Barro-Gordon
disinflation Barro-Gordon
,
Markov Regime-Switching
EMS
, , ,
,
,
,
2
1 2008
, Markov Regime-Switching
2 U.S. National Monetary Commission, Interviews on the Banking and Currency Systems, p. 26 2000
convertability
Eichengreen 1996 commitment
,
3
EMS; European Monetary System
4
5
,
EMS
credibility hypothesis EMS disinflation
Giavazzi and Giovannini 1987 Giavazzi and Spaventa
1989 EMS
Deutsche Bundesbank
, EMS
Deutsche Mark Zone: DM-Zone 6 ,
EMS
,
3 Krugman 1991 honeymoon effect
4 Weber 1991 credibility bonus
5 EU
EMS 1 125
,
6 Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989 , De Grauwe 2003
7
Cohen and Wyplosz 1989 EMS
asymmetrical 8 EMS
, EMS
, Discipline hypothesis 9
EMS
1979 4 , 7 EMS
1992 3 1992 9 , 1996 11 EMS
EMS , , ,
EMS 10
, , 1992 3 EMS ,
EMS
2 EMS EMS
, 3 Barro-Gordon
4
1970 2004 EMS
Mishkin 1981 Hamilton 1992 Barro-Gordon
5
7 Barro and Gordon 1983 2
8
9 Weber 1991 Weber 3 hard currency
soft currency ,
10 EMS
EMS
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
13 0 17 8 11 8 12 3 18 6 17 2 15 2 15 0 11 2 9 0
2.1. 11
1971 Smithsonian Agreement
12
, 1972
Snake 13 1973
,
,
1920 hyperinflation , 1930
begger thy neighbor
,
14
1950
EU
1979 4 EMS EMS
ECU; European Currency Unit , credit facility ,
ERM; Exchange Rate Mechanism 15 ERM
11 2004 , De Grauwe 2003
12 4.5 4.5
9
13 ,
snake in the tunnel 14 Eichengreen 1996
adjustable peg central parity
, 16
17
, consultation
18
ECU EU
1979 3 , ,
, , , , , , 9
1980 , , ECU ,
, , EU
, ECU
ECU
19
ERM ECU
20 parity grid ,
ECU ,
ECU ERM
marginal intervention
,
intra-marginal intervention
15 ECU 2004
16 1989 2 5 6 0 , 1992 1 125 1992 93
1993 8 15
17 marginal intervention
18 realignment
19 ECU 2004
20
Eichengreen 1996
,
, EMS ,
, 3
2 2
1992 93 ERM
Optimal Currency Area ,
Mundell 1961 , Mckinnon 1963 , Vaubel 1976 Mundell, Mckinnon
, 1970
1
, 2 , 3 , 4
, 5 seignorage
1979 EMS EMS
, EMS
21
, 1979 90 12 22
21 2004
22 1979 90
1979 09 24 2 , 2 9
1979 10 30 4 8
1981 04 09 6
1981 10 05 5 5 , 3 , 3 , 3 5
1982 02 22 8 5 , 3
1982 06 14 4 25 , 5 75 , 2 75 , 4 25
1983 04 21 5 5 , 2 5 , 2 5 , 3 5 ,
1 5 , 2 5 , 2 5
1985 07 22 2 , 2 , 6 , 2 , 2 ,
2 , 2
1986 03 07 2 , 3 , 3 , 1 , 1
1986 08 04 8
1987 01 12 3 , 3 , 2 , 2
1990 01 08 3 7 2 5 1 125
uncovered interest parity
Svensson 1991 , Rose and Svensson 1995 , Frankel and Phillips 1992 , Gomez-Puig and Montalvo 1996 , Tillman 2003 23
Rose and Svensson 1995
, ,
1 rF F S 1 rG rF , rG , F S
F , S
F S ,
Tillman 2003 Var vector autoregressive Markov Regime-Switching
24 Tillman
Regime , EMS
spread ,
25
Gibson 2003 Survival analysis
Gibson reputation
26
Giavazzi and Giovannini 1987 , Giavazzi and Spaventa 1989 , Cohen and Wyplosz
1989 , EMS
EMS ,
23 Gomez-Puig and Montalvo 1996 , Tillman 2003 Markov Regime-Switching
24 Barro-Gordon ,
EMS
25 positive
negative
26 Setzer 2004
1992 93 27 Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993
1992 93 ,
Gerlach and Smets 1995
1992 93 EMS ,
Krugman 1979 ,
Krugman
Krugman 1
EMS EMS
EMS
EMS
28
, EMS
Obstfeld 1994 EMS
2
1989 ,
27 Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti 1998
28 convergence play carry trade Eichengreen 2000
1992
0 25
,
EMS
EMS 29
Eichengreen 1996 EMS 1987 soft EMS hard EMS
, soft EMS 2 25 ,
6 0 , hard EMS
1 125 1980
, , , wide band Soft EMS
hard EMS 1980
EMS 1980
30
EMS 1980
1992 93 ,
, ERM
31
EMS
EMS ERM
29 EMS
Flandreau 1997 Eichengreen
30 1991 12 1 , 2 EMS , 3
EU ERM , 1992 9
1993 11
31
1 125 15 EMS
32
Barro and Gordon 1983
A, B A
, B
33
A B
,
B 0 ,
0 Q
R
S
T T Q
T A B
E
A B
Pa B Z B
32 2004 , De Grauwe 2003
33 Barro and Gordon 1983 A hard-nosed , B wet
B S
, T B
34
, B A
A A
Barro-Gordon ,
,
35
36
34 EMS A B
, A
[De Grauwe 2003 ] ECB Duisenberg
35 Masson 1995 EMS
1.125 36 Pelkmans 2001 2004
π
Pa
π
Pa C
R
Q S
D E
A B
T
Barro-Gordon Loss function
3 1 L π π 2 b u u 2
L , π , π targeted , u
, u , b
0 , u λun λ< 1,
3 2 u un a πe π ε
πe , ε stochastic
,
3 2 3 1 ,
3 3 L π2 b a πe π 1 λ un ε 2
3 3 L ,
a2b ab 1 λ ab
3 4 π 1 a2b ·πe 1 a2b · un 1 a2b ·ε
a2b ab 1 λ
3 5 πe ·πe · un
1 a2b 1 a2b
3 5 ,
3 6 πe ab 1 – λ · un
3 7 ab
π πe ·ε
1 a2b
3 8 π ab 1 λ · un ab ·ε
1 a2b
3 7 3 2 , 3 8
ab λ
3 9 π ab 1 λ · u ·ε
1 a2b
3 9 ab 1 λ
a ,
b , λ
3 7 3 9 ,
3 10 π ab · u λ π πe u
π πe Mishkin 1981 ,
ab Barro and Gordon 1983
, b
EMS EMS
optimal stabilization path
37
,
4.1. 1970 2004
1970 2004 38
70 80 , 90
2 70
1980 90 10
, 80
1970 78
37 wage setters
Blanchard 2000
38 X12 ,
DataStream Economics
1970 2004 1970 2004
DataStream.
