ISSN 2502-0722 Issue 19/ January 2017
Islamism and Democratization in the Post 411 and 212 Rallies of Indonesia Unholy Alliance:
Ultra-Conservatism and Political Pragmatism in Indonesia The Philippines’ War
on Drugs: Human Rights Concerns and Prospects for ASEAN +
INFOGRAPHIC ASEAN ROUND-UP
Islamism and Democratization in the Post 411 and 212 Rallies of Indonesia
Unholy Alliance: Ultra-Conservatism and Political Pragmatism in Indonesia
The Philippines’ War on Drugs: Human Rights Concerns and Prospects for ASEAN
ASEAN Round-Up
Is Rohingya persecution caused by business interests rather than religion?
Some Muslim politicians in Indonesia want a total ban on booze
Thai economy resilient, but growth outlook uninspiring
Infographic
A Presidential Wordcloud The Places They Go...
2 6
14 14 14 8
15 15 14
16
Project Supervisors Rahimah Abdulrahim
Executive Director, The Habibie Center Hadi Kuntjara
Deputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center Editor in Chief
A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi Thinking ASEAN Team Agustha Lumban Tobing Askabea Fadhilla Fina Astriana Muhamad Arif Hana Hanifa Bastaman Rahma Simamora Ray Hervandi Tongki Ari Wibowo Wirya Adiwena
A note from the editor
Dear readers:
Welcome to the January 2017 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!
Usually the New Year is a time for renewed hope, yet 2017 promises to be a year of great uncertainty and challenges for the Southeast Asian region. This month’s issue examines some of the key uncertainties and challenges that the region is immediately confronted with at the dawn of the year.
As the largest member-state in ASEAN, developments in Indonesia have important implications for the rest of the region. The apparent rise of Islamic conservatism and the threat it poses to Indonesia’s long-cherished reputation for tolerance, moderation and pluralism deserve closer attention. This month’s opening article by Muhammad Wildan, Director of CISForm, UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, looks at the different possible interpretations behind the ‘411’ and ‘212’ rallies in Indonesia and warns they indicate a worrying trend whereby religious conservatives claim to be the sole interpreters of Islam.
He further argues that Indonesia’s democratization has been exploited by such religious conservatives to take over the public sphere and espouse what he terms ‘covert intolerance’
against Chinese Indonesians.
On the other hand, Luthfi Assyaukanie, Researcher at Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), questions whether Indonesia’s moderate Islam image is even merited, arguing that Muslim hard-liners are not new to the Indonesian political scene. He argues that what makes the situation different from the past is the role important stakeholders have played to help prepare, fund and provide tools of communications for the mass rallies. His article further explores this idea of an ‘Unholy Alliance’ made up of ultra-conservatives, political pragmatists, and businessmen who have joined hands to not only oppose the incumbent Jakarta Governor, but also to advance conservatism, intolerance and challenge the current government.
Meanwhile, the accession of Duterte to the Philippine presidency has put his country under increasing spotlight, which will be focused even more given that Manila has taken over the chairmanship of ASEAN for 2017. Andrea Chloe Wong, Senior Lecturer at Miriam College in Manila discusses Duterte’s war on drugs and its implications for human rights. She points out the irony that the war on drugs appears to make victims of the very people it is supposed to protect against from the evils of narcotics.
As usual, we present a short infographic that addresses whether or not Indonesia really has turned its back on foreign policy and a summary of the goings-on in selected countries from around Southeast Asia. Don’t hesitate to drop me aline at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.
or.id if you have comments, input, or prospective submissions.
Happy reading!
Best regards from Jakarta
Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.
The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non- governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.
Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.
The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non- profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.
The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.
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Correction: Due to a typing error on page 12, Thinking ASEAN December edition mistakenly reported that the trade volume of RCEP members are 3.4 million. It should have read 3.4 billion.
Islamism and
Democratization in the
Post 411 and 212 Rallies of Indonesia
Muhammad Wildan is Director of CISForm (Center for the Study of Islam and Social Transformation) UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta
‘Super Peaceful 212 Rally’ congregators do a mass prayer at the Bunderan Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Friday (2/12)
Source: Antara
T
he boisterous but peaceful rallies that occurred in Jakarta on 4 November and 2 December 2016 (commonly referred to as the ‘411’ and‘212’ rallies respectively) were important phenomenon in the Indonesian Islamic political scene. The alleged defamation of Holy Qur’an by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and the formation of the National Movement of the Guardians of the Indonesian Ulama Council’s Fatwa (GNPF MUI) attracted many people to participate in the rallies. As was seen, almost all elements of society were involved either organizationally or individually. Indonesian Muslims, which in many cases had been fragmented into many different streams, were united into carrying out one action and under one command during those peaceful actions.
On the one hand, it was truly a great phenomenon for Indonesian Muslims.
Many reported that the crowd reached several millions Muslims. Their enthusiasm to join the event using all means of transportations, including some that even walked from such remote areas as Ciamis were seen as heroic and momentous actions. The most interesting thing was that Habieb Rizieq Shihab, the grand cleric of Front Pembela Islam (FPI or Islamic Defenders Front), who is normally found on the periphery of Indonesia’s political Islam, played a central role in the rallies.
The actions helped cast off the old belief that Indonesian Muslims are too fragmented and polarized to be able to unite. Historically, Indonesian Muslims would only unite once there was a common enemy. The same spirit of Islam and nationalism that existed during the fight against the Dutch occupation in the 18th and 19th century and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the 1960s re- emerged on Indonesia’s socio-political arena. That is to say that during the 411 and 212 rallies, Indonesian Muslims regarded Ahok (who is of Chinese descent) as the “common enemy”. Some Indonesian Muslims consider Ahok as a symbol of the victory of the Chinese Indonesian, which had long been seen as the tough “rival” for Indonesian Muslims socially and economically.
On the other hand, many Indonesian observers question the relationship between the phenomena of the rallies with the state of democratization in the country. From such a view, the rallies may be considered as part of the process of democratization, i.e., the representation
of many elements of society in the public sphere. However, we could also see this phenomenon as a conservative turn, with Islam increasingly being represented by a certain group of intolerant Muslims. This article tries to see the relationship among the phenomena of rallies, Islamism, and democratization in Indonesia.
Covert Intolerance
The rallies in Jakarta and other big cities across the country in support of the demands of the GNPF MUI to
#penjarakanAhok (imprison Ahok) could not be seen as merely a religious or even political entity. On the one hand, the accusation of insulting the Qur’an is still quite debatable, and the MUI itself, which had declared Ahok’s statement as blasphemous, is not a state legislature.
