*
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2.
3.
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3.
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2.
3.
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** , ([email protected])
: 2013. 10. 31. / : 2013. 11. 30. / : 2013. 12. 10.
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.1)
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.2)
,
.
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,
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.
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activism) (institutional investor
activism)
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2007. 4. 26, 34 .
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.
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.8)
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problem) (rational apathy)
.9)
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capitalism) ‘ ’12)
.13)
8) David Hess and Gregorio Impavido, Governance of Public Pension Funds: Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence, Proceedings of the Second Public Pension Fund Management Conference, World Bank, May 2003, p. 3
9) Glyn A. Holton, “Investor Suffrage Movement”, Financial Analysts Journal 62(6), CFA Institute, Nov.-Dec. 2006, p. 15.
10) , , 9 .
11) 48%
. Tiana Nenova, “The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control:
A Cross-Country Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics 68(3), Elsevier, June 2003,
p. 336. , , 146 .
12) . 1995 51.3%
2004 39.4% , (mutual
fund) 12.6% 23.1% 2 (Glyn A. Holton,
op. cit., p. 16). , 2008
2012
15.8% .
, “2012 ‘ ’ ”, 2013. 7. 22, 3 .
13) James P. Hawley and Andrew T. Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make Corporate America More Democratic, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, pp. 42~68.
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, 2008. 12, 367 .
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Development) ‘ , ,
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24) OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing, 2004, pp. 11~12.
25) , “ ”, 뺷 뺸G 22 2 ,
, 2003. 8, 46 .
26) , “ ”, 362 .
27) , “ ”, 뺷 뺸G 51 ,
, 2005. 3, 20 .
28) Robert A. G. Monks, The Emperor’s Nightingale: Restoring the Integrity of the Corporation, Capstone, 1988, pp. 148-149. , “
”, 366~367 .
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29) Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin, “Interpretive bulletin relating to writing statements of investment policy, including proxy voting guidelines”, 29 CFR 2509.94-2, 29 July, 1994.
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(2013. 10. 31 ). 10%
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.
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.
.
, 1992 ( Cadbury Report)
. ,
. 63) Clifton Petty, “Gathering Strength: The Reinforcement of Fiduciary Responsibility for
Proxy Voting”, White Paper Series(#04-03), Pension Consultants Inc., Oct. 2004. pp. 1-2.
64) , , 2 ; , , 23 .
,
2001 Myners Report
(engagement) .65) 2010
(UK Stewardship Code) .
(stewardship responsibility) ,66)
‘Comply or Explain ’
.
. 1997 IMF
, 2002
(
87 , 90 , 91 2 4 ).
.
, (2003. 12. 31.
7059 2 3, 3 3 )
65) Paul Myners, HM Treasury, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review, March 2001, p. 42.
66) UK Stewardship Code 7 .
,
, ,
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, .
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( 64 ).
.
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.
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, 2012. 12.
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, “ ”, 뺷 뺸G 14
2 , , 1995.
, 뺷 Stewardship Code
뺸G & 2011-5 , , 2011. 5. 24.
, “ ”, 뺷 Weekly뺸G
2012-07 , , 2012. 1
, 뺷
뺸, , 2007. 10.
, “ ”, 뺷
뺸G 51 , , 2005. 3.
, “ ”, 뺷LG 뺸, LG
, 2007. 4. 26.
, “ ”, 뺷 뺸G 13 1 ,
, 2006. 3.
, “ ”, 뺷KRX 뺸G 78 ,
, 2011. 8.
, “
-”, 뺷 뺸G 55 ,
, 2007. 4.
, “ ”, 뺷
뺸G
07-01-04, , 2007. 12.
, “ ”, 뺷 뺸G 21
4 , , 2008. 12.
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, , 2008. 12
______, “
-”, 뺷 뺸G 9 1 ,
, 2008.
, “ ”, 뺷
뺸GVol. 6, , 2003.
, 뺷 뺸,
, 1997. 8.
______, “ ”, 뺷 뺸G 17
1 , , 1998.
, “ ”, 뺷 뺸G 22 2 ,
, 2003. 8.
, 뺷 뺸G 20 , , 2012.
, “ ”, 뺷 뺸G
23 3 , , 2013. 7.
, “ ”,
뺷 뺸G 7 1 , , 2008. 6.
, 뺷OECD 뺸G
06-13, , 2008.
, “ ”, 뺷
뺸G 22 4 , , 2008. 12.
, “2012 ‘ ’
”, 2013. 7. 22.
The CEO Score Daily, 2013. 7. 17 , <http://www.ceoscoredaily. com/
news/article.html?no=1769>(2013. 10. 31 )
Clifton Petty, “Gathering Strength: The Reinforcement of Fiduciary Responsibility
for Proxy Voting”, White Paper Series(#04-03), Pension Consultants Inc., Oct. 2004.
David Hess and Gregorio Impavido, Governance of Public Pension Funds:
Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence, Proceedings of the Second Public Pension Fund Management Conference, World Bank, May 2003.
Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin, “Interpretive bulletin relating to writing statements of investment policy, including proxy voting guidelines”, 29 CFR 2509.94-2, 29 July, 1994.
Glyn A. Holton, “Investor Suffrage Movement”, Financial Analysts Journal 62(6), CFA Institute, Nov.-Dec. 2006.
James P. Hawley and Andrew T. Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make Corporate America More Democratic, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.
OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing, 2004.
______, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance, OECD Publishing, 25 Nov. 2011.
Paul Myners, HM Treasury, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom:
A Review, March 2001.
Robert A.G. Monks, The Emperor’s Nightingale: Restoring the Integrity of the Corporation, Capstone, 1988.
Tiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 68(3), Elsevier, June 2003.
SEC, “Final Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies”, 17 CFR Parts 239, 249, 270, and 274, Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922, <http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm>(2013. 10. 31 )
< >
. ·
.
. .
.
.
.
Journal of Legislation Research / 45th Issue
:
The Roles and Tasks of Institutional Investor for Corporate Governance Improvement
Jang, Woo-Young*78)
In today's capital market of Korea, institutional investors have been expected to assume a greater role than other investors, especially in controlling the misconduct of the management. Despite their advantages arising from some cost-saving factors, institutional investors have been passive to control the conflict of interests by exercising the shareholder’s rights. It is attribute to the fact that institutional investors does not have much incentive to exercise the rights as well as previous legal restraints.
Since sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008 spreads over the world, investment environment has been changed to ask institutional investors to exercise their rights more positively. Based on the change of circumstances, this paper focused on the constraints and new possibilities of institutional investors.
* Litigation representative, National Pension Service, Ph.D. in law
