서울대학교 화학공정신기술연구소 공정시스템 및 안전연구센터
김 구 회
화학공정의 사고 시나리오 합성 시스템
Automatic Synthesis of Robust Accident Scenarios for Chemical
Processes
Hazard Analysis
Hazard
Identification Accident
Probability Accident Consequence
RISK MANAGEMENT
정성적 추론 정량적 추론
공정내 사고로 인한
손실 발생 위험영향평가기술
가상사고시나리오 사용자의 주관에 의존
평가결과의 다양성 한계
사고시나리오 합성
공정요소 분석
장치거동 분석
물질특성 고려
사고형태 추론
• HAZOP Study
• FMEA
• What-If analysis
• PHA
• FTA
• ETA
• The starting point of analysis
• The direction of inference
• The scope of analysis
전통적인 위험성 평가 방법
• Time consuming
• Labor intensive
• Requiring extensive and multidisciplinary knowledge
• The quality of analysis is dependent on the analyst’ s ability
INFERENCE STRUCTURE using Rule-based method
기존 위험성 평가 방법의 단점
가상 사고 시나리오란?
정성적 안전성평가방법
미국에서 처음 WCS(Worst Case Scenario) 의 개념 도입
위험영향평가시스템의 입력값으로 가상 사고 시나리오에 따라 결과의 다양성 존 재
체계적 방법에 따른 시나리오 추론
공정상태 분석 및 및 발생 강도 고려
제안된 가상사고 시나리오 추론구조
GLOBAL INFERENCE ENGINE
Accident Scenario Knowledge
Base USER
Equipment Screening
Algorithm Equipment Behavior
Analysis Algorithm Accident Scenario Reasoning Algorithm Equipment Property
Knowledge-Base Material Property
Knowledge-Base Process unit
Knowledge-Base
Equipment Property KB
- NAME : Feed line valve
- UNIT ID :
- CONNECTED FROM - CONNECTED TO :
- SAFETY UNITS : Pressure Temperature Flow rate
- MATERIALS :
N/A N/A
CONTROLLER BY VALVE1 PIPE 4
PIPE 3 VALVE
Toluene
- FLOW RATE : 5 kg/s
- TEMPERATURE : 298 K
- PRESSURE : 2 kg/cm2
...
Material knowledge base
사용된 물질 특성
NFPA rating(N f , N r , N h )
Heat of combustion
Flash point
Boiling point
MF(NFPA material factor)
연소열, flash point, boiling point 고려
Material Property KB
NFPA code
• API 750
• Dow & Mond Index
... .
• N
h: Health Hazard Rating
• N
f: Flammable Hazard Rating
• N
r: Reactivity Hazard Rating
HAZARD INDEX
AMMONIA
Nr = 0 Nh = 3 Nf = 1 HC = 8,000
FP = gas BP = -28
EO
Nr = 3 Nh = 3 Nf = 4 HC = 11,700
FP = -4 BP = 51
C3
Nr = 0 Nh = 1 Nf = 4 HC = 19,900
FP = gas BP = -44
HC(Heat of Combustion, Btu/lb) FP(Flash Point, ℉)
BP(Boiling Point, ℉)
1
3 2
W
Flammability (Red) 4:Extremely flammable 3:Highly flammability 2:Flammability
1:Low flammability 0:Not flammable
Health Hazard (Blue) 4:Extremely hazardous 3:Highly hazardous 2:Hazardous
1:Slightly hazardous 0:Not hazardous
Reactivity hazard (Yellow) 4:Severe explosion risk 3:Explosion risk
2:Potentially explosive 1:Not violently reactive 0:Normal stability
Other hazard (if any) W:Do not use water OXY:Oxidizing
♦:Radiation hazard
N f
N r 0 1 2 3 4
0 1 1 2 3 4
1 1 1 2 3 4
2 2 2 4 6 9
3 3 3 6 9 12
4 4 4 8 12 16
복합 특성의 고려
(Multi-property matrix)
화학공정에서의 단위공정 분류
CHEMICAL/ENERGY PLANT
Oxidation, Electrolysis, Nitration Esterification, Aminolysis, Sulfonation,
Alkylation, Polymerization
이송,분배공정
분리, 정제공정
냉각, 소각, 열처리, 열가공, 배가스, 폐수,
폐기물 처리공정
원료,부산물, 및 최종생산물의 저장공정 반응시스템
공급시스템
분리시스템 유틸리티시스템
저장시스템
Process Unit KB-1
Chemical Process Unit Classification
Process Unit
-Feed System, Reaction System, Production System, Storage System,
Utility System