As far as the alleged blasphemy case is concerned, there has been no fatwa released by the MUI on this issue. The statement issued by the MUI is not in the form of a fatwa, but is instead an
‘Opinion and Religious Stance of the MUI’
(Pendapat dan Sikap Keagamaan MUI). Of course there are many religious personal opinions to support MUI, while there are also counter opinions stating that Ahok’s statement does not violate Islam let alone the Qur’an.
As far as I am concerned, the accusation of insulting Islam and the Qur’an is mixed with the issue of the existence of Chinese Indonesian in the archipelago. This can be seen by the wide spread on social media of hoax news about the dangers of Chinese descendants in the archipelago recently.
The case of the reclamation of Jakarta bay, the influx of Chinese workers etc. are among the major issues that point to the rejection by Indonesian Muslims to greater Chinese influence and power. Although it may be true about the half-hearted Chinese indigenization in the archipelago, the role of Chinese descendants in the country economically should not be overlooked.
In my view, the Jakarta governor election has been seen by many as not merely a political entity. In fact Ahok, who in many cases is actually quite close to some Muslim communities through his programs such as umrah prizes and building mosques, has been considered negatively by many Muslims, and his programs are even regarded as politicization of Islam.
Nevertheless, the nomination of the incumbent governor Ahok has been seen as triggering an ethnic competition which tends towards ethnic/inter-religious
intolerance.
I tend to see all these events as the accumulation of the fear of Muslims that Ahok would win another term. If so, some Muslims worry that he would give more economic opportunities to the Chinese Indonesian rather than to the indigenous Muslims. This leads to the belief Asal Bukan Ahok (Not Ahok Anymore) for the governor of Jakarta. This anxiety is understandable as Ahok’s electability was quite high in the first months of 2016. Although it may be true that Ahok has done something wrong during his campaign in Pulau Seribu on 6 October 2016, in my view, however, this concern should not then lead to the negative campaign and bullying against Ahok as he has also apologized that he did not mean to be rude to Indonesian Muslims let alone Islam.
Indonesia Islam has long been cited as having different characteristics compared to that found in the Middle East; Indonesian Muslims are very plural and open in terms of intra and inter-religious diversity. That is to say that no single group of Indonesian Muslims has a monopoly over Indonesian religious interpretation especially in the public arena. Although Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) always have different interpretation on certain issue, however, they always understand that their differences could produce many positive features.
On the issue of whether Ahok’s statement defames or insults Islam is part of religious interpretation on public life, as has been long practiced, the “fatwa” of the MUI cannot be considered as the sole religious interpretation in Indonesia’s religious life.
It seems to me that the demand of the rallies to jail Ahok tends to compel a certain religious interpretation in public life. Although Ahok to some degree could be considered as wrong, whether it could be considered as insulting Islam is still questionable. As good citizens, Indonesian Muslims should obey the rule of law and leave the matter to the court to handle it.
Islamism and Democratization Globalization and modernization played a central role in the widespread of Salafism. In the Indonesian context, there are also more Middle Eastern graduates, which altogether play a significant role in the growing conservatism and Islamism seen in the country. Literalism, as the most obvious characteristic of Salafism, has led Indonesian Islam to become
more conservative and tending towards Islamism.
Indonesia, however, has long been known for its feature of tolerant and irenic Islam.
The reformation of Indonesia in 1998 shifted Indonesian Islam to be more open as directed by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur).
The discourse on the creation of an Islamic state and the demand of the Jakarta Charter for example almost disappeared from any fora. Rather, the discourse is more on the acceptance of Pancasila as the ideology of the state, the United State of Indonesian Republic (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia), inter-religious dialogue etc.
In the last two decades, we can see that Islam is also more visible in the public sphere. This can be seen in the increasing visibility of many symbols of Islam such as fancy mosques in many big cities, Shari’ah banks, Shari’ah hotels, more fancy Islamic schools, Islamic outfits, Islamic programs on TVs etc. Nevertheless, it is hard to consider all these phenomena as a conservative turn of Islam in Indonesia.
At the same time, nowadays public Islam is dominated by conservatives especially on the internet and social media. In this sense, I am concerned that conservatism would be more obvious in Indonesian public sphere.
Although the “fatwa” of the MUI on the allegation of insulting Islam is possibly correct, the emergence of the National Movement of the Guardians of Indonesia Ulama Council’s Fatwa (GNPF MUI) is slightly misleading. Many people do not really understand the position of fatwas of the MUI under Indonesian law. The hashtag during the rallies, #tangkapAhok (arrest Ahok) and #penjarakanAhok (imprison Ahok), even somewhat symbolize the compelling nature of certain groups of Muslims toward the authorities. As the discourse and polemic on the “fatwa” of the MUI and positive law continues on many media channels, the public eventually understands that the “fatwa” of the MUI is not a part of positive law, and is just a statement.
As an institution which could issue a legal opinion, the position of the MUI is quite similar to Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah or Bahtsul Matsail of Nahdatul Ulama (NU). A fatwa is a legal opinion which does not bind any Muslims except those that willingly obey themselves. It is almost the same as the fatwa of Majelis Tarjih that forbade smoking for Muslims. The fatwa of
the organizations does not bind any Muslim even for its own members. The same thing can be said for the fatwa of the MUI that prohibits expressing Christmas greeting and attending Christmas ceremonies, which is not binding on all Muslims. In fact, a fatwa is simply a religious opinion which could be used by any legislative institutions to issue a positive law. As such, the opinion and religious stance regarding the case of alleged defamation of the Qur’an may have a lesser position.
Another interesting point of the rallies is that it was carried out using democratization mechanisms. The rallies, which involved millions of people, signifies that the other democratization mechanisms may not work properly such as through their representatives in parliament. Nevertheless, Indonesian Muslims should learn that there are abundant mechanisms of democracy which could be their means of voicing their aspirations.
Indonesian Muslims should also learn from the events that their unity in the rallies could be used to unite their political aspirations. As previously known, politics always become an inseparable part for Muslims. We have witnessed that among the euphoria of Indonesian Muslims after the reformation was the mushrooming of Islamic political parties, i.e., 15 parties in 2009, 7 parties in 2004, and 9 parties in 2009. Although there are only 5 Islamic political parties nowadays, they still have the potential to polarize Indonesian Muslims. Eventually, I tend to argue that it would be more appropriate and fair for Indonesian Muslims to use the spirit of 212 to unite all powers in politics to struggle for their objectives through democratic mechanism.
Finally, the rallies and many other conservative actions which may arise in the future could be seen as the democratization process. I also agree with Sindhunata (2000) who stated that all social tensions and conflicts that happened prior or post-reformation of Indonesia is part of the democratization process. In the same way, the rallies are part of the consequence of democracy where the public sphere is more open for any groups, including the conservatives. While there are many social observers who worry that Indonesian Islam is turning to be more conservative, I tend to argue that this seems unlikely. The democratization process of Indonesia is also possible for those groups who want to make Indonesia a theocratic country, reject democracy,
or for those in favor of democracy and the nation-state of Indonesia. In addition, the recent phenomena could also be considered as an indication of existing religious diversity. Although the Social Hostilities Index (SHI) and Government Resctriction Index (GRI) is still quite high (Pew: 2015), I believe that Indonesia’s democracy is just being challenged and still could be a role model that showcases the co-existence of Islam and democracy.
