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A complex socio economic and agro-ecological setting

문서에서 FAO’s Nine-month Action Plan (페이지 10-0)

1. Situation and needs assessment

1.1 A complex socio economic and agro-ecological setting

The northeast region of Nigeria comprises several livelihood zones providing food to a large territory with several urban centres. These zones include: the Lake Chad shores and open water (with large and fertile areas for dry-season grazing and flood recession cultivation); a large Sahel belt with livestock and dryland cereal production (Sahel savanna); a secondary more humid belt with cereal, cassava and sesame (Sudan savanna); and one large much more productive area where many food and cash crops grow easily (northern and southern Guinea savannas). Between these different zones and neighbouring countries, trade has always been very active and allowed the development of trading hubs such as Maiduguri. In northeast Nigeria, an estimated 80–90 percent of the population depend on agriculture, fisheries and livestock for their livelihoods and food security.

Figure: Northeast Nigeria Livelihood Zones Map*

*Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)

All planned activities must be well aligned with the existing crop calendars of the northern Nigeria states, focusing on the upcoming dry season and the need to prepare early for the 2017 rainy season.

9 1.2 The conflict and its consequences

In northeast Nigeria, local politics, demographic pressure and environmental changes have undermined social contracts established between ethnic groups to manage natural resources, especially around Lake Chad, and facilitate cohabitation between pastoral groups and farming communities.

The region has long been marginalized in terms of development policies, which has opened the door for a conflict targeting not only national administrative and military institutions, but also the civilian population.

The cross-border nature of the conflict has led to a regional military and political response involving Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon, with whom Nigeria shares resources such as Lake Chad and challenges like the effects of climate change. The last three years of conflict have transformed a rural area that, despite being largely marginalized in terms of development strategy, was dynamic and populated into a zone of considerable suffering, significant displacement, high food insecurity and worrying levels of malnutrition.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps and host communities

10 The conflict has cost northeast

Nigeria’s agriculture sector an estimated USD 3.7 billion1 due to livestock losses; destruction of irrigation and farming facilities;

collapse of extension services, market and trade facilities; and reduced production due to access limitations.

Looting and fear of attacks have prevented many farmers from working in their fields, leading to the loss of harvests and productive assets, and extremely reduced purchasing power.

Access to the areas beyond the most protected perimeters has been difficult and aid agencies involved in food security and support to the agriculture sector have been significantly constrained in their access to rural areas. In addition, the drop in oil prices and destruction of oil pipelines in the Delta have considerably reduced federal revenue and its capacity to support the economy, in particular in the north.

Following the Cadre Harmonisé2 food security analysis of March 2016, a joint food security alert was issued in July 2016 by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), FEWS NET, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

CILSS and its partners (the Government of Nigeria, FAO, WFP and FEWS NET) then undertook a joint rapid assessment in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States and updated the Cadre Harmonisé analysis in

2 CILSS developed a methodology for the analysis and identification of areas at risk and vulnerable groups in the Sahel called Cadre Harmonisé. The framework is based on different methodologies used by actors involved in food security analysis, with the aim of informing decision-makers and guiding action and response within the region by classifying the current and projected food security and vulnerability situation on a standard scale across the region.

3 http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/Fiche-Nigeria%20aout2016%20ver3_ASG.pdf

11 Mapping of food security classification in the three northeast states

Population in need

The situation continues to evolve with new areas progressively accessible. In these areas, the humanitarian situation is reported to be extremely serious after three years of missed harvests and seed security is at a minimum. Improved security has encouraged some farmers to return to their fields for the first time in two to three years. Host communities, where possible, are providing IDPs with access to land. However, the lack of agricultural inputs represents a major constraint for many farmers. Without support, they will continue to rely on prolonged and expensive humanitarian assistance to meet their food needs in the coming months.