Safety Unit -Mitigative Safeguard -Preventive Safeguard
Topography
Meteorological data
Characteristic of surrounding area
Process Unit KB-2
Unit 1
materials
Propane(G) Butane(G)
Water Air
Composition
Stripper Air fan Stripper pump
Number of
Analysis node 4
Unit 2
materials
Propane(L) Propane(G) Butane(L) Butane(G)
Composition
Dry tank(3) Heater(2)
Pump(7) Cavern
Number of
Analysis node 12
Unit 3
materials
Methanol Odorant Nitrogen
Composition
Storage tank Pump(2)
Number of
Analysis node 6
Unit 4
materials
Propane(L) Butane(L)
Composition
Unloading arm Pump(2)
Number of
Analysis node 4
Characteristics of Surrounding Area Meteorological Characteristics
가상사고 시나리오 추론단계
Macro Decomposition
(Unit function and topography analysis)
Micro Decomposition (Equipment screening
with equipment knowledge base)
Equipment Behavior Analysis (Root cause and effect reasoning)
Process Unit Selection
Process Equipment Selection
Accident Reasoning
(EFaCRA and material knowledge base)
Accident Scenarios at Given Mode
Accident Scenarios Selection
Effect Analysis Emergency Planning
And Safety Device
Secondary Equipment
Macro Decomposition Algorithm
시나리오 추론과정의 첫번째 단계
주요 기능시스템의 구분과 정의
Feed system, Reaction system, Production system, Storage system, Utility system
기후적 특성 고려
평균 풍향 및 풍속
Topography
인근지역의 주거비, 지리적 환경
Material
Highly toxic, flammable material
Macro Decomposition Algorithm
Unit
Decomposition
Detailed Analysis
Macro Decomposition Algorithm
Unit 1 Storage unit
Unit 2 Reaction unit
Unit 3 Reaction unit
Unit 4 Storage unit
Unit 5 Utility unit
Unit 6 Utility unit
Wind Direction
Commercial Area
Resident
Area
Wind Direction
Equipment Screening Algorithm
대상공정에 대한 세부요소 분석
물질의 특성
NFPA rating 3 이상
운전조건
초고온, 초저온상태
액화가스, 압축가스, 가연성물질에 따라 분류
유량
공정에 따른 상대적 유량
안전장치
Preventive safety device
장치의 연수
사고사례
Screening 기준
Equipment Screening Engine (Rule-Based)
Chemical Property NFPA rating Combustion of Heat
Flash Point
Operating Condition Pressure
Temperature
Flow Rate
Age
(averaging age) Safety Device
Preventive Device Mitigative Device)
Accident History Repaired History Failure Rate
(yr-1)
REPAIRED HISTORY
ACCIDENT HISTORY
FAILURE RATE
AGE
SAFETY DEVICE
OPERATING CONDITION
FLOW RATE
MATERIAL PROPERTY
Sequential Reasoning
Consequence Analysis Probability Analysis
기준에 따른 절대값 상대적 지침
Preventive Safeguard Failure Probability
최종 우선순위를 위한 참고지침
Screening guideword의 우선순위에 대한 기준
HIRA(Hazard Identification and Ranking)
Khan & Abbasi (1998)
Relative ranking method
Two Indices:
Fire and Explosion Damage Index (FEDI)
Toxic Damage Index (TDI)
It provides quantitative scores;
Easy interpretation of results
Comparison of hazards
Relative Sensitivity Analysis
공정변수들이 시나리오 결과에 미치는 영향의 정도를 비교
무차원군으로 표현
± 10% change
Heat of combustion (i.e., material itself)
Operating pressure
Operating temperature
Quantity (or flow rate)
x y x x
y y S
xyln ln
∂
= ∂
∂
∂
=
Relative Sensitivity Analysis
- Results
Analysis Results (김, 2000)
물질의 종류/양(유속)이 공정 온도/압력보다 더 민감한 변수
±10% Changes Relative Sensitivity Heat of combustion 0.33 (avg.)