In the long run, Islam should signify its vital force for socio-political transformation (Muhtadi: 2013). Some modernist organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU have played a significant role in boosting civil society as the foundation of civil Islam. As far as conservatism and even radicalism in the country is concerned, they comprise only a tiny number of Muslims and so far do not endanger the democratization process of the country.
Therefore, the rallies should not end up with religious anger on the streets, but Islam should exist in the society as a force for socio-political transformation for the country.
The future of Indonesian Islam will be the co-existence between Islam and democracy. While some conservatives and even scholars still question the applicability of Islam to democracy, there are many variants that support the co- existence of Islam and democracy such as theistic democracy, Islamic democracy, Ilahiyah democracy etc. They even cynically and suspiciously claim that the above co- existence as contradictio interminis. Many conservatives suspect democracy as a Western value that is not suitable for Muslim societies, whereas many scholars question how minority rights could be fulfilled once norms of a certain religion become the foundation of a state.
In this respect, I share my view with Asef Bayat (2011) who says that the problem nowadays is not on the compatibility of Islam and democracy, but lies on the ability of Muslims to run democracy.
Further, he coins a new concept i.e., post- Islamism as a new political manifesto to synthesize Islamic norms with the ethos of democracy.
Public and Civil Islam
Inevitably, Indonesia is neither a theocracy nor a secular country. However, spiritual and religious values have become the norms of daily life in the country. One of the good legacy of the New Order is that public Islam in Indonesia is free
from religious interpretation of any single group of Muslims. That is also to say that there is no sole religious interpretation in Indonesian public life.
The narrative and counter narrative discourse has always happened in public sphere including in social media. Such war of narratives always happened as a contestation of religious interpretations.
Well known as a moderate Muslim country, Indonesian Muslims have to maintain the public sphere from any authoritarianism of religious interpretation as it could incite tensions and even conflict between religions. The mushrooming of Shari’ah Regional Regulations (Peraturan Daerah Shari’ah) in many provinces in the country has consequently led to the rise of Biblical Regional Regulations in Papua. In the same way, the issuance of the defamation “fatwa”
by MUI could also incite other religious decree by other religious counterparts.
This of course could lead to endless tensions which could endanger inter- religious life in Indonesia.
In contrast, Indonesian Muslims do need
more on the substance of religious values to make the religion they adhere to not too dry from the very spirit of Islam.
For most Indonesians, the relationship between religion and the state is final.
Therefore, the role of the state is being challenged more on the functional of religion, i.e., to drive Indonesian Muslims to be more pious either personally or socially. Religious values and spiritualism to some degree is always needed for the formation of the nation-state of Indonesia.
As a rising democratic country, Indonesia should adapt the voices of the grass root in order to keep on the track of democracy.
Indeed, the government should not only regard majority rights as its source for values, but also must not overlook minority rights. Historically, it has been proven that Indonesian Muslims are quite adaptive in accepting better values. Many socio- religious organizations have demonstrated their role in constructing civil society in the country. As far as I am concerned, democracy is not all-or-nothing at once, but it is continuously incremental. I share my views with Hefner (2000) who states
that Indonesian Muslim societies will have their own dreams through democracy as it takes dialog and contextualization with local culture including Islam.
References:
Asef Bayat. 2007. Making Islam democratic: social movements and the post-Islamist turn. Stanford: Stanford University Press Martin van Bruinessen (eds.) 2013. Contemporary developments in Indonesian Islam: explaining the “conservative turn”. Singapore:
ISEAS
Robert W. Hefner. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Burhanuddin Muhtadi. 2013. ‘Potret Islam Pasca Orde Baru” in Jefrie Geovanie, civil religion: dimensi sosial politik Islam. Jakarta:
Gramedia
Pew Research Centre. 2015. Latest trends in religious restrictions and hostilities. US: Pew-Templeton
Sindhunata. 2000. Sakitnya melahirkan demokrasi. Yogyakarta:
Kanisius
Bassam Tibbi. 2012. Islam and Islamism. Connecticut: Yale University Press
Unholy Alliance:
Ultra-Conservatism and Political Pragmatism in
Indonesia
Luthfi Assyaukanie is Researcher at Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), Jakarta
Riot police stand guard as members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) hardline Muslim group take part in a pro-Palestinian rally outside the U.S. embassy in Jakarta
Source: Reuters
F
riday mass prayers-cum-rallies on Nov. 4 and Dec. 2, 2016, in Jakarta’s National Monument complex were tip-of-the- iceberg displays of Islamic conservatism that has been emerging in the past 15 years. Beneath this tip lies a huge mound of religious fanaticism within a widely touted moderate Muslim society. Indeed, Indonesian Muslims have been dubbed widely as “moderate” — an elusive term which can connote many things. In the first place, it means a neutral position between the extreme outlooks on the left (liberal-secular) and on the right (extremist, hard-liner) sides. It can also mean an open and tolerant attitude towards people of different faiths.Discussions on moderate Muslims in Indonesia among scholars and media often refer to those qualifications. They argue that the majority of Indonesian Muslims are generally tolerant and adhere to democratic values, as is evident in the works of Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred Stepan (Democracy and Islam in Indonesia, 2013) or Jeremy Menchik (Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, 2016). One of the key achievements of Indonesian democracy, they suggest, is the social capital within its Muslim society. The prime example of this is the existence of two major Islamic organizations, namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). They are moderate groups who have shown strong support for democracy time and again.
However, the rallies and current political circumstances in the country have made scholars question how moderate Indonesian Islam is as well as the future of Indonesia’s democracy. For example, Greg Fealy argues in his latest article that the rallies indicated “a triumph for the hard- line Islamists” and “evidence of deepening conservatism in Indonesian Islam” (Bigger than Ahok, 2016). The scale of the crowd, the interplays between the hard-liners and the government during the mass mobilization, and how Indonesians handled these issues, reveal a compelling situation that poses two serious questions: how did Islamic conservatism rise in Indonesia?
Why were the hard-liners able to mobilize the masses?
Political Intricacies
To answer these questions it is important to see the bigger picture of Indonesian politics from the past five years. In this context, it is visible that the hard-liners are not new to the Indonesian political scene. The key players behind the two big
rallies in Jakarta were the usual suspects from radical Islamic groups. One of them was Rizieq Shihab, chairman of the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). He has been very active in mobilizing masses and campaigning for Islamic sharia in the country since early 2000. His organization is notorious for its intolerance, attacking public discussions, or raiding cafes and restaurants during Ramadhan. Rizieq himself has been imprisoned for acts of violence. Moreover, FPI is actually a relatively small organization based in Jakarta, which inspite of the violence and vandalism it has committed, still manages to survive as there seems to be no serious commitment on the part of the government or police to contain their actions.