The wider negative impact includes the lack of economic and employment opportunities with possible

States Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Total Phase 3 à 5

Adamawa 1 697 300 1 868 200 591 200 38 000 - 629 200 Borno 675 700 1 672 400 2 219 000 886 200 58 500 3 163 700 Yobe 1 544 900 1 074 900 534 900 113 700 6 500 655 100 Total 3 917 900 4 615 500 3 345 100 1 037 900 65 000 4 448 000

12 harmful consequences, including youth radicalization and enrolment in armed groups, resulting in continued civil unrest. This changing situation offers windows of opportunities that cannot be missed.

FAO is thus preparing to carry out a seeds assessment for the three northeastern states in partnership with FEWS NET and other stakeholders (state institutions and Non-governmental Organizations [NGOs]). Given the region’s complex agro-ecosystems and the duration of the crisis, it is important to assess the level of seed security (what is still available in terms of seeds in farmers’ granaries) and potential sources of seeds of similar characteristics in neighbouring and less-affected regions and states of Nigeria. This will involve strong collaboration with Nigerian institutions in charge of agriculture and seed production, in addition to coordination with the Borno State Maiduguri-based agricultural administration. On the side of the Government, several strategic action plans have been prepared and are synthesized in the Buhari Plan

“Rebuilding the Northeast”, which represents a significant national effort.FAO has already mobilized significant resources through its own internal funding system (Technical Cooperation Programme projects and allocations from the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities), as well as with the support of several donors (the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection and the Governments of Belgium, Ireland and Japan). This has enabled FAO to distribute seeds and fertilizers in accessible area of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe and helped FAO to develop strong relationships with agricultural institutions at the federal and state levels, which will prove critical for the implementation of the Action Plan.

1.3 Scenarios and consequences for FAO programming

As the situation remains unpredictable, the nine-month Action Plan has been designed with a flexible operational framework. A planning exercise was undertaken, using best practices in multi-scenario planning – underlining the unpredictability of the situation (we cannot define what a “most probable scenario” could be), the multiplicity of possible events and facilitating the identification of different options for the coming nine months. Several key parameters have been identified that could determine the evolution of the situation, as outlined below.

Level Parameters

Internal to the northeast states

Activities of Boko Haram

Climatic patterns in the region (drought, floods) and their impact on food security Dynamics of population displacements

Land access and land tenure issues

Result of the military and security campaign

Behaviours of military and Civil Defence Forces/vigilantes Internal conflict in Boko Haram

Internal to Nigeria

Impact of oil price decreases and security evolution in the Delta region Political development in the Biafra area

National food production (taking into account possible floods) and its impact on food prices Devaluation of the Niara and impact of the exchange rate fluctuations

Regional (analytical

Level of military cooperation between the LCBC countries Level of international military support they get

Global

Evolution of oil prices in the global market

Evolution of cereal and food prices in the global market

Global dynamics in the Jihadist sphere, especially the links with North Mali and Somalia’s Al-Shebab, as well as the situation in Libya

13 The analysis led to the identification of a series of possible scenarios, as presented below:

Scenarios Description

The optimistic scenario

The efforts to regain territory and ensure security pay off and more areas become accessible. The Nigerian Army and Civil Defence Groups avoid large-scale human rights abuses. A certain level of confidence is slowly established, with a progressive return of the population to their areas of origin in Borno and Yobe, while large IDP populations who fled in Yobe and Adamawa are also returning. This will remain limited during the first part of the 2016–17 dry season and might accelerate from January to April 2017 as pe

ople don’t want to miss another rainy season. Unexploded ordinance (UXO) contamination turns out to be limited. The Government manages to redeploy at least a certain level of civil administration. Many IDPs might decide however to remain in the urban centres and develop new livelihoods there. Fishing activities and trade resumes actively, bringing good livelihood opportunities to a large segment of the population. Globally, agriculture activities and trade (allowing the area to benefit from the good production in the rest of the country) resume rather actively and significantly contribute to the improvement of the humanitarian situation.

The second best scenario

Stabilization of large areas is ensured, but insecurity remains an issue. Movements back and forth to the villages take place on a large scale, but people are still hesitating to resettle in their areas of origin.