Operating pressure under 10E-4
Operating temperature under 10E-4
Quantity (or flow rate): 0.33 (avg.)
Relative Sensitivity Analysis
- Results
0 0.5
R e la ti v e Se n si ti v ity
Relative Sensitivity A nalysis Results
Hc Temp.
Pres s .
Quan.
Equipment Screening Algorithm
Operating Condition
Flow-rate
Safety Device
Age
Accident History Material Property
액화가스: 2 kg/cm2 이상 압축가스: 10kg/cm2 이상 가연성 액체: 상온 상압 이상
유량5 kg/s 이상
Interlock system이나 비상밸브의 장착 여부
평균수명 이상 되는 장치 여부
유사장치나 공정의 사고 유무 NFPA rating 3 이상
(Nh Nf Nr)
A B C D E F G H I DESCRIPTION
Guideword Component
Equipment Behavior Analysis-1
(Equipment Failure and Cause Reasoning Algorithm)
Qualitative analysis
장치의 fail 여부에 따른 분석(Forward, Backward)
각 장치별로 작성
각 장치의 이상원인과 결과 추론
Property of materials
Material의 특성에 따른 등급 부여
Toxicity, Flammability
NFPA rating
Equipment Behavior Analysis-2
Heat Exchanger, High Pressure
Leak Rupture Fouling
Valve
Open Closed
Rupture Leak
Pump
On Off
Seal Leak/Rupture
Casing Leak/Rupture
Equipment Failure and Cause Reasoning Algorithm(EFaCRA)
Failure Mode
Cause Reasoning(Backward) Effect Reasoning(Forward)
Effect Propagation (Internal/External)
Ultimate Effect (Possible Accidents)
Effect Calculation
Preventive Measure /Emergency Plan Cause analysis for Failure mode
(Internal/External)
Root Cause
Safeguard
Equipment Failure and Cause Reasoning Algorithm(EFaCRA)
Fail Closed (No flow)
Internal
External External
Internal Motor failure
Malfunction
Indicator error Electricity shut-down Sedimentation
Internal high pressure
Rapid eddy
No flow External stream
Back-flow Inlet high flow/pressure
Cause Effect
Corrosion Abrasion Mechanical
error
Sensor failure Abrupt reaction
Impurity upstream
Valve breakage
Downstream failure Downstream
equipment breakage
Root Cause Ultimate Effect
Accident Reasoning Algorithm
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ALGORITHM
:RULE
Fire...
Personnel Injury Explosion
...
Equipment Damage Toxic Material Release Accident Scenarios
Knowledge Base
Material Property Knowledge Base
Material Hazard
Index Ultimate
Effect EFaCRA
NFPA Rating
Case Study-1
가연성액체 저장 설비 및 loading 설비
Tank truck으로 부터 가연성액체를 padding 상태로 T-1에 저장
Valve 7개, 저장탱크 1개, 펌프 1개
PICA-1
TIA-1
LIA-1
PI-1
FICA-1
To the next process
FV-1 V-4
P-1 V-3
1”
4”
V-1 1”
From tank truck
RV-1
V-6
PV-2
1”
1” PV-1
V-7 To atmosphere Nitrogen To flare
Flammable Storage Tank T-1
V-2 V-5
Equipment Screening Algorithm
Operating Condition
Flow-rate
Safety Device
Age
Accident History Material Property
액화가스: 2 kg/cm2 이상 압축가스: 10kg/cm2 이상 가연성액체: 상압 이상
유량5 kg/s 이상
Interlock system이나 비상밸브의 장착 여부
평균수명 이상 되는 장치 여부
유사장치나 공정의 사고 유무 NFPA rating 3 이상
(Nh Nf Nr)
V-1 V-3 V-4 V-5 V-6 V-7 PV-1 PV-2 FV-1 DESCRIPTION
Guideword Component
V-2 P-1
Equipment Behavior Analysis Algorithm
Equip. Mode
Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Valve
(V-5) on the feed line
Fail open
Motor failure Malfunction
Sensor failure Electric shut-down
Excess flow of flammable liquid to
the storage tank High level in the
storage tank
May cause tank rupture
due to overpressure
Flam- mable
liquid
A (Fire)
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking
Valve (V-5) on the feed line
Fail closed
Motor failure Malfunction Sensor failure
Electric shut-down
Sedimentation Impurity upstream
No flow of flammable liquid to
