I. Introduction
The “Korea Problem” first emerged as an important international issue of Northeast Asia during the 19th century. Since then, and throughout the Cold War period of the 20th century to the present day, “neutralization of the Korean peninsula” has been incessantly proposed as a plausible model underpinning the stability of the peninsula and the region, as well as a goal that unified Korea should aspire to. In most cases, the concept of neutrality referred to permanent neutrality. This is a legal status which forbids the country from engaging in direct armed aggression against another state or assisting other warring states, with the sole exception of territorial self-defense. Permanent neutrality is distinct from wartime neutrality in that, unlike the latter which only is effectuated during war time, the former does not allow a state to enter into alliance treaties or provide parts of their territory as a military base to other states even during peace time.
In this context, the doctoral dissertation submitted to Princeton University in 1910 by Rhee Syng-man, the first president of South Korea, titled Neutrality as Influenced by the United States, holds great significance. Rhee’s political adviser Robert T. Oliver makes the following observations on the historical and geopolitical background of the assertion for Korea’s neutrality.
Just so, Korea has proved through forty centuries of history to have a special importance to the peace of Asia. … And it is inescapably evident that in Asia’s long history, Korea has been a crucial area. Its primary role has been that of a buffer state. Never strong militarily and never ambitious for expansion, Korea has not in itself been a threat to anyone. Its significance lies now (as it has in the past) in the fact that it occupies the strategic heartland of north Asia, surrounded by China, Japan, and Siberian Russia. So long as Korea is truly independent, these powers are kept apart and the peace of Asia is safe. As soon as Korea is dominated by one of them, the other two are endangered. This is a truism impossible to avoid. It is the basis for Korea claims that (like Switzerland in
IP2021-05E | April, 14, 2021
Seeking Korean Neutralization in 19th Century:
Yu Gil-Jun’s On Neutrality and Sino-Korean Relations
by Jong-Hak KIM
Head, Center for Diplomatic History
Europe) it is to the fundamental advantage of the Great Powers to insure two things: (1) that Korea be protected against aggression; and (2) that this be accomplished without reducing it to a pawn or satellite of any one or any group of outside nations. If this contention seems self-contradictory, the answer is that it once was done for Belgium and still is being done for Switzerland; it must be done for Korea if the consequences of general war are to be avoided.1)
According to Oliver, Korea was a “strategic heartland” where great powers - China, Japan, and Russia – intersected, and a “crucial area” which served for thousands of years as a buffer zone that mitigated clashes between them. As long as Korea maintains its independence, Asia’s peace is guaranteed. If one of the three powers come to occupy Korea, the other two will be put at risk, and this means a disruption of regional order in Northeast Asia. Thus, in order to prevent this from happening, discussions have ensued on referring to the precedence of Belgium or Switzerland in Europe and protecting Korea from external threats while simultaneously preventing it from being relegated to a protectorate or satellite state of another country.
Although permanent neutrality refers to a special legal status, it does not necessarily mean that all issues can be resolved by international law. Historically, permanent neutrality manifested itself in different forms depending on international circumstances and the national interests of neighboring powers. One needs to look no further than 19th century Europe to find the example of Switzerland, a country which had been recognized as a permanent neutral state based on its longstanding tradition of armed neutrality, or the case of Belgium, which was given a de-facto obligation of assuming permanent neutrality as a condition for its independence from the Netherlands. In contrast to Belgium, Luxembourg’s position of permanent neutrality was established based on the collective guarantee of the signatory states of the Treaty of London (1867), and was thus substantially different in its legal effect compared to the individual guarantees given to Belgium.
What does this mean? If a weak country like Korea was to gain the status of a permanent neutral state in the 19th century, it first needed to have an in-depth understanding of and meticulously analyze the international political landscape, in particular, the strategic goals of surrounding powers and their geopolitical interests. As an historical example of such an analysis, I would like to review the treatise titled On Neutrality (中立論, 1885) by Yu Gil-Jun (俞吉濬, 1856-1914). He was the first Korean to ever study abroad in Japan and the United States. At the time, no one in Korea had better knowledge of international politics and Western learning than Yu. This combined with his foreign languages proficiency, Yu was able to have a long and distinguished career in diplomacy. And during the Gabo Reformation which was pursued by the intervention of Japan during the 1st Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Yu served in key government positions and became responsible for laying the theoretical foundations for the reform drive.
On Neutrality was the first paper by a Korean to present the idea of Korean neutralization.
