ASEAN to Enhance Cross-Border Enforcement (April 25, 2014)
A Workshop on Enhancing Cross-Border Enforcement in the ASEAN Region – Ecommerce, Cross Border Complaint Sharing and Sweeps was held from 24-25 April in Makati City, the Philippines.
The event acted as a platform for ASEAN member countries to exchange information and deliberate on issues, challenges and best practices regarding handling cross-border consumer complaints, e- commerce cases and developing law enforcement sweeps. Enhancing coordination among consumer protection agencies and the technical capacities and resources of the staff were among the identified challenges in consumer protection law enforcement. The participants also further recognized the importance of consumer education programmes and the usefulness of the ASEAN Committee on Consumer Protection website for consumers in the region to lodge claims and complaints. The United States Federal Trade Commission stressed the importance of ASEAN member states joining the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, a global network of over 50 international members that provides a platform to share information and intelligence on consumer protection trends and cases, as well as key best practices on consumer protection law enforcement and regulatory approaches. (Source: Vietnam Plus)
ASEAN to Advance Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives (April 23, 2014)
During the symposium on ‘Peace and Reconciliation: Principles and Best Practice’, co-organised by the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation and the Institute for Peace and Democracy, Dr.
AKP Mochtan, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for Community and Corporate Affairs, underlined the central role of ASEAN in these mechanisms and processes and how it actively engages partners from within and beyond the region. The ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General went on to say that the efforts by individual ASEAN Member States in resolving conflicts and disputes within their countries were notable. These include the recent signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the “Peace Dialogues” between the Government of Thailand and the representatives of the Muslim communities in the southern border provinces. The Symposium was conducted in four sessions canvassing the following topics: (1) Developing Knowledge and Institutions for Peace Building and Reconciliation in Southeast Asia: Sharing Experiences, Stock- taking Initiatives and Agenda Setting (2) ASEAN Political Security Community Building and Peace Development and Reconciliation: Initiatives in Southeast Asia (3) International and Regional Platform and Experiences in Peace Building and Reconciliation: Dynamics, Challenges and Prospects, and (4) The Development of ASEAN and the Future of Peace Building and Reconciliation in Southeast Asia. (Source: WN)
6th Meeting of the ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts Meeting (ACMA) (April 20, 2014)
The ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts (AMCA) and the AMCA Plus Three (AMCA+3) held their Sixth Meeting in Hue City, Viet Nam on 19 - 20 April 2014. H.E. Pham Binh Minh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam officially opened the meeting. He stressed that the theme of the 6th ACMA on role of culture for sustainable development of the ASEAN Community is ever more meaningful and hoped that the meeting would come up with concrete plans and actions for tangible benefits to all people. During the plenary session, the ministers welcomed the good progress in implementing culture and art measures in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, people-to-people exchanges in the Master Plan on ASEAN
ASEAN News Updates
Prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia
ASEAN NEWSLETTER
Editors: Mr. Steven CM Wong and Mr. Zhi Ming Gan
Inside this issue
Obama’s Asian Visit: Both Symbolic and Substantive Dato’ Steven Wong
ASEAN’s Security Dilemma: A Threat From Within
Billy Tea
25th Anniversary of the Dialogue Partnership between ASEAN and the Republic Of Korea Juita Mohamad., (Ph.D)
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Connectivity and outcomes of joint activities in cultural expressions to reflect ASEAN unity in cultural diversity with the view that all of which are important enablers towards building a people- oriented ASEAN community. In conjunction with the meeting, Vietnam hosted the 6th ASEAN Festival of Arts as part of Vietnam’s biennial Hue Festival 2014. The festival highlighted the creativity of the artists and fostered the exchange of ideas among the best artists from ASEAN countries. Each country within the ASEAN+3 showcased one of their finest works in their chosen field of performing arts to promote the ASEAN common identity and celebrate cultural diversity within ASEAN. Finally, the ministers acknowledged the steady progress of Work Plan on Enhancing ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation in Culture, outcomes of culture-related activities in the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2007-2017, and its reflection in a new ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2013-2017. (Source: High Beam)
ASEAN and United States Collaborate for Stronger Science-based Policy Making (April 7, 2014)
