He is the author of numerous books and reports, including "Threat Assessment of North Korea's Nuclear Capability," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2006, p. A Nuclear-Armed North Korea and South Korea's Strategic Countermeasures,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.XVI, No.2, Fall 2004, p.
For example, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on the outcome of the first round of six-party talks. On the other hand, despite North Korea's persistent violations, the Korean government adheres to the letter and spirit of the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization.
Experiences and Lessons
It is in the national security interests of the United States (A) to facilitate on a priority basis the transportation, storage, protection, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons in the Soviet Union, its republics, and any successor entity, and (B) to help prevent the spread of weapons. Ukraine as a nuclear armed republic of the former Soviet Union has become a major recipient of CTR programs.
Motivations and Possible Scenarios
The cooperative denuclearization of North Korea can only become a success if cooperation is achieved both from North Korea and from the international community, the main members of which would be the participants of the Six-Party Talks. As the focal point of the Six-Party Talks, cooperative denuclearization will move the talks from negotiation to an implementation phase. In this course, North Korea will rejoin the NPT and IAEA membership, sign the Additional Protocol, and accept full IAEA safeguards inspections.
Articulating that it is the main objective of the Six-Party Talks to dismantle North Korea's existing nuclear weapons and infrastructure, the joint statement is international proof that North Korea is indeed a nuclear weapons state. And they agreed to discuss the topic of providing a light water reactor to North Korea at an appropriate time in the future. This means that advance preparation for cooperative denuclearization is necessary regardless of the outcome of the talks.
A similar intensity of inspection by the ISG-Iraq Survey Group could be anticipated. North Korea.67 However, South Koreans kept in mind the main lessons of German unification. Here again, one would expect a similar intensity of inspection carried out by the ISG in Iraq.
North Korea’s Nuclear Capability
80 “Overview of North Korea's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities in the Early 1990s,” in David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and Security International, 2000), p. 83 David Albright, "Discrepancies in North Korea's Statement to the IAEA," in David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2000) , p. 84 North Korea's Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment, p. 95 North Korea's Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment, p. 96 Statement by a spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Korean Central News Agency, May 11, 2005.
Given that North Korea has been conducting high-explosive tests for nearly two decades, the IISS found that the US CIA also indicated that North Korea had gained a tactical advantage due to ambiguity about its nuclear capability. In the fall of 2004, rumors circulated in Seoul and Washington that North Korea would soon conduct a nuclear test.
On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test near the Chik-tong deposit, P'unggye-yok. Undoubtedly, North Korea has the low-level technologies necessary to build primitive nuclear devices. The number of nuclear devices that North Korea can have depends on North Korea's technical capabilities and target yield.
Cooperative Denuclearization of North Korea
Based on the recognition of the merits of a multilateral formula, a CSIS study compares the skills and capabilities of potential participants in the cooperative denuclearization of North Korea. 138 The Bush administration has upheld the principle of the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement – CVID – of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Therefore, it is reasonable to establish a new verification body to meet the new demand created by a cooperative denuclearization process for North Korea.
All participants in the Six-Party Talks assume that North Korea receives some rewards in exchange for abandoning its WMD options. In the worst case where North Korea is in chaos, a cooperative denuclearization process would only be viable once the chaotic situation is resolved. In principle, the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear capability, permanent verification and monitoring can be carried out.
A CSIS report estimated that the total cost of North Korea's cooperative denuclearization would be $200 to $500 million.170. 169 Larry Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, May 1, 2003), p. Politically, it would be a minimalist approach if the United States, Japan, and North Korea maintained business relations just enough to pursue a cooperative denuclearization process.
Key Issues and Recommendations
Improve access and transparency: The inherently closed nature of North Korean society will be a major stumbling block to a cooperative denuclearization process. Designate an overall coordinator: Denuclearization of North Korea is intended to complete the thus far half-achieved mission of a denuclearized Korea. 181 For example, North Korea criticized that the NPT merely reflected past situations and was discriminatory and unbalanced.
Since the inception of the NPT, various forms of security assurances have been provided individually or collectively to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. There are two different forms of security assurance: Conditional Negative Security Assurance (NSA) and Positive Security Assurance (PSA). This positive security assurance was adopted in Security Council Resolution no. 255 on 19 June 1968, shortly before the signing of the NPT.
The participants in the six-party talks must therefore persuade North Korea to return to the NPT by emphasizing the security merits of the Treaty. Providing appropriate financial resources will be a key task in a cooperative denuclearization process for North Korea. Considering North Korea's strong desire to operate light water reactors on its soil, the joint statement of the 4th round of the Six-.
To amend the Arms Export Control Act to authorize the President to transfer battle tanks, artillery pieces, and armored fighting vehicles to member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in conjunction with the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. Materials received by the United States Government under this section and suitable for inclusion in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve or the National Defense Stockpile may be deposited in the reserve or stockpile without refund.
Other materials and services received may be sold or traded in the domestic or international markets with the proceeds deposited into the General Fund of the Treasury. It is the opinion of the Senate that the Conference Committee on House Joint Resolution 157 should consider granting the necessary authority in the conference agreement to the President to transfer funds under this title. Desiring to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, thus creating an environment and conditions favorable to peace and peaceful unification of our country and contributing to peace and security in Asia and the world.
The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, will carry out inspections of facilities selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with the procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North. Joint Nuclear Control Commission. The South and the North, in order to implement this joint declaration, shall establish and operate a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission within one month of the entry into force of this joint declaration. This Joint Declaration shall enter into force on the day both parties exchange the appropriate instruments after completing their respective procedures to bring it into force.
THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF FORMER SOVIET UNION
Some states are pursuing uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities for weapons programs, in violation of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT and to the declarations made in Kananaskis and Evian, and we will work to prevent the illicit misuse of nuclear materials and technology. We announce the following new actions to reduce the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by terrorists, while enabling the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.
To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without increasing the risk of proliferation, we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential are not exported to states who may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into the hands of terrorists. We will work to amend the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines as appropriate and to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the future. We will also develop new measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including nuclear fuel and related services, on market terms, for all States, consistent with keeping commitments and non-proliferation standards.
The Additional Protocol should become a new essential standard in the field of nuclear supply agreements. We support the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation with states that violate their nuclear non-proliferation and defense obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with national governments or the Security Council. To increase the integrity and effectiveness of the IAEA and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements, we will work together to establish a new Special Committee of the Board of Governors of the IAEA.
Proliferation Security Initiative
The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
Directly, and through the relevant international mechanisms, we will actively work with states that require assistance to improve their national capacities to meet international norms.