In reviewing this, I would reassess the structural constraints and possibility of Korea’s neutrality in 19th century by seeking answers to following questions. If the asymmetry in
1) Oliver, Robert T., Verdict in Korea, Lebanon, PA: Sowers Printing Company, 1952. p.32.
Sino-Korean relations is the fundamental factor defining the constant geopolitical conditions of the Korean peninsula, how did Yu Gil-Jun think Korea could overcome this structural limitation and achieve neutrality? As it will be discussed later on in the paper, Yu Gil-Jun focused on the cases of Belgium and Bulgaria in his thesis. What was the reason?
Ⅱ. On Neutrality (1885)
On Neutrality begins by distinguishing the two different forms of neutrality; “wartime neutrality” and “permanent neutrality.”
A state’s neutrality can take two different forms. The first is wartime neutrality and the other is permanent neutrality. Neutrality means the nonparticipation in wars between other states.
What is wartime neutrality? If country A and country B get into a dispute with each other which escalates into an armed conflict, neighboring countries will declare their neutrality, guard their borders closely and forbid the entry of the warring countries into their territory so that the belligerent states can wage a war between themselves to decide the outcome. Therefore if a certain country is too weak to hold up its neutrality, surrounding countries may consult with each other and uphold the said country’s neutrality in its stead as a means of self-protection. Such a situation may arise out of unavoidable circumstances and is permitted under international public law.
What is permanent neutrality? If a strategically located country, once strong and prosperous, falls under the control of a powerful nation due to the failure of its posterity to defend itself, it will cause great disturbances in the regional order leading to catastrophes for neighboring countries. Therefore, a treaty to establish the neutrality of the country in question will be entered into by several countries after consultation, and by turning the said country neutral, the military forces of other states will be prohibited from crossing its borders whether in war or peace time and should any one country be found to have violated the treaty, a group of countries will launch a joint attack against the violating state to bring it to justice.
Yu goes on to cite the Belgium and Bulgarian cases as examples of permanent neutrality.
But, why of all countries, did Yu bring up Bulgaria alongside Belgium, when there were other well-known neutral countries like Switzerland or Luxembourg? The answer can be found in the international status of Korea back in the 19th century. Historically, for over 1,500 years, starting from 4th century until 1895, Korea had a tributary relationship with China. Problems started to happen in mid-19th century when Korea started entering into modern treaties with Japan and Western countries as an independent sovereign state. In other words, Korea was a tributary state to China, and China for its part claimed itself to be a higher state of Korea, but at the same time, China and Korea were both entering into treaty relations with Western powers on equal footing. As such, questions started to be raised on the international status of Korea.
More specifically, Korea concluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Korea and Japan in 1876, and signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the U.S, UK and Germany in 1882. Under article 1 of the treaty with Japan, the international status of Korea is stated as an “Autonomous State”(自主之邦).” The word “autonomy” is ambivalent
and can be interpreted two ways, either as the traditional autonomy of a tributary state over its internal and foreign affairs, or as the sovereignty of a modern state. Likewise, the United States, Britain, and Germany all declared that diplomatic relations with Korea will be conducted based on equal standing between sovereign states, in accordance with the international law and treaty provisions. As such, the international status of Korea in the 19th century was essentially contradictory: on one hand it was a tributary state to China, and on the other hand an equal sovereign state to Japan and other Western countries.
This is the very reason why Yu looked to the Bulgarian example. In his view, Korea resembled Belgium in that it occupied a strategic geopolitical location, while it was similar to Bulgaria in that it was paying tribute to a neighboring power - the Ottoman Empire.
However, there were dissimilarities as well. In short, Korea, unlike Bulgaria, possessed the right to autonomously enter into treaties with other countries, and unlike Belgium, the king had to receive the perfunctory approval of China to ascend to the throne. In other words, Yu believed that the unique nature of Korea’s international status could be explained to a certain extent through a comparison with Belgium and Bulgaria.
In the case of Korea, geographically, it is situated in a strategic location in Asia, and thus is similar in this respect to Belgium, while in terms of its status as a tributary state to China, the country is similar to Bulgaria in its relations with Turkey. However, the authority to enter into treaties with other countries based on equal “courtesy” was is a right absent in Bulgaria yet possessed by Korea. The rulers of Korea also had to be awarded official titles from China in order to ascend to the throne, a practice which was absent in Bulgaria. Therefore, the international status of Korea combines the characteristics of both Belgium and Bulgaria. Bulgaria was turned into a neutral state by the European powers as a means to guard against Russia, while Belgium was neutralized as an outcome of the European powers’ endeavor for self-protection. In this respect, Korea’s neutralization is key to contain Russia and a diplomatic strategy to ensure common security among large and powerful countries in Asia.
