Han-bum Cho
D. Weakening of the Discourse on Unification
5. The Principles and Goals of the Lee Administration’s North Korean Policies
The circumstances in which the Lee administration is able to advance North Korean policies is fundamentally the same as that of the Roh administration. Therefore, the magnitude of change in policies is limited. First of all, the prerequisite of the ‘Initiative for Denuclearization, Openness and 3000’ created by the Lee govern- ment is no different from that of the Roh administration since both emphasize that finding a solution for the North Korean nuclear problem is a necessity for creating policies that promote inter- Korean cooperation. To ensure the stable progress of inter-Korean relations, the South Korean government must achieve tangible results, including continuation of the denuclearization process that is currently underway, and the search for a permanent solution to the nuclear problem. In addition, along with dismantling the nuclear program the parties involved in Six Party negotiations need to concentrate on establishing a peace system on the Korean peninsula.
Tangible results are also needed with regards to the formation of a supra-partisan group that may facilitate the North Korean poli- cy making process. Even the Lee administration, elected with an approval rating higher than other recent administrations has a weak foundation to push forward policies because it failed to win more than half of all the seats in the National Assembly. This prob- lem already arose with regard to the resumption of beef imports from the US. North Korean policies are more complex than any other and the government needs the support of the progressive camp because North Korean issues are essentially a national issue that cannot be implemented only with support of the conservative camp. In particular, the cost of promoting North Korean policies is expected to grow immensely compared with the past, so domestic political cooperation is crucial for creating policies for North Korea. Achieving bipartisan and multilateral support for North Korean policies should be a task of high priority for the Lee administration since this support was nearly non-existent during the participatory government’s rule. After the process of denu- clearization is actually accomplished the government must estab- lish a large base of public support for its policies since it is antici- pated that the costs of pursuing progress and cooperation in inter- Korean relations and economic development North Korea will be enormous. This will also help deal with excessive criticism of North Korea policy and ‘arguments of unconditional over-generosity.’
The ‘Initiative for Denuclearization, Openness and 3000’ must also become more specific or should be outlined in more detail.
The ideas of denuclearization, openness, and the revitalization of the North Korean economy represented by the amount $3,000 take the same basic stance as the North Korean policies of past govern- ments, and as a result may be recognized for maintaining impor- tant continuity in North Korean policies. However, the fact that it
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asserts that denuclearization is a prerequisite for improvement in inter-Korean relations, as well as the fact that the specific objectives sought by North Korean policies and inter-Korean relations are more clearly stated, are reasons why this North Korean policy dif- fers from the others.
In the case of the Lee administration, the vision behind its North Korean policies is a combined goal of peaceful unification and the realization of a more developed nation. It can be deduced that the Lee administration intends to encourage the coexistence of both Koreas, by creating a positive cycle of improved inter-Korean relations and national development. Based on this understanding, it is possible to outline the following goals of the Lee administra- tion’s North Korean policies.
First and foremost, a requirement of the ‘Initiative for Denu- clearization, Openness and 3000’ is the promotion of denucleariza- tion. Since the Lee administration recognizes denuclearization as a basic prerequisite for progress in inter-Korean relations and the establishment of a inter-Korean economic community, dismantle- ment of North Korea’s nuclear program is not only a major goal of the Lee administration but also a task of top priority. Progress in denuclearization is also closely linked to progress made in official- ly ending the military conflict between the two Koreas and con- verting the armistice to a system of peace. With denuclearization as a prerequisite, the ‘Initiative for Denuclearization, Openness and 3000’ will help embody such goals as the promotion of full- scale economic cooperation. This will help create a more devel- oped Korea and further the search for a fundamental solution to the North Korean economic crisis. It will also directly improve the lives of the North Korean people by eliminating poverty and will help reduce the suffering of the people. Furthermore, a major objective of North Korean policies of the Lee administration is the
realization of a more developed Korea. This will be achieved by promoting improvement in inter-Korean relations and North Korean policies within the framework of a long-term program for national development.