Other leaders of the rallies were religious conservatives with openly intolerant views.
Bachtiar Nasir, the rallies’ coordinator, was responsible for the creation of the National Movement to Guard the MUI Fatwas (GNPF-MUI), a coalition of Islamist groups founded to organize the mass protests against Jakarta Governor Basuki
“Ahok” Tjahaya Purnama. Bachtiar is an ultra-conservative preacher known for condemning minority groups, particularly Christians and Chinese Indonesians.
As conservative as Bachtiar but less aggressive is Abdullah Gymnastiar, better known as “Aa Gym” — a cleric who runs a large pesantren in West Java. He has been criticizing the Jakarta governor for being Christian and called on Muslims not to vote for Ahok, since he claimed that Islam does not allow Muslims to be led by non- Muslims. Like Rizieq he was also very active in mass mobilization for the rallies.
Several hard-line organizations such as the political party Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) were involved in the rallies, although they kept a low profile. No less important was the role of the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in the rallies. MUI is a semi-governmental institution whose religious edicts (fatwas) are known to be intolerant towards minorities. They played an especially significant role in the Dec.
2 rally as they are the organization that issued the fatwa in response to Ahok’s alleged blasphemy. Indeed, the fatwa seemed to be quite influencial in triggering the anger of Muslims.
Despite their important role in mobilizing huge crowds, many believe that the success of the rallies was not merely due
to the hard-liners alone. Mass mobilization requires preparation, funds, and effective tools of communication. It is believed that certain politicians, members of the elite and businessmen were involved in the rallies. Bachtiar Nasir has openly acknowledged that he had secured more than Rp 100 billion (Tribunnews, Nov. 1, 2016). While he did not say where the money came from, it seems unlikely that it was from the protesters who are mostly poor residents who arrived to Jakarta from other areas.
There are suspicions that the rallies were financed by various stakeholders who did not necessarily agree with the ideology embraced by the hard-liners, particularly the FPI, but utilized them and the alleged blasphemy case to defeat Ahok. In this context, the rallies are not meant to stop Ahok from participating in the Jakarta gubernatorial election but to weaken his electoral support. The impact is quite visible. According to various pollsters, Ahok was leading the competition prior to the rallies. No one could challenge him until the blasphemy issue was dragged into the race. Indikator, a Jakarta based pollster found that Ahok’s support has declined for the first time since he assumed the office in 2014. According to this survey, in November the support for Ahok decreased to 26 percent from 53 percent in June. His position was taken over by Agus Yudhoyono, the candidate backed by most of those who were involved in the rallies.
Following this logic, the next question is: who would want to intertwine the alleged blasphemy case with the Jakarta gubernatorial election?
Firstly, the main beneficiaries from the rallies are the governor’s competitors in the election: Agus Yudhoyono, son of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and Anies Baswedan, former minister of education. The statements by their campaign teams show that in general they agreed that Ahok had insulted Islam and therefore should be put into trial. They also campaigned to criminalize Ahok and urged Muslims not to vote for him.
SBY, in particular, publicly claimed that Ahok should be brought to court. A day before the rally on Nov. 4, he delivered a staggering political speech during a press conference. He blasted the government for its inability to tackle the current political unrest, particularly with regard to the blasphemy case and recommended
that the police should bring Ahok to justice before the situation gets worse.
This type of fiery speech is unprecedented for SBY. Renowned for his politeness and manners, SBY made people speculate that he was no longer the person he used to be. Yet, as he is now supporting his son in Jakarta’s gubernatorial race, he seemed to choose politicking over civility.
Anies’s supporters have likewise been aggressive in using the blasphemy issue.
One of the central figures in their play was Buni Yani, a university lecturer and close friend of Anies and his running mate Sandiaga Uno. Buni acknowledged that he was close with both of them, as the three belonged to the same network of United States graduates. Buni obtained his Master’s degree from the Ohio University, where he studied mass communication.
Furthermore, he was also among the first persons, if not the first, who uploaded to Facebook a doctored video of Ahok’s speech, which later triggered anger among many Muslim groups.
Meanwhile, the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra) Party and PKS, which support Anies, have been tirelessly campaigning against Ahok, using all their means to prevent the governor from winning the election. However, unlike SBY, Gerindra founder Prabowo Subianto chose to remain silent. It seems that he is not too enthusiastic about Anies, who was a spokesman of President Joko “Jokowi”
Widodo — his rival in the presidential race of 2014. Also, Anies is not a member of Gerindra and has never been associated with the party.
Secondly, other stakeholders benefitting from Ahok’s case are businessmen who have been disappointed by his policies, particularly regarding Jakarta’s development projects. Under previous governors, these businessmen had good access to the government and to the city’s administration. Since Jokowi became the governor in 2012, and two years later was replaced by Ahok, the influence of these businessmen has been gradually decreasing. Jokowi’s and Ahok’s bureaucratic reforms have limited their access and affected their businesses.
This hurts their lifeline as Jakarta is a hub of development. Jakarta is currently in the midst of infrastructure development, ranging from the management of traditional markets, waste management, renovation of roads, property development, to the reclamation of rivers and coastal areas. Billions that circulate in Jakarta’s
economy were partly controlled by those businessmen. Now they have lost some of their privileges.
In the past, those businessmen enjoyed their privileges by working together (collusion) with the local parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) and bureaucrats, either by helping in drafting regulations that would suit their particular interests or through bribery or markup projects (corruption). By these means of collusion and corruption, the businessmen obtained government projects. It was relatively easy to gain permits for property development or land use. Many regulations were often tackled by money. This way of managing businesses have been the rules of the game since the Soeharto era.
In 2012, Jokowi and Ahok started to reform and manage Jakarta. They began by improving the quality of bureaucracy, increasing the salaries of civil servants, upgrading their work system, and implementing rewards and punishments schemes for public officials. Additionally, budget spending was tightened during Ahok administration. He ensures that any allocation of funds have to meet the needs and specific criteria. Regulations that benefitted the businessmen and harmed the state were revised and changed into fairer ones. In the case of reclamation, for example, Ahok requires a 15-percent contribution from the developers for public services. This regulation, however, has not been effectively implemented yet, due to bribery and still existent collusion bonds between the businessmen and bureaucracy.
The disappointed businessmen might also have supported the campaign against Ahok and were willingly supporting the rallies.
The attitude of anti-Ahok’s businessmen is visible through their own media. For example, Hary Tanoesoedibjo who owns five TV stations is among the businessmen who chose to go against Ahok and support Anies Baswedan. When the rallies of Nov.