Nevertheless, explaining the nature of Korea’s international status wasn’t the only reason Yu referred to Belgium and Bulgaria. More importantly, the two countries were cited as leading examples of permanent neutrality established by the agreement of neighboring powers. According to Yu, the European countries agreed to turn Bulgaria into a permanent neutral state to contain Russia’s southward expansion, while Belgium’s neutrality was established to maintain their balance of power and prevent the possibility of future clashes with one another. Therefore, should Korea follow in these footsteps and become a permanent neutral state, Russia will be contained, and at the same time clashes between Korea’s surrounding powers, namely Russia, China, Japan, and the U.S. can be avoided.
But, another question arises at this point. Is Bulgaria truly a permanent neutral state? In the case of Belgium, some treaties were concluded between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia and the Netherlands to establish Belgium’s permanent neutrality.
However, Bulgaria had never been officially recognized as a “neutral state” based on international law. Unless this oversight is attributed to Yu’s simple ignorance, it can be assumed that he had some reason to cite Bulgaria as an example. To understand this, the process of Bulgaria’s “neutralization” needs to be examined.
Ⅲ. Process of Belgium and Bulgaria’s “Neutralization”
Belgium became a permanent neutral state through the 1839 Treaty of London. Prior to this treaty, Belgium had been annexed into the Kingdom of the Netherlands following the decision reached at the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), held in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. It was the result of strategic calculations made to create a balance of power in the region to prevent France from ever rising again to wage war against the whole of European continent.
However, 15 years later, the outbreak of the French July Revolution of 1830 sparked armed riots in Brussel which ultimately led to the establishment of independent Belgium. Thereupon, the aforementioned five powers determined the independence and permanent neutrality of Belgium in the 1831 Conference of London. The 1839 London Treaty is nothing more than a belated acquiescence by Netherlands to accept this decision, after refusing for eight years.
Just like the decision to annex the country to the Netherlands, the neutralization of Belgium was based on the geopolitical calculus that a single country’s control over Belgium could threaten the balance of power in Western Europe. In other words, in return for recognizing Belgium’s independence, they turned the country into a permanent neutral state, forbidding it from entering into alliances or treaties that entail military obligations with other countries. The Belgium example offers a stark contrast to the case of Poland, where large people joined in an armed rebellion staged around the same period in protest against the rule of the Russian empire. The uprising was eventually brutally crushed by the Russian army amid the indifference of the European powers.
Then what about the case of Bulgaria? The 1830 July Revolution also had an impact on Bulgaria which had been under the rule of the Ottoman Empire since the end of the 14th century. In particular, the newly gained independence in 1832 by Greece, another country which had been under the rule of the Ottoman Turks, inspired Bulgarians to begin its struggle for independence in earnest.
The massive uprising that took place in Bosnia 1875 combined with Serbia’s declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire the following year, sparked a nationwide rebellion in Bulgaria. The uprising was met with brutal suppression by the Ottoman Empire. In the course of subduing the rebellion, the most well-known of the atrocities committed by the Ottoman forces was the wholesale massacre of Bulgarians, an event called the “Bulgarian Horrors.” In Batak alone, 5,000 people including children and women were killed. Across the country, over 30,000 Bulgarians were massacred, sending shockwaves across Europe.
The incident triggered the European powers to intervene in the independence movements of Bulgaria and the South Slavic people.
The most visible among them was Russia. Earlier, the European powers had been vying to take over the Balkans where the Ottoman Empire was losing control and lost the bulk of its territory. Russia, in particular, had suffered significant territorial losses in the Balkans
after its defeat in the Crimean War and no longer had access to the Black Sea. Moreover, pan-Slavism was gaining support among the Russian populace, leading to greater call for more active intervention in the Balkans. Diplomatic efforts took place to prevent Russia from going to war alone, but they were to no avail. Ultimately, in April of 1877, Russia declared war and the Russo-Turkish War broke out.
The Eastern Orthodox coalition led by the Russian Empire, which included the provisional government of Bulgaria, went on to win impressive victories against the Turks. As a result of the war, the Treaty of San Stefano, consisting of 29 provisions, was signed in March of 1878. The articles that relate to Bulgaria are as follows.
Art.Ⅳ. Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous tributary Principality, with a Christian Government and a national militia.
Art.Ⅶ. The Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the great European Powers shall be capable of being elected Prince of Bulgaria. … The introduction of the new system into Bulgaria, and the superintendence of its working, will be entrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian Commissioner.