The states of Adamawa, the extreme south of Borno and Yobe reach some acceptable stabilization levels allowing activities to resume and civilian government institutions to be progressively redeployed in some areas. The Lake Chad area, the western part of Borno and some large forested areas south of Maiduguri remain much more problematic. The real level of UXO contamination remain unknown but the perception of the issue affects the desire to go back to the villages of origin. There is no sign that the internal strife within Boko Haram is leading to a risk of resumption of large-scale military or terrorist intervention. The level of trade from the southern states of Nigeria is on the rise, facilitating price decreases and better access to food for the population.

The limited improvement scenario

Efforts to secure the areas pay off but not sufficiently to allow for a massive return to areas of origin. In addition, the evolution of oil prices and impact of the Niara devaluation seriously affect the State’s capacity to properly pay officials and invest in basic services. Main routes and recaptured settlements are secured but no further progress is made deep into the countryside. Markets resume functioning in the main cities, but not in rural areas. Agriculture resumes in a 20 to 30 km radius around Maiduguri but not much further away. Internal strife within Boko Haram raises issues about the evolution of the strategy of the actors of violence. The real level of UXO contamination remains unknown but the perception of the issue affects the desire to go back to the villages. The humanitarian system has to address many new displacements from the areas where stabilization efforts are taking place to cities and areas of existing IDP concentration. Cereal production does not resume at large scale, while trade with the southern part of the country does not function sufficiently well to significantly reduce food prices.

The degraded scenario

Internal fighting in Boko Haram leads to higher levels of military activities. Attacks resume regularly with suicide bombing and security incidents increase in number and gravity, which leads to the reduction of the humanitarian community presence in Maiduguri. As people have completely eroded their asset base, they start to move further south to Gombe, Adamawa and even further. Cities are further cut off from their supply and trade routes, leading to new price increases, which come as an additional negative element to the political and economic crisis affecting the whole country (oil price decrease, pipeline sabotage in the South, re-activation of the tensions in Biafra). The rainy season turns out to be below average, limiting even further the impact of the small-scale agricultural activities undertaken in 2016. This, compounded with the result of the difficult situation worldwide (cereal prices in the international market remain high), drastically limits the capacity of both the Government and aid agencies to supply sufficient food and livelihood assistance.

The worst case scenario

In the internal strife within Boko Haram, the most radical group takes over, with a clear alliance with

“global Jihad”. This leads to the resumption of large-scale military operations and the multiplication of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings. The Nigerian Army is confronted on multiple fronts with the resumption of the crisis in Biafra and the surge in the insurrection in the Delta States. Multiple

population displacements take place while humanitarian access is limited to a minimum and eventually aid agencies in Maiduguri have to be evacuated. The International Task Force does not manage to get the situation under control and there is a significant spillover effect on neighbouring countries.

14 Given the severity of and the urgent need to address the deteriorating food security situation and the windows of opportunity offered by the opening of new areas, FAO has declared increased corporate support for Nigeria and mobilized accordingly. FAO capacity is being strengthened and internal resources have been mobilized to scale-up the response and support coordination efforts.

Although FAO has been involved in emergency agriculture operations in the north of Nigeria since 2013, operating largely from Abuja, the Organization further scaled up its response, opening an office in Maiduguri and deploying staff and missions to develop an Action Plan for the period September 2016 to May 2017. Due to persistent Boko Haram activities in the concerned area, and based on the multi-scenario analysis presented above, FAO will pay due attention to the principle of “Do no harm” and seek to ensure the safety and security of beneficiaries targeted by the activities. Additionally, conflict prevention and the peace building approach, in particular in relation to land rights, will be critical elements in the implementation of the Action Plan.

In designing the Action Plan, FAO has drawn on the Organization’s technical competence and relationships with national actors involved in agriculture and livestock production to ensure that is area specific, adapted to the variety of agro-ecosystems of the concerned regions, and can be implemented in a timely manner as soon as sufficient resources are made available.

