Igor Denisov 5

Introduction

Given the deteriorating relations with the West and sanctions over Ukraine, it is a widely-held belief that Russia is excessively tilting towards China. This has led to arguments that the Russia–China quasi-alliance is gradually losing its ‘quasi’

nature and turning into a full-scale military bloc, based on common interests, an aligned strategic vision and joint actions to counter threats. When making such claims, the South China Sea is frequently cited as an example of the converging interests of the two states. However, there are questions over whether this read-ing of Russia’s attitude to China’s South China Sea claims is accurate.

Drivers of tension and modernization

Overlapping claims in the South China Sea are one of the key drivers of the arms trade and military modernization in South East Asia. As such, the potential for the South China Sea to become the next global flashpoint is great. Russia and China share convergent and divergent interests in the Asia-Pacific region, with a

5 Igor Denisov is a Senior Research Fellow in the Centre for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Or-ganization Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

focus on the South China Sea. Thus, it is useful to draw up a balance sheet of their respective visions of the territorial problems in this maritime domain.

As Russia–China relations grow closer, there are signs that Russia’s stance on the territorial disputes between China and its neighbours is shifting away from its long-standing policy of neutrality and non-interference. This is not only the case in the South China Sea, but also for the India–China border dispute and Japan–

China tensions over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands. Nonetheless, a number of Russian official pronouncements contradict the popular narrative that Russia and China are headed towards an alliance. These statements are set against the back-drop of mounting tensions and contested sovereignty claims. Flawed perceptions of Russia’s policy on the South China Sea can be attributed to six main causes.

First, there is an emphasis on Russia’s relative economic weakness vis-à-vis China. This argument maintains that the current economic situation in Russia is leading to its growing dependence on China. However, the increasing asymmetry of the two countries’ economic cooperation does not necessarily mean that Russia can easily accept the role of junior partner in Russia–China relations.

Second, there is an overestimation of China’s intentions towards a more active Russia in the South China Sea. Even at the height of the tensions there, China has proved to be more interested in Russia’s support in terms of soft power, rather than hard power. Increased China–Russia interaction occurred just after the decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. However, this was a part of China’s worldwide campaign to gain support from the international com-munity against the ruling.

Third, Russia’s own interests in the Asia-Pacific region have been underesti-mated. Although the Russian ‘pivot to the East’ is progressing more slowly than anticipated, its priorities in the region are more nuanced than simply serving as China’s junior partner. Russia does not intend to risk undermining its relations with other Asian players, which include important buyers of Russian arms.

Fourth, there is an over reliance on the narrative of the growing assertiveness of Russia and China. The two countries have different approaches to the interpre-tation of international law, but this is often ignored. Within the prevailing dis-course, it is presumed that Russia and China have an inherently offensive, rather than defensive approach, such that they seek to challenge the existing world order.

However, as a signatory to UNCLOS, Russia relies on this document to defend its own maritime claims. Moreover, some Chinese interpretations of UNCLOS do not fit with Russia’s own interests.

Fifth, there is ignorance of the differences between Russian and Chinese views on the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the South China Sea. Russia does not object to China’s use of the SCO to engage in a general discus-sion on the South China Sea, even though it is certainly not in the zone of responsi-bility of the organization. Nonetheless, Russia is quite irritated by the ‘excessively instrumental’ use of the SCO by China.

Sixth, the Russian–Chinese naval exercises in the South China Sea have been misinterpreted. These exercises, held on 12–19 September 2016, were character-ized by many observers as a sign of Russia’s clear support for China’s position.

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Russia tried its best to reduce the political effect of the exercises, but China inter-preted its participation as unequivocal support. To this end, the Joint Sea-2016 navy drills were held far from the conflict area and the flagship of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, Varyag, did not participate in the manoeuvres. This could be interpreted as a kind of consolation to Russia’s other partners in the region, particularly Viet Nam.

Takeaways

The evolution of Russia’s position on the South China Sea has been closely moni-tored in the region. Russia is trying to balance between China and other regional actors, emphasizing that it is not a party to the disputes and does not intend to become involved in them. Russia is neither an actual nor a potential stakeholder in the South China Sea territorial dispute. Thus, its cooperation with China in the region is much more nuanced than the current discourse suggests. Its part-nerships with China’s neighbours are also important and affect Russia’s overall security calculus.

8. New Domains of Crossover and Concern in