the reactor Overpressure of inlet of the pump
P-1
Overpressure of the tank truck
Internal high pressure back-flow to
the Cavern
May cause tank rupture
due to overpressure May cause valve
breakage
Flamm able liquid
Flamm able liquid
A (Equip.d
amage /fire)
A (Equip.d
amage /fire)
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Valve
(V-5) on the feed line
Leak Corrosion
Abrasion Outer impact
Small release of flammable liquid to
the surrounding area
Release of flammable liquid
Flamm able liquid
B (Fire)
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking
Valve (V-5) on the feed line
Rup- Ture
Corrosion
Abrasion Outer impact
Large release of flammable liquid to
the surrounding Area
Release of flammable liquid
Flamm able liquid
A (Fire)
Case Study-2
C3 이송, 저장, 공급시설
해양의 선박으로부터 공급 받아 지하동굴형 저장시설(cavern)에 저장한 후, 공급
Cavern, dryer 5개, stripper 2개, odorant storage tank, inhibitor storage tank,
heater 3개, pump 26개, valve 67개 등으로
구성
C3/C4 Storage Tank
Inhibitor Drum
Odorant Drum
C3/C4 Cavern
Dryer
N2 Storage Tank Air Stripper
C3/C4 Heater
Boosting Pump Unloading Arm
Loading Arm Vent Stack
Air
Stripper pump
Methanol Injection Pump
Odorant Injection Pump C3/C4 transfer Pump
V-1
V-2
V-4 V-3
V-5
V-6
V-7
V-8
V-9 V-10
V-11
V-13 V-12 P-1
P-2
P-3
P-4 P-5
P-6 H-1
A
B C
D E F
G
H
I J
K
L
M
N
C3/C4
Control Room
Utility Area
Education Center Office
Dining &
Rest Room
Power Facility Gate
Unloading Area
SEA
SEA
Cavern Area
Residential Area
Air Comp.
Stream
NO. Fluid Temperature ( C)
Pressure (kg/cm2G)
Flow Rate m3/h (ton/h)
Density (kg/m3)
A C3 Liquid -45 5.0 2000 585
B C3 Liquid -45 3.4 2000 585
C C3 Liquid -45 9.0 2000 585
D C3 Liquid -45 8.9 2000 585
E C3 Liquid 2 7.6 2000 527
F C3 Liquid 8.8 16.7 1568 517
G C3 Liquid 8.8 16.4 608 517
H C3 Liquid 8.8 14.4 608 517
I C3 Gas 5 6.1 - -
J Water
/C3 Gas 7.1 8.3 250 1010
K Water 7.2 0 350 1010
L Nitrogen AMB. 4.0 - -
M MeOH AMB. 24 4.5 0.79
N ROH AMB. 24 0.3 0.84
Operating Condition
Flow-rate
Safety Device
Age
Accident History Material Property
액화가스: 2 kg/cm2 이상 압축가스: 10kg/cm2 이상 가연성액체: 상압 이상
유량600 m3/H 이상
Interlock system이나 비상밸브의 장착 여부
평균수명 이상 되는 장치 여부
유사장치나 공정의 사고 유무 NFPA rating 3 이상
(Nh Nf Nr)
H1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 V1 V2 V3 DESCRIPTION
Guideword Component
P1 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13
Equip. Mode Cause (Root Cause)
Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Valve
(V-5) on the line to the dryer
Fail open
Motor failure Malfunction
Sensor failure Low hydraulic
pressure
Electric shut-down
Excess flow of Flammable liquid
to the dryer
High level in the dryer
Overpressure in the dryer
May cause tank rupture due to over-
pressure
C3 (L.G)
A (Fire/Ex -plosion)
Equip. Mode Cause (Root Cause)
Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Valve (V-
5) on the line to the
dryer
Fail closed
Motor failure Malfunction Sensor failure Low hydraulic
pressure Electric shut-down
No flow of C3 to the dryer tank Low level in the dry
and dry tank Internal high pressure
Rapid eddy Back-flow to cavern
High pressure of outlet pump in the
cavern
Inlet pump fail due to high pressure
May cause tank rupture in the cavern
May cause valve breakage
C3 (L.G)
C3 (L.G)
C (Pump Damage)
A (Fire.Expl
-osion)
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Valve
(V-5) on the line to the dryer