EMS 1979 1992 EMS
1999
2
79 92 , 92 96 , 96 99 , 99 ,
EMS ,
1970 2004 1970 1978
1979 1992 1993 2004
DataStream.
,
1999
Markov Regime-Switching 1970 2004
39
State 1 1972 1 1982 1 π 0 005 2 230·u
0 0008 0 2544
State 2 1971 3 72 3 , 1982 3 1985 1
π 0 005 1 000·u 0 0008 0 0695 State 3 1985 4 2004 1
π 0 005 0 345·u 0 0008 0 1396
1970 2004 3
1972 82 1
, 1982 3 85 1
, 1985 4
2 1982 1985
b EMS
40
, state 1 state 2 1982 3 , state 2 state 3
39
0 98 0 06 0
P 0 0 88 0
0 02 0 06 1 00
40 1979 85 5 3 1992
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
1985 4 EMS 1982
23 5 , 1982 3 85 3 16
1985 4 92 16 7 41
EMS
42
1985 1986
EMS
1989 EMS EMS
1992 EMS 1999
2000
41
, ECU
42 EMS
4.2.
1970 2004
Barro-Gordon Mishkin 1981 , Hamilton 1992 43
44
DataStream.
43 Hamilton 1992 , FIML
44 Mishkin 1981 x 1 pt pt1 Mishkin
Mishkin 1981 Hamilton 1992
4 1 pt1 Xβ μt1
4 2 pet1 Xβ
4 3 Xβ pt1
pt1 t 1 , pet1 t 1
4 1 Mishkin 1981 , Dominguez et al. 1988 4 2
adaptive expectation
, t 1 t t 1
4 1 β 4 2
t 1 4 2
4 3
4 3 t t 1
, unexpected inflation; π–πe
EMS 1980
4.3.
3 4
3 Markov Regime-Switching
3 3 10
3 10 π ab·u λ π πe u
π πe 3 , ‘a’
45
45
State 1 π 0 04677 1 242u 0 2118 π πe u 0 00763 0 4045 0 02277
State 2 π 0 04677 0 0688u 0 2118 π πe u 0 00763 0 0220 0 02277
1971 3 1984 4 1985 1
state 1 β
Dependent Variable: CPI Sample: 1970Q1 2004Q1
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CPI_1 1 526416 0 081403 18 75126 0
CPI_2 0 185344 0 0945 1 919637 0 0232
CPI_3 0 341453 0 080833 4 224207 0
C 0 973155 0 368224 2 642837 0 0092
R-squared 0 999967 Adjusted R-squared 0 999966 Durbin-Watson stat 2 118858
πe–π
0 98 0 02 P 0 02 0 98
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
state 2 state 1 1970 1971 2 , 1985 1
, state 2 1971 3 1984 4 46
EMS
4.4.
3 EMS ,
credibility hypothesis Discipline hypothesis 2
4 4 u un a πe π ε
4 4
commitment , πe π < 0
EMS
, EMS
, ‘a’
47 Markov Regime-Switching
46 EMS
State 1 u 0 1056 0 0028 πe π 0 0065 0 0009 State 2 u 0 1056 0 0231 πe π
0 0065 0 0026
EMS
48
EMS
1980 EMS , 1979 EMS
, 1 125 1992 3
EMS EMS
1983
1995
49
State 1 1972 1 1985 1
47 Barro-Gordon ‘a’ , Lucas 1973
‘a’
, 1 00 0 02
48 P
0 00 0 98 49
0 957 0 011 P
0 043 0 989
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
π 0 1004 0 6886·u 0 0089 0 0911 State 2 1985 2
π 0 0435 0 4292u 0 0037 0 0529
1979 EMS
1986 1992 93 EMS
3 3 10
1971 2008 b
1970 2007 1970 2007
λ 50
State 1 π 0 07670 0 17812u 0 10915 π πe u 0 0003 0 0001 0 0012
State 2 π 0 07670 0 17812u 0 75162 π πe u 0 0003 0 0001 0 0013
50
0 96 0 04 P
0 04 0 96
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
EMS
EMS EMS
, ,
EMS
EMS
1920
,
EMS EMS
,
EMS
,
10 ,
LG
150 721 20
02 3777 0433 02 3777 0400 E-mail: [email protected]
2004 EU ,
2000 1930 ,
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