6.1 Our approach
This case study is being developed to enhance our understanding of the conditions that justify the delivery of dedicated freight transport infrastructure to serve Australia’s major container ports.
The Stage 1 Report identified a set of principles for considering dedicated and priority freight infrastructure. The study found that there is a range of demand and supply factors that drive the viability of dedicated and priority fright infrastructure.
Principles of demand include:
► The presence of conflicts between freight and other users of the transport network
► The size of the freight task
► Distances that freight movements are required to travel
► General network congestion around ports and other key freight centres
► Land use planning considerations
► Amenity issues
► Safety and environmental concerns
► Industry demand and willingness to pay for infrastructure.
Principles of supply include:
► Capacity constraints around ports and other key freight centres
► Cost effectiveness in delivering priority freight infrastructure
► Form of infrastructure and design to address freight issues.
The case study features a project designed to overcome congestion and conflicts on the network, and to enhance nearby amenity, in order to drive growth in productivity to support the freight task.
These project objectives represent a blend of the key principles of demand for the potential need for dedicated freight infrastructure. On the supply side, capacity constraints are also identified as a key driver for the project.
6.2 Key findings from the analysis
The analysis of the baseline traffic data confirms the problem statements and the presence of demand-side pre-conditions that warrant consideration of dedicated freight infrastructure as a way of enhancing access to the Port and removing conflicts that exist between freight vehicles and other road users on heavily congested sections of Melbourne’s road network.
However, we also observe that these problems are not localised to just one or two road links, but instead affect much of the road network to the west of the Port, as well as the M1 corridor. We also understand that the spread of development across Yarraville, which contains a mix of industrial and residential land uses, creates a complex pattern of mixed freight and private motor vehicle traffic, which poses a challenge for the design of effective dedicated freight infrastructure. For example, it may be that the share of traffic in the area that actually uses the Port might not constitute enough of the local transport task to justify the delivery of cost-effective priority links.
Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
Our analysis of the project shows that the addition of the new link would attract both heavy and private vehicle traffic away from Francis Street and Somerville Road. This highlights that the new link would not be expected to operate as a priority freight link unless some other supporting measures were put in place. These measures could include vehicle restrictions and/or tolling measures.
The large reductions in traffic on both Francis Street and Somerville Road result in significant speed increases on Somerville Road and modest increases on Francis Street. However, the introduction of the new link would have a small impact on flows and speeds on the West Gate. Rather than improving the operation of this key arterial motorway, the project would instead provide a bypass for congested lower level roads.
User benefits from reduced journey times and operating costs provide the majority of the economic benefits for the project. This result is consistent with the analysis of the impact of the project on modelled link flows and speeds. However, the fact that large volumes of cars and trucks would be expected to remain on the streets of Yarraville to service surrounding land uses calls into question the potential for the project to deliver significant amenity benefits for local residents. It is envisaged that the directions outlined in the Victorian Government’s freight and logistics plan, supported by national port and freight strategies and investments, will make a meaningful contribution to addressing these needs.
Analysis of the performance of the new link shows that volumes are low compared to modelled capacity. As such, the case for making this a dedicated freight link is difficult to justify and risks eroding the benefits of the project. In effect, the project eliminates many of the pre-conditions for dedicated freight infrastructure when provided with open access to all users.
In any case, we have considered the potential impacts of delivering the project as a dedicated freight link. This would re-direct almost 2,000 private motor vehicles back onto the other parts of the road network in the AM peak, including around 500 cars on Francis Street and around 300 cars on Somerville Road.
Diverting traffic back onto the nearby parts of the road network would erode the speed increases and eliminate much of the time savings for private motor vehicles. This would significantly reduce the estimates of economic benefits in the evaluation (perhaps by as much as 25 to 50%).
An alternative option would be to restrict access to private motor vehicles during other times of the day (i.e. during the inter-peak period), when private motor vehicle traffic is reduced, as a way of providing a near-ultimate level of service for the freight sector. However, it is likely that the operational performance of the new link is even better during the inter-peak and off-peak periods when general traffic levels are reduced, further weakening the need for the link to be provided as a priority freight measure.
Our financial and commercial analysis has further underlined the difficulty of delivering the project as a priority freight link on a commercial and/or cost-effective basis. Tolling scenarios would fall short of full cost recovery, meaning that the Government would be expected to be a major financial contributor to the project.
6.3 Overall conclusion
While a range of demand and supply pre-conditions appear to be in place for a priority freight link to support the operation of the PoM and ensure it is better integrated with priority freight links in the west of Melbourne, the project as defined does not constitute a suitable form of dedicated freight infrastructure.
This could be due to a number of demand and supply factors, including:
Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
A study of the potential for dedicated freight infrastructure in Australia Ernst & Young ÷ 118
► The size of the freight task, while large, may not justify investment in priority infrastructure given the extent of other traffic types in the area (demand).
► The patterns of demand in the inner-west of Melbourne are diverse and involve a number of origin-destination flows that are not related to the Port, meaning that it is not possible to disentangle these flows and target freight demand through a single infrastructure investment (demand).
► The existence of alternative routes to access the Port from the M1 corridor via CityLink and other strategic connections, reduces the criticality of improving connections to the west.
► The form of design has not been developed with the aim of prioritising freight infrastructure, and if this was an overarching objective, then the design solution might be better targeted at addressing PoM access issues (supply).
► The nature of the existing road layout and other barriers (natural or otherwise) may limit the opportunity to develop cost effective solutions on the west side of the Port (supply). This recognises that there may be an access problem on the west of the Port, but that there may be insurmountable barriers to developing suitable dedicated freight infrastructure.
While each of these causes are possible, the case study also highlights that the need for dedicated freight infrastructure would be limited when alternative network modifications provide a feasible way of addressing the perceived problems. It is only when there is a lack of alternative network options available that the case for investing in dedicated freight infrastructure is strengthened. In this example, it might be when congestion on the M1 corridor reaches a certain level and spills over onto the new route that it becomes imperative to restrict access to private motor vehicles in order to prioritise freight flows.
Should this occur, and as the size of the PoM freight task continues to grow, we may reach a point where the market, including road freight operators and the PoMC, may start to demand and be willing to pay for a tailored infrastructure solution to strengthen the connection between the Port and key transport links in the west of Melbourne.
Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
CASE STUDY 2: BRISBANE
Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development
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