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10. Exploring Security Engagement with Pakistan and Afghanistan

10.2. Sitara Noor 16

Introduction

There is a lack of permanence among geopolitical alliances and partnerships, par-ticularly given current shifting global political priorities and relations. Within this spectrum of geopolitical manoeuvring, the gradual softening of relations between historical rivals Russia and Pakistan has emerged as a new political reality. Paki-stan and Russia had strained relations during the cold war, which continued even after the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, new openings in Pakistan–Rus-sia relations are on the horizon, heralded by the major political shifts taking place in Asia.

Pakistan–Russia warming of ties

Russia’s ‘Foreign Policy Concept’, published in 2008, declared Pakistan one of the key regional powers with which it intended to develop relations at the bilateral and multilateral levels.17 However, it was not until 2014 that Russia signed a

mili-16 Sitara Noor is a Research Fellow at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-proliferation (VCD-NP). The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VCDNP.

17 Russian Federation, Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, 14 July 2008, <http://kremlin.ru/

acts/news/785>.

exploring security engagement with pakistan and afghanistan 81

tary cooperation agreement with Pakistan, during a visit to Islamabad by Russia’s Defence Minister, Sergey Shoygu. This visit resulted in Russia officially lifting its decades-old arms embargo on Pakistan.

Following this shift, Russia and Pakistan held their first joint military exercise,

‘Friendship-2016’ (Druzhba-2016), in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.

The exercise involved combat troops from both sides and was followed by the announcement of a second joint military exercise to be held in 2017. The joint mil-itary exercise took place despite severe resistance from India, following a militant attack on Indian forces in Kashmir, which allegedly originated in Pakistan. Russia and Pakistan also held two naval exercises, ‘Arabian Monsoon-2014’ and ‘Arabian Monsoon-2015’, which primarily focused on combatting crime and the trafficking of narcotics.

Since these various exercises, Pakistan and Russia have deepened their defence relations and signed a variety of defence deals. One major outcome from these interactions has been an agreement on the transfer of Russian-made Mi-35M fighter aircraft, which are scheduled for delivery in 2017 to replace US-manufac-tured AH-1 Cobra fighter aircraft.18 There are also reports that Pakistan intends to directly import Klimov RD-93 engines from Russia for the JF-17 Thunder mul-ti-role fighter, which were previously to be routed through China.19 This expan-sion of relations into something more direct and less affected by third parties represents a dramatic shift.

The change naturally raises the question of what is drawing Russia and Paki-stan closer together. Their common vulnerabilities are a likely driving factor.

Following its annexation of Crimea, Russia has faced international isolation and economic sanctions, and is struggling to regain its political relevance. Beyond ter-ritorial issues, Russia is also in the process of losing its traditional arms buyers.

China is integral to these shifting arms transfer dynamics, moving away from being a major recipient of Russian military equipment to the indigenization of its weapon capabilities.20 Russia has increasingly been compelled to find new buyers for its arms exports. Pakistan, in turn, has faced shifts in its military suppliers.

Given the changes to traditional US military support, Pakistan has been looking for affordable defence deals to diversify its arms suppliers beyond China.

The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan has also played an impor-tant role in determining Russia’s strategic turn to Pakistan. Russia remains con-cerned about the spillover effects of terrorism, particularly when it comes to the spread of ISIS, and about the drugs trafficked from Afghanistan into the Central Asian region.21 Following the US military drawdown, Russia has sought a bigger

18 Tikhonova, P., ‘Pakistan, Russia and China boost military ties further’, Value Walk, 25 Dec. 2016,

<http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/12/pakistan-russia-china-army-ties/>.

19 Mitra, J., ‘Russia, China and Pakistan: An emerging new axis?”, The Diplomat, 18 Aug. 2015, <http://

thediplomat.com/2015/08/russia-china-and-pakistan-an-emerging-new-axis/>.

