Prospects for the 3 rd Trump-Kim Summit and Issues for the Working-Level Negotiations
2019.9.
Prof. Bong-Geun JUN jun2030@mofa.go.kr
IFANS, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
www.knda.go.kr
Questions
Q1) Why has the Korean peninsula continuously suffered from war, division and nuclear threats?
Q2) Why did North Korea change its course of action in 2018
suddenly? Is this time different from the past seven vicious cycles of nuclear negotiations with the DPRK?
Q3) What are prospects for the 3
rdTrump-Kim Summit in 2019?
Q4) What are contentious issues for the US-DPRK working level
negotiations and their solutions?
Political Landscape on the Korean peninsula and East Asia
Return of Great Power Politics in East Asia
- John Mearsheimer: The US-China competition is inevitable(2001) - Graham Allison: In the 12 of 16 cases of two-great powers
rivalries over the past 500 years, the result was war.
Return of Geopolitics on the Korean Peninsula - Robert Kaplan, “Korea is in a shatter zone.”
- J. Mearsheimer, “Korea, Poland and Ukraine are in the worst
geopolitical locations.” “. The only way for North Korea to secure its border and regime is to keep nuclear weapons.
- Henry Kissinger: A US-China big deal, putting North Korea under the Chinese influence, can solve the NK nuclear problem.
3
Brzezisnky’s ‘Grand Chessboard(1997)’
-
East Asia is a potential political volcano.
-5 Geopolitical pivots: Korea, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran
State Planning Economy
Market Economy
Pluralistic Political System One-man / One-party
Political System (a) China, Vietnam
(d) Ceausescu’s Romania, Honecker’s East Germany (c) DPRK
(b) Eastern, Central Europe
Why couldn’t NK transform itself?
Will it be different this time?
Who is North Korea?
The Longest Family Ruling Communist State
Kim Il Sung
1948-94(45 Yrs) Kim Jong Il
1994-2011(18 Yrs) Kim Jong Un
2011.12-????
North Korea’s Political-Economic System: too rigid to transform?
[State Strategy and Ideology]
-Kim IL Sung: Juche (self-reliance) ideology -Kim Jong Il: Military-first politics
-Kim Jong Un: Byongjin (dual) Policy of economic and nuclear development
[Systemic Characteristics]
The trinity of the DPRK state, the Communist system and the Kim regime
Infallible ‘Suryong’ (supreme leader) Ruling System
Closed Society
Socialist State-Planning and Self-reliant Economy
=>But, Is Kim Jong Un different? Is Kim another Deng Xiaoping, de Klerk, Gorvachev? He could be.
Another North Korea (NASA 2014)
9
Is North Korea changing? Markets.
Hwasong 14 ICBM Test(2017.7)
11
* Source: Korea Statistics / IMF (2012)
South Korea North Korea
48,223,854 23,889,616
Population
2 times greater
GDP at current prices (1 Billion US dollar)
>
Per Capita GNI (US dollar)
>
51,446,000 25,014,000
Comparing the Two Koreas- 2:1, 43:1
1,299 (2018)
32.2 1,393
29,859
CVID (DPRK) Nuclear Armament
B
E C
D A
Confrontation∙
Containment (ROK ∙USA) Engagement.
Diplomatic Normalization
North Korean Nuclear Scenarios and Our and NK’s Choice?
Living w/ Nuclear NK:
NK’s mil. superiority, nuclear coercion, SK’s nuclear armament, US forces withdrawal? -NK
Peace-regime Building:
denuke, peace agreement, NK-US normalization, NEA security cooperation:
Moon
Forced Denuclearization:
preventive attack, regime change/collapse,
containment-Bolton Balance of Terror: nuclear
threats, war crisis, arms race, MD, preemptive attack- Security
2017-->2018
A’
Opportunity Factors for the New Dialogue Cycle in 2018, Still Effective ?
• A higher sense of war and nuclear crisis - A moment of truth was near.
• ICBM, hydrogen bomb tests catalyzed stronger US-China joint reactions
- NK’s ICBM and H bomb tests passed Clausewitzian “culminating points of attack.”
• ‘Trump opportunity factor’
- presidential priority on NK: anything but Obama, national security threats, global nonproliferation threats, Nobel peace prize?
- Washington outsider: ignorant of past NK behaviors or strategically ignoring?
- Is he impulsive, ignorant or calculating, competent?
• NK ‘Byongjin Line’ under stress
- Adverse security and economy effects due to maximum pressure and sanctions - If Kim chooses to wait, his options could be worsened.
14
2018-2019 Summitry in Action
• April 20 DRPK Party Decisions: for domestic audience, US
- suspending nuclear, ICBM tests, dismantling nuclear test site, joining int’l efforts banning nuclear tests, no transfer of nuclear weapons and technology
• 4/27 South-North Summit, Panmunjeom Declaration
- Confirmed the goal of realizing a nuclear-free KP through complete denuclearization
• 6/12 Singapore US-DPRK Summit
- 3 goals: New US-DPRK relations, Korean Peace-regime building, Denuclearization - No more Libya model, but which model?