4 and Dec. 2 took place, his television stations ran live coverage and assumed a very negative angle towards Ahok.
Although himself a Chinese Christian just like Ahok, Tanoesoedibjo chose to ally with ultra-conservatives to topple the governor.
The Conservative Surge
The involvement of politicians and businessmen while important did not diminish the significance of the Islamic sentiments that were played during both
rallies. In this connection there are a number of questions: why and how did the hard-liners capture the national stage?
Why are Indonesian Muslims so resistant against a non-Muslim leader? Why are major Islamic organizations, such as Muhammadiyah and NU, unable to play an effective role in this situation? Where are the moderates?
Indonesia is witnessing the rise of conservatism. Since the fall of Soeharto, Indonesian political arena has undergone a dramatic change. Democracy and freedom have created an opportunity for many people to express their views openly.
Something that was forbidden for decades.
Indonesian democracy has become a stage for the contest of ideas. Economic growth has upgraded the country’s lower class to the new middle class. Those who lived in the rural areas migrated to the cities or even created their own towns. The change in the political system and economic structure has widely influenced the attitudes and lifestyles of Indonesians. As it is a Muslim majority country the most affected segment of the society is naturally Muslims.
A number of studies find that Indonesian Muslims have become more religious.
Evidence for this phenomenon is virtually seen everywhere: the increase in Islamic symbols in the public sphere — such as the use of hijab by Muslim women, a growing number of places to pray in malls, more and more Muslims going for pilgrimage to Mecca, and the exponentially growing number of Islamic programs on TV and other media (Greg Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam, 2008). These phenomena hardly existed in the Soeharto era.
Religion is by nature conservative. The liberal understanding of it is an exception. In the case of Indonesia, liberal understanding of Islam comes from elite Muslim intellectuals whose number is obviously limited. During Soeharto’s times, liberal Muslim intellectuals were represented by scholars such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and Dawam Rahardjo.
They controlled the Indonesian Islamic discourse. Conservative figures were relatively secluded to boarding schools or isolated religious institutions. However, since 1998, the situation has changed diametrically. Democracy enables the birth of mass media, both print and electronic.
It also enables people to speak whatever they want. There is no more control over the mosques and religious forums.
Religious preachers (khatib) are free to deliver their speeches (khutbah), including
those that contain messages of intolerance and hatred.
A dramatic increase in the number of internet users in the past five years worsens the situation. Most of them are active on social media like Facebook and Twitter. Indonesia always ranks second or third in the number of Facebook users worldwide. Religious preachers (ustad) use Facebook and Youtube to spread their mostly conservative views. Clerics such as Yusuf Mansyur and Abdullah Gymnastiar have millions of followers on Facebook and Twitter. At the same time, Indonesian Muslims who have no time to study Islam rely on the feeds of such clerics. It is with this background that technology has been helping conservative messages reach a much wider audience in Indonesia.
However, it does not mean that liberal Muslim intellectuals are absent. They are simply outnumbered by ustads and religious motivators who use simple and understandable language. While in the Soeharto era liberal Muslim intellectuals more easily obtained media coverage, they now have to compete with hundreds of thousands of preachers, mosques and religious circles with simplified religious opinions that are often intolerant and radical.
It should also be mentioned that Middle Eastern Islam, particularly that of Saudi Arabia, has been crucial in influencing the religious views of Indonesian Muslims. Since the early 1980s, the Saudi government has been aggressively campaigning for the spread of Wahhabism. They have been spending billions of dollars to disseminate Wahhabi teachings in Indonesia. They have
been building Islamic centers, mosques, and translating Wahhabi books to Indonesian and distributing them for free across the country (Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State, 2009). The fruits of these Wahhabi campaigns are now apparent with many Indonesian Muslims trying to embrace a Saudi Arabian lifestyle.
The changing political situation and the tireless Saudi campaigns have apparently created a new formula for Indonesian Islam which mixes conservative and intolerant views. The face of Indonesian Islam which was once known as pluralist and moderate is being challenged. Unfortunately, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama seem to have failed in tackling the influence of Wahhabism. Elements of Saudi puritanism are even gradually entering these two organizations. Since Abdurrahman Wahid left NU, conservatives are increasingly dominating. Meanwhile, in Muhammadiyah the Wahhabi outlook is gradually blending with the organization’s doctrines which are generally puritan.
Conclusion
The Muslim rallies in November and December should be seen as an alliance between two powers on the Indonesian political scene. On the one hand, the rallies were the tools of pragmatic politicians who oppose the current government and supported by a group of businessmen disappointed with the Jakarta governor’s policies. On the other hand, the rallies were a vehicle for expression of Islamic conservatism. Hard-liner groups which used to be on the peripheries have suddenly captured the national stage. Their presence in current politics reveals the
intolerant, exclusivist and fundamentalist side of Indonesian Islam.
To some extent, the effort of this unholy alliance has been successful. Their target to deflate Ahok’s support seems to have been reached, as we can see from the polls made right after the rallies. The pressure to bring Ahok to court has also been successful.
Although the evidence for blasphemy is very weak, the rallies have been successful in transforming a blasphemy allegation into a blasphemy case.
Finally, the unholy alliance between the hard-line Islamists and pragmatic politicians should be seen as a serious challenge for Indonesia’s democracy. With masses and big funds, it uses all means available under democratic conditions to prevent Ahok from becoming Jakarta’s governor again. Indeed, as Greg Fealy rightly said, the rallies were not really about Ahok’s governorship, but about something much bigger — the rise of conservatism and intolerance, and the opposition against the current government.
References
Luthfi Assyaukanie. 2009. Islam and the secular state in Indonesia.
Singapore: ISEAS
Greg Fealy. 2015. Bigger than Ahok: explaining the 2 December mass rally. Retrieved from http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.
edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass- rally/
Greg Fealy and Sally White. 2008. Expressing Islam: religious life and politics in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS
Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred Stepan (eds). 2013. Democracy and Islam in Indonesia. New York: Columbia University Press Jeremy Menchik. 2015. Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: tolerance without liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
...Middle Eastern Islam, particularly that of Saudi Arabia, has been crucial in influencing the religious views of Indonesian Muslims. Since the early 1980s, the Saudi government has been aggressively campaigning for the spread of
Wahhabism.
The Philippines’ War on Drugs: Human Rights
Concerns and Prospects for ASEAN
Manila during sunset.
Source: Pixabay
Andrea Chloe Wong is a Senior Lecturer at Miriam College in Metro Manila, the Philippines, and a Non- Resident Handa Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii, USA.
“I am a drug pusher, do not emulate me.”