Art.Ⅷ. The Ottoman army will no longer remain in Bulgaria, and all the ancient fortresses will be razed at the expense of the local Government. … Until the complete formation of a native militia sufficient to preserve order, security, and tranquillity, and the strength of which will be fixed later on by an understanding between the Ottoman Government and the Imperial Russian Cabinet.
Russian troops will occupy the country, and will give armed assistance to the Commissioner in case of need. This occupation will also be limited to a term approximating to two years.
Art.Ⅸ. The amount of the annual tribute which Bulgaria is to pay the Suzerain Court, by transmitting it to a bank to be hereafter named by the Sublime Porte, will be determined by an agreement between Russia, the Ottoman Government, and the other Cabinets, at the end of the first year during which the new organization shall be in operation.
Through this treaty, the international status of Bulgaria was established as an autonomous tributary principality. However, to the Bulgarians at the time, the term “autonomy” was understood to mean independence from the Ottoman Empire. Such a view is also supported by the fact the Bulgarians up until the present day, celebrate the 3rd of March, the date the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, as their national Liberation Day.
Although the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire (Art. IX) and the duty of annual tributes of Bulgaria (Art. IV&IX) are stipulated in the treaty, these had only nominal meaning.
Bulgaria was able to elect its own prince, and to possess a national militia as well as autonomous administration. However, the true meaning of the Treaty of San Stefano lies in the affirmation of Russia’s de-facto right to protect Bulgaria. More specifically, Russia gained the right to dispatch a Commissioner to Bulgaria to oversee its internal affairs and also to station troops in the country. Therefore, the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire as stipulated in this treaty was limited to a recognition of the Empire’s symbolic and religious authority. The concept of “suzerainty” under modern international law was introduced in the 19th century to facilitate the territorial disintegration, particularly the Balkan
possessions, of the Ottoman Empire whose power had once spanned from the Mediterranean coast to the whole of the European but was now reduced to the “Sick man of Europe.”2)
In addition, the resized Bulgaria created under the Treaty of San Stefano, came to occupy a vast territory spanning from the Danube, the Aegean Sea, the Vardar basin to the Black Sea. Because Bulgaria in truth had become a satellite state of Russia, the great powers of Europe refused to recognize the treaty for fear of Russia’s expanding its sphere of influence. In the following year, through the mediation of Otto von Bismarck, the German prime minister, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire entered into the Treaty of Berlin on July 13th, 1878. The most important revision to be made by the treaty was to separate the southern part of Bulgaria to create Eastern Rumelia which was placed directly under the authority of the Sultan.
Ⅳ. Sino-Korean Relations in the 19th Century
As seen above, classifying Bulgaria as a neutral state appears to be something of a stretch. At this point, it would be difficult to assess the extent of Yu Gil-Jun’s knowledge on the details of Europe’s historical vicissitudes. However, if one was to look for similarities between Belgium and Bulgaria, the common factor is not that they became permanent neutral states by the consensus of great powers, but rather, that they were both weak countries which, through the intervention of the great powers, gained independence or political autonomy from the unjust occupation by a strong country.
Belgium won its independence from the Netherlands and Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps it was the process that the two states went through and the liberation movements attracting the attention of the surrounding powers which eventually led to complete independence that caught Yu Gil-Jun’s attention. Permanent neutrality was the logical conclusion for small and weak states that gained independence through this process.
On Neutrality was a historical product of Sino-Korean relations in the 1880s. At the time, China was moving away from the traditional tributary relationship which had recognized the autonomy of Korea over its own internal and foreign affairs. Instead, China now started treating Korea as a protectorate and increased political intervention.
When a massive riot by soldiers erupted in Seoul in 1882, Chinese troops and warships were deployed under the pretext of quelling the rebellion. Meanwhile, the father of the king, who was suspected of having incited the revolt, was arrested and taken by force to Tianjin. The Chinese continued to station their troops in Korea afterwards, directly
2) In the international treaties of 19th century, the term suzeraineté first appeared in the Treaty of Constantinople (March 21st, 1800) concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Through this treaty, the Septinsular Republic was created in a way that ensured the de-facto control of Russia, while the Ottoman Sultan held the nominal or spiritual authority in his hand. As evidence of the recognition of the nominal suzeraineté of the Ottoman Empire, the treaty stipulates that 75,000 piastres be paid as tribute. Afterwards in 1829, under the Treaty of Edirne which granted autonomy to the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, the suzeraineté of the Ottoman Empire is again stipulated. In short, the concept of suzeraineté was nothing more than a pretext created to facilitate the dismemberment of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire.
interfering in many areas including finance, diplomacy and the military.