The ASEAN-U.S. Science and Technology Fellows Pilot Program was formally inaugurated in Jakarta on the 7th of April. The program aims to ensure that ASEAN Member States will increasingly utilize science when making difficult policy decisions. The program, managed by the United States Agency for International Development, will support eight scientists from academia to work for one year with the goal of increasing utilization of science, technology and objective analysis of existing data in decision-making. The fellows will work in the fields of biodiversity, climate change, early warning for disaster risk reduction, health and water management in the Ministry of Research and Technology in Indonesia, the Ministry of Transport in Myanmar, the Department of Science and Technology in the Philippines, the National Science and Technology of Science and Technology in the Philippines, the National Science and Technology Development Agency in Thailand and the Ministry of Science and Technology in Vietnam. This is modeled on the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science and Technology Policy Fellowship Program in the United States. (Source: ASEAN Secretariat)
3 Obama’s Asian Visit: Both Symbolic and Substantive Dato’ Steven Wong
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia
When the US was contemplating its participation in ASEAN’s East Asia Summit (EAS), questions were asked about how durable US interests would be in the region. In the pre-‘pivot’, and later pre-‘rebalancing’ era, there were doubts about how serious the US would be in remaining engaged with ASEAN’s talk shop, as well as its ability to secure clear deliverables that the Obama administration could trumpet to Congress as evidence of its diplomatic offensive. There was the belief that the US suffered from an overriding attention deficit disorder and would turn away when other parts of the world attracted its global interests.
President Barak Obama’s aborted attendance at the APEC Summit in Bali last year, ostensibly because of the US government shut-down, further fuelled criticisms about US domestic capacity and sincerity towards the region, even drawing pointed comments from Singapore, one of the US’s closest allies. Even though President Obama’s absence was filled-in by senior members of his Cabinet (notably, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and US Trade Representative Michael Froman), the US administration had still to counter the negativity thrown up by the President’s cancellation and made a visit to the region in early 2014 all that much more of a priority.
These days such talk has – at least for now – died down. Even debates about US rebalancing appear to have silenced by President Barak Obama’s recent tour to Asia. If President Obama needed any further ammunition to bolster his case to be away from Washington, China’s actions may have all but made the case for him. The unprecedented level of regional tensions following the latter’s increasing assertiveness in pursuing its maritime claims [vis-à-vis Japan (the Senkaku islands) and the Philippines (Second Thomas Shoals) but also Malaysia (James Shoal)] ensured he would receive a warm welcome even if there were no direct mention of China in the official communiques of the countries visited.
His visit offered vital reassurance to countries embroiled in the conflicts while underscoring the US’s vital interests in the region. The first payoff went to Japan where President Obama made the point of stating that the Senkaku Islands fell under Article 5 of the US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty. This marked the first time that a US president had explicitly pointed out that the Treaty covers the disputed islands. This fact would, of course, not have gone unnoticed by China. In view of cuts to the U.S. defense budget, it was an open question whether the US would voluntarily assume more explicit responsibilities.
The second payoff went to the Philippines where the signing of the 10-year Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was touted by some observers as the single most significant outcome of his regional foray.
Obama also acknowledged the strategic location of the Philippines and stated that his government has an
‘ironclad commitment’ to the defense of the Philippines in the event of external attack. The EDCA provides for defense modernization with US assistance through training and acquisitions, toward the end-goal of developing what Manila has called ‘minimum credible defense’ capability. This was met with great enthusiasm both at home and with the large Filipino community in the US. This too would not have gone unnoticed by China.
The third payoff was in Kuala Lumpur where a Malaysia-US Comprehensive Partnership was announced, implying an upgrading of the bilateral relationship. As yet there are few details about this Partnership entails except that it contains political, trade and social (people-to-people) elements. (The US State Department is currently in the process of following-up on the matter.) Malaysia’s official participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the 103rd country to do so, was a surprise deliverable that President Obama could refer to Congressmen back in Washington. While Malaysia had attended previous PSI Summits, it had done so as an observer. By signing on to the Statement of Interdiction Principles, Malaysia cemented its commitment to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enhancing security and safety of global trade.