The following few principles contain statements to help accom- plish these goals. The first principle aims to expand the pragma- tism of North Korean policies. This should not be interpreted only in terms of pursuing actual gains from inter-Korean relations, or even making substantial progress in inter-Korean relations in order to build a basis for unification. The North Korean economic crisis cannot be solved by North Korea alone which has become institu- tionalized must also be considered. This crisis along with the growing influence of globalization on the Korean peninsula create the need to make substantial provisions for unification. From this point of view, enacting measures for the stable management and expansion of inter-Korean relations as well as making plans for possible unification are necessary. The practicality of North Korea policies must be interpreted from this standpoint.
Asymmetric reciprocity must also be deeply considered. This means that South Korean measures such as the expansion of inter- Korean economic cooperation and aid provided to North Korea should promote asymmetric responses form the North in the form of direct benefits for the people of North Korea and the search for solutions to human rights issues. Asymmetric reciprocity takes into consideration that cooperating with North Korea on develop- ment and aid issues does not have to necessarily produce symmet- rical responses. In other words, North Korean responses to South Korean aid can relate not only to economic reciprocity and issues of military security, but also to a comprehensive range of issues that include a reduction in poverty, development of individual skills, and a solution to the human rights problem. This is requires
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an understanding of North Korea’s development that extend beyond the economic standpoint and contribute positively to the process of securing peace and unification on the Korean peninsula.
Consequentially, investment in inter-Korean economic cooperation also does not necessarily require North Korea to respond with symmetric measures. That is to say, there is a need to recognize a certain asymmetric delay in the time required for the effects of development cooperation with North Korean to materialize. Firm- ly maintaining this perspective will have positive effects for gain- ing the support of the public on issues such as provision of neces- sary resources to North Korea. This will ultimately further the goal of improved inter-Korean relations.
Furthermore, the administration should strive to achieve a national consensus on North Korean policies and should make this a major policy objective. The Lee administration must create a model for cooperation that seeks produce understanding and explains the new initiatives. The ruling party must also not initiate North Korean policies unilaterally and the opposition party must not rely on one-sided criticism or anticipate gains from the failures of a certain policy. Both conservative and progressive camps should foster cooperation on unification and North Korean policies in a sincere manner. Issues of nationalism are problems beyond the interests of individual factions and camps, and are directly related to the shared future of the entire nation. Even with the Lee admin- istration, it is always important to note that establishing a base of public support is important for securing the power needed to pro- mote North Korean policies.
Lastly, the coordination of international cooperative efforts on this issue should be a major principle contrived in the policy. Efforts to build the foundation for a peace system and achieve the strate- gic goal of denuclearization should be coordinated closely among
neighboring states and in conjunction with the US-South Korean alliance.
6. Conclusion
The inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak, who has a dif- ferent political stance than other recent presidents, presents certain possibilities for change regarding North Korean policies. However, there should be no change in the basic objectives of achieving peaceful management of inter-Korean relations, prosperity for both Koreas, and the ultimate goal of peaceful unification. From this standpoint, the North Korean policies should maintain a line of continuity.
With regards to these policies, the Lee administration must strive to build a model for productive cooperation in connection with the new policy initiatives.
The most important lesson gained from past North Korean policies is the fact that the ruling party should not initiate policies unilaterally, nor should the opposing party solely criticism and seek to gain from failed policies. Both the conservative and pro- gressive parties should sincerely try to find possibilities for cooper- ation on unification issues as well as the North Korean nuclear issue. The economic and security problems associated with North Korea are clearly beyond the interests of certain political factions.
They are issues that are directly connected to the future of all Korean people.
The conflict between the conservative and progressive camps is the type of transitional pain that must be overcome for the country to move beyond Cold War conflict and advance into a new stage of national reconciliation. The problem is not the mere existence of
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conservative and progressive groups, but the fact that they cannot coexist or cooperate. This is the reason why establishing a solid base of public support at the start of the Lee administration is now being thoroughly discussed.
1 – Han-bum Cho, “The globalization of Korean society and discussion on unification,” Paper presented at the spring academic seminar at Ewha Institute of Unification Studies.
2 – “The younger generation such as high schoolers or university students have clearly different views on North Korea compared to the older gen- eration” ... “If phrases such as ‘We must be unified, but only after I die’ become common, a lot of people will feel that North Korea is an
‘irrelevant country.” Yonhap News, August 23, 2006.
Notes