originality is that he thought of the elements considered as separate substances in the other school as the moments that is logical and integral. Therefore knowledge has three moment, the object moments, that is, the subject moment, and self-awareness(sva-saṁvedana).
Perception is more important mean than inference in acquiring knowledge. According to Dignagna’s definition, perception has no conceptual construction(vikalpa). Sanskrit ‘vikalpa’ means imagination that
is subjective reaction to the pure given. In Buddhist view it is contaminated by all the subjective actions. Svalakṣaṇas is the only particular that perception can meet and it is impossible to be expressed.
The second definition of perception is that it does not contain an illusion.
For Dignaga, pratyakṣa is always true for its nature is not conceptual construction. But Dharmakirti thought that we should distinguish the difference between the sensual illusion and the conceptual illusion.
According to Dharmakirti, sometimes abnormal sense organ can influence the judgement so we may perceive an illusion. The importance of Dharmakirti’s illusion theory is that consistency that he thought as the nature of knowledge means the causal effect.
In Buddhism, the causal effect is considered as a reality that works in two ways. First it makes sensual effects. Nonetheless the other conditions are satisfied, if any object is not perceived, it means there is no existence of object. Second it works as ability that makes a result. For example a seed has the ability that makes a sprout. Dirmakirti’s own idea is taken as similar to Nagarjuna’s skepticism for he thought the object itself is not perceived but what we can see is the form of object. In Buddhist epistemology the distinction between the order of subject and the order of object is hypothetical. What gives the particular perception the required ‘accretion’ to make it cognitive is, according to Dignaga, awareness. There is no awareness which does not contain the self-awareness. The more important thing about self-awareness is that through the self-awareness the action is involved with desire.
In Buddhist epistemology, perception has the aesthetic features because it is avoid of any kind of subjective desires and conceptualization.
It is very similar to the concept of ‘disinterestedness’ in Kant’ Critique of Judgement, but it is different in that aspects that aesthetic judgement in
Kant is involved with sensory perception and imagination. In Kant aesthetic experience is accidental and subjective. On the contrary in Buddhism perception is the transcendental basis for the experience so it is superior to rational cognition. So we could conclude that in Buddhist epistemology cognition is related with the practice and the aesthetic.
Key Words
arthakriyā, Buddhist epistemology, conceptual construction(vikalpa or kalpanā), Dharmakirti, Dignaga, pramāṇa, prameya, pramā, perception (pratyakṣa), svalakṣaṇa(particular)