I.
II.
1.
2.
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IV.
* , .
: 2011. 10. 31 / : 2011. 11. 25 / : 2011. 12. 7
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1) Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227(1980)
Rule 10b-5 “
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2)
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18) Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading Regulation, Enforcement, and Prevention, West Group, 2010, § 7:4.
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25) William K.S. Wang, “Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?,” 54 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1217, 1981, p.1291.
26) 188 2 “
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29) Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222(1980).
30) ,
. Victor Brudney, “Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law,” 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595, 1997, p.595.
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. SEC v.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42(2d Cir. 2009)
SEC Rule 10b-5
31) Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, “Substitutes for Insider Trading,” 54 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 2001. p.235.
32) , “ ,” BFL 43 ,
, 2010, 6 1.
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1934 10 (b) SEC Rule 10b-5
. Rule 10b-5
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246~247 .
34) Rule 10b-5 (Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices)
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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36) SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F.Supp.2d 321(S.D.N.Y., 2008).
37) SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42(2d Cir., 2009).
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market)’ . ,
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39) , , 167 .
40) Roberta S. Karmel, “Outsider Trading on Confidential Information - A Breach in Search
of a Duty,” 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 132, 1998( , , 168 ).
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42) 1997.3.27. 94 24; 1994.4.26. 93 695.
43) 174
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SEC Rule 10b-5 . “
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artifice to defraud)” Rule 10b-5
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. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F.Supp. 756(D.C.Okl., 1984)
. Switzer
.
(improper purpose)
, (tippee)
.
Rule 10b-5 .48)
,
.
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.
48) SEC v. Switzer, 590 F.Supp. 756, 764~766(D.C.Okl., 1984).
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53) United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643(1997).
54) Ayres & Bankman, op. cit., p.259.
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55) Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec, & Cynthia A. Williams, “Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan,” 84 Va. L. Rev. 153, 1998.
56) , , 6 1.
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59) Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222(1980).
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, , , 1990.
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1 , , 2008.
, “ ,” BFL 43 ,
, 2010.
, “ ,”
, , 2011.3.
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading Regulation, Enforcement, and Prevention, West Group, 2010.
Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, “Substitutes for Insider Trading,” 54 Stanford Law Review 235, 2001.
Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec, & Cynthia A. Williams, “Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan,” 84 Virginia Law Review 153, 1998.
Roberta S. Karmel, “Outsider Trading on Confidential Information - A Breach in Search of a Duty,” 20 Cardozo Law Review 132, 1998.
Terry Fleming, “Telling the Truth Slant - Defending Insider Trading Claims
Against Legal and Financial Professionals,” 28 William Mitchell Law Review 1421, 2002.
Victor Brudney, “Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law,” 38 Boston College Law Review 595, 1997.
William K.S. Wang, “Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?,” 54 Southern California Law Review 1217, 1981.
< >
174
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.
Journal of Legislation Research / 41th Issue
Outsider Trading Regulation under the Capital Markets Act
Chang, Kun-Young*60)
This Article examines the regulation of outsider trading under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (the “Capital Markets Act”).
Outsider trading occurs when a market participant who is not a traditional corporate insider trades securities based on either “inside” or “outside” nonpublic information. Unlike “inside” information, “outside” information is referred to as information not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer. “Outside”
information includes both “corporate” and “market” information. “Corporate information” is information about events or circumstances which affect the company’s assets or earning power. “Outside corporate information” is information about the company’s assets or earning power not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer. “Market information” is information about events or circumstances which affect the market for a company’s securities but which do not affect the company’s assets or earning power.
The Capital Markets Act prohibits both “temporary insiders” from using
“corporate” information in trading securities and “outsiders” from using “market”
information, such as (i) information regarding the initiation or discontinuance of a tender offer; or (ii) information regarding acquisition or disposition of stocks in bulk. However, the Act does not encompass circumstances (i) where an outsider trades securities based on confidential corporate information obtained through certain types of wrongful conduct; (ii) where an outsider trades securities based on corporate information obtained through eavesdropping; and (iii) where an outsider trades securities based on either outside corporate information or market information created by the outsider himself.
In order to plug a few of the gaps left open in the law of outsider trading under the Capital Markets Act, this Article suggests that regulators adopt a
* Associate Professor, Hanyang University School of Law, S.J.D.
Abstract
:
relatively broad reading of the scope of § 178(1) of the Act, which is similar to SEC Rule 10b-5, to include outsiders with no relationship to the corporation that had issued the securities. Since § 178(1) of the Act does not require
“deception” for liability, it would seem to evade the limitations imposed by the U.S. misappropriation theory.