T
his is the warning message that has appeared on crude cardboards placed atop the dead bodies found throughout the Philippines.More than 6,000 people have been killed since Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office on June 30, 2016, and the figure is still rising. While most Filipinos are satisfied with this war on drugs, some are alarmed at the brutality of these deaths.
The ongoing anti-narcotics crusade in the Philippines is the fulfillment of Duterte’s campaign promise that catapulted him to the presidency. Nicknamed the Punisher, Duterte believes that his peace-and-order platform, which focused on eliminating drugs and related crimes, will encourage more businesses, investments, and tourism that will bring economic benefits for the country. As of December 20, 2016, about 950,000 drug pushers and addicts have surrendered to the police, while more than 41,000 drug personalities have been arrested.1 Police claims these developments have led to a remarkable reduction in street crimes, especially in Metro Manila.
Despite this, Duterte’s war on drugs has polarized the country. According to a nationwide poll taken in December 2016, some 85 percent of the 1,500 Filipinos interviewed are satisfied with the president’s crackdown on illegal drugs.2 For the government, the survey results validate Duterte’s landslide victory in the elections. However, a growing number of Filipinos has raised concerns as the death toll of suspected drug personalities mounts.
In fact, while there is an overwhelming support for Duterte’s campaign against illegal drugs, the same survey reveals that 71 percent of the respondents think that it is “very important” for these suspects to be caught alive.
Controversies Arising From Duterte’s Drug Crusade
Duterte’s nationwide operation is believed to be linked with human rights violations and extrajudicial killings. This has resulted in the increasing death toll of mostly poor Filipinos in recent months. These people are indiscriminately identified as drug addicts and pushers without due process, in violation of their legal and constitutional rights. Eventually, they are shot dead during police operations or killed by unidentified
gunmen.
These human rights violations and extrajudicial killings are allegedly state- inspired and even purportedly state- sponsored. Police authorities are believed to be encouraged and emboldened by Duterte’s shoot-to-kill order against drug suspects who resist arrest. His directive to the police officers is clear: “Do your duty, and if in the process you kill 1,000 persons because you were doing your duty, I will protect you.”3 Aside from the police, vigilante groups and ordinary citizens are offered million-peso bounties for the capture or death of drug lords, resulting in the current spate of killings in the Philippines.
A nationwide poll reveals that Filipinos are alarmed at the growing death toll resulting from the Duterte administration’s war on drugs. Taken in December 2016, the survey reveals that 69 percent of Filipinos regard extrajudicial killings as a serious concern.4 What is even more alarming for the body politic is the fact that 78 percent of these respondents worry that they, or someone they know, could become victims of extrajudicial killing, possibly due to a wrong identification by police authorities or vigilante groups.
Despite the widespread fear over the growing death toll, Duterte caused even more alarm after making controversial statements regarding executing drug suspects. He initially admitted to killing them while he was still the mayor of Davao City, a province located in southern Philippines. “In Davao, I went around on a big bike and I would just patrol the streets... looking for an encounter to kill.
I used to do it personally. Just to show to the policemen that if I can do it, why can’t you?”5 says Duterte. Yet after drawing criticisms from his statement, Duterte eventually dismissed it as a “joke.” He rebuffed allusions that he was a “killer”
for allowing extrajudicial killings against his fellow Filipinos. But whether it is true that he has killed drug suspects or not, it is clearly evident that Duterte is disturbingly obsessed with eradicating the drug menace plaguing the country.
Duterte’s alarming pronouncements, along with the increasing casualties in his war on drugs, have attracted criticisms from the international community. At the start of his campaign, Duterte has been condemned by the United Nations (UN) for the increasing death toll attributed to police operations and vigilante killings. In particular, the UN Human Rights Council criticizes his
shoot-to-kill order to the police, without solid evidence against drug dealers and users. The fear is that this will ultimately trample on human rights and undermine justice. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court has expressed concerns over the endorsement and contributions of Philippine government officials to this bloody campaign against drugs, which it sees as tantamount to becoming a serious crime against humanity.
Defending Duterte’s Drive Against Drugs
In response to the growing number of critics, the Duterte administration is rationalizing its tough and punitive approach on its war against drugs. The government insists that most of the killings by the police were due to self-defense measures. Moreover, some officials argue that criticizing these deaths and labelling them as extrajudicial or illegal only demoralize police officers who are doing their job. In a way, the administration justifies that these drug suspects do not deserve due process, since they have already victimized so many people.
The ruthless deterrence against drug dealing and drug use, with its accompanying justifications, is not only apparent in the Philippines. In fact, it is common in Asia to execute people, either through death penalty or extra-judicial killings. According to a report by the drug policy institute International Harm Reduction Association, countries as diverse as China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia have executed drug traffickers since 2010.6 Indonesia, in particular, shares the same hard-hitting resolve as the Philippines in eliminating drugs. Since becoming president in Indonesia, Joko Widodo has also named ‘drugs’ and its proliferation as the number one problem for the country, just as Duterte has tagged it as a national crisis in the Philippines. But while Widodo advocated for the application of the death penalty for drug-related offenses, Duterte’s ferocious and violent method to combat illegal drugs borders on extrajudicial killings with blatant violation of human rights.
Before Duterte, There Was Thaksin’s War on Drugs
The ongoing war on drugs in the Philippines brings to memory the previous anti-drugs crusade in Thailand that bore striking similarities. Like Duterte’s campaign, former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched his own, all-out war
against drugs in 2003. In his campaign, Thaksin labelled drug dealers as enemies of the state and sponsored the murder of thousands of drug suspects. His anti-drugs operations were carried out through the collaboration between local governors and police officers. These government officials compiled several “blacklists” that included the names of suspected drug personalities, which led to their arrests and, in many cases, extrajudicial killings.
The Thai police are given a quota and an incentive to both pressure and reward them to kill suspected drug dealers/users, even without solid evidences against them.
After several years, local and international investigations on Thaksin’s war on drugs declared that it was a disastrous campaign. According to Thailand’s Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), of the thousands of people killed as part of the war on drugs since 2003, half of them had nothing to do with drugs.7 In addition, many drug lords were spared, only the smaller drug dealers at the bottom of the hierarchy were killed. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), the Myanmar-Laos- Thailand drug routes remained intact. This so-called Golden Triangle, which is one of the world’s biggest drug-producing and trafficking hubs, is believed to be protected by the country’s bureaucracy and business elites.