What further exacerbated Korea’s situation was the Korea policy adopted by Britain.
Britain, involved in an intense rivalry against Russia called the Great Game, illegally occupied the island of Geomundo(Port Hamilton) as a response to the Russian army’s attack against Panjdeh, Afganistan in March of 1885. Afterwards, the British government gave notice of the occupation not to the Korean government but to the Chinese Legation in London. The negotiations for withdrawal were also conducted solely with the diplomatic authorities of China. This was a de facto recognition of China’s authority to oversee and direct Korea’s foreign affairs. Japan soon followed in the steps of Britain in its Korea policy, and Russia also declared its position of nonintervention into Sino-Korean relations on the condition that the status quo will be maintained. Thus Korea was left in complete isolation diplomatically, alone and unaided.
In such a situation, the permanent neutrality of Korea seemed to be the only solution to maintain independence while addressing the security issues. The problem here, however, was that while the political pressure from China had increased to extreme levels, the other powers were gradually losing interest in the peninsula. Thus, the initiative for Korea’s neutrality came to lie solely in the hands of China. In such a condition, how could one persuade China? Herein lay Yu Gil-Jun’s dilemma.
Neutrality alone can protect our country. However, this is not something that we can just go ahead and proclaim, but something that requires us to make a request to China. If China, for various reasons, does not approve immediately, we must make the request today and again tomorrow so that China takes the initiative and convene Britain, France, Japan, and Russia and other the relevant stakeholders in Asia to conclude a treaty.
This will not only benefit Korea but is also in the interest of China. It is a strategy for common security, so how can say we won’t pursue the matter because it involves hard work? The great European powers declared and swiftly achieved neutrality for both Belgium and Bulgaria, because they were preoccupied with plans for the defense against Russia and their own protection. If such is the case in Europe, why is it that the great powers in Asia are only sitting there worrying instead of strategizing?
Yu Gil-Jun asserted that Korea’s neutralization would stabilize not only the Korean peninsula but also the broader regional order in East Asia, and thus serve the general interests of the surrounding powers as well. Not only that, he praised China claiming
“Korea was able to preserve its people and territory in the wider world until today, because China had permitted this to be so.” On the other hand, Yu cites the examples of the Septinsular Republic to allay China’s suspicion and show that neutrality does not necessarily mean independence. We can read between the lines the dilemma Yu faced.
It was a situation where realistically China - which claimed Korea its protectorate – was the only country to appeal to, and it also had to be persuaded to adopt a policy against its own national interests.
V. Conclusion
Due to its geopolitical location surrounded by China, Russia, Japan, and even the United States across the Pacific, the neutralization of Korea has been the subject of ongoing studies as a means of maintaining the peace on the peninsula and stability of the East Asian region. However, the theory of permanent neutralization by international guarantee did not progress much further than as a proposal set forth by a few scholars.
Instead, more often than not, Korea was only perceived as an object to be managed or a pawn in the geopolitical competition of surrounding powers.
A look at the European history of diplomacy also reveals that small and weak countries becoming a permanent neutral state based on the agreement by the great European powers was more of an exception rather than the norm. This is because, the surrounding powers must not only have a shared interest in neutralizing the state in question, but also if a certain country has overwhelming power or asserts special interests over it, then granting of neutrality becomes structurally impossible. Poland is a case in point. Despite waging a fierce struggle for national liberation, Polish people lost its country and suffered under the rule of Russia for 123 years from 1795 to 1918.
Historically, China was to Korea what Russia was to Poland.
As mentioned above, On Neutrality was the very first conception of Korea’s permanent neutrality presented by a Korean. The fundamental dilemma facing Yu was that Korea had to gain permanent neutrality in order to win independence from China but at the same time, Korea had to rely on China to take action on this matter. Therefore, he cites as examples of permanently neutral countries, Belgium and Bulgaria, despite running the risk of factual error, in order to make the appeal that a neutral Korea will benefit China’s security interests and to give the assurance that even after Korea attains neutrality, its international status as a semi-sovereign state will remain unchanged.
In a situation where gaining the understanding and cooperation of surrounding powers is indispensable for the improvement in relations and ultimate unification of the two Koreas, the idea for the permanent neutrality of Korea is being pursued in many different shapes and forms. Also, in tandem with the growth of its national power, China’s influence on the political landscape of Korea is becoming much more extensive than before. In this respect, we may say Koreans of today share the similar dilemma confronted by Yu Gil-Jun 130 years ago.
This document was written as reference material for the purpose of establishing foreign policies.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Korea National Diplomatic Academy