• 9/19 Pyongyang Declaration @ 3rd Moon-Kim Summit
- Military Agreement: to stop hostile military activities in and near the DMZ
- NK, to dismantle missile engine test site, launch platform; to permanently dismantle Yeongbyeon nuclear complex in exchange for US corresponding measures
• 2019.2.28 Hanoi Trump-Kim Summit
- disagreement over scopes of denuclearization and sanction relief
• 2019. 6.30, Kim-Trump, Kim-Trump-Moon Meetings
- Recovering from the Hanoi wound, to resume working-level meetings in 2-3 weeks
Characteristics of the New ‘Political’ Approach
The dialogue Approaches to the NK problem changed from the normative, legal to the political (top-down), transactional ones.
• Politicians, not technocrats, are main drivers.
- Those strong political leaders are free from the burden of the past failed nuclear diplomacy and domestic political pressure.
- Trump, confident negotiator; Moon, determined peacemaker; Kim, ambitious autocrat.
• As a political process, changes are fast, wide-ranging, widely- fluctuating, could be unpredictable.
• Chairman Kim seems to have made a strategic decision to move from the nuke-first, to economy-first state line, but would wait its
implementation until conditions are met.
3 rd Trump-Kim Summit in Late 2019?
• Without Trump’s intervention, the dialogue process should have collapsed by now.
- the June 30 surprise meeting with Kim at Panmunjeom - “I am in good relations with Chairman Kim.”
- “Short-range missile tests did not violate our agreement.”
• Trump’s Signals for the 3rd Summit
- Responding positively to NK vice-minister Choi’s Sep. 9 statement - Fired John Bolton on Sep. 10 and blamed him for the Hanoi failure by
saying that “Libyan model was a mistake”
• Trump’s Interests in Early Summit, Why?
- Trump repeatedly said that I am not in a hurry
- But, prospects of the US economy are bad; Support rates slow down - He may need all the boost and leverages for the reelection campaign.
- If aiming at the Nobel Peace Prize for a personal honor and reelection, he needs to be recommended by Jan. 2020.
Contentious Issues at the Working-level Negotiations
1) Denuclearization roadmap: big deal vs. small deal
-US demands: 1) dismantling Youngbyon plus , 2) definition of denuclearization, 3) roadmap; In order to get NK answers, need to provide corresponding measures in the same formats. Then, both parties could draw a comprehensive (conceptual) roadmap.
2) first denuclearization: fissile material production freeze vs. others
Freeze and shutdown of fissile material production should be the primary goal.
may add the dismantlement of ICBMS, shutdown of production facilities and launchers.
3) Verification: NPT safeguards vs. nuclear arms control
- DPRK already walked away from nuclear deals four times due to verifications - Begins with less intrusive verification such as monitoring,
4) Corresponding measures: sanctions relief vs. security assurance
-DPRK needs both, though it said it would not seek ‘sanctions relief’ anymore 5) Reversibility problem: US view vs. NK view
- NK views that its denuke measures are hard to reverse, while US political security assurances are easily reversible; US views that its sanctions relief is hard to reverse, while NK denuke measures are reversible.
Denuclearization and Peace Regime-building Roadmap(BGJ, 2019)
1st Stage: Nuclear Freeze 2nd Stage: Nuclear CVID Denuke -nuclear, missile tests suspension
- All fissile material production, warhead production freeze/shutdown, monitoring -dismantling ICBMs, IRBM
(I) Nuclear facilities reporting, disabling;
(II) CVID; NPT reentry; AP SG
Peace Treaty
-3-party end-of war declaration, 4-party peace forum-peace declaration
(I) Interim peace treaty (II) peace treaty
NK-US relations
-to announce nonaggression, regime assurance, no hostile policy; to start normalization negotiations
-representative/liason office in capitals -military dialogue, hotline, CBM
-’nuclear security’ dialogue, CTR program
Diplomatic normalization Sanctions removed
Mission of USFK revised
SK-NK relations/
Arms Control
-SK-NK ‘basic agreement’ for peaceful coexistence
-military dialogue, military CBM
-arms reduction
-SK-NK free trade agreement
NEA region -Ministers conference: NEA security cooperation statement
-6-party summit, statement -NEA security cooperation body Economic -humanitarian aid
-promises of economic aids, LWR
-LWR provision
-NEA gas pipeline, electricity connection 19
Future Tasks
• How to make NK stay on the course, and to prevent the “vicious circle”?
- strong penalties and incentives combined
- peace-regime on the peninsula, Northeast peace architecture should progress in parallel - consistency in North Korea policy and political support
- President Moon, “to handle inter-Korea relations like dealing with a glassware”
- pressing for NK’s “decisive concessions” could backfire.
• ‘Korea-type’ denuclearization model should be developed
- Lessons from Argentina/Brazil, Ukraine, Libya, South Africa, Iran?
- Lessons from other nuclear weapons-free zones
- To develop and promote a balanced, comprehensive, feasible denuke roadmap
• EU’s role as peace-maker, facilitator, partner.
- Utilizing NK’s affinity for Europe; EU is western, advanced, without subversive intention.
- EU can help reform (economically) and open NK by expanding exchanges and assistance