2. Nine-month Action Plan

Given that a considerable part of the rural economy of Nigeria’s northeastern states and its relationship with the urban sector has been dramatically affected by the conflict, a strong intervention in this sector is required. The absence of decisive engagement in the rural sector is likely to have serious negative repercussions on the socio-economic and nutrition situation of the population, as well as potentially severe political and military consequences. Therefore, FAO is determined to rapidly increase livelihood support for rural households, urban and peri-urban IDPs and host communities and to be fully prepared for the 2017 rainy season.

2.1 Key assumptions

The focus will be on nutrition-sensitive agricultural activities and initial steps to recapitalize rural households affected by the crisis. Special attention will be paid to IDPs remaining in cities and camps and to the newly accessible areas and areas with observable IDP returns. In addition, as there will be huge needs for seed supply interventions, other key partners will implement seed programmes and excellent coordination will be required between these actors.

The scale of needs is massive and no single programme can respond to all (either qualitatively or quantitatively). The FAO nine-month Action Plan aims to respond to specific needs to improve the food security of approximately 248 000 households. The goal is to reach an estimated 2 million people, representing 45 percent of the population in Cadre Harmonisé Phases 3 to 5 in the three northern states.

As well as supporting the returns process, the Action Plan will include direct or indirect support to the local economic integration of households who may decide not to return home for the foreseeable future. In addition, the Plan will explore possible modalities to improve land tenure security for IDPs and host communities, as well as to deal with conflicts between pastoralists and local farmers.

15 The situation in the livestock and fishery sectors is particularly complex and needs to be better understood.

The patterns of livestock movement are peculiar in this area where large south–north bovine movements take place during the dry season to optimize the use of the Lake Chad grazing lands. In addition, the Boko Haram insurgency significantly disturbed pastoral patterns and most IDPs have lost their small livestock as they fled.

It is unlikely that restocking can take place on a large scale in the coming months, as it is difficult to launch restocking projects when entering the dry season and fodder becomes scarce. Some small pilot activities can however take place to explore the feasibility of the activity. Given that the disruption of the livestock economy created conditions for the spread of diseases, it is important to increase the level of surveillance and prepare technical services to be ready for veterinary interventions. Livestock interventions are likely to be much more feasible during the second part of 2017, in favour of returning communities. Similarly, fisheries used to be an important part of the economy of the area, largely based on fish intakes from Lake Chad and all submerged areas linked to the network of its tributaries. While it will take time for this sector to recover, a feasibility study and pilot projects on aquaculture should be carried out in the short term.

2.2 Programme design

For all scenarios:

 IDPs with secure access to land, host community vulnerable households and returnees will be supported in dry season activities starting in October/November, especially for vegetable production:

o support to vegetable-growing groups, especially women and youth groups, with the provision of seeds, irrigation equipment, tools and other inputs, including technical advice. This could be done through a combination of in-kind distributions and cash transfers through existing rural micro-finance institutions and banks; and

o specific technical support to ensure that vegetable production induces both a positive nutritional impact and some income for the population.

 Specific attention will be paid to urban IDPs and some host families with limited access to land: the experiences gathered by FAO in similar emergency contexts and by the Food for the Cities network indicate that there are many opportunities to be seized in a situation such as the one in northeast Nigeria. This will imply:

o provision of specific technical inputs (bags and wood beams for vertical agriculture4);

o specific technical advice on urban agriculture; and

o support to the negotiation with municipal authorities, if and when required.

 FAO is preparing to target IDPs and vulnerable host community households with horticulture packages, comprising seeds, fertilizers (with as much as possible organic fertilizers), small equipment to set up micro-gardening systems and irrigation equipment.

 FAO is preparing to target IDPs and vulnerable host community households with horticulture packages, comprising seeds, fertilizers (with as much as possible organic fertilizers), small equipment to set up micro-gardening systems and irrigation equipment.

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