Quite clearly, the Obama visit, though a gesture of friendship and covering different areas, including discussions on the Trans-Pacific-Partnership (TPP) Agreement, nevertheless had strong security and military overtones. In all probability, US approaches would not have been to Beijing’s liking. As events would have it, within weeks of the President’s leaving, China seriously ratcheted-up tensions by placing an oil rig in waters near the Paracel Islands, which is claimed by itself and Vietnam. Whether this had been planned much earlier or was intended to send a signal to disputant countries and the US about the seriousness of it claims post-visit is unknown. What is indisputable is that this has significantly raised the level of tensions, which continue to the time of writing.
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President Obama is expected back in the region this November, when China hosts the APEC Summit and late next year, when he attends the East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur. Until then, the US is sure to be monitoring developments in the region closely and keeping the White House up-to-date on developments. How much more the US can do remains to be seen but it may be argued that the US’s commitment to the individual ASEAN countries visited (he has so far been to six of the 10 member states) places the US rebalancing on a qualitatively different footing compared to the time before his visit.
5 ASEAN’s Security Dilemma: A Threat From Within Billy Tea
Independent Security Analyst
On May 5th, the US-Philippines started their annual military exercise called Balikatan (shoulder to shoulder).
The Philippines Public Affair Office Chief, Ramon Zagala, said that it aimed to improve “tactical-level military proficiency” and enhance US-Filipino cooperation. This comes after President Obama’s recent visit, during which he signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. It aims to reinvigorate bilateral defense and cooperation ties between the two allies. The US military will have greater access to Philippine bases for the next 10 years. The visit comes at a tense time in Sino-Philippine relations over the disputed islands1.
The Philippines was not the only country in the ASEAN region that President Obama visited; he also stopped by Malaysia. It is one of the claimants in the South China Sea (SCS); however, unlike its Filipino counter-part, Malaysia’s strategy has always been to keep good relations with both China and the United States, through political, economic, and social exchanges.
Although all parties that took part during this visit have stated officially that it was not “targeted toward China,”
Asian analysts all agree that this symbolic visit was aimed at the Asian giant, with some even naming the visit a
“containment tour2. ” They argue that it demonstrates that America is part of the Asian security sphere, and that the tour consequently sends a message to China that it is being watched and cannot “bully” other countries in the region.
ASEAN countries have always look up to their American partner for security against their Chinese neighbor.
However, such a method does have its drawbacks – and, at worst, escalates the situation. For example, the conflict in the SCS was “internationalized” at the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), when Secretary of State Clinton said that the US “has national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the SCS3.”
China was blindsided at the ARF, and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi response was sharp: “[Clinton] had virtually attacked China…China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact.”
Within days of the statement, China conducted a naval and air exercise in the SCS. The exercises included a large group of submarines and warship firing guided missiles and testing anti-missile air defense systems, as well as naval aircraft conducting “air control operations4.”
Weeks later, in September 2010, China seized a Vietnamese fishing trawler and arrested its crew of nine in waters near the Paracels. Four days later, China officially notified Vietnam that the boat had been seized for violating China’s territorial waters and the crew detained5. China flexed its muscle in order to demonstrate its power and its frustration with its ASEAN counterparts for involving external powers, especially the United States.