Though there was significant reduction in drug use/trade in Thailand, there were devastating consequences, which point to several factors. Foremost of which was the abuse of extralegal powers by police authorities in carrying out their shoot-to- kill operations based on flawed ‘blacklists,’
which also included people with no connection to drugs. Moreover, the culture of impunity, rampant corruption, lack of
police professionalism, and links between drug lords and political elites rendered Thailand’s war on drugs ineffective in the long term.8
The Duterte administration must take note of and consider the political circumstances of Thaksin’s beleaguered and brutal anti- drugs campaign as warning signs. After all, the corruption, abuse, and impunity confronting Thailand are also evident in the Philippines. Though Thaksin may have declared success in his own war, it only produced some fleeting gains. Likewise, Duterte may have gained some wins, but his battle against drugs may not guarantee an overall victory. Similar to Thailand’s experience, the ongoing war against drugs in the Philippines may eventually lose traction as more innocent lives are lost through human rights violations and extrajudicial killings.
And if the spate of killings continues unchecked, then it may undermine the reputation of the Philippines in the international community. Notably, Duterte’s brutal anti-drugs crusade runs counter to the Philippines’ long-held ideals of democracy and human rights, which are protected and promoted through its institutions. As a democratic country, the Philippines is expected to safeguard the rights of its citizens and uphold the rule of law. Yet, the current administration seems to overlook these values and principles in the name of eradicating drugs and controlling crimes.
Duterte’s contempt for due process and his authoritarian tendencies also discredit the Philippines’ human rights advocacy and democratic credentials in the international community, particularly in ASEAN. The growing militarization of the police force and the autocratic leanings of the Duterte
administration erode the Philippine’s image as one of the oldest democracies in the region. Moreover, the current extrajudicial killings undermine the country’s credibility as one of the active members in the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. Interestingly, the Philippines holds the most number of international human rights treaties ratified among the 10 member states in the region, which would appear increasingly paradoxical given the incidences of human rights violations in the country.
The War on Drugs vs. the Fight For Human Rights
The Philippines’ war on drugs has certainly captured the attention of its ASEAN neighbors. Most, if not all, share similar objectives yet navigate through different political circumstances. For democratic societies such as Indonesia, the constant challenge is to bear the difficult balancing act of promoting national security while upholding human rights. For those with authoritarian governments such as Laos and Vietnam, the important goal is to maintain peace and order at all costs, preferably with fewer international criticisms regarding blood on their hands.
Indeed, the current developments in the Philippines have reawakened various political debates that resonate within ASEAN. The tension lies between prioritizing security and order on the one hand, and protecting human rights on the other. Essentially, the question remains whether or not the achievement of national goals by the state justifies its questionable approach. To win this war against drugs, should governments then be allowed to display lethal force at the expense of human rights?
...Duterte’s brutal anti-drugs crusade runs counter to the Philippines’ long-held ideals of democracy and human rights, which are protected and
promoted through its institutions.
It is interesting to take note of how the rest of ASEAN will look at the Philippines’
war on drugs. It is highly likely that what is happening in the Philippines may be used as a justification for other governments to carry out police force without due process. If a long-established democracy such as the Philippines is perceived to employ extrajudicial killings in its fight against illegal drugs, what is to hinder other ASEAN countries from doing (or continue doing) the same? Essentially, the ongoing anti-drugs crusade in the Philippines may feed into the rationale of other governments in ASEAN to defy individual human rights (particularly those of drug suspects) to preserve the collective security of the majority. If other ASEAN countries will adopt Duterte’s anti-narcotics operation bordering on extrajudicial killings, then such possibility will be a huge setback towards ASEAN’s advocacy on human rights.
This alarming trend in the Philippines implies several unfortunate insights regarding human rights that are likely shared by some countries in ASEAN. The mass murder of drug suspects tolerated by the Duterte administration reveals that mere human suspicion (without factual evidence) is enough to shoot someone dead. In a broader perspective, this development indicates how governments may perceive “some people as less human than others, that there are lives worth protecting and lives worth sacrificing for the sake of a political project.”9 It also brings to light doubts and reservations on the permanence and universality of human rights in this part of the world, and how sometimes it can be subject to negotiations and compromises depending on who is in power.
The Philippines and ASEAN in the War against Drugs
Despite its many controversies, the war against illegal drugs must be fought not only in the Philippines but also within ASEAN.
Drug trafficking and narcotics trade are longstanding transnational threats that need to be seriously addressed. And since illegal drug operations are increasingly going beyond a country’s sovereign borders, neighboring states within ASEAN have to work together to combat them.
In this sense, Duterte’s plea at the 2016 ASEAN Summit in Laos for regional cooperation is an important step in the right direction towards a “drug-free”
ASEAN.
However, this battle should not be brutally
waged at the cost of innocent lives. Human rights should not be suspended to save a nation from its drug problems. Though in the short term it may deliver instant results by way of a rising body count, the long-term implication of it however will be the blood stains of innocent casualties that may leave the nation weeping.
Despite its many controversies, the Philippines’ ongoing war on drugs has largely gained support from its ASEAN neighbors. Brunei, Cambodia, and Singapore have publicly praised the Philippines’ anti- narcotics crusade during Duterte’s recent state visits in these countries. Indonesia is contemplating imitating Duterte’s hard- hitting stance against drug personalities despite having some of the toughest drug laws in the world. Meanwhile, other countries in ASEAN are quietly observing how the Philippines’ war on drugs will evolve, and are curiously monitoring the impact of its ongoing battle.
As the Philippines prepares for its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2017, it is highly likely that the Duterte administration will put its advocacy on illegal drugs and transnational crimes on top of the regional agenda. The country is expected to further elevate its anti-narcotics campaign with the aim of pushing it beyond its borders in pursuit of a drug-free ASEAN. However, such well-meaning advocacy at the same time puts the Philippines on the spotlight for its ruthless method and brutal force in its war on drugs. This may not bode well for a country with a long-held reputation of having a vibrant democracy with a strong foundation on human rights. It is hoped that the Duterte administration will find success in reducing the proliferation of illegal drugs without violating the rule of law. And that the Philippine government will be able to safeguard national security without trampling on human rights, especially those of the innocent.
Such hope could be transformed into a more sustainable objective that, if pursued effectively in the long term with as much political will, could put the Philippines in a better light. The Philippines’ experience in its crusade against illegal drugs, if fought with less violence and brutality, could be an insightful case for other ASEAN countries to learn from. Thailand has already gained a lot of battle scars, traumatized from its own war on drugs. Thus, the Philippines should make every effort not to suffer the same fate as Thailand.
The Duterte administration is riding high on the positive results of its campaign, but
not without its devastating consequences.
To be fair, it deserves commendation with the recent decrease in drug trade, reduction of drug-related crimes, and voluntary surrender of drug lords, addicts, and pushers in the Philippines. Yet, for most Filipinos, the war on drugs may be worth the fight, but it should neither be at the expense of innocent casualties, nor should it be in plain disregard for human rights and the rule of law. It is indeed ironic and unfortunate that Duterte’s ruthless anti-narcotics campaign has consequently induced and promoted fear among the very people he wants to protect from the apparent evils of illegal drugs.
