Didem Akyel Collinsworth
Map 2: The Turkish Cypriots’ claimed hydrocarbon research blocks
The conflict heated up when the RoC announced its second international tender for hydro -carbon exploration in February 2012. Turkey’s reaction was to issue a harsh warning that Greek Cypriot blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 overlap with its continental shelf areas in the eastern Mediterranean, adding it ‘will not allow under any circumstances foreign oil companies to conduct unauthorized oil/natural gas exploration and exploitation activities in these overlapping areas and will take all necessary measures to protect its rights and interests in the maritime areas falling within its continental shelf.’4
4 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release (No. 43) ‘Regarding the Second International Tender for Off-Shore Hydrocarbon Exploration Called by the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA)’, 15 February 2012.
26 Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons
Even though Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan has publicly ruled out the use of force, and Turkish officials underline they have no intention of getting physical, any perceived aggression on the part of a newly assertive Turkey against EU member Cyprus further damages its already-stalled EU process, and hurts its image among its neighbours. This complex dispute over maritime boundaries also affects Turkey’s relations with Greece (particularly with regard to problems in the Aegean Sea),5as well as other regional states such as Israel, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. Most importantly, unilateral moves by Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, or Turkey set back already fading hopes of reunification for Cyprus. On the other hand, a new gas find can be beneficial to all sides if it could be used to encourage normalization, most notably between Turkey and Greek Cypriots.
According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a coastal state has the right to declare an EEZ up to 200 nautical miles from the edge of its territorial waters.
Turkey, a rare non-signatory to the Convention, thinks this limit is not automatically applicable in the crowded neighbourhood of the Eastern Mediterranean where delimitation of maritime boundaries has to be done through negotiations among all coastal states based on equitable principles. Turkey underlines the general principle of UNCLOS requesting states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea such as the Mediterranean to ‘cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties’.6
As a result, Turkey challenges EEZ agreements that the RoC signed with Egypt in 2003, Lebanon in 2007 and Israel in 2010. It has two levels of objection to Cypriot maritime bound -aries. The first concerns the legitimacy of the all-Greek Cypriot RoC government, which Turkey argues is not ‘competent to represent jointly the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, conse -quently Cyprus as a whole’.7Turkey therefore says that it had no legal right to enter into EEZ agreements at all. Here, Turkey brings up its status as a guarantor state based on the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and says it is looking out for the interests of the Turkish Cypriots.
Consequently, Turkey wants the Greek Cypriots to halt all offshore exploration and exploitation activities while the current UN-mediated reunification talks continue. With regard to the 2010 agreement with Israel, however, Ankara underlines that its objections are not to what happens in the Israeli portion of the EEZ,8 although it admits to having concerns about freedom of navigation in this portion of the sea.9
5 See International Crisis Group Policy Briefing No 64, turkey and Greece: time to settle the aegean dispute.
6 Note verbale dated 4 October 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN (UN Law of the Sea Bulletin, No: 59, p. 34).
7 Information note by Turkey concerning its objection to the RoC-Egypt Agreement submitted to the UN on 2 March 2004 (UN Law of the Sea Bulletin, No: 54, p. 127).
8 ‘Turkey does not have any claim regarding the maritime areas subject to the said EEZ delimitation agreement. Turkey approaches this issue within the context of the Cyprus problem’, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release (No. 228)
‘Regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel’, 21 December 2010.
9 See press statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu regarding Turkish-Israeli relations, 2 September 2011.
Eastern Mediterranean Gas and Turkey’s Position 27
Turkey’s second official objection is a technical one, involving areas overlapping its continental shelf claims in the EEZ between Egypt and Cyprus, which covers all points off the western coast of Cyprus to the west of geographic coordinates of longitude 32 degrees 16 minutes and 18 seconds (see Map 1). Turkey says delimitation of EEZ west of this longitude should be achieved by means of agreements between the affected states.
On a greater scale, Turkey also has genuine concerns about being shut out of a large share of the Eastern Mediterranean, to which it has claims due to its long coastline, as the Republic of Cyprus and possibly Greece establish maritime zones without entering into negotiations with Ankara (see Map 3).
Map 3: The initial Greek Cypriot concept for East Mediterranean EEZ delimitation As always, all sides have legal arguments to defend their positions. More pressing, however, is the fact that at a time when the latest round of UN-mediated talks to reunify the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities of the island are limping along, unilateral acts on the hydrocarbons issue give the impression that the sides are not planning a future together and further erode trust.
Moving forward, all parties should focus on using this gas as an opportunity. The gas finds could give a boost to the dwindling reunification process whereas unilateral actions make a mutually agreed settlement even more difficult and further raise tensions. A comprehensive settlement would be the surest way to end the conflict over hydrocarbons and maritime
28 Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons
boundaries but even in its absence, the parties can still take independent confidence-building steps. Both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should commit to sharing any gains from their unilateral hydrocarbon exploitation. They should also agree on jointly establishing an advisory committee to discuss ideas for joint use and distribution of the gas already discovered in Block 12. In the meantime, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots should stop their actions inside Cyprus’s EEZ.
The newly discovered reserves can also be a tool for rapprochement between the RoC and Turkey, if the sides can cooperate in finding a way to send this gas to the large Turkish market, and from there onwards to Europe. This would certainly increase Turkey’s interest in a solution on the island. For this to happen, Ankara needs to find creative ways to engage Greek Cypriot officials, and consider entering into a dialogue with them to discuss its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greek Cypriots, for their part, should not condition any talks with Turkey on first reaching a settlement on the island.
The reward of a healthy development of a major gas field is a rare, clear example of how working together would be to the benefit of all, and the failure to do so will mean that no one gets to fully enjoy the riches.