This was a key event in the conflict in the SCS because it had great consequences for the dynamic between ASEAN, the United States, and China. First, the conflict reached a point of “no-return.” Once the conflict was internationalized, there was no turning back, further escalating and complicating the conflict. In January 2013, the Philippines filled a notification and Statement of Claims at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), seeking to invalidate China’s nine-dash line, which encompasses virtually the entire SCS. Moreover, In November 2013, Vietnam, another claimant, offered India several blocks in the South China Sea6. In the former, the US supports the move by the Philippines to bring the dispute to ITLOS: as US Ambassador Philip
1 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-‐05-‐05/vietnam-‐protests-‐against-‐china-‐rig-‐placement-‐in-‐disputed-‐
waters.html
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/world/asia/on-‐a-‐trip-‐that-‐avoids-‐beijing-‐obamas-‐eye-‐remains-‐on-‐
china.html?_r=0
3 http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP220.pdf
4 Ibid
5 http://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/timeline_UsVietnamChina-‐10052010113837.html
6 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/vietnam-‐offers-‐india-‐seven-‐oil-‐blocks-‐in-‐south-‐china-‐
sea/article5372744.ece
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Goldberg said, “No such thing as 9 dash line7.” While in the latter, China has stated that if India wishes to explore resources in the disputed area, then it would be hard for China to be motivated to cooperate with India8. The internationalization has led to the escalation of the conflict in the SCS. On one hand, China feels like it is set as an outsider with everyone ganging-up on it. This feeling of isolation pushes it to react with stronger fervor to these provocation using its political, economic, social leverage, including a show of force. On the other, the fact that China is flexing its muscle pushes ASEAN claimants to pursue the internationalization of the conflict in order to counter-balance China’s influence in the region. For example, with regards to Vietnam and India’s cooperation in natural resources exploration/ exploitation, China is setting an exploration rig in the disputed waters between the two nations, raising the prospect of an escalation of tension9. Essentially, the SCS issue has become a vicious cycle in which all actors react to one another’s actions by escalating the conflict, thus making the stability in the region fragile and possibly jeopardizing the economic growth that Asia has enjoyed, especially in this time of economic hardship in the rest of the world.
Second, it shows a disunited and weak ASEAN. There is an internal division within the association’s members.
Those that enjoy strong economic and political support from China tend to side with it more; those that feel threatened by China want to bring external actors to counter-balance it; and those that are pragmatic want both powers to stay in the region. There is no consensus within ASEAN on how and what its relationship with both China and the US should be, which weakens its ability to be a credible actor. Indeed, how can the international community trust the organisation when it cannot even set its house in order?
For example, in 2012, Cambodia, which is known for its close relationship with China and receives large investment and military aid without “strings attached,” was ASEAN Chair that year and refused to address the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. That event was humiliating as ASEAN, for the first time in 45 years, failed to issue a Joint Statement at the ARF10. Moreover, this disunited front that ASEAN affects its credibility in the international realm as a leading economic and political organization.
Indeed, ASEAN has been more focused on organizing its 1000 plus meetings (link to 2014 schedule:
http://www.asean.org/images/calendar/Revised%20Notional%20Calendar%20as%20of%207%20April%202014
%20-%20rev.pdf) a year than tackling the hard questions of security in the region. For example, among the most important meetings includes: the ASEAN Regional Forum (26 countries including the EU as one entity), East Asia Summit (18 countries), ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea), ASEAN Plus Six (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (21 members)11. There are two main issues with ASEAN’s numerous meetings: first, there can be only so many experts and officials going to these meetings, and therefore a large number of these conferences are made up of similar personalities; and these meetings often cover similar subjects, creating an overlap of issues being covered and being presented by the same people. The large number of meetings combined with a limited pool of experts to draw from as well as topics to discussed has made ASEAN a talk shop without much influence.
What does that mean for ASEAN’s security?
The sources of insecurity in ASEAN lie in two levels: there is the external one and the internal one. The former refers to the threat that China poses to its neighbors, especially in light of the SCS conflict. Some member states have internationalized the conflict in order to counter-balance China’s influence in the region and to provide a sense of physical safety with the United States through visits of diplomatic missions as well as access both to bases and places in the region. However, a vicious cycle has been created by all parties involved in the SCS: the more internationalized it gets, the more China flexes its muscle, which then pushes claimants to feel insecure and to want to internationalize it even more, thus creating a never ending cycle.
ASEAN’s security dilemma lies in the fact that in order to protect itself from China, it tries to get other actors involved, which in turns escalates the situation rather than resolves the conflict. As demonstrated by the events post-2010 ARF, it is essential to be meticulous in managing the US and China relationship dynamic in the
7 http://www.rappler.com/nation/51422-‐goldberg-‐china-‐claim
8 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/India-‐warned-‐against-‐exploring-‐oil-‐in-‐disputed-‐South-‐China-‐
Sea/articleshow/30701439.cms
9 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-‐05-‐05/vietnam-‐protests-‐against-‐china-‐rig-‐placement-‐in-‐disputed-‐
waters.htmlm
10 http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/asean-‐summit-‐fallout-‐continues-‐on/
11 http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/admm-‐plus-‐talk-‐shop-‐or-‐key-‐to-‐asia-‐pacific-‐security/2/
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region. Both powers are essential to the success of the region and both are here to stay for the long run; therefore it is indispensable to find a good balance that helps ASEAN. This can only be achieved through a strong and unified organization, which is currently not present.