The cardboard message on dead bodies declaring: “I am a drug pusher, do not emulate me,” is certainly a disturbing symbol on the brutality of this ongoing battle in the Philippines. Yet the cardboard sign held by some Filipinos arguing: “We could all be drug pushers; all lives matter,”
must also serve as a striking reminder to the Duterte administration on the perils and destruction that this war on drugs has wrought.
Endnotes
1. Michael Bueza, “In Numbers: The Philippines’ War on Drugs,” Rappler, 20 December 2016. http://www.rappler.
com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics-philippines- war-drugs, (accessed 21 December 2016)
2. “SWS: 4 of 5 Filipinos Fear Being EJK Victim,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 December 2016, pp A16.
3. Julliane Love De Jesus, “Duterte Tells Cops: Will Die for You if you Fulfil Your Duty,” Inquirer.net, 1 July 2016, http://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/793794/duterte-tells-cops-will-die- for-you-if-you-fulfill-your-duty, (accessed 1 November 2016).
4. “SWS: 78% of Filipinos Fear Becoming Victims of EJK,”
CNN Philippines, 19 December 2016, http://cnnphilippines.
com/news/2016/12/19/sws-78-percent-fear-EJK.html, (accessed 21 December 2016).
5. Marlon Ramos, “Duterte: I Personally Killed Drug Suspects,”
Inquirer.Net, 14 December 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/853420/duterte-i-personally-killed-drug-suspects, (accessed 20 December 2016).
6. Patrick Gallahue and Rick Lines, “The Death Penalty for Drug Offences, Global Overview 2010,” International Human Reduction Association, pp. 1-53, https://www.hri.
global/files/2010/06/16/IHRA_DeathPenaltyReport_Web1.
pdf, (accessed 1 November 2016).
7. “Most Killed in Thailand’s 2003 Drug War Not Involved in Drugs, Panel Finds,” Drug War Chronicles, Issue 512, 30 November 2007, http://stopthedrugwar.org/
chronicle/2007/nov/30/southeast_asia_most_killed_thail, (accessed 10 November 2016).
8. Janjira Sombatpoonsiri and Aries Arugay, “Duterte’s War on Drugs: Bitter Lessons from Thailand’s Failed Campaign,” The Conversation, 29 September 2016, http://theconversation.
com/dutertes-war-on-drugs-bitter-lessons-from-thailands- failed-campaign-66096, (accessed 15 November 2016).
9. Nicole Curato, “The Philippines’ War vs Drugs: It has been Bloody,” Rappler, 25 July 2016, http://www.rappler.
com/thought-leaders/140817-duterte-war-drugs-bloody, (accessed 2 November 2016).
Is Rohingya persecution caused by business interests rather than religion?
The Guardian, 4 January 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/
global-development-professionals- network/2017/jan/04/is-rohingya- persecution-caused-by-business-interests- rather-than-religion?CMP=share_btn_tw The past two decades have seen a massive worldwide rise of corporate acquisitions of land for mining, timber, agriculture and water. In the case of Myanmar, the military have been grabbing vast stretches of land from smallholders since the 1990s, without compensation, but with threats if they try to fight back. This land grabbing has continued across the decades but has expanded enormously in the last few years.
At the time of the 2012 attacks, the land allocated to large projects had increased by 170% between 2010 and 2013. By 2012 the law governing land was changed to favour large corporate acquisitions.
Why it matters:
The often-cited reason that the Rohingya people are persecuted because of their religion may only be partly true. New research shows that Buddhist farm owners have also been victims of overt land- grabbing by the military government for the benefit of large corporations. Although this does not excuse what may very well amount to crimes against humanity perpetrated towards the Rohingya, it does show that the situation in Myanmar is not as simple as hitherto perceived. The possibility that military backed business interests may have been responsible for a humanitarian crisis is a lingering stain in both Myanmar and ASEAN’s legacy in protecting its own citizens.
Some Muslim politicians in Indonesia want a total ban on booze
The Economist, 7 January 2017 http://www.economist.com/news/
asia/21713897-huge-new-beer-factory- betting-they-wont-get-their-way-some- muslim-politicians-indonesia-want
Beyond booze, the state-backed council of clerics, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), has in recent years passed edicts condemning everything from homosexual partnerships to the wearing of Santa hats.
Although these have no legal force under Indonesia’s secular constitution, vigilantes have sometimes used the edicts to target revellers as well as religious and sexual minorities. Partly at the MUI’s urging, parliament has passed sweeping anti- pornography laws, which some Indonesians see as a threat to artistic and cultural liberties. Muslim groups are petitioning the courts to interpret the law in a way that would criminalise extramarital sex. They are also making more use of laws against blasphemy—notably in the trial against the governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian of Chinese descent.
Why it matters:
The influence of Islamist hardliners in Indonesia is worrying for those who value Indonesia’s respect for diversity in all its forms. Yet even more worrying is the fact that even though they are a minority in the Indonesian population, they command a large and growing influence on the national stage. This signifies both a significant breakdown in political representation and a failure of the more moderate majority in organizing themselves in making their aspirations better heard. If fringe groups always get their way then Indonesian democracy is in trouble.
Thai economy resilient, but growth outlook uninspiring
Nikkei Asian Review January 10 2017 http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/
Economy/Thai-economy-resilient-but- growth-outlook-uninspiring?page=2
At a time when the currencies of emerging economies are being squeezed hard, the Thai economy, Southeast Asia’s second largest, is showing encouraging resilience.
But being able to absorb shocks is not the same as achieving the growth the government so desperately wants. The hurdles littering the path to expansion are numerous – from an aging society to lack of engineers – making for a decidedly downbeat outlook.
Why it matters:
Even though the Thai economy has so far held steady under six years of military rule, seen from a respectable enough GDP growth rate and a steady baht against the dollar, there are numerous structural issues that will continue to hamper ASEAN’s second largest economy. Chief among them are a dearth of engineers (which are sorely needed in developing an economy) and an increasingly older population (which obliges the economy to take care of old people). This twin problem of education and demography is a problem that is faced not only by Thailand, but also Indonesia, the Philippines, and many other emerging economies. How Thailand chooses to combat this problem will be an important lesson for them as well as for the region.
AS E A N R O U N D - U P
Agustha Lumban Tobing is a researcher at The Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Program1 2 3
The year 2016 saw President Jokowi delivering speeches at bilateral events and international forums. We analyze these speeches to summarize the words that are often used in these events to sketch an illustration of his foreign policy priorities in the
past year.
Indonesia, World, State , Palestine,
Become, Democracy, People, Nation, Islam, Good, Society,
Economy, International, Constitution,
Government, Foreign, Challenge, Global, Peace
Tongki Ari Wibowo is a communication officer at The Habibie Center’s Wirya Adiwena is the Head of
International Relations and a Researcher at the ASEAN Studies Progam
