Introduction

Chapter 5

Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe and North

salient within the EU; they remain of great importance in the North American context. With this understanding about the differences between Europe and North America in broad institutional context, one can discuss the experience of cross-border cooperation in the two continents with a focus on the motivation and structure of cross-border cooperation. It appears that the North American context rather than the European context is closer to the realities of Northeast Asia in which the Korea-Japan strait zone is located.

However, the European experience serves as a model for cross-border cooperation from which Asian countries can learn.

1.1 A Classification of Cross-Border Regions

Reflecting upon the empirical variance of cross-border regions in Europe and North America, a tentative typology can be developed to illustrate important differences. First, cross-border region (CBRs) can be distinguished on the basis of the respective ‘border regimes’ they are embedded in. In an

‘open border’ scenario, the rationale for cross-border cooperation is provided by continuing erosion of border barriers and steady convergence of political and economic conditions in the regions involved. A ‘persisting’ border scenario prevails where borders are only selectively opened to allow for specific transactions while the friction of these same borders is maintained or even increased for other transactions. The rationale for cross-border cooperation is based on the persistence of the differences between the nation state territories concerned, for instance as complementary locational advantages.

Second, CBRs differ regarding the role of their policy context, comprising central state policies, inter-state agreements and macro-regional initiatives in establishing them and facilitating their ongoing operation. For many CBRs, explicit bi- or tri-national agreements or even central state

interventions were crucial for generating the conditions for their emergence.

This is particularly pronounced in 'persisting border' scenarios. In the US-Mexican case, for example, a narrow strip of US-Mexican territory immediately adjacent to the US border was declared as a Special Economic Zone by the Mexican government. In this case, the interest lies in exploiting persisting factor price differentials and other locational disparities.

Conversely, central state intervention played a lesser role in most European cases where the initiatives usually came from local and regional authorities, sometimes even in opposition to central state forces. European CBRs can thus be conceived as part of the broader tendency of European

‘Neo-regionalism’, providing new opportunity structures for regional and local authorities (Balme 1996). A look at the empirical manifestation of CBC types shows that actual cases will often cluster within two out of the four possible quadrants of the cross-table resulting from the above consideration (Table 5.1):

a) CBRs induced by Inter-State agreements or unilaterally within persisting border scenarios (in the following: type A CBRs)

b) Supranationally induced CBRs within open border scenarios, often in a context where subnational entities – such as districts, regions or municipalities – are relevant players (type B CBRs)

Out of these two clusters, European CBRs can be largely associated with type B, i.e. they are embedded into an open border scenario – provided by the context of European integration – and supported and facilitated by a supranational policy-maker, notably the European Union, in conjunction with subnational authorities. In contrast, North American cases especially in the US-Mexican border regions belong to type A.

1.2 Different Modes of Governance: Policy-Driven and Market- Driven CBRs

If one looks more closely at the logic according to which various types of CBRs operate, one recognises that there is often a difference as to how Type A and Type B CBRs are governed. Before this difference can be explored, it should be noted, however, that all CBRs have in common that they are not ‘regions’ in the conventional juridico-political sense. For they are not formal administrative units subordinate to a national state bureaucracy nor do they normally have mechanisms that allow for binding popular-democratic representation. CBRs are therefore not ‘governed’ in a conventional, territorial sense – they have no ‘government’.

By contrast, CBRs are governed through partial and irregular structures that often operate in a network-like manner. Two main levels of these networks can be distinguished.

On the micro-level, the integration of cross-border spaces – and hence the building of functional CBRs - is based on the proliferation and/or reactivation of social and/or economic relationships. The US-Mexican border offered a similarly favourable opportunity structure that induced a thriving Maquiladora industry.

By contrast, on the meso-level, governance involves cooperative relationships between public and other bodies that share certain interests, such as coping with environmental interdependencies or creating cross-border economic spaces. These networks often emerge in response to the failures of central state authorities, with local and regional actors exploiting the new opportunity structures created by rationalization and globalisation.

Examples are provided by most European CBRs but also ‘compensatory’

meso-level networks that emerge as a reaction to the interdependencies created by micro-level cross-border integration, such as on the US-Mexican border (Scott 1999).

One important conclusion that can be drawn from these considerations is that a strong degree of micro-level integration will often be associated with Type A cases where a persisting-border scenario – possibly created and reproduced via government intervention – creates strong incentives for the exploitation of factor price differentials, trade opportunities, etc. These cases represent market-driven cases of CBRs. By contrast, a strong degree of meso-level integration will often be associated with an open-border scenario where a supranational authority in cooperation with regional bodies promotes the building of policy-coordinating institutions across borders, often preceding the micro-level integration of border territories into functional regions. These cases represent policy-driven cases of CBRs.

Results from the discussion above are schematically presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 A framework to classify Cross-border Regions

Border scenario

open Persisting

Inter-State-induced

Type A: Maquiladoras &

growth triangles (market-driven)

Supranationally induced

Type B: European micro-CBRs

(policy-driven)