ASEAN is an association of countries that originally was created to stand up to Communist insurgent forces in the region and to ensure each other’s sovereignty through the core principle of non-interference. The lack of unity and leadership in ASEAN is reflected in its poor handling of the SCS conflict, especially in balancing China-US relations.
ASEAN’s main external threat comes from its giant neighbor, and in order to protect itself it needs to have a uniform policy on managing both China and US political, economic, and social presence in the region. It is much easier said than done, however; it is certain that, in order for ASEAN to stay a credible actor, it needs to be able to handle internal and regional issues. Therefore, it is paramount for members to come together and to decide on their plan of actions with both China and the US by weighing the pros and the cons for each country as well as for the region – and consequently, to make an informed decision with one voice.
If ASEAN wants to resolve its security dilemma, it needs to first find its identity. Is it a driver or a passenger?
The answer to ASEAN’s security dilemma goes beyond the China threat; it is within itself, and until it figures out what kind of organization it is, these securities issues will persist, and even worse, will continue to deteriorate over time.
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25th Anniversary of the Dialogue Partnership between ASEAN and the Republic Of Korea:
From the Tropical Slopes of the South East Asian Archipelago to the Wintery Hills of YongPyong Juita Mohamad., (Ph.D)
Senior Analyst
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia
I learnt to ski in the rumbling, snowy slopes of YongPyong Ski Resort in Republic Of Korea during the wintertime of 2003 as part of the ASEAN-ROK Youth Program. That was my first memory in relations to the ASEAN-ROK umbrella of partnership put into action for the youths of the world. Situated in Gang-won do province, YongPyong Resort is not only famous for its powdery snow but it is also known for the romantic setting it embodies, perfect for the Winter Sonata Drama. The Korean Wave phenomenon or hallyu started around then as it flooded through the living rooms of Malaysian homes, attracting millions of audience ranging from young naïve teenagers to busy stay at home moms, to intrigued husbands.
Geographically sandwiched between the two giants in the region namely; China and Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) finds itself in a position that confers great challenges on the one hand; and potentially great benefits on the other.
It would be an understatement to say that the ROK has achieved remarkable success over the past decades. As we all know the success of ROK is not only limited to its Korean wave or hallyu culture. ROK has single- handedly transformed itself from an impoverished, war-torn nation in the aftermath of the Japanese occupation of Korea World War II in 1945, into one of the most dynamic, modern, developed nations within the span of one generation. As one of the Four Asian Tigers, ROK has evolved into a manufacturing powerhouse overtaking Japan in recent years. The Government’s success in nurturing the domestic manufacturing sector through effective R&D funding and by efficiently rewarding innovation and creativity have resulted in the creations of efficient mega conglomerates such as Samsung and LG which are considered to be household names in Asia and beyond.
The ROK presents a success story whereby with the emergence of its strong manufacturing sector it has succeeded in alleviating poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy in the real sector. This positive spillover effect represents the epitome for emerging ASEAN countries to emulate as it proves that balanced growth is attainable for newly developing countries. On the international front it has been well noted that South Korea has become an important middle-ranking power in global affairs. Korea’s hosting of the G-20 Summit in 2010, its conclusion of an FRA with the European Union and the appointment of Ban Ki-moon to the United Nations Secretary-General position are examples of Korea’s increasing prominence in the international stage. In terms of developing into an important player in global trade, investment, aid and tourism with a strong economy Malaysia and its ASEAN counterparts have a lot to learn from this great nation.
It is widely understood that in the past the ROK has traditionally been struggling to acquire its rightful limelight in the debate on major power relations in Asia. It is on this note I hypothesize that the inception of the ASEAN- ROK Dialogue were established 25 years ago. Since its inception, the ROK has expressed its unfaltering commitments on a spectrum of issues. The commitments made by both the ASEAN and ROK leaders were outlined by the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation Partnership established in November, 2004.
The Partnership’s efforts were quite inclusive to say the very least.