20 Pulipaka, S., ‘Russia’s new approach to Pakistan: all about arms sales’, The Diplomat, 28 Sep. 2016,

<http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/russias-new-approach-to-pakistan-all-about-arms-sales/>

21 Roy, R., ‘Russia’s military cooperation agreement with Pakistan: an assessment’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 15 Dec. 2014, <http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/RussiasMilitaryCooperationA-greement_rroy_151212>.

role in regional security and recognizes Pakistan’s important role in Afghanistan, especially in combating the challenges posed by ISIS.22 The recent trilateral dia-logue involving Pakistan, China and Russia on the issue of Afghanistan is an indi-cation of this convergence of interests. These trends also represent push factors for Pakistan’s full membership of the SCO.23

Impact on regional security

As relations between Pakistan and Russia warm, there is discussion of a probable nexus developing among China, Russia and Pakistan. Pakistan and China have enjoyed a decades-long relationship based on a shared regional outlook, particu-larly in their views on India. By contrast, Russia is a traditional ally of India and the two countries share a long history of cooperation. It is therefore erroneous to assume that Russia will develop its relations with Pakistan at the expense of the Russia–India relationship, which continues to stand on solid ground despite talk of an India–USA strategic partnership.

Furthermore, India remains a primary market for Russian weapons exports.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates suggest that India’s defence imports from Russia amounted to USD $1.96 million in 2015, which is a 15 per cent increase on 2005.24 Moreover, on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in India in 2016, Russia agreed to lease a second Akula class submarine to India, along with the export of S-400 air defence systems and 200 multi-role Ka-226T helicopters. India and Russia also agreed on the development of the BrahMos missile and the manufacture of four Admiral Grigorovich class (Project 11356) guided-missile stealth frigates. Both countries are also cooperating extensively on nuclear power.25

By contrast, Pakistan–Russia ties are not based on mutually shared values and long-term interests. Their deepening of relations does not yet qualify as a strategic shift, but remains a tactical move for the time being. Given these dynamics, India is likely to use its leverage to challenge planned defence deals between Russia and Pakistan. However, its failure to curtail the first ever Pakistan–Russia military exercise in 2016 showed India that there are limits to this approach. This mile-stone caused great discomfort in India and is likely to be a harbinger of coopera-tion to come.

If the recent confirmation hearings on the US Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency are any guide, South Asia is likely to occupy a lower position among the policy priorities of the Trump Administration.26 Combining these US shifts with Russia’s relations with India

22 Mitra, D., ‘Pakistan critical to defeating ISIS, says Russian special rep. to Afghanistan’, The Wire, 5 Dec. 2016, <https://thewire.in/84672/pakistan-isis-afghanistan-russia/>.

23 Roy (note 21).

24 SIPRI, ‘India’s defence import data, 2011–25’, <http://armstrade.sipri.org>, accessed 3 Mar. 2017.

25 Topychkanov, P., ‘Moscow and New Delhi disconnect’, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 28 Oct. 2016, <http://

carnegie.ru/2016/10/28/moscow-and-new-delhi-disconnect-pub-64989>.

26 Topychkanov, P., ‘Trump’s presidency: a new opportunity for Russia in South Asia’, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 20 Jan. 2017,

<http://carnegie.ru/2017/01/20/trump-s-presidency-new-opportunity-for-russia-in-exploring security engagement with pakistan and afghanistan 83

and growing interest in Pakistan, Russia is likely to have an opportunity to play a bigger role in South Asian security dynamics. Among the potential arenas for Russia to exert a greater influence would be in resolving issues between India and Pakistan, particularly regarding Afghanistan. While India has historically not accepted mediators in its bilateral issues with Pakistan, both states have in the past relied on third parties for crisis de-escalation. Russia may have an opportu-nity to serve this function in the future.

Takeaways

To benefit from the strategic opening offered by geostrategic shifts in Asia, Paki-stan should enhance its diplomatic and economic relations with Russia. While the volume of bilateral trade between Russia and Pakistan remains low and even decreased by 13 per cent in 2015,27 Russia’s probable engagement in CPEC could be extremely beneficial to Pakistan. This expanded involvement in South Asia could prove to be a game changer for Pakistan–Russia relations and would provide the foundation for a much broader relationship that extends beyond mili-tary sales and exercises into the economic and political realms.

south-asia-pub-67753>.

27 Topychkanov, P., ‘Why Russia must come clean on its Pakistan policy’, RBTH, 16 Jan. 2017, <http://

rbth.com/opinion/2017/01/16/why-russia-must-come-clean-on-its-pakistan-policy_682071>.

11. Impact of Shifts in Arms Trade and Exercises

문서에서 CHINA–RUSSIA RELATIONS AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS (페이지 96-101)