Leak Corrosion
Abrasion Outer impact
Small release Of C3 to the
surrounding area
Release of C3 C3 (L.G)
B (Fire/Ex -plosion)
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Valve
(V-5) on the line to the dryer
Rup- ture
Corrosion Abrasion
Outer impact
Large release of C3 to the surrounding
area
Release of C3 C3 (L.G)
A (Fire/Ex -plosion)
Equip. Mode
Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Heat
exchang er(H-1)
on the feed line to
the cavern
Leak (tube
To shell)
Corrosion
Abrasion
Outer impact
Over flow rate or high pressure of
inlet line
Small release of C3 to the
shell side
Less flow of C3 to the cavern
High pressure of water stream Low pressure of inlet stream to the
cavern
Release of C3 C3 (L.G)
B (Fire/Ex -plosion)
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Heat
exchang er(H-1)
on the feed line to
the cavern
Rup- ture (tube
To shell)
Corrosion Abrasion
Outer impact Over flow rate
or high pressure of
inlet line
Large release of C3 to the
shell side No flow of C3 to
the cavern
High pressure of water stream
May cause shell side rupture due to overpressure
Heat exchange damage
C3 A
(Fire/Ex -plosion)
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Heat
exchang er(H-1)
on the feed line to
the cavern
Leak (tube
To Exter -nall)
Corrosion
Abrasion Outer impact
Small release of water to the
surrounding area
Less flow of water in the
shell side
Lowering function of heat
exchanger
Heat- exchanger
damage
Water -
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Heat
exchang er(H-1)
on the feed line to
the cavern
Rup- ture (tube
To Exter -nal)
Corrosion
Abrasion Outer impact
Large release of water to the
tube area No flow of water in the
shell side Malfunction of
exchanger
Heat- exchanger
damage
Water -
Equip. Mode Cause (Root Cause)
Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Heat
exchang er(H-1)
on the feed line to
the cavern
Plugg ed (tube side)
Sedimentation Abrupt reaction
Impurity upstream
Outlet valve fail
No flow of C3 to the cavern
Internal high pressure Rapid eddy
Back-flow to the pump (P-1) High pressure
of inlet pump Inlet pump fail
due to high pressure
May cause tube rupture
due to overpressure
Pump and heat exchanger
damage
C3 -
Equip. Mode Cause
(Root Cause) Effect Ultimate
Effect Mat.
Relative Risk Ranking Heat
exchang er(H-1)
on the feed line to
the cavern
Plugg ed (shell
side
Abrupt reaction
Impurity in shell side
Lowering function of heat
exchanger
Heat- exchanger
damage
- -
결론 및 제안사항
Fault tree analysis와 effect analysis와의 연계
Accident probability와 accident consequence analysis로의 확장
Accident Probability
Hazard
Identification Accident Consequence
정량적 추론 정량적 추론
Hazard Analysis
ARA 분석결과의 정량화 가능성
Ultimate effect와 material property의 정량화 Ultimate effect의 고려
Release of material
Equipment failure
Downstream fail
Upstream fail
각각의 ultimate effect에 대한 penalty
크기에 따른 penalty(1-5)
Material property에 대한 penalty
복합 특성 등급 사용(0-16)
Release of material(5) Equipment fail(3) Downstream fail(2)
Upstream fail(2)
C3(4) EO(12)
Am(3) C3(4)
Magnitude of Potential Damage And Possible Accident
물질의 복합특성
Ultimate Effect
Material Property (복합물질 등급 또는 MF)
Release of material Equipment breakage
Upstream fail Downstream fail에 대한
PENALTY
발생가능 사고유형 및 등급 Fire
Explosion Toxic release Equipment damage
이상원인에 대한 상황 및 근본 이상
원인 이상으로 발생 가
능한 상황