It encompasses eight broad fields of cooperation which are; a) ensuring political and security cooperation; b) strengthening the foundation of comprehensive economic cooperation; c) bridging the development gap among ASEAN Member Countries and supporting ASEAN's efforts for regional integration; d) strengthening ASEAN Competitiveness; e) enhancing mutual understandings through social and cultural exchange; f) expanding cooperation in addressing global issues; g) regional and international cooperation; and lastly g) fostering East Asia cooperation.
Looking back at these comprehensive joint efforts the evidence is clear. Why else would ROK show a strong interest in continuous cooperation with the ASEAN nations, if it is not for the purpose of rebalancing the power of the 3 East Asian economies in this region? Through the creation of this platform the ROK would not be left behind in exerting its soft power in this tropical archipelago.
Whatever the political intentions might be, it is quite clear however that the trust and cooperation built over the years have been well received and welcomed by the ASEAN leaders due its stark evidence of progress. As a
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result of the establishment of ASEAN-Korean FTA (AKFTA) five years ago, ASEAN-Korea bilateral trade has been consistently growing. The trade value as of 2011 has reached a total of US$125 billion. As the platform for trade has been strengthened over the years this has led to the attraction of FDIs in the South East Asian region.
In 2010 and 2011, ASEAN was the ROK’s second largest investment destination. The ROK’s commitment to cooperation and multilateral institutions in Asia are acknowledged as evidence that Seoul is moving closer to President Lee Myung-bak’s policy of ‘New Asia Initiative’ and his vision of a ‘Global Korea’. On the green growth front, as Malaysia strives to meet its target of 40 per cent cut in its carbon dioxide emission by 2020 we turn to Korea’s expertise in green growth and technological innovation. This is highlighted by our Prime Minister Najib who has expressed interest to “adopt, adapt and learn from the South Korean experience in promoting green energy.”
As both ASEAN and Korea continue to promote trade cooperation and cultural exchanges for a quarter of a century, now it is ever more crucial to reinforce the ROK’s presence in Southeast Asia in other fields as well.
Just as Korea should reinforce its presence in Southeast Asia by displaying its commitments to Asian institutions, we in this region should move away from limiting our efforts in pressing issues and concerns posed directly to this region. Instead we have to broaden our scopes of efforts and cooperation to include peace and harmony in this area as a whole.
With the success of our 25-year symbiotic relations in trade and green growth there is still space for improvements especially in the area of Asian security. In this facet the ROK plays a pivotal role in the management and resolution of the security challenge posed by North Korea. With the United States as the ROK’s alliance on this pressing matter the ROK serves as an important source of peace and stability in Asia.
With this said the ROK’s status here, as a middle power is evident and strongly backed by the ASEAN counterparts. Through greater multilateral engagement and enhanced ROK’s network diplomacy in this region hopefully this platform would allow ASEAN to assist the ROK in dealing with its current top priority:
Pyongyang when the right time presents itself. Although Southeast Asia has not had much added value to security concerns in the Korean Peninsula area, it is not too late to start now as the rising power of the North may hinder the safety of our own peace and harmony.
Our involvement in this aspect may cause divergence of perceptions and interests among different ASEAN members. This problem exacerbated by centrifugal pulls exerted by the two great powers namely the US and China, may negatively impact the workings of the ASEAN bloc itself. With this said however we are not a lost cause especially when the region’s safety and wellbeing is being trespassed upon. Hopefully through cementing the ROK’s role as the bridge between Southeast Asian countries and major powers, Southeast Asia too can learn from the ROK by playing a stronger mediatory role to ease tensions between the U.S. and China.
Even though the ROK’s role in Southeast Asia is slightly overshadowed by the intensity of China’s and Japan’s economic relations with and development assistance to Southeast Asian countries, it is not without its glimmer of hope shining steadily and brightly. As we celebrate the Silver Jubilee of our partnership I believe that the ROK’s overall standing in the region will further strengthen gradually in this age of globalization. Now it is high time for us in South East Asia to ask: Does ASEAN have the capability to redirect the ROK into the same conversation as China and Japan in this region? If the answer is indeed yes, we would have identified our next combined objective in this Win-Win Partnership for more jubilees to come.
